SRI LANKA: GROWING CONCERNS ABOUT TAMIL TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00472R000200190041-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: July 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Sri Lanka: Growing Concerns
About Tamil Terrorism
Sri Lanka appears headed for a period of increased
Tamil terrorist violence if President J. R. Jayewar-
dene's newly reelected government does not soon
resolve longstanding grievances of the minority Tamil
community. Although violent incidents have tapered
off in the weeks since local elections in May, tensions
remain high, and another terrorist attack could set off
a bruising communal confrontation.
The ever-present threat of communal violence is the
Achilles heel of Sri Lanka's stability and national
unity. Traditional animosities between the Sinhalese
Buddhist majority (about 74 percent of the popula-
tion) and the Tamil Hindu minority (about 13 per-
cent)-which are based on religion, language, cultural
identity, and numerous specific grievances-have
flared into widespread, bloody confrontations in re-
cent years. Since the mid- I970s the Tamil community
has endeavored to establish an independent Tamil
state (Eelam) in the northern and eastern provinces
where Tamils predominate.
Tamil separatism poses a major challenge to Jayewar-
dene's United National Party (UNP) government.
Although Tamil terrorism is containable and does not
threaten the government, it risks provoking Sinhalese
overreaction and a wider conflict that could gather
steam rapidly in this communally sensitive society.
The recent spread of violence to Trincomalee has
particularly worrisome implications because of the
potentially volatile racial mixture in that city. Exten-
sive communal unrest could seriously undermine the
government's ambitious economic development pro-
grams, according to Jayewardene, and would frus-
trate the efforts of moderates on both sides to reach a
constructive accommodation.
The Forces of Moderation
Jayewardene has long recognized the dangers posed
by communal differences, and we believe he is deeply
committed to fostering better Tamil-Sinhalese rela-
tions. He is staunchly opposed to the idea of a
separate Tamil state, but, unlike his predecessors, he
has attempted to provide the Tamils with a greater
voice in their own affairs. Working with the moderate
leadership of the Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF)---the major political spokesman for Tamil
interests and the official opposition in parliament-
Jayewardene set up a system of district development
councils in 1981 to give the Tamils a measure of local
autonomy. Later that year he also began a series of
talks with TULF General Secretary Amirthalingam
as a means of hearing Tamil grievances directly and
reducing communal tensions. We believe these ses-
sions strengthened Amirthalingam's position in
appealing for moderate Tamil support.
Government promises, however, have not borne fruit.
The district council system has never been adequately
implemented. Talks with Amirthalingam were sus-
pended indefinitely last fall when Jayewardene and
his party were in the throes of a national election, and
the government does not appear prepared to resume
them.
The lack of progress has put the TULF in a vulnera-
ble position. The party is caught between its commit-
ment to work for an independent Eelam through
nonviolent, constitutional means and its apparent
recognition that no useful purpose would be served by
launching a confrontation with the government. We
believe that Amirthalingam's position as spokesman
for moderate Tamil interests is being eroded by
government inaction on Tamil issues and that many
Tamils are shifting their support to more militant
forces.
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Tamil Tigers
Tamil disaffection with the predominantly Sinhalese
government erupted into terrorism in 1975. Since then
a number of radical Tamil terrorist groups have
sprung up, all ostensibly dedicated to dramatizing the
cause of Eclam but mainly seeking to drive a wedge
between moderate forces in both camps and prevent-
ing any compromise on Tamil demands. Because of
the general anti-Sinhalese attitude within the Tamil
community, popular support for these groups is diffi-
cult to measure, but, based on substantial evidence,
we believe it is strongest in the Jaffna District in the
far north
The most notorious of these groups is the Tamil
Tigers-an umbrella organization that contains a
number of offshoots and rival factions. Estimates of
Tiger strength vary, but we believe that hardcore
members number between 100 and 200. Since their
emergence, the Tigers have been credited with a
number of highly publicized political assassinations
and politically motivated bombings, as well as bank
robberies and terrorist raids on police stations in
search of cash and arms. Embassy and press reporting
indicates that they receive material support, training,
and sanctuary in Tamil-speaking areas of southern
India, making them a difficult target for Sri Lankan
The TULF has consistently condemned Tiger propa-
ganda and violence, some of which has been directed
at moderate Tamil politicians as a warning against
dealing with the Colombo government.
Tiger Effectiveness
Although the Tigers are usually given to random acts
of violence, their tactical sophistication and effective-
ness may be improving. The almost simultaneous
assassinations of three UNP politicians in separate
attacks on 29 AlDril demonstrated an unusual degree
of organization
however, the Tigers continue to suffer rom internal
leadership struggles and factional rivalries that have
occasionally erupted into debilitating internecine war-
The Tigers waged an effective campaign in Jaffna
against Tamil participation in local elections in May.
Using a combination of propaganda and intimidation,
they were able to force numerous candidates into
withdrawing from the races and keep many voters
away from the polls. Voter participation ranged from
a high of 24 percent in the town of Jaffna to a low of
less than 2 percent in outlying areas. The TULF
leadership vowed to stay in the race, however, despite
Tiger threats and, as expected, captured all of the
local seats at stake.
lengthened further
Government Security Measures
The government has employed a number of security
measures to control Tiger violence, with varying
degrees of success. Government powers of search,
seizure, and preventive detention have been considera-
bly strengthened through the Prevention of Terrorism
Act-put into effect in 1979 for a one-year period and
now extended indefinitely-and its liberal use of
emergency powers as granted by the constitution. The
imposition of a state of emergency immediately
following local or national elections to head off com-
munal and other postelection violence has become
standard practice. The state of emergency imposed
after local and parliamentary byelections in May was
extended in late June for another month and may be
As part of a new antiterrorism offensive, the govern-
ment established a 500-member antiterrorism unit
last May, and in June it suspended coroners' inquiries
in a bid to strengthen the hand of security forces in
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Sri Lanka. Recent Terrorist Incidents
2 April 1983 Tiger bombing of the government's district administrative center in Jaffna.
? Gasoline bombs thrown at Jaffna Airport.
24 April
29 April Terrorists kill three UNP politicians in separate attacks.
8 May Tigers disrupt election rally in Jaffna by firing in the air and seizing a senior
Tamil politician's official car.
9 May Three bombs planted in J4 na; all disarmed.
18 May Bombs explode outside five polling stations. Shots fired at a military patrol. One
soldier killed in attack on a sixth polling station. Retaliatory attacks by
government security forces result in at least four deaths and the burning of about
100 shops and dwellings in Jaffna.
1 June Terrorists kill two Air Force men in Vavuniya bazaar. Two terrorists captured.
4 June Tamil militants assassinate unsuccessful UNP candidate in recent elections in an
execution-style slaying.
11 June Two bombs thrown at house of a Tamil member of parliament in Trincomalee.
Other bombs reported 13 June. Curfew put in effect.
27 June-1 July Scattered bombings/incidents in Trincomalee result in 14 dead and over 100
injured. Considerable property damage. Curfew reinstated. Over 300 suspects
under arrest.
1 July Jaffna-Colombo train destroyed by Tigers.
active pursuit of suspected terrorists. According to in mid-June on an official visit, the President took the
press reports, however, the government acknowledges unusual step of appointing Prime Minister Premadasa
shortcomings in antiterrorist operations and plans to as acting Defense Minister in order to give him direct
revamp its security organization to emphasize intelli- control of the security apparatus while the communal
gence gathering and better cooperation among the situation remains tense
services
The government's use of extraordinary security meas-
In several recent speeches Jayewardene has pledged to ures has helped curtail terrorism, but it has also
eliminate terrorism and has called upon opposition
parties to help combat it. Prior to leaving the country
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further soured Tamil attitudes toward Colombo. The
stringent provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism
Act in particular have become a major rallying point
for antigovernment protest within the Tamil commu-
nity, which complains that the law has been used to
arrest and detain without charge a number of promi-
nent Tamils under the guise of combating Tiger
activities
Sri Lankan police campaigns against the Tigers have
been least successful in Jaffna District, the major
Tamil stronghold in the north, where the largely
Sinhalese security forces are widely regarded as an
army of occupation. Because of widespread antigov-
ernment dissidence among the general Tamil popula-
tion, security forces have received little public
cooperation in their efforts to track down suspected
terrorists. The frustration of chasing an elusive enemy
occasionally erupts into indiscriminant violence
against the general Tamil population by the military.
The Dangers of Sinhalese Backlash
Jayewardene and his government are increasingly
coming under fire from the majority Sinhr lese com-
munity for not taking a harder line against Tamil
terrorism, according to press reports. When commu-
nal tensions arc high, a single, well-executed terrorist
attack can provoke a strong Sinhalese overreaction,
and the government has lately become concerned
about growing indiscipline in the Army. In several
recent incidents, security forces have gone on the
rampage when one of their members has fallen victim
to the Tigers. In one case a suspected terrorist died of
injuries received while in Army custody, presumably
the victim of a beating.
We believe that such indiscipline in the security forces
tends to encourage both the Tamil and Sinhalese
communities to look to their own resources for protec-
tion and vengeance. The perception on both sides that
security elements had lost their impartiality was a
major factor in widespread communal tension and
bloodshed in 1981. The government clearly fears a
similar outbreak and has moved swiftly to restore
discipline
The Indian Connection
We believe that many Sinhalese government officials
suspect that the Indians have been less than coopera-
tive with Colombo's antiterrorism efforts, although
President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Gandhi
would probably move swiftly to prevent the issue from
seriously damaging bilateral relations.
Perceived Indian indifference and the ready availabil-
ity of Indian sanctuary complicate Colombo's antiter-
rorism efforts and could become a political issue. A
shootout in Madras in May 1982 between rival Tiger
groups resulted in the arrests by Indian police of
several prominent militants wanted by Sri Lankan
authorities. Colombo immediately pressed for their
extradition, but the Indians demurred, claiming that
no extradition treaty existed and that the terrorists
were to be held for trial in Madras. In April 1983,
however, two of them jumped bail while awaiting
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Outlook
Jayewardene's best hope of defusing communal ten-
sions and curbing Tiger violence in the near term
probably lies in strengthening the position of the
TULF through a resumption of direct talks and at
least the appearance of movement in addressing
Tamil grievances. Having won reelection both for
himself and for his government last fall, Jayewardene
should have the political strength to combine a tough
line toward terrorist activity with a more moderate
attitude toward legitimate Tamil demands for the
devolution of power.
vulnerable to Tiger disruption.
We believe that the Tigers will continue to seize
opportunities to poison Tamil-Sinhalese relations
through attacks on security forces and politicians of
both camps. Their success in reducing voter turnout in
May may encourage them to test their strength again
soon. The next period of significant Tiger activity
could come in early August if the TULF decides to
follow through with its threat to resign its 18 seats in
parliament as the new six-year term begins. This
would necessitate a new round of byelections that
would be held exclusively in the north and would be
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