ANTITERRORISM BY PROXY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240023-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: May 14, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240023-9
AITICLE APriA.?ziri
\ ell PAGE__ /JO
NEW YORK TIMES
14 May, 1985
Antiterrorism by Proxy ,
U.S. Intelligence Agents Warned Officials
,? Against Reliance on Foreign Organizations
By LESLIE R. GELB
sp.ciat to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, May 13 ? A year - Administration officials said Pres?i-
ago, sailor Administration officials
,
agreed unanimously to set up counter-
terrorist groups to take pre-emptive
and punitive action. At the same time,
, intelligence operatives
News . said the groups were un-
likely to work and were
AnalYsis ' likely to get the United
' States into trouble.
There was no question about the seri-
ousness of the problem of combating
terrorism. And officials said the Ad-
ministration was united on the need to
do so by improving the collection of in-
telligence and warnings of planned ter-
rorist actions. But there was doubt that
any kind of covert action could be taken
effectively, particularly in Lebanon.
The split between the policy-makers
who felt the need to be tough on terror-
ism and the professionals charged with
Implementing the policy has plagued
the Administration from the outset.
' C.I.A. Link to Lebanese
On March 8,, 80 people were killed in a
Beirut car bombing that had been
aimed at killing a Shiite leader sus-
pected of being an anti-American ter-
rorist. It was carried out by a group
with ties to Lebanese intelligence,
which, in turn, had worked with the
central Intelligence Agency, according
to Congressional and Administration -
SOUrCeS.
Today the C.I.A. issued a statement
saying that it had not had advance
knowledge of the bombing. In addition,
Intelligence sources said the agency
had no connection to the Lebanese
counterterrorism group that report-
edly hired the bombers. But that was
disputed by some Administration and
Congressional officials who said the
agency was working with the group at
the time of the bombing.
? The CIA, statement did not seem to
go to the core issue. For exam le?it_
said that the cadi, had not trained
those who carried out the bombing. But
the statement included no specific
denial that the agency had been work-
ing with Lebanese intelligence. The
White House declined comment alto-
gether. ?
e?
dent Reagan had canceled his order di-
recting C.I.A.-Lebanese intelligence
cooperationTricounterterrori.sm within
a day or two after the March 8 bomb-
ing. But by then, the damage had been
done and the risks run, causing Admin-
istration officials to once again evalu-
ate what they realistically could and
should do to combat terrorism.
An Administration official involved
In intelligence said that, a year ago,
there was agreement on the need to
pre-empt terrorists, but that concern
about the risk to innocent civilians had
been voiced. He also said retaliation by
terrorists was also feared.
"The best we can do to counter ter-
rorism is to improve counterintelli-
gence, not counterterrorist capabil-
ities," he added. "That way, we can get
our people out of harm's way."
Order Was Signed in April ISM
But this was not the thinking that
prevailed on April 3, 1984, when offi-
cials said President Rea an sl :"ed a
ventive and retaliatory action against
terrorists and against countries spon-
soring terrorism.
Officials said the policy was sup-
ported by Secretary of State George P.
Shultz. Robert C. McFarlane, the na-
tional security adviser, and William r.
Casey, Director of Central Intelll
After the signing of the directive, Mr.
Shultz spoke publicly about the neces-
sity of going beyond "purely defensive
postures" in dealing with terrorists.
Reporters were told by officials that
this meant plans for pre-emptive and
retaliatory action were under way.
As a result of these moves, officials
said, American intelligence agents and
military personnel began financing,
training, sharing information and in
other ways supporting groups in
friendly countries to combat terrorists.
No Plans to Use Americans
The officials said there were no plans
to use Americans in other countries,
which meant relying on foreigners in
the employ of other governments.
?
Many American intellixence opera-
tives had doubts about their ability to
control the foreign counterterronsts.
They were concerned about the United I
States' taldng responsibility for the
program without being able to control
It, especially in Lebanon, where the
Government and the intelligence or-
ganization are divided.
In Lebanon, the officials said, Amer-
ican intelligence was hot on the heels of
Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, a Shi-
ite leader who has been linked to at-
tacks on American installations
throughout the Middle East. Lebanese
intelligence operatives were on ? his
tracks, too, but for other reasons, the
officials said.
. tration officials said that the
r 7 A ha not .act. w t it wantea
tg do about Mr. Fadlallah. but that
some Lebanese intelli ? - officials
The Lebanese not move against
him as a Government unit because Shi-
ites were now part of the Lebanese
Government, so according to the ac-
counts offered by Administration offi-
cials, the Lebanese intelligence organi-
zation hired outsiders.
U.S. Not Ready to Abandon Policy
Even after the attempt to kill Mr.
Fadlallah on March 8, the officials
said, Administration leaders were not
ready to abandon the policy. On March
25, Mr. McFarlane said in a speech,
"We cannot and will not abstain from
forcible action to prevent, pre-empt or
respond to terrorist acts where condi-
tions merit the use of force."
To renounce the use of force, he said,
"Is to invite more, not less, more ruth-
less, not less terrorist brutality."
According to a number of Adminis-
tration officials today, the United
States is unlikely to alter this approach
or to disband the counterterrorist train-
ing and support operations. But senior
officials are said to be taking a look at
specific cases of cooperation between
the ZJA, and foreign intelligence
agencies to see whether the policy can
be realistically implemented.
And Congressional committees
charged with overseeing intelligence
will be looking at both the problems of
Implementation and the policy itself.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240023-9