U.S. IS CHALLENGED ON SOVIET RADAR

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240032-9
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
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1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 26, 2012
Sequence Number: 
32
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Publication Date: 
March 15, 1985
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OPEN SOURCE
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240032-9 REW YORK TIMES po?? tr U.S. IS CHALLENGED ON SOVIET RADAR Some Experts Said to Accept Moscow's Explanation for Goals of New Station Ily LESLIE H. GELB Special to The New York Times ? WASHINGTON, March 14 ? Reagan Administration charges that a Soviet radar system violates the treaty limit. Ira antiballistic missile systems are tieing questioned by British and Amer- ican intelligence exyerts, according to Administration othciais. These intelligence officials are said to be saying that Moscow's explanation for thcradart now under construction at Krasnarsk in central Siberia, can- not be ruled out. The itussians have said that the radar is for space tracking and is allowable under the treaty. ? Nonetheless, officials said the pre- vailing view in the Administration re- mains that the radar, which American ? officials say is to be completed in two or three years, constitutes a treaty violation. They added that the American dele- gation to the arms control talks in Geneva has been instructed to make a central issue of this and other pur;1. ported Soviet violations, both because ( of the importance of the purported violations to the integrity of arms con- trol and at a counter to what the Ad- ministration calls Moscow's propa- ganda attacks against President Rea- gan's program on space-based de- I tenses. American Experts' Opinions 15 March, 1985 . - The sides further agreed That early warning radars could be placed only in a nation's peripheral areas and only with the antennas facing out. Deployed Inland, such radars could become the basis of a territorial defense system if they were used to track incoming war- heads and guide missiles to destroy them. Only space-tracking radars and radars used to monitor arms control treaties may be located anywhere. These radars do not face at the angle of Incoming warheads and so cannot be used to track them. Moscow insists those are the purposes of the Kras- noyarsk radar. The Reagan Administration's con- tention is that this radar is an early warning radar and that its location. about 500 miles from the Mongolian border, violates the treaty. ? British officials were said to have asked for intelligence data on this mat- ter several months ago and to have sub- mitted a preliminary report on the radar at the end of January. Adminis- tration officials said that the British re- port called the battle management' charge "unlikely" and the Russian con-' tention that the radar was for space- tracking purposes "plausible." The corn ? lica factor to Ole n ish ts . ? some Am can is gence experts t one YU can Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agen- cy, said in an interview that senior offi- cials in different departments and agencies were "unanimous" in believ- ing the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a violation, but that there were some dif- ferences of opinion among experts over whether the radar was also designed for "battle management." ? Use of the radar for battle manage- meat or to direct missiles to shoot down Incoming missile warheads is gen- erally seen as more ominous than an ? illegally placed early warning radar. Under the 1972 treaty on antiballistic tnissile systems, Washington and Mos- cow agreed to restrict themselves to no more than one missile defense site with no more than 100 antimissile missiles ? at that site. ' The purpose of the treaty was to - ? sharply limit defenses against missile ? attacks so that a side contemplating an ? . attack would have no defense against a, retaliatory blow. Thus, mutual deter, rem was said to have been assured:- eral es. These expe.rts noted That one of the Americaiiirarly warning systems, known as Pave Paws, also is used for tracking objects In space. , These analysts and experts are also said to argue that from what is known of future plans for orbiting Russian satellites the location and direction of the Krasnoyarsk radar might be useful for space tracking. But even these British and American officials are said to believe that the most likely explanation is that the radar is for early warning purposes, and is being built at Krasnoyarsk rather than on the nation's periphery for reason of topography. According to several Administration analysts, the only area of the Soviet Union that was not covered by early warning radar was in the northern Pa- cific region. They said that a number of years ago Moscow built two radar sta- tions on the periphery in the tundra fac- ing in that direction, but that given the nature of the tundra, the stations could not be maintained. Angle of Antennas ? "So what they tried to do," said one Administration expert, "was to build the radar inland near the trans-Sibe- rian railway where they could- main- tain it and hope they could pass it off as a space-tracker." The consensus among senior Admin. istration canals, including Mr. Adel- man, however. is that the decision to place the radar in Krasnoyarsk is more probably an attempt to lay the basis for a Russian "breakout," as they call it, a major step toward a general territorial defense system. They say that an early warning sys- tem in that location makes little sense since Moscow would be losing about 6 minutes of warning time, because of the station's location inland, out of a total warning time of about 22 minutes for a submarine-launched ballistic mis- sile. These senior officials also contend that the antennas are aimed at the angle for incoming ballistic missile warheads. The skeptich say the angle is mostly toward the horizon and ? thus consistent with an early warning (unc- tion. The senior officials acknowledge that there are no interceptor missiles nearby for the Krasnoyarsk radar to manage and control against incoming warheads. But they say the radar could "hand off" information to other such radars near interceptors in the future. - The skeptics argue that the radar is not "hardened," that is, defended and protected against a missile attack. The Administration position is that these elements could be added later. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240032-9