SPECIAL INTERAGENCY PHILIPPINE ANALYTIC GROUP MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100020045-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 21, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87SOO734ROOO1OOO2OO45-4
? ?
SECRET/NOFORN
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 3050
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
NIC #05204-85/1
21 October 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: Special Interagency Philippine Analytic Group Meeting
1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 16 October to
consider the attached subjects.
2. Next month's Special Interagency Philippine Analytic Group Meeting
will be held on 13 November 1985 at 1500 hours in Room 7E62, CIA
Headquarters. Recommendations for discussion topics should be forwarded to
this office by COB 1 November 1985.
3. Attendees from outside agencies are advised to arrive early to avoid
parking problems created by construction work. For your convenience, please
enter the compound throu h Gate 1, the Route 123 entrance. Please telephone
attendance intentions t and have your
clearances verified to us by your security office by COB 8 November 1985.
Carl W. Ford, Tr.
16 October 1985 Special Interagency Philippine
Analytic Group Report
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
SECRET/NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87SOO734ROOO1OOO2OO45-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87SOO734ROOO1OOO2OO45-4
SECRET/NOFORN
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC #05204-85
21 October 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Nsia
SUBJECT: 16 October 1985 Special Interagency Philippine Analytic
Group Meeting
Conditions in the Philippines
Marjorie Niehause, State/INR, reviewed observations made during her
recent trip to the Philippines. The trip focused on the moderate political
opposition in Manila, however, there also were visits to Negros, Bicol,
Isabella, Cebu City, Baculan, and Laguna. The subject most frequently
raised by residents of these areas was the communist insurgency. Almost
everyone could cite some recent example of the impact of the insurgency,
such as kidnappings, murders, or attacks on nearby government
installations. The impression gained was that the insurgency is spreading
not just by its own efforts, but by default; as government and military
authorities retreat, the CPP and NPA occupy the vacuum they leave behind.
Many people mentioned the need for military reform and their concern about
the impending reinstatement of General Ver. The military reform movement
appears much weaker than the press describes--suggesting that Marcos may be
using the planted articles about the "movement" to diffuse legitimate calls
for reform. One final observation was that the deteriorating economy is
impacting almost everyone, either through hunger, income or both.
The Moderate Opposition
The two names most mentioned as leading candidates for President are
Salvador Laurel and Cory Aquino. As many as 85 percent of the opposition
appear ready to coalesce behind one or both of these candidates in an
election. The backers of Laurel and Cory Aquino appear to be working
together closely. The opposition is not, however, without diversity;
moderates are drawing away from radicals and some liberals may be acting as
stalking horses for other candidates. One underlying theme was that
although there was closer cooperation amongst various opposition elements,
no one believes the opposition has a chance of winning an election if Marcos
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
SECRET/NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87SOO734ROOO1OOO2OO45-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87S00734R000100020045-4
? SECRET/NOFORN ?
runs. (NOTE: Even if Marcos were to leave the scene by death or
incapacitation, we see no guarantee that the opposition would hold together
as the various elements scramble for the presidency.) Grassroots support
for the opposition is still lacking. While the UNIDO office reports having
slates of candidates in 30 provinces and NAMFREL reports having
representatives in 90 percent of the districts, there is little evidence
that a competitive political organization, comparable to that being
developed by the communists, is evolving anywhere in the country outside
Manila.
Forecast
The opposition sees no hope of beating Marcos. They seem to be
operating on the hope that he will die, and they will be able to run against
some other KBL candidate.
An Assessment of the Recentl Announced Reforms and Enlar ement of the Armed
orces of t e Philippines
1. OEA reported that the new reforms, specifically the
formation o new a alions, appears to be more cosmetic than real. The few
units that have been formed appear to result from the assignment of
headquarters and logistic support personnel to new battalions. Although
eight new battalions have been recently announced, we can only confirm two.
Three others which were recently identified in the Philippine press as
having been deployed may be the result of changes that took place over a
year ago.
2. In addition to the new AFP units being reported, there are rumors
that local security forces, the national police and the Philippine
constabulary may be removed from the control of the Chief of Staff and the
Defense Minister and be assigned to the Ministry of the Interior or the
Ministry of Public Safety which may be headed by General Ver. Marcos has
sidestepped questions on this issue, indicating that many other problems,
such as the overstaying generals and General Ver's reinstatement, must be
settled before any action on a matter like this could take place.
Forecast
We think it unlikely that there will be a significant reorganization or
enlargement of the Philippines armed forces. Although a great deal of
public statements may be made both for domestic and US consumption, we
believe changes will be more cosmetic than real. Furthermore, there is
almost no prospect that a reorganization of the Philippine constabulary is
likely in the foreseeable future.
2
SECRET/NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87S00734R000100020045-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87S00734R000100020045-4
?
SECRET/NOFORN
Philippine Economic Indicators: What They Will Tell Us
EA described an index of economic indicators which has
be lp assess current trends in the Philippine economy. The
index indicates when a turning point in the economy has been reached. Three
of the indicators in the index are concurrent and five are leading.
What the Indicators Are Telling Us
1. The index is being used to analyze the current economic performance
of the Philippines. Based on that analysis, we see the economy leveling off
from its two-year decline and, at best, a zero percent growth is likely for
the last half of this year. This will be the best growth since 1983, the
rate during intervening years having been negative.
2. It appears that Marcos is likely to follow a do nothing policy
between now and the 1986-87 elections. Even if that is the case, the
economy in the Philippines could gradually improve; not sufficiently by 1986
to impact on the election for the local officials, but possibly enough in
1987 that Marcos would be able to cite the progress in his bid for
reelection. Other policy options which would be available to Marcos in the
economic area would produce more rapid gains but would come at the cost of
political leverage or the economic well being of his cronies. We doubt he
will take either of these other options.
Carl W. Ford, r.
3
SECRET/NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87S00734R000100020045-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87S00734R000100020045-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16 :CIA-RDP87S00734R000100020045-4