OUT STARK CHOICES IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2 STAT
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.
[phone]
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
21 October 1986
Thought you might be interested in seeing
what Lally Weymouth wrote on Central America
after her trip to the area. As you will recall,
I arranged for Vickers to brief her before she
went.
STAT
George V. Lauder
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2
D2 SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1986
Our Stark Choices in Central America
Costa Rica, the oldest and most authentic
democracy in Central America, is officially fol-
lowing a line of neutrality. President Arias is
scathing about the Sandinista regime and wor-
ries that it will export sabotage and instability
throughout the region. But he's trying to stay
out of the fray.
"Every day the whole world is seeing how
the Sandinistas are identifying more and more
with the Soviet bloc," says Arias. "Look at
Daniel Ortega with Gadhafi and Fidel Castro
(at the Nonaligned summit).... If there was
any hope that Nicaragua could become non-.
aligned, not totally identified or committed
with the Marxist world, there is no doubt
now."
In Guatemala, president Vincio Cerezo is
pursuing a policy he labels "active neutrality"
which he says doesn't mean ideological neu-
trality. "We are in favor of democracy and plu-
ralism," he told me in his office. "If we have to
decide and choose, we're going to decide in
favor of democracy."
President Jose Azcona of Honduras is pro-
viding a base for the contras, but even he
seems doubtful they can win. He says the San-
dinistas are willing to remain in power at any
cost: "By force there has to be opposition and
this opposition has the right to raise arms."
Honduras has offered the contras military
bases in return for U.S. guarantees of assist-
ance if it is invaded.
N The contras'view. I met Enrique Bermudez,
the military leader of the contras, in Tegud-
galpa, Honduras. Bermudez, dressed in a khaki
shirt, was optimistic about the prospects for
his troops.
If the U.S. had not cut off the aid back in
1984, Bermudez said, the contras could have
won by now. As a result of the aid cutoff, he
said, the contras had to leave certain areas and
the Sandinistas had the chance to go in and
remove the sympathetic local population. Now
they must start again, when they receive the
promised $100 million in U.S. assistance.
If f the Contras Can't Win, What Do We Do Then?
By Laity Weymouth
C AN THE CONTRAS win? Can they
overthrow the Sandinista government
of Nicaragua? Reagan administration
officials in Washington assure you that they
can. But if you ask the question in Central
America today, you get some disturbing
answers.
Central American leaders I met on a re-
cent tour of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua and Guatemala were
unanimous in expressing skepticism about
the contras' chances. Their comments
added up to a bleak forecast of prospective
American failure in the region and Soviet
and Cuban success.
The problems cited by Central American
leaders include:
n American indecisiveness. Many officials
in Central America say they doubt the stay-
ing power of the contras' main backer, the
United States. Convinced that the United
States will eventually back away from sup-
porting the contras, the Central Americans
are reluctant to stick out their necks. Some
hope for a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua to
eliminate the Sandinistas, but they also
want to hedge their bets in case they are
left stranded on the front lines of a Soviet-
backed state.
Azcucena Ferrey, a member of one of
Nicaragua's opposition political parties,
summed up the despair felt by so many Cen-
tral Americans in regard to the U.S.:
"We saw the Berlin Wall go up, and the
Lally Weymouth writes regularly about
foreign affairs for The Los Angeles Times
Syndicate.
U.S. said it wouldn't be permitted. Then
came Cuba, and they said it wouldn't happen.
Then the U.S. said it wouldn't permit a sec-
ond Cuba here. But here we are, seven years
into a Marxist-Leninist regime, and I ask my-
self, 'What is the U.S. going to do? Is it going
to propose another $100 million every three
to four months?' . . . . How do you want us to
push for change when the U.S. administra-
tion isn't going to push?"
^ Sandinista strength. The Nicaraguan junta
has built a powerful military. There are about
65,000 men in the regular army and at least
100,000 more in the militias and reserves.
The Soviet Union and Cuba have provided
advisers and modern anti-guerrilla weapons,
including the Hind helicopters which have
performed so effectively in Afghanistan in
the war against the mujahideen.
A senior Honduran military officer told
me: "The contras do not represent a solution
to the problem we are facing in Nicaragua
because currently, Nicaragua constitutes one
of the strongest armed forces in Central
America."
One U.S. official offered a terse summary:
"Power flows from the barrel of a gun, and in
Nicaragua, they have the guns. Unless some-
one with more and better guns throws them
out, they'll stay in power."
^ Weak contra leadership. Listen to the grim
forecast given to me by Costa Rica's Pres-
ident Oscar Arias, who said flatly: "I don't
think the contras have a chance to win. If the
purpose is to overthrow the Sandinista gov-
ernment, it is unlikely to happen. The contras
don't have a charismatic leader, the Sandi-
nistas are very powerful, and they'll get more
help from the Soviets."
Even contra fans admit that the contras
could use a charismatic leader like Jonas
Savimbi of Angola's UNITA guerrilla army.
Contra leader Adolfo Calero, although liked
and respected by many, doesn't excite peo-
ple.
? Lack of popular support for the contras in-
side Nicaragua. One problem the contras
face is how to muster support in a state that
is controlled ruthlessly by quiet terror.
President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Sal-
vador, a roan who speaks with some authority
since he got the guerrillas under control in
his own country, told me: "You cannot im-
pose (a liberation movement) from the out-
side, unless you invade. To get the people of
any country to liberate itself, it must come
from the inside." Duarte says he tells the
Nicaraguan resistance leaders that to win "is
a matter of winning the hearts of the people
inside and not depending much on what's
coming from outside. The Sandinistas were
in Managua. They were inside."
The contras also need more international
support, from countries other than the Unit-
ed States, says Enrique Ballanos, probably
the leading opposition leader inside Nicara-
gua. "The contras cannot win by them-
selves," he said. "It's too little too late. They
need diplomatic and political support around
the world. The Central Americans see no will
in the U.S. We've experienced the Bay of
Pigs. You've left people stranded. You pull
the rug out from under your friends."
^ Our fence-sitting allies. Everywhere I
went in the region, I heard the same fears
and doubts-and the same eagerness not to
get involved.
After the Contras get the aid, Bermudez
says the following four months will be crucial.
For example, it will important to see, he ex-
plained, if the local Nicaraguan population will
join the 18,000 contras he says exist today.
"We are fighting for people, not for terrain," he
said.
But even Bermudez expressed doubt that
his men can seize power by military force
alone. I was startled to hear him say: "We
don't expect a military defeat of the total ar-
my. Total military victory is not in our minds.
(The goal is) softening or weakening, lowering
the morale of the Sandinistas. We expect to
increase our propaganda and diplomatic action.
If we have some early successes, then inter-
national support will come. I believe the San-
dinistas will be in a serious crisis at the end of
the $100 million."
After visiting with the leaders of Central
America, I was left with the feeling that
the United States faces a stark choice in
the region. The contras probably can't win,
given the unreliability and insufficiency of
American support and other factors. That
means the United States must either pursue a
policy of containment through the Contadora
process or, if it is serious about preventing a
second Cuba in the Western hemisphere, con-
sider direct United States military intervention
to overthrow the Sandinistas.
Edward Ulibarri, a distinguished Costa Ri-
can journalist, says that most Central Amer-
icans would welcome a U.S. invasion, "but
don't say it. They'd like to the U.S. to take
care of it."
One high-ranking Salvadoran army officer
suggested a U.S.-Central American invasion of
Nicaragua. "I think there should be military
action not only by the U.S. but also by the
democratic countries in this area. It's the only
road left." A senior U.S. official in the area
endorsed this idea. The contras, he said, would
give us time to consolidate U.S. and Central
American opinion in favor of an invasion.
"We can win with an invasion," he said.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807340001-2