PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000200210005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 2, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHM
SUBJECT: (Opionol)
Fes: Richard G. Stilwell
Chairman, SIG-I Working Group DGI ICS-86-0850
Via CCISCMS/ICS, 1225 Ames Bldg. 2 July 1986
TO: (Oflicor designation, room number, and DATE
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FORM 610 E :
I-79
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000200210005-2
DCI/ICS-86-0850
2 July 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SIG-I
FROM: R. G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.)
SUBJECT: Professional Integrity
1. On 26 June, someone finally had the courtesy to show me the attached
memorandum. Please note that it is dated 23 May; that it concerns the report
whose drafting you asked me to oversee; and that it contains a number of
comments which are professionally disparaging of the undersigned. Given the
memorandum's routing and the absence of any commentary, I must assume that the
senior echelons of the Agency and the Community Staff believe 0 points 25X1
are an accurate summary of the state of affairs. They are decidedly not.
2. Item: Stilwell's report, not a Presidential report. Patent
ludicrous . -The drat of the main report and of the abbreviate version will
be reviewed by the several IGs and their comments will be reflected in what is
served up to the SIG-I for further review/modification/approval. You will
determine what goes forward to the White House via the NSC Staff. But the
start point must be a strawman to shoot at.
3. Item: Stilwell is unilaterally determining the report content.
Incorrect. The draft report is faithful to the outline (15 pages long) which
was ewed and approved by the WG. Based on input (tasked to various
agencies and, for the most part, inadequate) I undertook, by default, the
preparation of the strawman, consulting members of the WG frequently for
needed elaboration. As sections were drafted, they were circulated to.the WG
members (and others) for comment. When meetings were required to discuss
sections, meetings have been convened. The main counterintelligence section
is endorsed, in toto, at the level of Messrs Major, Donnelly, nd 25X1
DuHadway. To be sure, the "for comment" draft to be circulated to the IGs
will not have accommodated every comment of every agency in the
countermeasures area; I have exercised the judgement you have reason to expect
of me. But I must say that CIA's comments have fared well throughout (except
in one area as discussed below). Not surprisingly, there are several points
on which the Community is sharply divided and the SIG-I will have to grasp the
nettle--which is its vested responsibility.
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I I
4. Item: The countermeasures section has a decided DoD tilt. So? The
gross est mi ate is that of the total executive branch activity is-in DoD;
DoD did an extensive review last year and called a spade, a spade. SecDef
accepted and published the report, and has directed implementation of more
than 55 of the 63 recommendations flowing from that review. The Select
Intelligence Committees concluded that most recommendations were appropriate
for the Executive Branch as a whole. The IG/CM has also endorsed many of the
recommendations for general adoption.
5. Item:
has communicated his views to Stilwell. Incorrect. The
25X1
record will show that at no time during the past five months has ever
25X1
initiated a call to me or sought me out to discuss the concerns reflected in
his memorandum. Had he done so, there would be no reason not to dro me a
copy. There was one comment, in a memo signed by his deputy about
25X1
too many recommendations. The record will also show that as not seen
25X1
fit to attend the last several WG meetings. Since I believe in open
communication, he shall have a copy of this rejoinder, concurrent with its
delivery to you.
6.
memorandum boils down to two substantive points, one general
25X1
and one specific. The first lends credence to a perception that the
non-intelligence countermeasures community has about Agency attitude: "hands
off" anything relating to CIA and SCI; while, conversely, CIA has full rein to
critique the non-CIA and non-SCI world. (This is why an empowering NSDD is
essential if the revised SIG-I directive is to be given more than cursory
attention.) The second has to do with any comment which would suggest that
there is room for improvement in the CIA/SCI personnel security area (except
more $), and, in particular, the thought that efforts should continue to bring
SCI and TS investigative scopes into closer alignment (apparently not 25X1
aware of the DDCI's views on this subject).
7. I did not seek this assignment. You asked for and received my assent
because we both know that it would otherwise be difficult to find someone to
take on such an onerous--but nonetheless essential--task.
Richard-g-./Stilwell
Attachment:
a/s
cc: DDCI
DDA
D/O S
Dep Sec Def
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13 MAY i ibb
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM:
SUBJECT: Problems with Draft SIG-I Working Group Report
General Stilwell has submitted for review a draft ot_~the
"Plans for Enhancement" section of the President's report to
Congress on counterintelligence and security. Listed below are
views we presented to the Working Group on three issues
fundamental to the proper and successful conduct of CIA's
security program. However, counterviews, particularly from
DOD, have tended to obscure our position. (C)
Common Scope for Top Secret and SCI
DOD has repeatedly proposed that the scope of
investigative coverage for SCI be reduced from 15 years to
some shorter period; CIA has repeatedly resisted this. By
reducing the scope, DOD hopes to realize some cost
savings. However, the unique nature of SCI, its
sensitivity and its fragility, and the special and
statutory responsibilities of the DCI to protect it,
militate against the DOD position.
The greater scope of 'investigative coverage for access
to SCI is designed to compensate for its proliferation and
its relatively lax document control (as compared to the
more limited distribution and strict accountability of Top
Secret information). A 1980 SECOM study indicated that
small, but significant, amounts of noteworthy information
would be lost if the investigative scope were to be reduced
to even 10 years.. However, we recognize the need for
current research regarding the cost and utility ofvarious
aspects of our investigative process. Such research would
allow us to participate in meaningful discussions with DOD
and others on this subject. Until such research is
completed, however, the office of Security is strongly
opposed to any reduction in the pre-screening protection
currently afforded SCI. (S)
25X1
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Preempting NSDD-84 Working Group
The draft report contains several pages of
recommendations and statements which would, in effect,
impose direction and substance on the Working Group which
was chartered by Presidential directive (NSDD-84) to
prepare a new Executive order on personnel security. Many
of these recommendations and statements contain
inaccuracies and elements which are either unacceptable to
CIA, and other agencies such as OPM and DOE not represented
on the Stilwell Working Group, or which require further
study before being considered as something to be mandated.
We also object in principle to preempting the prerogatives
of a properly chartered and expert interagency group. We
believe this detailed section should be replaced with a
general statement to be provided by or coordinated with the
NSDD-84 Working Group. (S)
Restrictions on the Scope of Polygraph Testing
In the draft and in virtually every document we have
seen from DoD which mentions polygraph testing, the phrase,
"counterintelligence-scope polygraph" is used. We are
concerned that continual use of this phrase as a general
description of polygraph testing may eventually result in a
universal perception that such limited testing is the only
proper and-,permissible kind. This could adversely affect
the CIA polygraph program in future years and could make it
extremely difficult for other agencies to implement
expanded polygraph programs if they chose to do so. This
very problem was recognized by the NSDD-84 Working Group
which decided to avoid such restrictive language. Where
applicable, we have offered the alternative language,
"polygraph testing as deemed appropriate by;the agency head
and in compliance with applicable law and regulation." (S)
General Comments on the Working Group Paper
In addition to the above major.points, I am
disappointed by the overall scope and utility of the
Stilwell product. The Working Group met for long hours
over the course of many weeks, deliberating pertinent
issues and gathering and refining information. We expected
this information to be distilled into a concise
"Presidential" statement of basic functions,
accomplishments, shortfalls and issues, plus policy and
program direction for the 1980's.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000200210005-2
Instead, the report is emerging, not as a
distillation, but as an expansion of the Working Group's
efforts with a decidedly DoD tilt flavored strongly with
what appear to be General Stilwell's own views. As an
expansion, it contains new issues which have not been
adequately discussed and presents some contentious issues
in a way which improperly implies interagency agreement.--
Also, as an expanded document, the report no longer
pretends to be "Presidential". We understand that General
Stilwell intends to forward the report with a covering
memorandum of endorsement for the President's signature.
Because the report is so overly detailed and contains many
recommendations, some of them controversial, ambiguous or
premature, I believe it will cause more harm than good if
it is provided to the Congress without considerable
pruning. I am advising General Stilwell of my concerns but
he has made it quite clear that he is committed to the
present scope and thrust; I expect only token concessions
as the draft is finalized. (S)
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SECRET
DCI/ICS-86-0850
2 July 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SIG-I
FROM R. G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.)
SUBJECT: Professional Integrity
CCISCMS/ICS:RG Stilwell:gdc
Distribution (w/att as shown)
0 - Addee
1 - DDC I
1 - DDA
1 - D/OS
1 - DepSecDef
1 - CCISCMS Subject
1 - CCISCMS Chrono
(bcc:l-ER
1-ICS Registry)
3
SECRET
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 1 02777000 ^ 1wi^ . in
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SECRET
ROUTING AND. RECORD' `SHEET
SUBJECT: (Op onoq
Problems with Draft_ SIG=1 Work n} Group Report'.'
F
Dirxtnr of
TO: (Officer d.signatiwiroom number, and
building)
Deputy,:. Dii r
fortion'
Deputy Director o
Central Intelligence
AY 1986
4d/p6
EXTENSION ,
OFFICER'S
INmAIS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column otter each comment.)
25X1
25X1
13. Regrade to Unclassified ;.W
Separated frcm Secret Att
14. --WARNING NOTICE--
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR MT'rPLTnnc Tt~7nT X7131
15.
FORM 610 Eomo is
1=79
29?
;hn nt
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000200210005-2
I3 NAY lybb
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:
FROM:
Deputy Director for Administration
Director of Security
SUBJECT: Problems with Draft SIG-I Working Group Report
General Stilwell has submitted for review a draft of the
"Plans for Enhancement" section of the President's report to
Congress on counterintelligence and security. Listed below are
views we presented to the Working Group on three issues
fundamental to the proper and successful conduct of CIA's
security program. However, counterviews, particularly from
DOD, have tended to obscure our position. (C)
Common Scope for Top Secret and SCI
DOD has repeatedly proposed that the scope of
investigative coverage for SCI be reduced from 15 years to
some shorter period; CIA has repeatedly resisted this. By
reducing the scope, DOD hopes to realize some cost
savings. However, the unique nature of SCI, its
sensitivity and its fragility, and the special and
statutory responsibilities of the DCI to protect it,
militate against the DOD position.
The greater scope of investigative coverage for access
to SCI is designed to compensate for its proliferation and
its relatively lax document control (as compared to the
more limited distribution and strict accountability of Top
Secret information). A 1980 SECOM study indicated that
small, but significant, amounts of noteworthy information
would be lost if the investigative scope were to be reduced
to even 10 years. However, we recognize the need for
current research regarding the cost and utility of various
aspects of our investigative process. Such research would
allow us to participate in meaningful discussions with DOD
and others on this subject. Until such research is
completed, however, the office of Security is strongly
opposed to any reduction in the pre-screening protection
currently afforded SCI. (S)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000200210005-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000200210005-2
Preempting NSDD-84 Working Group
The draft report contains several pages of
recommendations and statements which would, in effect,
impose direction and substance on the Working Group which
was chartered by Presidential directive (NSDD-84) to
prepare a new Executive order on personnel security. Many
of these recommendations and statements contain
inaccuracies and elements which are either unacceptable to
CIA, and other agencies such as OPM and DOE not represented
on the Stilwell Working Group, or which require further
study before being considered as something to be mandated.
We also object in principle to preempting the prerogatives
of a properly chartered and expert interagency group. We
believe this detailed section should be replaced with a
general statement to be provided by or coordinated with the
NSDD-84 Working Group. (S)
Restrictions on the Scope of Polygraph Testing
In the draft and in virtually every document we have
seen from DOD which mentions polygraph testing, the phrase,
"counterintelligence-scope polygraph" is used. We are
concerned that continual use of this phrase as a general
description of polygraph testing may eventually result in a
universal perception that such limited testing is the only
proper and permissible kind. This could adversely affect
the CIA polygraph program in future years and could make it
extremely difficult for other agencies to implement
expanded polygraph programs if they chose to do so. This
very problem was recognized by the NSDD-84 Working Group
which decided to avoid such restrictive language. Where
applicable, we have offered the alternative language,
"polygraph testing as deemed appropriate by the agency head
and in compliance with applicable law and regulation." (S)
General Comments on the Working Group Paper
In addition to the above major points, I am
disappointed by the overall scope and utility of the
Stilwell product. The Working Group met for long hours
over the course of many weeks, deliberating pertinent
issues and gathering and refining information. We expected
this information to be distilled into a concise
"Presidential" statement of basic functions,
accomplishments, shortfalls and issues, plus policy and
program direction for the 1980's.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000200210005-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000200210005-2
Instead, the report is emerging, not as a
distillation, but as an expansion of the Working Group's
efforts with a decidedly DoD tilt flavored strongly with
what appear to be General Stilwell's own views. As an
expansion, it contains new issues which have not been
adequately discussed and presents some contentious issues
in a way which improperly implies interagency agreement.
Also, as an expanded document, the report no longer
pretends to be "Presidential". We understand that General
Stilwell intends to forward the report with a covering
memorandum of endorsement for the President's signature.
Because the report is so overly detailed and contains many
recommendations, some of them controversial, ambiguous or
premature, I believe it will cause more harm than good if
it is provided to the Congress without considerable
pruning. I am advising General Stilwell of my concerns but
he has made it quite clear that he is committed to the
present scope and thrust; I expect only token concessions
as the draft is finalized. (S)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000200210005-2