CIA 'MIGHTY WURLITZER' IS NOW SILENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100060001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100060001-4
C
C
I--
By ROBERT C. TOTH
Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON-The Soviets
knew the schedule of the United
States' KH-9 spy satellite to the
minute. and when it flew over the
Uzbekistan missile center every-
thing was tucked out of sight. But a
few hours later. another U.S. satel-
lite the KH-11, passed over the
same field and caught an aerospace
glider out in plain view-giving this
country its first evidence that the
Soviets were making a craft similar
to the U.S. space shuttle.
In the kind of games modern spy-
masters play. the Soviets had ex-
posed the secret space glider be-
cause they had been tricked into
believing the second satellite was
electronically "dead." Among other
ploys. it was made to seem silent.
Instead of transmitting its TV-like
pictures down to earth as other
satellites do, the KH-11 radioed its
pictures up into space-to a com-
munications satellite that relayed
them to a U.S. intelligence station
halfway around the world. (The de-
ception worked until ex-CIA em-
ployee William Kampiles sold the
operations manual of the multimil-
lion-dollar KH-11 to the Soviets,
for a mere S3.000.)
Supremacy Misleading
Technological cleverness is the
pride of U.S. intelligence-no nation
is better at it-and that supremacy
can be a source of comfort to the
American people as U.S. military
vulnerability in the early 1980s puts
greater reliance on. intelligence to
avoid dangerous surprises.
LOS ANGELES TIMES
30 December 1980
But American supremacy in Slptiy
technical intelligence is profoundly : buses
misleading. It is not representative' "The
of U.S. intelligence capabilities as a acerci
whole but stands in stark contrast. I Co
For in every other intelligence field
-human spies, analysis of data col-
lected and ability to conduct secret
operations-the U.S. intelligence
community appears to be dange-
rously deficient.
"Except for technical surveil-
lance of the Soviet Union," said one
highly knowledgeable source,
"we're in lousy shape throughout
the world." Some examples-.__
-Human intelligence sources
have largely dried up because of
leaks. "Some potentially coopera-
tive sources say frankly they are
afraid they might find their names
in our newspapers," one
knowledgeable source said, "and I
must say for myself that if I were a
Libyan or Pakistani,. to say nothing
of a Soviet, I would not cooperate
today with any American intel-
ligence agency."
Firings, Retirements Costly
-Recent waves of firings and
early retirements cost the CIA
many hundreds of senior personnel
with unique language abilities and
regional expertise. In 1978, when
Iran's Shah Mohammed Reza Pah-
lavi fell, the agency did not have a
single regular employee who could
speak Persian. A large percentage
of the field officers of its Near East
division, which includes Southwest
Asia, are former employees recalled
to temporary duty, according to an
informed source.
-In Africa and Latin America,
the United States must rely heavily
on information supplied by British,.
French and West German agencies.
But cooperation has slowed signifi-
Z.S. di
ca~tly
,Sirds
:nav
a t b,
Ftfs na
irizt_ -
tY..--t in
't
dining Soviet oil pr cduction declines. one natiora! se-
curity official said. "but they almost missed the Afgha-
nistan invasion. after watching the Soviet buldup for
sin mcnths. because they focused on reasons Moscow
would not move-detente. Salt 11. trade.
"They are biased to predict the ordinary, not ssr-
prises. " he said.
-The CiA's covert action capability. which once un-'
dertcok everything from propaganda campaigns to se-
cret wars, has been virtually dismantled.
Hostage R aid Cited
:.. The raid to free U.S. hostages in Iran. for example.
ors;.r._z u
would have had a better chance if it had been
and run by the CIA, according to several intelli;;en^e of-
ficials as well as one military officer who took part n
the ad hoc Pentagon effort.
At a less dramatic level. the CIA's ability to aid inssr-
? most non-ems-
..gedt groups short of intervention is al
.ter-t. "If we wanted to help the Afghan 'freedom fig: t-
'
.'ers' with guns," one source said. "there is no supply of
:.untraceable arms, no experienced gunrunners, no tram-
:.pc- -ation as ets available readily. And the Soviets kro ?v I
Political
such :ci 17ies andcaiding sympathet c offiicialslabroad Sneveri
::,vas suspended totally by the CIA. even in the Carer;
Administration. "But it's on a piddling scale." one offi-j
:'cial said, "and what's left is rather atrophied." Carter became angry at Cuba's continued use hf ' s!
To a considerable degree. the agencies brought it on
themselves with f:,reig t and domestic crimes and ex-
cesses in the name of national security. As a result,
bower ful figures in the Carter Administration, including
Vice President Walter F. Mondale who served on the
Senate committee that publicized CIA abuses, seemed
intent initially on punishing the intelligence communi-
troops in Africa after his initial overture to Fidel Castro
in 1977 for more normal relations. He ordered accounts
of Castro's activities to be disseminated internationally.
But most of the machinery for such propagandizing-
the "Mighty Wurlitzer" once boasted by the CIA-has
deteriorated into rusty silence.
Even the U.S. Information Agency resisted Carter's
orders to play up anti-Castro stories. This particularly
incensed the President and led to a minor shake-up
within that agency, informants said.
Such is the debris left from the unprecedented cam-
pai?as against the intelligence and counterintelligence
agencies in the government particularly the CIA.
Brought on Them3elves
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100060001-4