THE TOWER REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301290096-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 96
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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ILLEGIB
Face the Nation
CBS Network
March 1, 1987 10:30 a.m. -
The Tower Report
MS . LESLEY STAHL: The President is facing momentous
decisions. The Tower Report says he must take
responsibility for the Iran/contra affair.
SENATOR JOHN TOWER: I think he was not aware of a lot
of the things that were going on and the way the
operation was structured and who was involved in it.
He, very clearly, didn't understand all that.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it's possible to forget.
MS. STAHL: The Tower panel said the President forgot
meetings he attended and key decisions he made in the
Iran affair and that the operation was handled
casually and sloppily by a team of advisors who lied
constantly to Congress, to the public and to each
other. Much of the blame went to the President and
Donald Regan.
SENATOR EDMUND MU.51C.L.E4 More than almost any Chief of
Staff of recent memory, he asserted personal control
over the White House staff. ,,He, as much as anyone,
should have insisted that an orderly process be
observed.
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MS. STAHL: The President moved quickly this week to
find a new Chief of Staff, turning to former Senator
Howard Baker, a moderate Republican known for his
skills as a conciliator.
SENATOR NANCY KASSEBAUM: I believe you can already
hear a sigh of relief throughout Washington.
MS. STAHL: Donald Regan learned of the Baker
appointment from television, reportedly blew his fuse
and stormed out of the White House. Mrs. Reagan, who
had sought his departure for over three months, was
said to be ecstatic.
But the damage to President Reagan has been
devastating. A Newsweek poll over the weekend found
32 percent who feel he should consider resigning.
Is changing Chief of Staff enough? We'll ask Tower
Commission member Edmund Muskie, Republican Senator
William Cohen of Maine and Democratic Congressman Lee
Hamilton of Indiana. And we'll hear Vice President
George Bush on an interview he gave on a recent
campaign swing.
President Reagan tries damage control, an issue facing
the nation.
(Commercials)
MS. STAHL: With us now, former Secretary of State
Edmund Muskie, a member of the Tower Commission.
Senator Muskie, I would like to ask you about the
meetings that you had with President Reagan. You, in
your report, described his as forgetful, unaware,
didn't understand.
I think there's concern that you, perhaps, were using
euphemisms to tell us something deeper about the
President's state of mind. Are you worried about the
President's mental state?
SENATOR MUSKIE: Well, I'm not too clear as to the
extent to which he applies his energy, including his
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mental energy, to his job. But at those meetings we
had with him, in each instance, after the usual
pleasantries, he was seated, he looked comfortable, he
looked relaxed and he rlooked more healthy the second
time than the first because of his illness.
MS. STAHL: But what about his grasp of -- can I use
this word -- his grasp of reality?
SENATOR MUSKIE: Well, he was definite in what he
remembered and what he didn't, but what he didn't
remember astonished us because by that time we had
been exposed to a great deal of the story. We
expected him to reinforce some rather obvious
developments, beginning with July of 1985 through the
end of 1985. He did not recall them and he did not
recall meetings that we knew took place at that point.
MS. STAHL: But are you worried about that or do you
think he can --
SENATOR MUSKIE: Of course. Of course that worries us.
To have the President not focusing and not recalling
what he did on these significant occasions is
worrisome.
MS. STAHL: What are you worried about? Are you
worried about his judgment? Are you worried about his
ability to govern? What are you worried about?
SENATOR MUSKIE: Well, I guess you stated it more
strongly than I would be inclined to for this reason.
We're conscious of the fact that he has got -- in the
interest of the country, he's got to recover as much
as he can of what he has lost.
Politically, I doubt that he will ever again be the
dominant figure that he was say six month ago. Now,
until that time, he had effectively pursued his own
priorities, domestic and foreign. But from now on,
the question is, can he continue to do so in a way
that is credible to the country, that will mobilize
the country's support and that will achieve
objectives, especially in the national security area.
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MS. STAHL: You all called on him to get more involved.
SENATOR MUSKIE: Yes.
MS. STAHL:
that?
Do you think that he is capable of doing
SENATOR MUSKIE:
lifetime doing
can really come
his office.
Well, one wonders whether after a
business as he has, whether or not he
to grips with the responsibilities of
MS. STAHL: Did the three of you on the Tower panel,
after you met with the President, sit down and talk
amongst yourselves about his mental capacities?
SENATOR MUSKIE: Not -- no, I wouldn't say that we
treated him as a mental patient or considered him a
mental patient.
MS. STAHL: No? You --
SENATOR MUSKIE: But certainly, we were all appalled by
the absence of the kind of alertness and vigilance to
his job and to these policies that one expects of a
President.
MS. STAHL: But do you think he can go on?
SENATOR MUSKIE: That depends upon how he faces
adversity. This is a season of deep adversity for
him. And whether or not he can mobilize his energies
and go to work -- I know what you're driving at,
Lesley. We do not regard him as a mental case, but we
regard him as a President who didn't do his job.
MS. STAHL: Okay. You know, Vice President Bush said
that the White House is fairly elated that the
President and he were cleared of any wrongdoing. Is
that the way you would characterize the conclusions
about what the President knew in terms of diversion of
monies to the contras?
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SENATOR MUSKIE: I would not. The President is clearly
responsible for the mistakes that were made, and
responsible in a very real way. As far as the Vice
President is concerned, in the story ?that we developed
with the help largely of people's recollections, the
Vice President would be known more for his absence
than his involvement in this whole unfolding tragedy,
and it is a tragedy.
MS. STAHL: Why do you think that staff did not tell
the President what they were up to?
SENATOR MUSKIE: Well, of course, the people who should
have been telling him what was going on are not the
people who are operating this policy. The Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the National
Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff, these are the
people who should have been in a position to tell the
President what was going on. They failed and he did
not -- on his part, he did not pursue that failure to
learn for himself what was happening.
MS. STAHL: But do you know why they didn't tell him?
Is there any sense that you got from all your
interviews what the reason was that they didn't report
to him?
SENATOR MUSKIE: Well, let me take those four people,
if that would be helpful; or maybe five. As far as
the Vice President is concerned, he was not involved.
MS. STAHL: He was not involved? You are saying that?
SENATOR MUSKIE: He was not involved. I mean he
attended the National Security Council meetings but he
was never recorded, in anybody's recollection, as
saying whether he was for or against this policy and
its implementation.
MS. STAHL: Well, didn't Mr. Shultz, in his notes,
write that he thought the Vice President was for it?
SENATOR MUSKIE: I think Shultz did, but recall the
words. He "thought" the Vice President was for it.
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MS. STAHL: Okay.
SENATOR MUSKIE: Now, the Vice President's presence
should have been such that nobody would have to
speculate as to whether he was for it or against it.
He should have made clear whether he was for it or
against it.
Now, there's no written record. So, Mr. Bush says
today that while he was against it, there's nothing to
substantiate or challenge that. But people do not
recall that he took a vigorous active role in this.
As far as Weinberger and Shultz are concerned, they
stated their opposition, clearly did and did so at
length on the three occasions when the National
Security Council met. But then , they distanced
themselves from this. And one had the sense that they
must have known that this policy was being pursued,
but they never pursued it themselves to find out what
was happening, whether results were being achieved.
Let me give you just one "for instance." In January of
1986, this whole policy was reviewed. Up to that
point, the Israelis had been transferring the weapons.
In January, a change took place. We took over the
transfer of weapons and did it directly. This was
discussed on January 7th with all members of the
National Security Council present.
Now, the finding was not signed at that meeting, but
it's clear that the President was going forward. The
thing was signed on January 17th. I think the Vice
President was present at that point. There's no
record that he opposed it. So it was signed. And
part of the initiative that was approved at that time
was this, that a thousand TOWs would be sent as a first
installment and, in return, we expected the release of
the hostages. If that didn't happen, then the whole
thing was supposed to end.
The thousand TOWs were shipped, no hostages were
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released and nobody called the thing up for review.
Nobody.
MS. STAHL: Did you ask the President about that? "Why
didn't you stop it after then?"
SENATOR MUSKIE: No, because we weren't at that point.
MS. STAHL: You know, your report is almost harsher
against Shultz and Weinberger for not getting in there
and fighting against this. You almost suggest they
betrayed the country. It's harsher against them,
really, than you are against Mr. Regan who resigned.
Do you think they should stay on board or do you think
-- what do you think they should do in light of your
criticism in this report?
SENATOR MUSKIE: Well, I think they and the President
have got to decide whether, notwithstanding their
failure in this case, they should continue. I think
there is a problem. The problem is the danger that --
what happens is the complete dismantlement of this
Administration, that that may create more problems
than it solves. So, this is a decision that those
three must make.
MS. STAHL: Let me ask you one final question. What is
the key question or questions that remain in your
mind, because I know you didn't get to complete the
investigation, you just sort of ended when you ended,
right?
SENATOR MUSKIE: The diversion of funds, important. To
the extent of the contra operation in Nicaragua, we
just got on the fringes of that. There were enough
threads that we couldn't pursue. That really needs
careful and thorough investigation because this whole
business of raising money in the private sector,
managing it to get lethal weapons to the contras at a
time that the Congress had prohibited it, that needs to
be thoroughly explored and aired.
Until all of that is unfolded and until the country
knows all of that, we really won't know the full
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extent of this failure of responsibility. And that's
the words we used. This was a failure of
responsibility, from the President through his
principal Cabinet officers, down to those who operated
it.
MS. STAHL: Senator Muskie, thank you very much for
being our guest this morning.
We'll be right back.
(Commercials)
MS. STAHL: Joining us now from New York, Senator
William Cohen of Maine, a member of the Senate Select
Committee on Iran, and here in Washington, Congressman
Lee Hamilton of Indiana, Chairman of the House Select
Committee on Iran.
Let's go first to New York, and Senator Cohen, who has
also shown a great deal of interest in arms control
and ask you what you think about Mr. Gorbachev's
sudden new proposal to delink medium-range missile
arms talks from the Star Wars proposal, which would
mean a separate arms proposal could be negotiated now.
Why do you think he did that at this particular point
in time, Senator?
SENATOR WILLIAM COHEN: Well, first, I think it's a
very positive step as far as the delinking is
concerned. I think we can perhaps try and speculate
about his motivations. Obviously, some will feel that
this is an opportunity for Gorbachev to try and
exploit President Reagan's current difficulties and
seek to push him into an arms control agreement that
might not be in our best interests.
On the other hand, we can speculate that Mr. Gorbachev
himself is in need of some sort of progress in the
arms control field if he is to maintain the kind of
credibility with his own people at home. He might
feel, for example, that if he doesn't push on this
particular level or some level, that he won't get an
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arms control agreement until well after 1988, perhaps
close to 1990 would be more realistic, and by that
time he may have run out of his own political coinage
at that point.
So, we can speculate back and forth. I think rather
than trying to determine motivation we ought to look
at the merits. And looking at the merits, the first
thing we should do is to consult very closely with our
allies to see if they have strong objection or are
strongly in favor, to reassure them that this would
not represent a decoupling, and to then proceed with a
decision that's in our best national security interests
and that of our alliance.
MS. STAHL: I take it though, you are basically for it
at this time?
SENATOR COHEN: Well, there are some details to be
worked out. Obviously, the so-called zero-zero option
is something this Administration had been pushing for
some time. The questions remain concerning
short-range-or shorter-range missiles.
Those details are not unimportant and would have to be
resolved, but I think it's a very positive step
forward, provided the allies are reassured that this is
not, in any way, a symbolic or militarily delinking of
the operation of our security arrangement with them.
MS. STAHL: Congressman Hamilton, is this a good time
or a dangerous time for President Reagan to start back
on the arms control negotiation trail with the
Russians?
REP. LEE HAMILTON: Well, I think the Soviet Union has
given the President an extraordinary opportunity here.
I don't know whether we should jump at it, I don't
think we should, but it's quite clear that unusual
things are going on in the Soviet Union. I agree with
Bill that I think the Soviet leader wants an
agreement. I think President Reagan wants an
agreement. So, we should test the Soviet Union and
see what the possibilities are and be very careful, of
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course, to protect the national security interests of
the United States.
MS. STAHL: Okay. I want to ask you both about the
Tower Commission. But first, Senator Cohen, Robert
Gates, who was the President's nomination to head the
CIA has been tainted, if you will, by the scandal in
some way because he was there at the CIA as Mr.
Casey's number two man while this was going on.
Do you think the President should withdraw Mr. Gates'
name?
SENATOR COHEN: I think we should wait and certainly
have consultations with Howard Baker. We're having a
hearing next Wednesday to examine some of the further
questions involving Mr. Gates, concerning, for
example, whether or not political pressure was brought
to bear upon the Special National Intelligence
Estimate, the so-called SNEI. If that were the case,
then I think that Mr. Gates would have a good deal of
difficulty being confirmed.
But I think it's a bit too early at this point. It's
some factor that the Administration. President Reagan
and Howard Baker will have to take into account.
MS. STAHL: You have no advice? You're not leaning in
one direction or another?
SENATOR COHEN: I think I would like to wait until more
evidence is in so that -- Mr. Gates is an obviously
very competent individual and someone who has spent 20
years of his life with that agency. I think we owe
him a little bit more in terms of an opportunity to
explain his role. There are some questions and he
will have to answer those questions, but I believe
that that's something that should be takenup with the
Administration and not for Congress to decide at this
point.
MS. STAHL: All right.
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Congressman Hamilton, on the question of your
committee's investigation into this whole Iran
operation, Bob Woodward at The Washington Post --
every Sunday he comes out with another story. This
Sunday his story is that that memo that North wrote,
Oliver North, about the diversion of money to the
contras was a memo intended for the President. Do you
know about this memo? Did you know it was intended
for the President and does this change in any way the
focus of your investigation?
REP. HAMILTON: Well, I knew about the memo. I also
know that the path of that memo is not clear. We
don't know who really saw it. There's a lot we don't
know about the memo we would like to know. But it's
an important memorandum, obviously, and the Select
Committees will be looking at it with great care.
MS. STAHL: In other words, the question of what the
President knew about the diversion is still a
question?
REP. HAMILTON: Oh, sure. Yes, indeed. It's probably
one of the more important questions that we must yet
answer.
MS. STAHL: Okay. I want to ask you both about this
question of immunity for both your committees. I know
that both committees have granted immunity to some
lower levels, but more and more people are saying that
if you don't grant immunity to North and Poindexter
that you'll never get to the bottom of it.
Now, are you both inclined to do that in order to get
the full story out or are you inclined to wait because
they may be the highest up who know and allow the
prosecutions to go forward?
First Senator Cohen.
SENATOR COHEN: I think the question is, when will we
get to the bottom of the story. We could wait weeks
or certainly months and have this drag on well into
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the summer and fall months before answering those
kinds of questions.
I think the question we have to decide is whether or
not we want to accelerate that process by moving more
quickly and considering the issue for immunity for
either Colonel North or Admiral Poindexter or others.
It's a question we have to address very quickly
because of the time factors involved. And I suspect
that in the next three to four weeks, we'll be dealing
with this issue.
So, I think you use immunity as a last resort and not
as a first resort. We may find at some point along
this investigation that the time has come to consider
some limited form of immunity ?after consulting with a
special prosecutor, the so-called independent counsel.
He himself is now under constitutional attack in the
court.
But nonetheless, we want to make sure that he has
enough evidence locked away in his files so that he
could establish criminality, if such exists, without
reference to any testimony that might come from the
mouths of Colonel North or Admiral Poindexter.
MS. STAHL: Congressman, in your mind, what's more
important, allowing those prosecutions to go forward
or having the Senate find out what happened?
REP. HAMILTON: We'll have to balance that. But my own
sense is, you should give us time to go through the
volumes of evidentiary material that is before us to
see what we can find out about the conduct of Admiral
Poindexter and Colonel North.
Keep in mind, just a week or so ago, we had revealed a
possible very serious crime, the destruction of
evidence. Now, we don't know what's ahead of us here.
Give us a little more time. We all know we're going
to have to confront the question of immunity to these
two gentlemen and I agree that probably sooner rather
than later. But also keep in mind that the
independent counsel is saying to us, "Don't grant
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immunity yet, I need more time for investigation." We
simply have to balance these needs that Senator Cohen
has set out.
MS. STAHL: Okay. We have about one minute left. Can
you both, very, very quickly, tell us what you think
the most important thing President Reagan has to say
in his speech this week to the American people?
Senator?
SENATOR COHEN: I think he's got to come forward and
admit his responsibility for what took place, the fact
that he authorized the program, whether last August --
August of '85, or January of '86, and accept the full
responsibility for the acts and excesses of his
subordinates.
Secondly, I think he has to take a strong affirmative
action in gaining control ?over the White House.
MS. STAHL: Very quickly, Congressman.
REP. HAMILTON: The President is facing the most
serious crisis of his presidency. He must, in a word,
demonstrate his control, that he's in charge. He must
also accept responsibility.
MS. STAHL: Thank you both very, very much.
We'll be back with a short interview with Vice
President Bush.
(Commercials)
MS. STAHL: Reporter Joe Day of CBS affiliate WNEV in
Boston, interviewed Vice President Gebrge Bush on a
campaign stop in New Hampshire Friday night and asked
him if the President is as unaware as the Tower
Commission portrayed him.
VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: In the first place, he's a
delegator. He delegates. And any time you delegate,
why there's certain -- you put more trust in certain
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subordinates. I think the report made that very,
very clear.
And so, changes have been made in the NSC structure.
More changes will be made in the NSC structure. And
out of things that are bad come things that are good.
And what's good is going to be a tightened NSC
structure, but still one that's independent and
reports to the President. We cannot permit the NSC to
be put in as some new bureau reporting to Congress or
something of that nature.
MR. DAY: Had you been more heavily involved, do you
think this could have been averted? Maybe that's an
unfair question.
VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: No, it's a good question and I'd
love to give you a self-serving answer, but I don't
think the system worked that way. If the President
had been told some of the things that are in that
report, they wouldn't have happened. But he was cut
off and that's one thing the Tower Committee shows.
So, I'd love to say, with the benefit of total 20/20
hindsight, that I, in my infinite wisdom, could have
stopped it. But I don't think that's fair. I think I
see things in that report that I never would have
permitted to happen and I know the President feels the
same way.
MR. DAY: One more quick question, sir. Does this
affect at all your Presidential possibilities?
VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, it makes them much better.
MR. DAY: Why?
VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Because I think some people out
there were wondering what was the Vice President's
involvement. I thought Senator Muskie put that very
well. I think the report speaks to it, makes very
clear that I wasn't involved in some of the things
that people consider wrong.
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But that's not what's important to me. What's
important to me is the success of this 'Administration
because I am linked to that. I think the President is
now much freer to move this country forward from a
base of support. And all this pounding -- he's 55
percent in the polls. Now, you tell me a president at
this time in his presidency that wouldn't have
rejoiced to have that.
We're going to get this thing moving, believe me.
MS. STAHL: Vice President Bush.
That's our broadcast. I'm Lesley Stahl. Have a good
week.
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