ANTITERRORIST PLAN RESCINDED AFTER UNATHORIZED BOMBING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807590017-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 12, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807590017-8
LBTICLB :P-`-f a
of PIGE_~-~'
WASHINGTON POST
12 May 1985
Antiterrorist Flan Rescinded after
Unauthorized Bombing
Sources Say Reagan Approved CIA Covert Training and Support of Squads
Set L-p to Preempt Strikes at U.S. Facilities in Mideast
JBy Bob Woodward and Charles R. Babcock
Kunmrlon Post Suit writers
Late
last year, President Reagan
ap-
proved
a covert operation directing
the
Central
Intelligence Agency to train
and
support several counterterrorist units for
strikes against suspected terrorists before
they could attack U.S. facilities in the Mid-
dle East, according to informed sources.
About four months later. members of one
of those units, composed of Lebanese intel-
ligence personnel and other foreigners, act-
ing without CIA authorization. went out on
a runaway mission and hired others in Leb-
anon to detonate a massive car bomb out-
side the Beirut residence of a militant Shiite
leader believed to be behind terrorist at-
tacks on U.S. installations. the sources said.
More than 80 persons were killed and
200 wounded in the car bombing in a Beirut
suburb on March 8. The suspected terrorist
leader escaped injury.
Faced with an indirect connection to the
car bombing. alarmed CIA and Reagan ad-
ministration officials quickly canceled the
entire covert support operation, the
sources said.
CIA personnel had no contact with those
who actually carried out the car bombing.
they said. According to one source, officials
of the intelligence agency were upset that
one of its most secret and much debated
operations had gone astray.
Administration spokesmen had no com-
ment yesterday: --
Several intelligence sources said the in-
cident revealed the hazards of trying to
fight the "ditty'' war of terrorism. Others
questioned whether training and support of
the covert units might have violated the
longstanding prohibition against U.S. in-
volvement in assassinations. One source.
skeptical of the short-lived operation, called
it "an illustration of how some people learn
things the hard way."
Another source said Defense Department
officials refused two years ago to give Leb-
anese units any counter terrorism training
because of fears that "we'd end up with hit
teams over there .... The concern was
that when some have the capability it can
be turned upside down and used offensively.
The concern was that one faction would use
it on the other factions."
Administration sources said that the con-
gressional oversight committees on intel-
ligence were briefed on the covert support
operation in Lebanon after the president
approved it late last year, although Reagan
specifically directed that only the chairmen
and vice chairmen of the Senate and House
intelligence committees be informed.
Several sources said there is some ques-
tion whether the new chairmen and vice
chairmen who took over the committees in
both chambers in January received full
briefings on the operation. Administration
sources last week insisted that they had.
Within weeks of the March 8 car bomb-
ing and the cancellation of the covert oper-
ation in Lebanon, both Robert C. McFar-
lane, the president's national security af-
?atta auvtucl, d11u 1.111 L:rector William J. f'~
Casey gave speeches saying the adminis-
tration had the capability to preempt ter-
rorist attacks.
Using the same language, both McFar-
lane and Casey said: "We cannot and will not
abstain from forcible action to prevent, pre-
empt or respond to terrorist acts w>`ner e
conditions merit the use of force. Many
countries, inciading the United States, have
the specific forces and capabilities we need
to carry out operations against terrorist
groups."
It could not be learned exactly what ca-
pabilit.es M.crariane and Casey were talk-
ing about. The CIA has extensive world-
wide count erterr orist training operations
N
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807590017-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807590017-8
designed to help other nations de-
fend -against and react to terrorist
attacks. McFarlane and Casey have
declined to elaborate. McFarlane's
speech was given here on March 25
and- Casey's in Cambridge, Mass.,
on April 17.
Dozens of bystanders were killed
and wounded in the March 8 car
bombing in a Beirut suburb about
50 yards from the residence of Mo-
hammed Hussein Fadlallah.,'leader
of-the Hezballah (Party of God), a
militant Shiite movement. A num-
ber of Fadlaliah's bodyguards re-
portedly were killed in the explo-
sion.
:No one publicly has claimed re-
sponsibiiity for the bombing. Some
Shiites accused the Israelis, who
denied any involvement.
Numerous U.S. intelligence re-
ports have tied Fadlallah directly to
the series of terrorist attacks on
American facilities in Lebanon in
1983 and 1984. According to one
report, Fadlallah participated in an
Oct. 20, 1983. planning meeting of
terrorists in Damascus, Syria, three
days before the suicide bombing of
the Marine headquarters compound
in Beirut that killed 241 U.S. ser-
vicemen. Intelligence reports also
say that on the night of Oct. 22,
1983, just hours before the bomb-
ing, Fadlallah received and blessed
the man who drove the truck car-
rying the explosives in the suicide
bombing.
Tadlallah's group also was re-
sponsible for the more recent Sept.
20, 1984, bombing of the U.S. Em-
bassy annex in Beirut, according to
intelligence sources. Fadlallah has
denied involvement in these terror-
ist actions.
.:A Lebanese intelligence source
said: "My service did the [March 8]
Fadlallah bombing. I believe it was
done to show we are strong ....
You've got to stop terrorism with
terrorism."
:The Lebanese source said that
the CIA would have nothing to do
with a car bomb because of the dan-
ger to innocent people. But the
source . contended that the CIA
knew it was being planned.
U.S. sources emphatically denied
any advance knowledge of the
bombing and said immediate steps
mere taken after it occurred to can-
cel the entire covert operation.
- The plan to form and train three man getting off the first shot at a
teams of Lebanese capable of neu- man pointing a shotgun at him."
tiali.z ng or disabimg terrorists be- Secretary of State George P.
fore they could make planned at- Shultz and national security affairs
asks on American targets was ap- adviser McFariane were chief pro-
roved after years of internal debate ponents of the cover plan in Leb-
arid increasingly tough Reagan ad- anon, sources said.
rdi nistration rhetoric about how to Shultz Urged Response
respond to the wave of aevastating
?--^ *~~~~ ~~-^~~ "State and the White House
pushed this," one source said. Ac-
Preemptive Strikes Difficult cording to this source. the final de-
::The covert training and support cision to approve the plan late last
program was set up under a pres- ; fall was made because of 'Shultz's
idential "finding" signed by Reagan. assertiveness and [Defense Secre-
Ii: specified that the teams of for- tar)' Caspar W.] Weinberger's re-
elgners were to be used only with luctance to use force convention.
great care and only in situations ally, and McFarlane's anger with
where the United States had good terrorism."
intelligence that a terrorist group Sources said that McFarlane was
was about to strike. The teams instrumental in developing a con-
were supposed to use the minimal sensus from the disparate views of
force necessary to stop specific at- senior administration officials.
tacks. Several sources said this in- Shultz repeatedly has urged a
ciuded the authority to kill sus- he strong has response called to~terrorism, which
petted terrorists if that was the barbarism that
threatens the very foundations of
only alternative. civilized life." On the other hand,
: Conducting preemptive strikes is Weinberger has voiced reluctance
very difficult in practice, because to use military force without full
they depend on intelligence infor- public support.
mation that is timely and accurate. Sources said that some senior
i However, sources said the U.S. ca- intelligence officials opposed involv.
pability to collect advance informa- ing the intelligence agencies in
lion on planned terrorist actions is what one official called "the ulti-
i improving. mate covert action: an undercover
After previous terrorist attacks I hit squad." The revelations of pre-
on American facilities in the Middle vious assassination plots and the
East, U.S.' officials learned they had more recent public and congres-
had some clues, at times significant sional criticism of the CIA's involve-
ones, before the event. But they ment in a covert war against the
were only discovered afterward, leftist Sandinista government in
when analysts sorted through raw Nicaragua made the CIA reluctant
intelligence reports, cornrnunica- to undertake new operations, ac-
tions intercepts and satellite pho- cording to the sources.
tography. The covert option was selected,
Officials said the short-lived co- the sources said,, as a preferable
vert operation in Lebanon did not alternative to the use of military
violate the presidential ban on in- force such as the guns of the bat.
volvement of U.S. personnel. di- tleship New Jersey or air strikes,
rectly or indirectly, in any type of which could kill or injure innocent
assassination planning or operation. civilians close to a terrorist camp.
The prohibition dates to 1976, after The sources also said that train-
congressional investigations uncov- ing and supporting a covert team
ered such plots against Cuban Pres- would avoid the possibility of live
ident Fidel Castro and other foreign television coverage of U.S. military
leaders. - action and the visible use of Amer-
Reagan administration officials ican force in the Middle East, which
reasoned that killing terrorists was previously had increased anti.
"preemptive self-defense" rather American sentiment and more acts
than assassination, according to one of terrorism. Compared with the
source, who said, "Knocking off a alternatives, the sources said, a
guy who is about to kill you is no small team also would be the most
more assassination than a police-_ cost-effective.
4.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807590017-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807590017-8
Two weeks after the unautho-
rized March 8 Beirut car bombing
aimed at Fadlallah. McFarlane gave
his speech that seemed to confirm
the existence of some type of new
counterterrorist capability. McFar-
lane said that in making a decision
to react, we need not insist on ab-
solute evidence that the targets
were used solely to support terror-
ism."
In his speech, "Terrorism and the
Future of Free Society," McFarlane
said he was outlining the "operating
principles" of a presidential direc-
tive on terrorism. "Whenever we
obtain evidence that an act of ter-
ror ism is about to be mounted
against us, we have a responsibility
to take measures to protect our
citizens, property and interests,"
McFarlane said.
Use of force in self-defense is
legitimate under interna:tonal law,"
he said. "It is explicitly sanctioned
under Article 51 of the United Na-
tions charter."
Sources said this speech and one
given by Shultz on Dec. 9 in New
York. "The Ethics of Power," were
intended to express the rationale
for administration policy.
Addressing an audience at Yeshi-
va University, Shultz said: "The
Talmud upholds the universal law of
elf-defense, saying, 'If one comes to
kill you, make haste and kill him
first.' Clearly, as long as threats
exist, law-abiding nations have the
right and indeed the duty to protect
themselves."
According to the sources. Reagan
approved the covert "finding" au-
thorizing CIA training and support
for antiterrorist units in Lebanon
just before Shultz gave the speech
last December.
Mock-Up of Embassy Seen
Two sources said that the Sept.
20 terrorist bombing of the U.S.
Embassy annex in Beirut last year
heiped persuade officials that they
had to develop some means of pre-
empting planned terrorist attacks.
After the fact, officials learned that
U.S. intelligence agencies had over-
head satellite photographs of what
is thought to be the van used in the
suicide bombing.
Those photos showed the vehicle
outside a mock-up of the embassy
annex that the terrorists were us-
ing for a practice run, sources said.
Although the connection was estab-
lished after the fact, the sources
said that, in the future, this kind of
intelligence might be part of the
basis for a preemptive attack.
One source argued that the de-
cision to use a covert team
amounted to recreating for the CIA
a role it played in its early years,
before the Watergate scandal and
subsequent congressional investi-
gations of the agency dampened its
ardor for clandestine operations.
Accordingly, this source said,
Reagan's decision to authorize the
covert team was "the final curtain
or, the legacy of both Vietnam and
Watergate." Of all the Reagan ad-
ministration's decisions on national
security, this source said. "It was
the most tricky, the most contro-
versial and sensitive .... [It) took
the most goading to get change."
But when the operation went
astray after the Lebanese went
ahead with an unapproved car-
bombing, officials involved in the
plan felt they had no alternative to
canceling U.S. support for the an-
titerrorist squads.
One official who favored creation
of the units said: "If you take ter-
ror ism seriously, as we must,
you've got to realize that it could
get worse .... If we had informa-
tion on some terrorists involved in
nuclear detonation practice, you've
got to act. No choice. That is the
type of issue we are going to have
to face, and we better be ready."
Staff researcher Barbara Feinntan
contributed to this report.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807590017-8