CASE OF THE BEHEADED RUSSIANS: HOW U.S. MONITORS WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000504830008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 14, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000504830008-5
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER (CA.
14 January 1980
By John P. Wallach .
Examiner Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - A US. intelli-
gence report that 35 Soviet military
advisers were beheaded in Afghani-
stan about six weeks before the
invasion points out several problems in
the - release of information to the
public.
The main problems are-
a, How does the government get its
information?
Q, How good are its sources?
a What can the public believe?
Marshall Shulman, the State Depart-
ment's Soviet expert who is considered
a supporter of detente, said. that the
Soviets were beheaded in Herat, near
the Iranian border. He added that their
heads were carried around on spears
in a torchlight parade through the
- bazaars of Herat.
"If you're looking to apologize for
the Soviet action. you may believe
that," a high-ranking White House
official said when told of the behea&
ing report. "On the other hand you
may be intensely skeptical about the
reliability of the source."
National security adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski, for example, is known to
believe that Shulman is inclined to be
too soft on the Soviets.
Thus, it can be asked whether
Shulman made the report to help put
the Soviet invasion in perspective"
and put brakes on U.S. actions over the
invasion. Unfortunately, the answer
will probably never be known.
Shulman said that he got the
information from the State- Depart-
ment's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR) - the in-house intelli-
gence gathering organization that sifts
information from the cL& Defense
Intelligence Agency and National Se-
curity Agency.
INR does technical intercepting
plus the translation,. but does no
intelligence gathering.
Asked where INR would have
from one of its sources ? through a
:clandestine channel such as a CIA
operative in another capital like Isla-
mabad (Pakistan)."
..- There can be and usually are
conflicting intelligence reoorts. These
create a credibility problem for the
White House or State Department
-spokesman and ultimately- for the
government. So the spokesman, ac-
cording to press officer David Passage,
"will reflect only the official consen-
That, he explained, "will almost
inevitably be conservative. It will he.
the lowest common denominator upon
which a majority of intelligence ana-
lysts and pobcyir: leers can agree."
How then does it happen that last
Monday, for example; State Depart-
ment spokesman Hodding Carter esti-
mated that there are 85,000 Soviet
troops in Afghanistan, while ABC
News reported there are well over
100,000?
And that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul
was quoted in a New York Times story
last Tuesday as putting the official
figure at a much more conservative
30,(00 to 40,000?
"An individual reporter is basing
his information on cultivated sources
like someone on the (State Depart-
ment's) Soviet desk," Passage said. `But
that will be valid only insofar as it
reflects the views of the, person or
persons to whom he talked.
"Our process, namely that of a
spokesman - be it Hodding Carter
(State Department), Tom Ross (the
Pentagon) or Jody Powell (the White
House) - is a different one. It consists
of asking questions of the bureaucracY
in order to get a clear, coordinated
response to come back down in the
form of 'guidance.'
"Our procedure would be to go to.
INR or the Bureau of Near East and
Asian Affairs and ask them point-blank
what is the most recent estimate of the
number of Soviet troops in Afghani-
received the information on the be- scan?
bedding of the Soviets, a State Depart- "They will then go to CIA, DLA,
ment analyst explained NSA, NSC and any other sources to put
"That would be based on a field together something that accurately
report that came in from the CIA, DIA reflects the number of troops that are
or our embassy in Kabul, based ? there. Bingo. Drew Middleton (New
iresumably on an eyewitness who told York TSmes) or someone with a
reporting officer in the field. hawkish bent may have his own
"It could have been. an embassy sources within the Senate Select Com
you say?' That person may be acting on
fragmentary information and will say
there are 115,000 troops. Maybe there.
are 115,000.
"But until there is a new consensus.
in the intelligence community on the
higher figure, the official spokesman.
will be reflecting what the consensus!
is. He will not be reflecting either the,
higher or lower figure."
He conceded that "we were very
slow to confirm the existence of a
Soviet brigade in Cuba."
He said the State Department could
not do that officially "until there was a
consensus within the intelligence com-
munity on evidence of -a brigade
command structure.
`'We were not prepared to confirm
what some autonomous intelligences
expert decided on his own." t
How then was Hodding Carter last'
Monday able to arrive at the figure of'
B.5,000 Soviet troops? Carter himself
"has no intelligence-estimating capabil-,
ity," Passage explained. "He uses what-
ever is provided to him thoroughly'
.cleared by whoever. ought to have'
some influence."
In practical terms, he said, "this
means NSA operating on reports from
our embassy in Kabul; 'NN. operatingi
on the basis of intelligence gathered by'
the U.S. intelligence community and.,
CIA, summaries:
"They will include NSA radio moni
toring of aircraft flying into and out of
Kabul and-one-or more Soviet airfields,;
monitoring. of radio intercepts bet
tween Soviet units such as who has;
been instructed by Moscow- to send
how many men where. .
"It may include overhead photogra-
phy by reconnaissance such as SR-71
and U-2 flights, conversations with
friendly governments in the area an:
reports from observers on the ground,
for example, a U.S. Army attache
talking to an Indian Army counterpart.
about reports from their embassy ink
Kabul.
- In sum, there is a wealth of
material," Passage said- ; i
And that is where the problerics[
begin - interpreting the "raw intelli.
-gene data."...., . _ . _~
cer or U. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000504830008-5