CBS CONTRADICTED BY A ONE-TIME WESTMORELAND AIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000707160121-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 121
• Publication Date: October 23, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

-_ Approved For Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000707160121-8
ARTICLE APPS
I ON PAGE_ Z!
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
23 October 1984
contradicted by a
one 4ime Westmoreiand aide
f By David Zucchino The colonel responded with a firm
InQ, irer scoff Writer "no" four times, as Burt asked if he
NEW YORK - An attorney for Gen. recalled any reports to Westmore-
William C. Westmoreland continued land's command giving an infiltra-
to hammer away yesterday at a CBS tion figure as high as 25,000 a month.
documentary on the Vietnam War, Later, Morris testified - as have
elicting testimony in the libel trial other witnesses for Westmoreland -
that challenged some assertions that discrepancies in estimates of en-
made in the 1982 program. emy strength resulted from a well-
Col. Charles A. Morris, a former known' debate within the intelli-
intelligence officer under Westmore- gence community over whether to
land, contradicted key elements of include irregular forces in official
CBS' contention that Westmoreland estimates.
had deceived his superiors about en- Burt questioned Morris at length
emy troop strength in 1967. West- about a September 1967 conference
moreland's attorney, Dan M. Burt, in Saigon at which CIA analysts and
led Morris through more than two Westmoreland's intelligence officers
hours of questioning during which
Morris said he knew of no orders to
suppress or alter estimates of enemy
strength. CBS in its documentary Vietnam villages. He described the I
had cited a "conspiracy at the high- meeting as "a free and full exchange
est levels of military intelligence" to of ideas."
distort and conceal the numbers. Morris. said Westmoreland's top
Under cross-examination by a CBS command did not arbitrarily dictate
attorney, however, Morris made sev- how its intelligence officers should
eral statements that tended to ,sup- lay out its proposals at the confer-
port the premise of the show. ence, as alleged by the CBS program.
The testimony by Morris, 64, came As head of the command's intelli-
as the second week of testimony be-
gan in the trial of the general's $120
million libel suit against CBS.
Morris, a burly retiree with a
Southern accent and a courtly man-
ner, told Burt flatly that he was
aware of no orders to keep estimates
of enemy strength below a "ceiling"
of 300,000. The CBS program accused
Westmoreland of ordering the ceil-
ing as part of an attempt to make it
seem that the United States was win-
ning the war.
"I never received any such order,
nor was there an implication".to do
so, Morris said.
Morris played a central role in the
daily analyzing and reporting of mil-
itary intelligence in Westmoreland's
command - what the colonel called
"real-time intelligence" compared
with monthly reporting and analysis.
Morris disputed a CBS contention
that Westmoreland suppressed intel-
ligence reports showing that Com-
munist infiltration into South Viet-
nam had risen to 25,000 troops a
month in the five months preceding
the Tet offensive of January 1968.
irregular enemy "self-defense" and
"secret self-defense" forces in South
gence delegation to the meeting,
Morris said he was told only to pres-
ent "the best figures we could come
up with" for enemy strength. .
But he said the CIA analysts "want-
ed a higher figure than we were
willing to accept," so he passed the
problem "to a higher echelon` -
indicatin .t a to el of Westmore-
land'- cowman in Vietnam. A
month later, the command's monthly
"order of battle" report detailing en-
emy strength announced that the
self-defense forces would no longer
be included in enemy troop esti-
Morris also contradicted a charge
made by the CBS program that Lt.
Col. Everette Parkins, an intelli-
gence officer under Morris, had been
dismissed from his job because he
had become "incensed" by the al-
leged refusal of Westmoreland's com-
mand to report the higher infiltra-
tion figures.
.Under cross-examination by CBS
attorney David Boies, Morris conced-
ed that Westmoreland'and other U.S.,
commanders in Vietnam were under
"political pressure" to show progress
in the war.
After long pause, Morris told Boies,
"I'm going to say, yes, there was a
certain amount -of pressure. ... As
Gen. Westmoreland said, no one
likes bad news."
Morris also quoted Westmoreland
as saying that he had decided in
April 1967 to drop the self-defense
forces from the order of battle. CBS
reported that Westmoreland had be-
gun suppressing the troop numbers
after he gave a glowing report on the
war's progress to President Lyndon
B. Johnson in April 1967.
Boies' questioning elicited the first
direct testimony on preparation of
the CBS program by one of the three
defendants in the trial - George
Crile, the producer of the document
tary. Morris was asked by Boies. if he
had told Crile in a telephone' inter
view that one of Westmoreland's offi-
cers had been instructed by the gen
eral to give an optimistic evaluation
of the war's progress at a Washing-
ton briefing in 1967.
He replied, "If I didn't tell him that,
he could have concluded that"
CBS reported that Westmoreland's;
command "cooked the books" on en
emy troop figures while sending op
timistic reports on the war back-A0
Washington.
Boies also got Morris to concede
that he may have inadvertently miss'
led Crile about enemy infiltration by
his use of terminology. Morris said
he referred to "infiltration-related
activity," which he defined as south-
ward enemy troop movements itt
North Vietnam and not infiltratiot
into South Vietnam.
mates. Describing the forces as
"home guard and low-level fifth col-
umnists," the report said eliminating
them from official estimates "more
accurately reflects" true enemy
strength.
Asked by Burt where such reports
were sent, Morris responded, "To
higher intelligence headquarters."
That included Westmoreland's supe-
riors at the Pacific military com-
mand and at the Defense Intelli-
gence A enc and the CIA in
Washin on, he said.
Approved For Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000707160121-8