UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01M00147R000100190002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 22, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIA?I'- . ,
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3637 ~'?-"~
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EXECtiTIVE SECRETARIAT
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ER 89-3952
25 Sep 89
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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L-108-IMP
Executiv Secretary
25 Sep 89
Date
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NO. NSD 2 3
COPY # 8 (czA)
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
INFORMATION
Notice
The attached document contains classified National Security Council
Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by
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Access List
DATE NAME DATE NAME
25 Sep 89 F.R FILE
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CIA Copy # 2
NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE P
THE CHAIRMAN,,;,~~p~'"'~~ IEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTO. NITED TES ARMS CONTROL AND
SECURITY AFFA
THE SECRETAR '? REASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
THE SECRET
DISARMAME
THE DIRECTO
For forty years the Unit
will to containing the m
communism. Containment
strategy born of the condi
States recognized that, whi
fitted its power and
ogical threat of Soviet
in itself; it was a
postwar world. The United
ilitary power was not the
ity, it was the most immediate
and grave one. The U.S. challenge was to prevent the spread of
Soviet communism while rebuilding the economic, political and
social strength of the world's long-standing and new democracies.
Those who crafted the strategy of containment also believed that
the Soviet Union, denied the course of external expansion, would
ultimately have to face and react to the internal contradictions
of its own inefficient, repre nd inhumane system. (C)
only threat to international st
This strategy provided an
Western democracy and fre
goal of containment has be
prosperous societies in We
world -- the Soviet milit
in the last two decades
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ar for the growth of
While the most important
development of free and
and in other parts of the
not diminished. Rather,
n has increased its
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military power across the ~ ct o`~u apabilities, drawing on
that power to exacerbate 1' a li s and to conduct a global
foreign policy opposed to s rn nt` ests. The Soviet Union
has stood apart from the i r n.` order and often worked to
undermine it . (C)
The character of the cha` es: akin la in the Soviet Union
leads to the possibility ha anew.` ra ay now be upon us. We
may be able to move beyo c i nt a U.S. policy that
actively promotes the int rat f Soviet Union into the
existing international sys The, .S.R. has indicated an
interest in rapprochement w ternational order and
criticized major tenets of its own postwar political-military
policy. (C)
These are words that we can only applaud. But a new relationship
with the international system can not simply be declared by
Moscow. Nor can it be granted by others. It must be earned
through the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy and
reinforced by behavior consisten
order to which the Soviet Un
repeatedly violated since.
fruits of membership in th
ideological principles and
overthrow of that communit
instability to a product
a long-term goal that ca
American strength and wi
is not designed to help a'
the Soviet Union. We see
Soviet military force struc
which can only be reversed at
ribed in 1945 but has
Union cannot enjoy the
f states while holding
conduct that promote the
the family of nations is
from a position of
reativity. Our policy
der or set of leaders in
damental alterations in
"tutions, and practices
cost, economically and
politically, to the Soviet Union. If we succeed, the ground
for cooperation will widen, while that for conflict narrows.
The U.S.-Soviet relationship may still be fundamentally
competitive, but it will be less militarized and safer. (C)
We are in a period of transition and uncertainty. We will not
react to reforms and changes
yet taken place, nor will w
We will be vigilant, recog
governed by authoritarian
forces remain a threat to
But the United States will
step, issue by issue and
accordance with the high
itself has enunciated.
willing partner in build
foundation of that relat
reforms lead to condition
relationship between Mosco
he Soviet Union is still
hat its powerful armed
and that of our allies.
e Soviet Union step by
institution to behave in
t the Soviet leadership
the United States a
tionship. The
firmer if Soviet
port a new cooperative
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with the principles of world
Soviet Union that have not
o. every Soviet initiative.
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Deployment of a Sovie
much less threatening:
Soviet Union has leg
military power is fad
those interests. (S)
Renunciation of the
source of internatio
States believes that the
y interests but Soviet
that needed to defend
lass conflict is a
establishment of a
that pledge . ( S )
Adherence to the obligatiori"`hat it undertook at the end of
World War II to permit self-determination for the countries
of East-Central Europe. Moscow must authoritatively
renounce the "Brezhnev Doctrine" and reaffirm the pledge of
signatories to the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state. (C)
of the world and serio
ameliorate conflict,
Soviet clients who do
interests of their ne
Participation in coo
proliferation of ba
nuclear, chemical a
Willingness to coope
pressing global prob
in drugs and narcotics
environment. (C)
gn policy in other regions
ation in efforts to
nging pressure to bear on
e the legitimate security
s to stop the
ethnology as well as
pons. (C)
ited States to address
the international trade
and dangers to the
Institutionalization of democratic internal laws and human
rights practices, political pluralism, and a more market-
oriented economic structure, which will establish a firm
Soviet domestic base for a more productive and cooperative
relationship with the free nations of the world. (C)
The United States must mai
strengthen deterrence and
military-technological ad
not to put pressure on a
superiority. Rather, U.
a hedge against uncertai
Union and to impress upo
pursuing a responsible cd
nothing can be gained by t`
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military forces that
ecurity of our allies and
o protect and sustain its
purpose of our forces is
Homy or to seek military
zes the need to provide
opments in the Soviet
ership the wisdom of
ust be convinced that
a more militaristic
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policy. Most importantly,`er' n ~'Y. ces are a reliable and
credible guarantee of our fe" our commitment to the
security of our allies in a ce` f oviet forces that, even if
restructured, will be large`, n~? er~. (S)
At the same time, the Uni
control agreements with
control is not an end in
robust military forces.
that our arms control pro
defense strategy. We se
seek verifiable arms
and its allies. Arms
t take the place of
s Government will ensure
istent with our overall
Contribute to stability at lower numerical levels, where
desirable, and encourage restructuring of Soviet forces to a
less threatening force posture.
Emphasize transparency in our military relationship with the
Soviet Union. The goal of greater transparency will be
served through verification and confidence building
measures, including increas contacts between the military
officers of the United d the Soviet Union. (C)
The spread of nuclear, the a ~ b logical weapons and the
problem of ballistic missi p li r' ion are increasingly
threatening to our securit
I direct the Secretary o
Lead an interagency ff t, in oo ination with the review
of U.S. proliferate po 'cy, d elop a detailed plan for
non-proliferation co era it he Soviet Union,
including the boundar of suc operation. (C)
Political-Diplomatic Ob-iectives
Regional Issues
U.S. policy will encourage fundamental political and economic
reform, including freely contested elections, in East-Central
Europe, so that states in that region may once again be
productive members of a prosp eaceful, and democratic
Europe, whole and free from r o viet intervention. Our
policy of differentiating ng st ropean states based on
their internal political a e 'c rocesses, and our support
for the CSCE process, will. el i h achievement of this goal. (C)
We will engage the Soviet ion a iety of regional issues
not only to seek their r lu ut so in order to test the
reality of new Soviet th ki and et r Soviet behavior
matches rhetoric in key ea aroun th world. We also shall
seek to limit the expanse o t er through arms
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transfers, force projectio =~ an ro ~ forces by continued U.S.
political, economic and mi. t ' p t for friends and allies,
and for freedom fighters. )
I direct the Secretary of,.- ate:
Consider the most a' ro ~ fate "'? ys';? o engage the Soviets in
discussions on reso in' regio 1 nflicts and eliminating
threatening Soviet ~ it i uence around the world. (C)
Transnational
The United States and the Soviet Union share an interest in reversing
the spread of drugs and narcotics. The United States must challenge
the Soviet Union to refrain from directly or indirectly supporting or
training terrorists and insist that its allies do the same. (S)
I direct the Secretary of State to:
Lead an interagency effor develop a detailed plan for
cooperating with the So n on these matters, including the
boundaries of such co ration ven security and intelligence
constraints. (S)
Examine ways in whi th t ion and the United States
might cooperate on vi men i` ues. (C)
Explore through the 'onal Sp Council ways that the United
States and the Soviet jointly use space to advance
our mutual interests. A p icularly promising area might be
research on the environment in support of multilateral efforts to
protect our planet. (C)
Bilateral Issues
We will encourage an expansion of contacts between the Soviet and
American peoples at all level, means of promoting Western ideas
of democracy and free enter e. will insist on full reciprocity
in all areas of bilateral op io ith the Soviet Union and in the
treatment of U.S. and Sovi al epresentatives. (S)
The United States supports
strategic trade on strict
economic policy toward M
our overall approach to
prepared to streamline,
list. In the longer run
political and economic cry
reduce the legislative, a
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on of mutually beneficial non-
erms. At the same time, our
nsidered within the context of
In the short run, we are
th our allies, the COCOM
nion meets appropriate
ted States will remove or
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strategic trade and normal.." mme cial nd financial ties. The U.S.
private sector would then ve; portunities to pursue expanded
commercial relations with e vi` ~ ion, except where COCOM
controls on strategic trad e'~ i lace. Increased cooperation
will be revocable in the e: t of a r rsal in Soviet policy. (S)
The Secretary of State, aw' on` he? departments and agencies,
is directed to:
Encourage public deb' o'~ ~ so anik and consult closely with
Congress and the rele t publi ~ roues. With the requisite
support, we will consi~ r of the Jackson-Vanik amendment
if the Soviet Union codifies emigration laws that meet
international standards and demonstrates its intent to implement
them faithfully. (S)
Democratization
The United States is encouraged by emerging trends in the internal
political processes in the Soviet Union. Our concern about the
character of the Soviet syst denies its people basic
political and economic libe es an rsues a policy of expansion
abroad, is at the heart of: r er ces with Moscow. Let no one
doubt the sincerity of the a ca p ple and their government in our
desire to see reform succe i t Soviet Union. We welcome the
positive changes that have ke a and we will continue to
encourage greater recogni n an 'ghts, market incentives, and
free elections. To the e ha ov t practices are modified and
institutions are built b ed n pop ar' ill, we may find that the
nature of the threat its f ch ed though any such
transformation could take
Where possible, the United d promote Western values and
ideas within the Soviet Union, n the spirit of provocation or
destabilization, but as a means to lay a firm foundation for a
cooperative relationship. I direct the United States Information
Agency, within budgetary limitations, to find new ways to promote the
flow of information about American institutions and ideals to the
Soviet Union. A special effort should be made to encourage private
sector initiatives in support of this objective. (C)
Review carefully Sovi c an with the commitments that led
to our conditional ag e t tend the 1991 Moscow human
rights conference.
Develop new initiat' s ar of U.S.-Soviet exchanges
designed to promote ov' un st ding of the rule of law,
free-market economi' pr ciple U business management
concepts, and other i 1 of ee Western societies. (S)
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S~rRFT
Public Diplomacy
to communicate our messag
abroad. Our goal is a c
policy toward Moscow. W
agenda as well as the fa
on the basis of long-sup
Soviet Union is now adapt
Conclusion
ort clearly and responsibly
viet relations at home and
sible and sustainable
comprehensiveness of our
ionship is moving forward
jectives to which the
The goal of restructuring the relationship of the Soviet Union to
the international system is an ambitious task. The responsibility
for creating the conditions to move beyond containment to integrate
the Soviet Union into the family of nations lies first and foremost
with Moscow. But the United States will do its part, together with
our allies, to challenge and test Soviet intentions and, while
maintaining our strength, to work to place Soviet relations with the
West on a firmer, more coope ~{`' urse than has heretofore been
possible. (U)
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SEGRET
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