THE CHANGING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 5, 1984
• Content Type: NIE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
Director of Central Intelligence Secret
The Changing
Sino-Soviet Relationship
Secret
NIE 13/11-84
S April 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
NIE 13/11-84
THE CHANGING
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate is
being published separately with regular distribution.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
SCOPE NOTE
For almost two years the USSR and China have been actively
probing the possibilities of improving their relations with one another-
at the very time that the Soviets have continued to develop and
modernize their already formidable strategic and conventional military
forces adjacent to China. These negotiating probes are not wholly new;
they have occurred before. But this time there has been some forward
movement, at least on secondary issues and political atmospherics. This
raises several questions for us:
- In what manner is the relationship between these two powers in
process of change?
- How do Soviet consultations with China fit into the USSR's
broad strategic-military objectives in East Asia?
- How far are present Sino-Soviet consultations going to carry
Moscow and Bening?
- In addition to probable trends, what alternative outcomes are
possible and what would be their likelihood?
- And what will be the significance of the Sino-Soviet future for
US interests?
This Estimate addresses these questions, examining both the con-
straints on and incentives for improvement in the Sino-Soviet relation-
ship. The Estimate also explores the possible effect of certain variables,
and proposes indicators by which to measure changes in the relation-
ship. Except where otherwise indicated, the period of the Estimate is
the next two to three years.
Because of the complexity of issues discussed in this Estimate, it is
being published in two versions: for broad readership, the complete text;
for senior readers, the Key Judgments.
t
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
KEY JUDGMENTS
The present consultations between the USSR and China are
unlikely to produce major concessions on the part of either, and the
many issues that divide them will largely continue. A change in their re-
lationship is nonetheless taking place. We believe this process will
continue during the period-the next two to three years-covered by
this Estimate.
As a result largely of Soviet initiative and of an increased Chinese
responsiveness, Moscow and Beijing have reached numerous agreements
over the past year or so on relatively minor economic and cultural
questions. But the change taking place in their relationship does not so
much involve their basic positions or any "moving closer" to one
another, as it does a moderating of the intensity of conflict. These two
powers will almost certainly remain suspicious, wary antagonists,
continuing to arm against each other and to criticize each other's aims
and conduct-but within a less hostile climate.
Many issues will continue to divide China and the USSR-and
will continue to prevent either from making major concessions to the
other. The principal such forces:
- On both sides, historical enmity, suspicions, ideological preten-
sions, and racist attitudes toward each other.
- The sensitivity of the Sino-Soviet issue in the inner politics of
both Beijing and Moscow-with the consequent need for their
leaders not to become vulnerable to charges of betraying vital
national interests to the other power.
- Chinese concerns about Soviet power over the coming decades;
Soviet concerns about potential Chinese power over the coming
century.
- On the part of China, Beijing's continuing belief that the USSR
retains expansionist ambitions, and that Moscow's long-term
desire to expand Soviet presence and influence around China's
periphery is aimed directly at isolating China and diminishing
its influence in Asia.
- The desire of China that the USSR make concessions on three
major issues: that is, that the USSR significantly reduce its
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
military power (nuclear and nonnuclear) in the eastern USSR
and Mongolia, cease its support for Vietnam's occupation of
Kampuchea, and withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan.
- In the absence of any major Soviet concessions on these
questions, Chinese reluctance to come to terms with Moscow on
the Sino-Soviet border dispute.
- Beijing's bitter experience with the high costs of close association
with Moscow: remembrance of unacceptable past Soviet efforts
to subvert the politics and armed forces of China and to
subordinate China's national interests to those of the Soviet
Union.
- The fact that China's boss, Deng Xiaoping, was himself one of
the foremost anti-Soviet officials indentif ied with the split of
these two Communist powers, a generation ago, into rival Third
Romes.
- On the part of the USSR, a bedrock, absolute refusal on the
part of Soviet leaders to halt Moscow's continuing buildup of
military power adjacent to China, or to give up or markedly
lessen the great military superiority the USSR enjoys over
China.
- Moscow's reluctance to yield the geopolitical advantages it
currently derives from its ties with Vietnam, especially the
forward deployment of ships and aircraft, and the barrier these
developments constitute to Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
- The f act that the buildup of Soviet military power in Asia serves
many strategic and political purposes beyond those relating
directly to China, and is but a portion of the Soviet global
strategic buildup.
- Soviet unwillingness to make the major concessions demanded
by Beijing unless China significantly reduces its relationships
with the United States or moves to settle the border dispute.
At the same time, certain other forces will tend to support a
reduction of the intensity of Sino-Soviet hostility. The principal such
forces:
- Overall, the numerous changes in time, situation, and personal-
ity that have occurred since the Sino-Soviet split of a generation
ago-which render extreme hostility between Moscow and
Beijing somewhat of an outmoded phenomenon, the product of
certain circumstances of the time that now have less relevance.
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
- The mere fact of reaching agreement on at least some (second-
ary) issues in itself creates an environment for momentum and
the possibility of further agreements.
- On the Soviet side, as Moscow's leaders perceive increasing
strategic challenge from more forceful US policies and future
US weapon systems and deployments, a strong wish on their
part to lessen the possibility that Sino-Soviet hostilities might
greatly complicate the USSR's basic security interests or its
overall strategic objectives.
- A basic desire to reduce the danger of a two-front war.
- A strong desire to prevent close cooperation between China and
the United States (and Japan), and to that end to take advantage
of known dissatisfactions on the part of Bening with its Ameri-
can connection.
- A desire to enhance the security of the USSR's eastern borders
by means additional to military power.
- Concern about what the long-term political implications would
be for China's economic modernization programs if outside
assistance to those programs were to come only from the United
States and the West.
- A sense in Moscow that the danger of Chinese adventurist
actions against the Soviet Union-one of the original reasons for
the beginnings of the Soviet military buildup, years ago, on the
Sino-Soviet border-has greatly diminished.
- The opportunity to take advantage of the more businesslike
attitudes and procedures that have come to mark Chinese
politics and society since the death of Mao Zedong, in the
process lessening some of the emotional content that Mao and
Nikita Khrushchev personally contributed to Sino-Soviet
estrangement.
- On the Chinese side, Deng Xiaoping and his associates have
determined that (a) China's greatest problems are those it faces
as a vast, poor LDC; (b) the process of national development in
China will be so difficult that it will need a prolonged period of
respite from outside pressures; (c) to these ends a reordering of
China's foreign policies is needed, one that reduces the level of
tension with the USSR; and (d) such a reordering would not
seriously risk jeopardizing the continuance either of strong US-
led opposition to Soviet expansion in the world, or of US and
Western willingness to continue cooperating economically with
China.
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
Associated with those decisions, almost certainly low expecta-
tions on the part of Beiiing's leaders that the United States
would come to Beiiing's aid in the event of a Soviet attack on
China.
China's discovery during its invasion of Vietnam in 1979 that it
faced a formidable military antagonist on its southern border,
and Beijing's consequent desire to reduce the pressures on China
resulting from its two-front confrontation with the USSR and
Vietnam.
- Views on the part of China's leaders that a modest improvement
of relations with the USSR serves to increase Beijing's leverage
on Washington.
- A desire to diversify further the foreign sources of input into
China's modernization, and to take advantage of certain bene-
fits that would derive f rom expanded economic and technologi-
cal ties with the USSR.
- A view on the part of Deng and his fellow pragmatists that less
hostile relationships with the USSR will also signal that, in
accepting some US economic and military assistance, Beijing
does not intend to embrace the United States too closely or
completely refuse all assistance from the USSR.
It should be stressed that present Sino-Soviet talks are taking
place against the background of a continuing substantial augmenta-
tion of Soviet military strength adjacent to China-which has contin-
ued during the Sino-Soviet consultations of the past two years. Roughly
one-fourth of all Soviet ground force personnel are now stationed
opposite China, together with more than 2,000 Soviet aircraft, over
100,000 air personnel, greatly enhanced naval strength, a rapidly
expanding SS-20 force, and considerable additional nuclear weapons
carriers in the form of Backfire and Badger bombers, SLBMs, and
ICBMs. The great majority of the USSR's nuclear weapons targeted
against East Asia will continue to be devoted to Chinese targets. And, a
principal net result of the buildup will be certain continuing marked
asymmetries in Soviet and Chinese military forces: the Chinese seriously
lagging, qualitatively, in modern arms; Soviet ground and air forces
generally positioned fairly close to China's borders, Chinese forces
deployed deeply behind those borders.
Moscow's leaders see their military augmentation as insurance
against Chinese military provocations along the border, and against the
prospect of a signif icantly enhanced Chinese nuclear threat to the USSR
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
over the long term. They almost certainly also consider that their forces
will continue to serve meanwhile as a deterrent to China from invading
Vietnam once again, or from otherwise effectively challenging Soviet
interests in Indochina. And, these forces will strengthen Moscow's
negotiating hand vis-a-vis the Chinese.
This ongoing Soviet augmentation will at the same time continue
to stem from many causes beyond those directly relating to China and
will continue to serve many broader Soviet interests. That is, the
augmentation of forces in the East also reflects the USSR's plans to
upgrade all of its forces, everywhere; its desire to strengthen its
capability to f fight a two-front war, in Europe and Asia; the f elt need to
compensate for dependence on a very long, vulnerable railroad to
reinforce and resupply the isolated Soviet Far East; the traditional
Soviet practice of overinsuring, of massing more military strength than
outside observers might think necessary; the Soviet effort to use the
military buildup as an instrument for political intimidation and further
expansion of influence in East Asia; and a desire to reinforce Soviet se-
curity against the perspective of much-enhanced Western military
capabilities in the Pacific.
It should also be stressed that the Sino-Soviet future is not just a
bilateral matter, but will develop within the dynamic of triangular
relationships with the United States. This dynamic will be a crucially
important factor affecting the behavior of Moscow and Bening toward
the other. Each leadership will remain highly sensitive to its perceptions
of the US relationship with the rival Communist power, and especially
to any development that either power might consider to represent a
major discontinuity in US orientation or strategic priorities.
What developments appear most likely in the Sino-Soviet rela-
tionship over the next two years or so?
- Chances favor continuance of the process of markedly increas-
ing trade relations and reaching agreements on other secondary
issues of economic and technological ties, cultural interchanges,
and the like, amidst continuing reflections of a more business-
like, less intensely hostile overall atmosphere. This may proceed
to the point of including agreement on certain confidence-
building measures ICBMs) such as mutual notification of troop
exercises.
- The two sides will upgrade the level of negotiating representa-
tion. The Soviets will continue to press for broader ties with
Beiiing, in the belief that agreement on enough small steps will
lay a path for progress on major issues. The Soviets will also seek
7
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
to institutionalize the negotiating process. The Chinese will
probably continue to draw the line well short of the most far-
reaching Soviet proposals in the absence of major Soviet military
concessions.
- While continuing to emphasize its maximum demands for large-
scale Soviet force reductions in the Soviet Far East, Bening
would welcome even small concessions from the Soviets in their
force deployments against China. The Chinese would particu-
larly welcome Soviet troop withdrawals from Mongolia.
- For their part, the Soviets will continue their force improve-
ments in the East. And, the Soviets will probably not make more
than token gestures to China over the next two to three years.
- Moscow will almost certainly continue to withhold major
concessions regarding its forces along China's border and in
Mongolia until Bening has made more fundamental concessions
than it has yet been willing to consider. There is nonetheless a
modest chance that the Soviets will make a token pullback of
perhaps a division or so from Mongolia during the next two to
three years. This would not constitute a material change of
much consequence, but could represent a symbolic concession
of some magnitude that might induce the Chinese to reciprocate
in some way-and thus perhaps encourage Moscow to make
further concessions.
- Even if there were a token Soviet military pullback from
Mongolia, however, we doubt that the Chinese would make
major concessions on the issues of greatest concern to Moscow-
particularly the border dispute-until Soviet force withdrawals
had gone well beyond the token stage.
- Nor is the USSR likely to give up its control over the regime in
Afghanistan, to abandon support for Vietnam's war effort in
Kampuchea, or to surrender its military privileges at Cam Ranh
Bay in Vietnam-where since late 1983 the Soviets have
deployed Badger bombers.
Contingent developments that could upset the above-estimated
course of Sino-Soviet relations:
- Maior escalation of Vietnamese war efforts in Kampuchea or
along Thailand's borders.
- North Korean reversion to incendiary policies.
- Mayor Soviet efforts to destabilize Pakistan.
s
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
- Vietnamese clashes with China, either along the border or in the
South China Sea.
- The adoption of major new policies on the part of post-Deng or
post-Chernenko leaderships.
- A Japanese move toward major rearmament.
Possible alternative outcomes:
- There is an off chance that during the period of this Estimate
the Sino-Soviet relationship could take on a much more hostile
character than the Estimate holds probable:
- This could occur because so many variables are present, many
of them not fully within the control of the present leaderships
in either Moscow or Beijing: the advent of new policies on the
part of post-Deng or post-Chernenko leadership, initiatives
taken by other governments (in Korea or Vietnam, for exam-
ple), and so on.
- It does not follow that US interests would necessarily benefit
from the coming of a much more frigid Sino-Soviet relation-
ship. The effect on US interests would depend on the nature
and intensity of the estrangement between Moscow and
Beijing: up to a point, US interests would clearly benefit from
probable increases in Chinese cooperation against Soviet poli-
cies in the world, in Chinese receptiveness to US advice and
counsel, and-possibly-in willingness to permit expanded
levels of Western economic and technological presence within
China. But, if Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to the point of
actual or threatened large-scale hostilities, US diplomatic and
security policymaking could be greatly complicated.
- Conversely, there is also an outside chance-though less likely
than the above-that the Sino-Soviet relationship could become
a much closer one during the period of this Estimate than we
now judge likely:
- This might come to pass if no great disruptive contingencies
should occur; if the Chinese should back away in practice-
though not in principle-from certain of their key "de-
mands"; if agreements reached on a number of secondary
issues should begin to create a somewhat greater momentum
toward Sino-Soviet rapprochement; or if for some reason
Beijing's leaders should come to depreciate the value of
China's relationships with the United States.
9
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
- The coming of significantly closer relations between the USSR
and China could seriously harm US interests; the warmer the
Sino-Soviet relationship, the more damaging to US geopolitical
concerns, defense policies, targeting, and alliance systems, to
the role of Japan, and to numerous other key US interests.
- Although the possibility cannot be excluded that alternative
outcomes such as the above could occur in the Sino-Soviet
relationship, we stress that the most likely outcome, by far, is
that which this NIE has postulated: namely, that the level of
hostility between Moscow and Bening will decrease, that some
additional agreements on secondary matters or possibly CBMs
will be reached, that at most the USSR may make a token
withdrawal of perhaps a division or so from Mongolia, and that
continuing basic differences between Moscow and Bening will
not permit any significantly greater degree of rapprochement
between them to develop over the next two to three years.
io
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05 :CIA-RDP87T00495R000900990002-2