LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM DAVE DURENBERGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000200240003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 5, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SUP
SUSPENSE ar
TO #13: Please prepare appropriate response after
discussing with DDCI.
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
a
2
DDCI
X
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EXDIR
X
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D/ICS
5
DDI
X
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DDA
X
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
X
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
X
11
IG
12
Compt
x
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
X
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
18
ES
X
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2
2
22
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?a U W!Wwr."t MMIESOTA CNARNIAN
ZTKICK J. LEANT. VERMONT. VICE CNAIMIAII
WKAIAM V MOTH. JR. DELAWARE LLOYD SENTSEN. TEXAS
WILLIAM S. CONEN. MAINS
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FRANK MUIIROWSXI, ALASKAEAGLETON. MISSOIRK
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SERNMIO F. McMA$ON. STAFF DSECTON
USC D. NEWSOK MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
9timted States senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTEWGENCE
WASHINGTON. DC 20610
March 5, 1986
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 2 0505
Dear Bill:
Again, let me thank you for including me in the
Intelligence Community Conference on the 27th.
the discussions of what you, as a Communit I found
the Committee and what we expect from you to bepeCt from
enlightening and useful. This relationship is, of
course, established by law but legal definitions are
sketchy at best. The law does not and should not define
what Bob Gates has described most aptly as the "social
contract" between us. As I see it, this contract is built
on three pillars:
o Understanding and appreciation of each
other's mission, operating environment
and objective;
o Mutual trust and confidence expressed
in public -- as well as private; and
o Communication
It is clear that the Intelligence-Community looks
to the Committee to share the special burden that comes
with knowledge of the most sensitive secrets in government
a burden which carries with it a unique and special
responsibility. The Community expects that because of
our understanding of intelligence, we will act as a buffer
between those who do not understand and appreciate it and
the InteigenewComnunith. The Committee should, therefore
s and tall when he difference between myth and '
relity, truth and falsehood -- stand tall with the press,
the Administration or even our colleagues.
ntel
Community expects to be given the benefit ofTtheldoubtlgence
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The Honorable William J. Casey
March 5, 1986
Page Two
by the Committee because we know firsthand the integrity
and dedication of Agency personnel.
The Committee should be expected to speak out on those
things which the Intelligence Community is doing well. Public
praise and private criticism is the epitome of the
demonstration of our trust and confidence. That is our half
of the social contract.
But the contract has two parties. From the Committee's
perspective, these same expectations pertain to the
Intelligence Community's reactions to the oversight
process. The reaction should be based on the recognition
of the Committee's unique role in assuring the American
people and our colleagues in the Senate that we are
conducting evenhanded, objective oversight of activity to
which they are not privy. Our need for full and open
communication by the Intelligence Community flows from that
unique role, as well as from the desire of Congress to make
our intelligence system as effective as possible.
The trust the public has in the Intelligence Community
is, in large measure, a function of the trust the public has
in the integrity of the oversight Committees. It is our
expectation that there will be no presumption that the
Committee is irresponsible in the discharge of their special
responsibility to protect the Nation's secrets -- or assumption
that anything other than enhancement of the national security
motivates the actions of our Members or staff. That is your
half of the contract.
In sum, it is fundamental to our trust in the Community
that you have absolute willingness to share with us the
information we need to do our job. It is fundamental to
your trust in us that we always use the information
responsibly. And it is fundamental to our relationship that
both sides base their actions and statements upon that trust.
In looking back over the past year, it seems to me that
this social contract- has not been strengthened as much as I
had hoped -- not because of any ill intention by either side,
but rather due to a weakness in the third pillar -- communication.
I think the fundamental problem is the tendency to allow
someone else to interpret views or positions, attitudes or
reactions. One example is to believe bad news from some one
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The Honorable William J. Casey
March 5, 1986
Page Three
who is not privy to all the facts. Another is reliance on
the press as interpreter. I have spoken often on the
positive aspects of intelligence, the quality and dedication
of the people, and the value to the policymaker of
intelligence product. In particular, all my public
statements in reference to the Intelligence Strategy were
designed to achieve what Leo Cherne, in his recent speech,
said was vital to the future of intelligence:
"The functioning of U.S. foreign
intelligence will remain seriously hampered
until the American people better understand
the nature of the role of foreign
intelligence, the importance of its
functioning, and its indispensability if
peace is to be preserved."
Despite this, the press continues to print stories
on the Strategy with a critical and controversial slant.
I would hope that no one in the Intelligence Community
would accept Times' interpretation of the Committee view-
on the Strategy any more than the Committee would accept
the Washington Times' statement that quoted the DCI as saying
the CIA simply "rewrote the Agency's plans to keep
Durenberger happy." There are numerous other examples.
I would only observe that since we both know how inaccurate
the press is when they report on events with which we are
very familiar, we should be equally skeptical of other
stories about each other. This is, I think, the basic
message John McMahon articulated so well for us on Thursday.
The strength of this social contract is fundamental
to the effectiveness of oversight and of the intelligence
process. With that objective, I intend to share the thoughts
in this letter with the other members of the Community, the
Committee, and its staf -c T-Tio~se- you can do the same with
appropriate personnel in he Agency`s
SincpAply,'
Dave Durenberger
Chairman
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