WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000300250040-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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KET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
NIC No. 01555-85/1
25 March 1985
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Europe
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held 20
March 1985. If there are any significant amendments or additions you
would wish to make, please let me know.
2. Next month's warning meeting will be on 17 April 1985 at 1015 in
room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances passed and
call with names of the attendees by noon, 16
April 1985.
3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and
proposals to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have
your comments for the next meeting by Monday, 8 April 1985.
Attachment
a/s
eorge Kolt
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 01555-85
25 March 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: March Warning and Forecast Report
I. The Main Topics
1. Italian Regional Elections:
A. Discussion
Regional elections on 12 May could lead to a cabinet
reshuffle or even a crisis for Premier Craxi's government by
late summer. The main danger for Craxi is the Possibility of a
PCI plurality that would increase the Communists' power to
demand a role in national government. In the campaign Craxi is
sticking to his long-term strategy of wooing the center (with
the attendant risk of losing leftist voters to the CPI) while
the Christian Democrats (DC), afraid of another erosion of their
base, are using traditional appeals to Church values and
condemnations of communism. Rising abstention rates,
vote-switching, and the lack of reliable polls make results
impossible to predict.
After the May elections, maneuvers testing new coalition
possibilities are likely -- including talk of a Socialist-PCI
arrangement at the expense of the Christian Democrats. When
Parliament begins ballotting to elect a new President on June
23, extensive wheeling and dealing could add enough wear and
tear on Craxi's coalition to bring on another government crisis.
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SRIZFTI
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2. Turkey: On the Eve of Ozal's Visit
A. Discussion
Premier Ozal, the country's civilian leader, is likely to
remain solidly in control at least through summer. He benefits
most from growing confidence that Turkey is gaining ground
internationally in its rivalry with Greece -- particularly
because of Kyprianou's political weakness in Cyprus and
Papandreou's antics. For the near term, Ozal probably will
concentrate more attention on containing rebellious provincial
party leaders and factions in preparing for the Motherland Party
at its congress in April. He seems to have survived the first
wave of scandals in his cabinet without much lasting damage to
himself or the party. The shock effect of renewed terrorism and
Kurdish separatism last summer has also worn off and government
counter-measures are taking effect. The major problem he faces
down the road is controlling inflation -- increasing at an
average of 6 percent in January and February and 48.7 percent
higher than in February 1984 -- and lowering the 21 percent
unemployment rate. Some analysts foresee serious civil-military
frictions if he fails to turn the economy around by fall and
possible attempts to engineer Ozal's fall through defections
from his party.
But even this "limited intervention" option risks a return
to a weak coalition regime and holds little attraction for the
generals. They are therefore likely to stick with Ozal while
pressuring him to change his market-oriented economic policies.
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3. Papandreou's Gamble
A. Discussion
Premier Papandreou's unexpected move in dumping President
Karamanlis two weeks ago upset previous assumptions about
electoral politics and Papandreou's overall motives and
intentions. The meeting reviewed several theories about his
motives. They include: a long standing and duplicitous "grand
design" to rid himself of the President's constitutional
restraints and assertive strong personality; a desperate move to
hold the loyalty of wavering PASOK leftists; and, an
idiosyncratic, ideologically motivated, and rash response to
pressures of the moment.
Projections of his next moves were less diverse. Most
analysts forecast he now will appease moderates rather than
pursue a full-blown PASOK program, but some stressed that this
moderation tactic would disappear as soon as the next elections
are over. All analysts agreed that Papandreou's political
partners would be ill-advised to bank on his gratitude,
consistency or predictability.
Looking at the political branch points ahead, there was
agreement that PASOK had the best chance to remain in power if
Papandreou can postpone the elections until fall, but little
agreement on which party would win the election, be it in spring
or fall.
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II. Monitoring Items
1. East Europe: First Perceptions of Gorbachev
Initial reactions in East Europe to Gorbachev's selection as
Secretary General appear to be warmest from regimes in Hungary and
Bulgaria which have economic reforms underway. Leaderships with deep
misgivings about reform -- Czechoslovakia and Romania -- seem less
effusive and there is hesitancy in some reactions -- Poland's for
example -- due an apparent lack of "feel" for Gorbachev. A
long-postponed Political Consultative Committee meeting of the Warsaw
Pact now rumored for April may give a public clue on Gorbachev's East
European policy. The aging leaders in East Europe might not be able
to develop strong personal ties with the younger Soviet leader and
their younger lieutenants may begin maneuvering behind their backs.
2. New Polish Developments
Jaruzelski faces heightened internal pressures this spring.
Lech Walensa last week announced Solidarity's call for protest
actions on 1 April and 1 May. Last year, Solidarity managed to blend
its marchers into state-run May Day parades.
3. Cyprus: Status of Tensions
Greek and Turkish leaders are too preoccupied with internal
political issues at this time to press their mutual rivalry. On 28
March, Kyprianou must face a second round of Parliamentary criticism
of his handling of UN-sponsored talks in February. In the meantime,
he has agreed to review a SYG-proposed "composite document" in order
to revive intercommunal talks at about the point that they were
broken off in February. Denktash meanwhile is pressing ahead with a
referendum on a new Constitution for the TNRC. Parliamentary
elections will formalize the new Turkish parliament but probably make
no major personnel changes. The Turks, playing to world opinion,
have also pledged that these steps are not intended to foreclose
later discussions on federation. The Turks are not prepared to make
new concessions to Kyprianou that might ease his political problems.
4. Malta: Mintoff in Eclipse -- Bonnici on the Rise?
A growing number of reports suggest Dom Mintoff gave up more
than nominal power last December when he ceded the premiership to
Karmelu Mifsud Bonnici. Subsequently Mintoff failed in a bid to take
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SECRET)
charge of the central bank and he has appeared rarely in public since
January. In the meantime, Bonnici has assumed the leadership of the
Labor party -- apparently without benefit of a vote. Bonnici is also
grabbing the limelight in his own right. He played a moderate role
in arranging a speech by a visiting Italian politician even though
other Labor leaders attemped to invoke the Foreign Interference Law
to stop it. On the other hand, Bonnici afterward delivered 25X1
attack in Parliament on the EC for "excluding Eastern Europe."
Minister of Public Works, Lorry San 25X1
thinks he should be Mintoff's heir, and now disparages Bonnici's
ability to survive in a tough fight. In the meantime, Libya has
managed to establish a more or less constant naval presence in the
form of several smaller naval craft which are undergoing minor
repairs. Qadhafi is also urging a disinterested Syria to emulate the
security agreement which Quadhafi signed with Mintoff in November
1984.
George Kolt
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