GENERATIONAL POLICY PERSPECTIVES WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000501010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 7, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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7 September 1984
SUBJECT: Generational Policy Perspectives Within the Soviet
Leadership
The recent prolonged absence of 72-year-old General Secretary
Konstantin Chernenko and the increased public prominence of younger
leaders have focused the attention of Soviet officials and Western
observers on the prospect that the top party post will pass to a
younger successor. Although younger leaders--such as party
secretaries Mikhail Gorbachev (53) and Grigoriy Romanov (61)--rose
to power in the post-Stalin period under significantly different
political circumstances than their elders, the impact these
circumstances have had on their political orientation remains
unclear. Moreover, the range of views among Soviet leaders of the
same generation suggests that for mainstays of the regime--such as
Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko--the
question of whoscceeds Chernenko will be more important than how
old he is.
With their current influence in the Soviet leadership at a
peak, Gromyko and Ustinov have personal stakes in maintaining the
Politburo status quo. Although both owe much of their
unprecedented current influence to the weakness of incumbent
General Secretary Chernenko, they enjoy political positions that
antedate Chernenko's tenure and that are likely--at least in the
short term--to assure their continuing influence even if Chernenko
is succeeded by a younger, more dynamic party chief.
Gromyko, Ustinov, and Chernenko
, when Yuriy Andropov died
in February, Gromyko and Ustinov supported Chernenko, whom they
reportedly had opposed in the past, as Andropov's successor. They
apparently opted for a leader whose relative weakness would
guarantee their strong influence in the defense and foreign policy
spheres rather than risk the uncertainties that a younger leader
would bring to the Politburo equation. In light of Chernenko's
apparent ill health, however, the Politburo may once again be faced
with choosing a new General Secretary and the prospect of a
possible younger successor.
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Gorbachev and Romanov--may be quite different.
The Next Succession
It is not clear which leader Ustinov or Gromyko would support
this time around. Although the two are alike in some obvious ways--
both are 75 and have powerful positions with national security
responsibilities--they also are significantly different and
independent political figures and are not known to be personally
close. Gromyko has spent his entire career in the Foreign Ministry
and focuses almost solely on foreign policy matters. Ustinov has a
much broader background, and his current responsibilities require
the integration of the economic and political aspects of defense
questions--resource allocation, research and development, armaments
programming and foreign policy considerations--with strategic
doctrine. Because of these differences, their views on policy
issues do not necessarily coincide, and their perceptions of
contenders for Chernenko's post--such as party secretaries
experts--Ustinov and Gromyko.
Gromyko and Ustinov: Political Prospects
If Ustinov and Gromyko remain healthy, neither Gorbachev nor
Romanov seems likely to pose a threat to their political positions
in the near term. Although either probably would be more ambitious
and formidable than Chernenko, neither would have the power at the
outset to challenge a colleague of Ustinov's or Gromyko's
stature. Moreover, Gorbachev or Ro.manov would be coming into
office with even less experience in foreign policy than Chernenko
had. Although the successor might inherit the trappings of power
rather quickly, his influence in foreign policy and national
security matters would be limited by the continued presence of the
the Politburo elders.
If either Gorbachev or Romanov wins out, however, his youth
and apparent good health should at least give him sufficient time
to consolidate his position and the stamina to wear down--or
outlive--the opposition. Others in the leadership, moreover, would
likely realize that their long-term political prospects would be
better served by forming an alliance with the new General
Secretary, a factor that would gradually undercut the influence of
Gromyko, Ustinov, and Gorbachev
Of the current contenders for Chernenko's post, Gorbachev
appears to have a clear lead. He is being openly touted by some
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Soviet officials as the next General Secretary. otocol
treatment of him moreover,
indicate that he was "in charge" in Moscow during ernenko's
recent vacation and suggest that a ro decision was made to
accord him such prominence.
Gorbachev's policy views may not be particularly palatable to
Gromyko. On US-Soviet relations, Gorbachev's rhetoric has been far
less strident than Gromyko's, and since the breakdown of the INF
talks he has continued to express hope that some progress can be
made in other areas. As agriculture secretary, he has shown a
strong interest in acquiring US agro-industrial technology, and
this consideration may hp a fartnr in tamnarinn hic viPwc nn [IS
Soviet relations.
Gorbachev might not be chosen because he is "too pro-
American" suggests that Gorbachev's views are widely perceived as
significantly different from those of Gromyko, reputedly the most
"anti-American" Soviet leader.
In contrast to his apparent differences with Gromyko,
Gorbachev has a record of concern with economic issues that is like
Ustinov's. Gorbachev, unlike previous agriculture secretaries has
not been a lobbyist for narrow agricultural interests, but has
taken a broader view. He has favored a shift of resources away
from direct investment in agriculture to the development of the
rural infrastructure (housing, storage, transportation), and he
recently described the priority development of heavy industry as a
"prerequisite for the solution of all economic and social tasks."
Similarly, Ustinov has on several occasions passed up opportunities
to push publicly for additional resources for defense, noting
instead the importance of building a stronger economy that will, in
turn, lead to a stronger defense capability.
Gorbachev may also have initiated the Politburo's decision
earlier this year to withhold the bulk of the military transport
usually provided for the harvest--a move that probably was designed
to make the agricultural sector more self-reliant but that may also
.,have increased his standing with Ustinov.
Gorbachev was unusually demonstrative in welcoming stinov
back from his trip to Czechoslovakia last month, leaving the
impression that personal relations between the two are good.
Gromyko, Ustinov, and Romanov
Like Gorbachev, party secretary Grigoriy Romanov has become
increasingly prominent in recent months, attending functions that
confirmed his responsibility for defense industry and security
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organs. Although Romanov's prospects have been played down
he is the only contender other than Gorbachev
Molds dual membership in the Politburo and Secretariat--a key to
victory in past succession struggles.
Romanov's views on US-Soviet relations appear to be closer to
Gromyko's than Gorbachev's have been. Both Gromyko and Romanov
have been described as "lacking flexibility" in
that area. The dif achev and Romanov was
illustrated in speeches that both delivered last winter. Although
both leaders were critical of the United States, Gorbachev balanced
his portrayal of the sense of threat with several protestations
that the Soviet Union would have liked to avoid a breakdown of the
arms talks and asserted that Soviet deployment of additional
missiles in Eastern Europe was not irreversible.
Some circumstantial evidence suggests that Romanov advanced to
his current position with the acquiescence, if not the backing, of
Ustinov. As secretary for defense industry from 1965 to 1976,
Ustinov probably had frequent contact with Romanov, who headed the
party organization in Leningrad, an important arms production
center. It also seems likely that Ustinov approved Romanov's being
entrusted with his current responsibility as party secretary for
defense industry. Neither Ustinov nor Gromyko, however, has been
reported to be a solid ally of Romanov's and both may share a
wariness about his
independence, overweening ambition, and strong-willed style.
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