SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIA IN TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100020006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 22, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208
ECONOMIST
22 March 1986
BOOKS PLUS
In the bugging business
SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: The
CIA in Transition
By Stansfield Turner.
Sidgwick & Jackson. 304 pages. # 12.95.
Available from Houghton Mifflin.
Admiral Stansfield Turner always
thought big. When he was in the Ameri-
can navy he was often accused-not al-
wass wrongly--of being more concerned
with "tomorrow's navy" than with to-
das's. He never got to the top of it:
instead. President Carter shunted him off
to the CIA.
It was predictable that, in writing about
his time there. he should try to do several
things at once. He tells fascinating tales of
his experiences as director of the CIA and
as director of central intelligence (DCI),
the soh of co-ordinatine all the American
intelligence agencies. (The two jobs have
gone together ever since the CIA was
established.) But he also grapples with
two other vital issues: how to deal with
the cumbersome American intelligence
organisation: and how to reconcile the
secrecy and ethics of intelligence work
with the democratic ideal.
The story of his appointment and disap-
pointments as President Carter's intelli-
gence chief is probably the best account
vet written of the inner workings of the
Intelligence organisation of a world pow-
er. If `1r Turner does not reveal every-
thing the reader might want to know (he
was hamstrung not only by legitimate
security restraints. but by the require-
ment to clear his text with the present
CIA. which appears to have introduced
some illegitimate ones as well), he tells
much more than any of his predecessors.
The story of the wrongheaded treatment
of a Russian defector by Mr James Angle-
ton. who was for years a power in the CIA.
has been partly told before. but Mr
Turners account is more powerful-and
interesting-both because of its basis in
fact and the straight talk that has always
been his trademark.
Mr Turner had his share of problems
With colleagues from other intelligence
organisations. Partly these were profes-
sional disagreements. such as the peren-
nial dispute between the "classic" school
of intelligence, which believes that dili-
gent research and spies still have their
uses. and the electronic operators. who
are mostly convinced that nothing apart
from technical methods of collecting in-
formation matters any more. Within the
CIA, the intelligence collectors and clan-
destine-operations people had almost al-
ways overshadowed' the analysts.
Having an analytical mind himself. Mr
Turner tried to change this pattern in
order to achieve a better finished prod-
uct. One step towards this end was the
famous 1977 "Hallowe'en massacre". in
which he cut some 820 jobs from the
espionage branch. It has been widely
criticised as having "wrecked" the agen-
cy. However, long before he arrived, the
CIA was believed to be hugely over-
staffed. He says that the espionage
branch in particular was so top-heavy that
many good young men were leaving be-
cause they could not see their wav to the
top, and so overmanned at all levels that
on returning from overseas assignments
many agents had to "walk the corridors"
for months looking for something to do.
Although 820 was the number of auth-
orised jobs that were cut. only 164 people
were forced out (most of them pensioned
off): of these. only 17 were fired. And few
know how big the CIA was to start with:
16.3 may have been a fairly small percent-
age. Most bureaucracies become more
R000100020006-5
efficient when they are cut, and the ci.a
was probably no exception. The main
objection (for which the author must and
does take responsibility) was the callous.
bureaucratic wav in which notifications
were made.
Outside the CIA. his troubles were
mainly due to the turf-fights resulting
from America's over-complicated nation-
al intelligence organisation. Each military
service has its own intelligence branch.
the Pentagon has another for the defence
department as a whole: the State Depart-
ment has one: the FBI chases foreign
spies: the air force runs the office that
controls the reconnaissance satellites: the
National Security Agency engages in
electronic eavesdropping and tries to
break codes: the CIA produces spies and
"national" intelligence. And its boss is
supposed not only to run it, but to co-
ordinate its operations with those of all
the other organisations as well, although
he has little authority over them. Mercy!
Needless to say. there is too little co-
ordination. By and large. the individual
agencies go their own ways, and the
system creaks along: co-operation is
mainly a matter of horse-trading punctu-
ated by compromise. To solve part of this
problem. Mr Turner outlines a specific
plan for the job of DCI to be hived off
from that of director of the CIA. It is not a
new idea, but it is so sensible that it is
hard to fathom why it has not been done.
The author writes best about the theo-
retical discussion of the ethics, mechanics
and politics of congressional supervision:
the means by which the legislature. and
through it, the body politic, maintain
some sort of control over the CIA. He is
clear that this kind of oversight is good
not only for the country but for the
intelligence organisations themselves.
Nevertheless, he appears a bit uncertain
when he comes to grips with the most
vexed problem of all: how much to tell
the overseers.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100020006-5