EAST GERMAN RESISTANCE TO THE COMMUNIST REGIME AND TO SOVIETIZATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-00809A000700160224-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 8, 2011
Sequence Number:
224
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 9, 1954
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
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STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700160224-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP80-00809A000700160224-4
EAST GERMAt7 RESISTANCE TO THE CGhII~tUNIST REGIME AND TO SOVIETIZATION
~omment: Following is a summary of an article published
by the French periodical, L'Economie, which discusses the rea-
sons for the alleged "failure of the Cormnunist regime to So-
vietize the CDR." The article deals with the economic, cul-
tural, and religious factors involved in the East Cervan resist-
ance to Sovietization
From 1945 to 1947, East Germany was treated by the Russians as the van-
quished enemy. From 1947 to 1951, with the economic revival of West Germany,
the Russians attempted to conciliate opinion in both East and West Germany by
championing the cause of German unity. 7n July 1952, Soviet policy towerd Ger-
many took a third turn. With West German rearmament becoming imminent, the
Russians, while continuing to exploit the oropaganda theme of German unity,
reached the conclusion that an agreement with the West regarding unification
had become impossi'le. They decided to treat the ?R as if it were never to
be united xith West Ger:rany. Their objective became the acceleration of the
econom$ ~~ollectivization of the GDR and its rapid conversion into a Communist
sth~e.
However, the policy of the Russians in the first years of their occupation
of East Germany had been contrary to the Communist doctrine that industrializa-
tion is the key to a socialist economy. The East German production capacity
had been reduced by nearly half. Hence, retooling would be necessary, with
priority on heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods and agricultural
production. This i~esulted in a lower standard of living and increased workers'
norms.
It was the increase in norms which prompted the Berlin riots in June 1953,
Labor unrest has not ceased since that time, and the over-all character of cer-
tain movements seems to indicate the existence among the workers of an organized
opposition sponsored, perhaps, by the Social Democrat trade unions, clandes-
tinely reconstituted. While there were a few strikes in July and August 1953,
today the discontent has taken the form more of general hostility.
Peasant Resistance
The first phase of the Russian agricultural socialization of the GDR, the
division of lands which had been the property of the Junkers, was apparently
popular enough; and the second phase, the formation of cooperatives, did not
raise at{y major difficulties. From 1945 to 1951, in ti7e field of agriculture,
Soviet policy met no very serious obstacles.
However, this situation changed in 1952, when the third phase, the trans-
formation of the peacants into kolkhoz farmers, was undertaken. Resistance
suddenly became very vigorous: thousands of farmers escaped to West Germany
and most of those remaining, two thirds of the population of the CDR, took up
passive resistance, slaughtered their livestock, and deliberately reduced
their plantings. The decline in agricultural production, which had been con-
siderable in 1952, was disastrous in 1953? The harvests of wheat, beets, and
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP80-00809A000700160224-4
potatoes were so poor in 1953 that the USSR and its Satellites had to send
great quantities of food products into the GDR. At present, the Communise
authorities are unable to honor the meager rations of meat, sugar, milk, sad
fats; and the food situation is so serious that famine can be expected this
winter.
The Russian occupation regime was at the beginning extremely rigorous.
It was the time of the "collective guilt" of the German people, held respon-
sible for the Nazi horrors. Germany was also treated as the vanquished eneny
from the economic standpoint. Industry was halted, the best cf the agricul-
tural,production went to the USSR, and the majority of the male population
was in captivity in the Soviet Union.
The terror of the last days of the war and the occupation regime has left
memoriee which have never been erased. It must be remembered that the military
~rcupation is continuing and that, in the June 1953 riots in East Berlin, it
was Russian tanks and troops that established order. Resentment has been very
lasting in the German memory and,,furthermore, German pride has suffered its.
greatest humiliation.
German Contempt for Slavic Peoples
German scorn of Slavic peoples was increased after the war by the errors
committed by the USSR. During the first 2 years, the Soviets made no distinc-
tion between Nazis and Germans. The annexation by the USSR of Koenigsberg and
a part of East Prussia in order to "punish Prussia for hsving been the cradle
of German militarism" had the appearance of a deliberate act of humiliation.
The brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from the Saxon and Silesian terri-
tories beyond the Oder-Neisse line which, according to the terms of the Pots=_
dam agreements, were merely placed under Polish administration by the USSR,
but were in fact annexed by Poland, served only to aggravate anti-Russian sen-
timen*. In 1950, the government of the GDR recognized the Oder-Neisse line
as the frontier between Germany and Poland. The Germans have never forgiven
the Communist regime fcr this amputation of their national territory. "
Conflict With the Lutheran Church
While abstaining from open battle against the Lutheran Church,. the 8ommu-
nist authorities have attempted since 19!+5 to counterbalance its influence by...,;
spreading Marxist doctrine. and by obstructing religious education. But the-
people remained very much attached to their beliefs and it is generally agreed
that the Soviet occupation was marked by a new outbreak of religious sentiment.
A secret poll conducted at the beginning of 1953 in an East German plant re-
vealed that 79 percent of the workers interrogated regularly attended religious
services, compared with only 64 percent before 1845. The r-aurgence of relig-
ious feeling in the GDR is related to the national protest against a foreign .
regime,. a regime which is moreover matcriali;~tic erg atheistic.
.The Communist authorities concentrated their greatest efforts on the youth,
with attempts at Marxist indoctrination and outlawing of Christian youth move-
ments. Being unable to organize into official groups, the Protestant youth
formed extremely solid and active communities around their pastors. .These com-
munities benefited from the experience acquired under the Hitler regime by.the
clandestine movement led by Niemoeller. The Cocmiunist organizations soon took
offense at the Young Evangelical Communities, particularly numerous amoc school
children. Ifi February 1953, the communities were o:rt:swed and their members
expelled from the universities and schools.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP80-00809A000700160224-4
Relations between the Lutheran Church and the GDR government be _ime
strained. Many pastors were arrested. A movement hostile to the regime be-
came so general and so active in the GDR th~it the authorities, in June 1953,
had to rescind their restrictions, release the arrested pastors, and once
again permit the. Young Protestant Communities to Function.
Further attempts at religious persecution will undoubtedly follow. It
is probable that they x111 only further strengthen the resolution of the East
German Protestants. On the moral level, there is no trace in the German con-
science of that sort of inferiority complex which can be noted among certain
Catholics regarding~Communism, For example in France. To the East Germans,
Marxism can appear only as intellectual and moral regression.
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