SINGAPORE: SOME ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE UK MILITARY WITHDRAWAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010081-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: October 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Singapore: Some Economic Implications
of the UK Military Withdrawal
Secret
ER IM 68-131
October 1968
copy N2 94
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GIIOJP 1
E clud.d from automatic
downpradinp and d,ciouification
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Singapore:
Some Economic Implications
of the UK Military Withdrawal
Summary
By 1971, Singapore will have to plan and implement
measures to compensate for the loss of the British
military establishment whose bases occupy 12 percent
of the island's total land area, generate 20 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP), and provide direct
employment for 54,000 of Singapore's 2 million people.
Singapore is making a determined effort to minimize
this considerable blow to its economy. During the
four-year transition period, government spending is
planned to increase by $312 million (including $120
million in loans and grants from the British), the
large naval base and probably the airbases will be
converted to civilian use, and private investment will
be encouraged in tourism and manufacturing. These
factors and the basic strength of Singapore's economy
should enable the island to make the transition with-
out serious economic consequences.
The withdrawal comes at a time when the economy of
Singapore is expanding rapidly, as the result of an
aggressive government program to industrialize as well
as a substantial inflow of foreign capital. Singa-
pore's economy has been shaken twice previously in the
1960's: in 1963 because of Indonesia's policy of con-
frontation with Malaysia and again in 1965 when Singa-
pore opted out of the Federation with Malaysia.
Despite these setbacks, Singapore's GDP has grown at
a rate of 9 percent a year since 1960. Even with this
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and
was coordinated wi l h the Office of Current Intelligence
and the Office of National Estimates.
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rate of expansion, however, the economy in the past
has failed to provide enough jobs for the growing
labcr force, leading to an increase in unemployment
which has become the island's major economic problem.
With about 10 percent of the island's labor force
unemployed, the withdrawal would be disruptive to
Singapore's economy if there were not offsetting
factors. Roughly one-fourth of the base workers are
Malays and Indians and, by agreement between London
and Singapore, they will be discharged first and
encouraged to leave the country. Expanding tourism
will absorb some of the slack in the service indus-
tries, which now cater to British servicemen. About
13,000 of the base employees are supervisors or skilled
industrial personnel who should have little problem
finding jobs as the bases are converted to non-military
uses and the industrial sector continues to expand.
The conversion of the Royal Naval Base to a commer-
cial ship repairing concern is already under way, and
prospects look bright for turning the airbases into
regional aircraft maintenance and repair facilities
(see Figure 1). The government's plan to increase
local spending substantially over the next four years
will help to offset the recessionary influence of the
withdrawal.
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w..dlune.
o0
.1 ,sagulung I
SINGAPORE
Railroad
Road
} Airfield
It Principal port
0
of
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ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
it Petroleum refinery 1 Petroleum bulk storage
0 Rubber plantation
Thermal electric powerplants Substations
50.000-kilowatt and over ? Major
A Other
- Transmission line
N - j6 N-_ I A
10 Miles
J
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The Setting
1. Singapore, an island country smaller than
Hong Kong, has been independent for just over three
years. In June 1959 the United Kingdom granted the
island internal self-government under Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew, leader of the Peoples' Action Party
(PAP). In 1963, Singapore joined with Malaya and
the Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak to form the
Federation of Malaysia. But the racial antagonism
between the Malays and the largely Chinese population
of Singapore and the increasing friction between Lee
and Federation leaders in Kuala Lumpur was too deep,
leading Singapore to withdraw from the Federation in
August 1965.
2. Traditionally the island has been the leading
entrepet port in Southeast Asia, but this role was
changing even before the breakup of Malaysia. The
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flow of goods between the less developed countries
the region and the developed countries of the
world via Singapore is declining in importance, ac-
counting for only about 13 percent of the country's
GDP in 1967 (see Table 1 and Figure 2). Singapore is
gradually becoming an entrep8t/manufacturer by process-
ing many of the raw materials which pass through its
ports, although the local Chinese businessmen are
traditionally traders, and many of them are reluctant
to move into manufacturing. But the recent problems
with Communist agitators in Hong Kong have encouraged
some investors there to examine opportunities in Singa-
pore, and this may help to accelerate investment in
manufacturing.
Figure 2
SINGAPORE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1966
Agriculture and Fisheries $, Wh0%1a/p
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3. Singapore has benefited over the years from
a substantial British military presence. The island's
officials have long known that the British eventually
would leave, and London's announcement in 1967 that
British forces east of Suez would be withdrawn by
the mid-1970's came as no surprise. Indeed, Singa-
pore's defense planning after the break with Malaysia
assumed that the presence of British forces could
not be counted on beyond 1975. The shock came with
the UK announcement in January 1968 that withdrawal
had been moved forward to 1971. After an initial
period of threats of reprisal, Singapore began to
work out programs to take up the expected slack in
the economy.
The UK Military Presence
4. The UK military establishment in Singapore
was and is impressive in terms of the number of people
and the size of the installations involved. In April
1967 the United Kingdom had 28,800 uniformed personnel,
2,000 civilians, and 3,300 Gurkhas stationed in Singa-
pore. The oases occupy 17,069 acres, or 12 percent
of the island's total land area. About 54,000 local
personnel were employed in early 1967, including
persons employed directly by the bases, locally en-
listed personnel (90 percent of whom were Malays not
holding Singapore citizenship) , domestics, and persons
employed by contractors working on the bases. Prob-
ably as many more were indirectly dependent on the
British for jobs.
5. The direct expenditures attributable to the
bases and to UK personnel in Singapore in 1966 (the
last year for which complete figures are available)
totaled about $187 million. These expenditures
generated roughly 20 percent of national income and
represent a valuable source of foreign exchange (see
Table 2). Singapore runs a chronic deficit on its
balance of trade, which is made up by a surplus in
services, consisting largely of the British military
expenditures.
Population and Employment Problems
6. Unemployment is Singapore's major economic
problem and the greatest potential threat to stabil-
ity. There are no government statistics on the size
of the labor force or the number of unemployed; how-
ever, a survey made by the University of Singapore in
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1966 and data from the Labor Exchange suggest that
about 60,000 people are now unemployed and that this
represents roughly 10 percent of the labor force.
Probably at least an equal number are underemployed.
7. After World War II, Singapore's birth rate
soared and became one of the world's highest. While
population growth remained high throughout most of
the 19501s, it has declined from 4.4 percent in 1959
to 2.2 percent in 1967. The government's goal is to
reduce the rate of population growth to 1.2 percent
by the end of 1970, a goal which may be reached by
1971 or 1972. The reduction in the birth rate should
soon begin to ease the burden on Singapore's educa-
tion system, but for a number of years at least it
will not ease the island's major problem of a large
number of young people entering the labor force
annually (see Table 3) .
8. Singapore has an unbalanced age distribu-
tion -- more than half of the island's 2 million
people are under 20 years of age. Each year, more
than 50,000 people reach working age, and the number
is expected to swell to 60,000 by 1972. The labor
force participation rate in the 15-to-19 age group
is 44 percent for males and 25 percent for females
(comparable rates for Hong Kong in 1961 were 55 per-
cent and 48 percent) . Thus 18,000 to 20,000 young
people will be entering the labor force annually
between now and 1972. Just to hold unemployment to
the present rate, about 70,n00 new jobs will have to
be created by 1972. Although the economy has grown
at an average of 9 percent a year since 1960, the
unemployment rate has almost doubled during that
time.
Singapore and Malaysia
9. Singapore's domestic market is too small
for the development of a viable industrial sector.
The Federation with Malaysia was seen as a partial
solution to this problem. Even at the time of the
1965 break, both sides promised full economic co-
operation, and many hoped a common market might still
be formed. But economic cooperation has not developed,
and prospects for a common market are dim. Although
Malaysia is still Singapore's most important trading
partner, accounting for one-fourth of the total,
trade has declined since separation. In the first
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The Singapone Hanbon
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I n the Fonegnound, the Singapone Cu4.tom4 Shed
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five months of 1968, Singapore's exports to West
Malaysia were down 17 percent and imports 10 percent
from the same period in 1965. Trade is expected to
continue to decline in relative, if not absolute,
terms as Malaysia raises tariff barriers to protect
its own processing industries and ports. Singapore
traditionally served a large hinterland in West
Malaysia with imports from third countries coming
via Singapore. Malaysia has been successful in re-
directing some of this traffic to West Malaysian
ports but has not succeeded in finding other outlets
for Malaysian rubber, which continues to be processed
in Singapore (see Tables 4, 5, and 6).
10. Aside from a decline in transit trade, Singa-
pore probably has not suffered from its break with
the Federation of Malaysia. Economic integration
with Malaysia would have had advantages in terms of
market size, but the Chinese business community in
Singapore would have been restricted in this larger
market by the Malay-dominated federal government.
Programs to promote economic integration within
Malaysia were being implemented very slowly, if at
all, because of continuing communal and political
rivalries between the member states. Disputes be-
tween the federal government and the government of
Singapore were intense on questions of economic
policy, with each side claiming that the other lacked
the proper common market spirit. Disputes centered
on such matters as the size of Singapore's financial
contribution to the federal government, allocation
of Malaysia's quota for textile exports to the United
Kingdom, and the establishment of a common external
tariff.
11. The dispute over allocation of the textile
quota is a good example of a number of federal
policies which discriminated against Chinese-dominated
Singapore. Unler the quota negotiated by the federal
government with London in 1965, Malaysia could export
annually to the United Kingdom 9.8 million square
yards of woven textiles and 7.6 million square yards
of made-up goods. The federal government reserved for
Malaya the entire quota for woven goods. It also
reserved 4.7 million square yards of the made-up goods
for Malaya in spite of the fact that no garment manu-
facturers in Malaya could produce this volume of goods
for export. Meanwhile, textile manufacturers in
Singapore were being forced to cut back operations and
lay off workers.
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Government Policies
12. The failure to achieve a common market with
Malaysia has resulted in increased efforts by the
Singapore government to attract foreign firms with
established international markets. The main invest-
ment incentives that Singapore offers are an ideal
location from which to tap the Southeast Asian market;
a well-developed infrastructure in transportation,
communications, and banking; experience in interna-
tional trade; a stable political and economic situa-
tion, including a sound, freely convertible currency;
a plentiful, relatively well-educated labor supply;
and a favorable tax structure. Singapore must com-
pete for foreign capital with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
to some extent South Korea, all of which offer most
of these incentives plus a labor supply which is
cheaper and less protected by unions and legislation.
Singapore has recently enacted legislation aimed at
reducing labor costs and restricting union prerogat-
tives by limiting fringe benefits, reducing overtime,
making wage increases and bonuses dependent on pro-
ductivity, and giving employers a free hand to dis-
charge workers "for cause" and to promote workers
without regard to seniority. The change in tone on
the part of the government is designed to reassure
investors that in Singapore profits are not frowned
upon and to remind the unions that the time has come
for belt tightening. This is a marked change both
for Prime Minister Lee, who started his career in
the labor movement, and for a government which came
to power through the support of labor.
13. Singapore offers a number of tax breaks
designed to encourage investment. Most new firms
enjoy a tax holiday of two to five years. To encour-
age established firms to expand, profits derived
from expansion are tax exempt for a period of three
to five years. The tax structure was modified in
1967 to favor firms manufacturing for export. Prof-
its derived from the export of locally produced goods
are taxed at only 4 percent instead of the normal
rate of 40 percent. To encourage the flow of capi-
tal into Singapore (especially from Hong Kong) the
tax rate on interest earned on deposits in Singapore
banks by nonresidents was reduced from 40 to 10 per-
cent in 1967. An additional attractive feature of
Singapore to overseas Chinese investors from Hong
Kong and Indonesia is that investors are eligible
for citizenship.
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SL.ngapon.e: Thn.ee-Stony Low-Coat wonfzmen'4 Fta.tb
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C~)
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SZngapone:
Ka.e.eang Ba.6,tn S.eum Anea to be Redeve.eoped
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Implications of the UK Withdrawal
14. The withdrawal of British fcrces which began
last year is scheduled to be completed by the end of
1971. Between May 1967 and July 1968, about 6,500
civilian employees and 950 enlisted personnel lost
their jobs. About one-fourth of all base employees
are Indians and Malays who are not citizens of Singa-
pore. By agreement between the UK and Singapore,
these persons will be released first and encouraged
to leave the island. The United Kingdom has agreed
to make a payment to each worker who loses his job
because of withdrawal, and this money will go into
a fund set up by the government of Singapore. Citi-
zens will eventually be able to draw the full amount,
but noncitizens will be able to draw only two-thirds
unless they leave the island permanently. About
13,000 of the local base civilians are supervisors
and skilled industrial personnel who will have little
problem finding employment as the bases are converted
and the industrial sector in Singapore continues to
expand. Some of the slack in the large services
sector, which caters to the British servicemen, will
be taken up by the expanding tourist trade. The num-
ber of visitors arriving in Singapore was up 60 per-
cent in 1967, to about 205,000. The expansion is con-
tinuing in 1968, with the number of arrivals in the
first four months up 31 percent above the same period
in 1967.
15. The United Kingdoii. will provide $120 million
to help offset the money Singapore loses when the
British withdraw. Beginning this year, 75 percent
of the aid distributed over the next five years will
be in the form of an interest-free loan, repayable
over 25 years with a seven-year grace period. The
balance will be an outright grant. London and Singa-
pore have already agreed on the initial allocation of
$32.7 million for the period April 1968 to March 1969.
Specific projects include: conversion of the Royal
Naval Dockyard, $2.9 million; vocational training,
$3.3 million; purchase of British machinery and equip-
ment, $9.8 million; harbor modernization, $1.8 mil-
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profitable commercial enterprises. The conversion
of the Royal Naval Dockyard is already under way,
and offers have gone out to 3,000 of the 5,000 skilled
and semi-skilled workers to remain on the job when
the yard becomes commercial at the end of this year.
The ship repairing business has been booming in
Singapore, and prospects are bright for the converted
base to be a successful enterprise. There are also
prospects for converting the Royal Air Force bases.
Both US and Australian investors have expressed an
interest in converting the bases to regional aircraft
maintenance and repair facilities.
Singapore's Plans for Adjustment
17. From now until the end of 1971, when the
British complete the withdrawal, there will be a pro-
gressive reduction in the UK's military expenditures
in Singapore. For its part, Singapore will adjust
its fiscal and monetary policy to smooth the transi-
tion. In March the Minister of Finance announced
plans to increase government spending by $312 million
during the transition period to offset the recession-
ary influence of declining British expenditures.
Singapore expects to raise the $312 million for addi-
tional government spending by official overseas aid
and loans ($93 million), floating loans on overseas
money markets ($49 million), increased local taxa-
tion and borrowing ($114 million), and drawing down
its foreign reserves ($56 million). The official
overseas aid portion is already oversubscribed (the
United Kingdom alone has promised $120 million). The
$49 million figure for private foreign loans is well
within Singapore's capacity to raise, considering the
island's high international credit standing (see
Table 7). The level of official foreign reserves
stood at more than $490 million at the end of 1967
and will only have to be reduced by about 10 percent
in order to raise the $56 million from that source
(see Table 8).
18. The planned $312 million increase in govern-
ment spendinq will be divided between defense and
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for the middle and late 1970's will be advanced
several years, including express highways, a second
large industrial complex, land reclamation, and an
increase in housing construction from the 12,000 units
per year previously planned to 16,500 units per year.
In addition, Singapore hopes to increase private in-
vestment by $65 million over the four-year period
by accelerating the construction of tourist hotels
and by loan guarantees and equity participation.
Some $20 million of the increased government expendi-
tures has been allotte;d for this purpose. To en-
courage increased private construction, interest
rates on approved private buildings started during
the period 1968-71 will be subsidized sufficiently
to reduce the effective interest rate to between 2/
and 4 percent throughout the life of the mortgage.
Prospects
19. The British pullout will not cause major
disruptions in Singapore's economy, because the con-
version of the bases, the gover::ment's expansionary
monetary and fiscal policy, and the infusion of UK
aid will cushion the impact. Aided by foreign capi-
tal, Singapore's economy is growing rapidly, and the
British withdrawal may slow but probably will not
stop Singapore's economic development. On balance,
the economy will probably expand at a rate of 8 per-
cent or more for the next few years. Unemployment,
the island's major economic problem, will, of course,
be aggravated by the withdrawal. But conversion of
bases,
the expected rise in tourism, and Singapore's
plans
to enlarge its military establishment
(16,000
young
people are to be inducted each year)
should
keep unemployment close to present levels.
20. Investors seem to be confident about Singa-
pore's future after the British leave, and the govern-
ment intends to maintain that confidence. An in-
creased inflow of investors specializing in labor-
intensive industry would go a long way toward solv-
ing Singapore's unemployment problem. There is mount-
ing evidence that such an inflow may take place in
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The Si,ngapone Nava.e Ba4 e
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SLngapone: The Queen'e Dnydoclz
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SLngapone: The Queenstown Housing Pnoject
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S. ngapohe: The Ho-tet SCngapun.a In-teh.contZnen-tat
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:;ingapore: Estimates 'It' Truss 11,meotit Pr:du:t, by Sectur of Origin a
1' )60-66
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1
6
66
9
5
19
Million
US $
Percent
Million
US $
Percent
Million
US $
Percent
Million
US $
Per
t
Million
US $
Million
Million
cen
Percent
US
Percent
s$
Percent
Ai.1culture and fisheries
40.g
6.0
44.6
6.1
45.5
5.9
48.5
5.5
46.9
5.3
48.2
4.8
54.1
4.9
Mining and quarrying
1.3
0.2
1.3
u.2
1.7
0.2
2.0
0.2
2.3
0.3
2.0
0.2
2.3
0.2
Manufacturing
48.8
7.3
59.4
8.1
62.4
8.1
74.3
8.5
83.5
9.5
99.7
10.0
116.8
10.6
Cl) n
Construction
13.9
2.1
21.8
3.0
23.4
3.0
31.4
3.6
37.6
4.3
43.2
4.3
42.6
3.8
J
N
oth.r services
16.8
2.5
17.8
2.4
19.5
2.5
19.8
2.3
22.4
2.5
22.4
2.2
26.7
2.4
o
h
l
J
W
olesale and retail trade
217.5
32.6
235.3
32.2
245.9
31.8
297.7
34.0
248.5
28.2
270.0
27,0
306.3
27.7
~
I
Entreptt
D
i
128.7
8
19.3
131.4
18.0
134.0
17.3
159.7
18.3
109.2
12.4
121.1
12.1
149.8
13.5
omest
c
8.8
13.3
1014.0
14.2
111.9
14.5
138.0
i5.8
139.3
15.8
148.8
14.9
156.4
14.1
Ownership of dwellings
30.7
14.6
33.3
4.6
34.3
4.4
36.3
4.2
38.9
4.4
42.6
4.3
46.9
4.2
Covernment services
35.0
5.3
147.5
6.5
54.1
7.0
62.4
7.1
63.0
7.2
70.6
7.1
88.4
8.0
Military services
92.1
13.8
92.7
12.7
99.3
12.9
106.6
12.2
136.0
15.4
171.3
17.1
174.6
15.8
Other services
171.0
25.7
177.9
24.3
186.5
24.1
195.7
22.4
201.0
22.8
231.0
23.1
247.9
22.4
Tourism
Oth
10.2
6
1.5
10.6
1.4
13.2
1.7
18.2
2.1
20.1
2.3
21.5
2.1
27.4
2.5
er
1
0.7
24.1
167.3
22.9
173.3
22.4
177.6
20.3
180.9
20.5
209.6
20.9
220.5
19.9
Statistical discrepancy
-1.7
26.2
66.7
34.5
9.7
-42.3
-10.6
GDP at factor cost
666.3
757.8
839.3
909.2
889.8
958.7
1,096.0
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Estimated Contribution of UK Bases
to Singapore's Gross Domestic Product
1966
Million US $
Expenditures
Wages and salaries to local civilians 42
Expenditures of UK military personnel 79
Local base expenditures 57
Other 9
Import content of local purchases -53
Direct contributions 134
Indirect contribution 87
Total a/ 221
a. Equal to 20 percent of GDP.
Unemployment in Singapore a/
1966
Never Unemployed
Age Previously Previously
Group Employed Employed Total Percent of Total
10 to
19 4,061 18,545 22,606 42.9
20 to
29 8,473 8,814 17,287 32.8
30 to
39 4,228 844 5,072 9.6
40 and
over 7,115 586 7,701 14.6
Total 23, 877 28, 789 52,666 100.0
a. Based on a survey of sample households.
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SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010081-1
cn
y
a. Data reflect the dominance of Singapore's role as an entrepot,
inasmuch as only a small portion of the major commodities involved
in Singapore's foreign trade are produced or consumed locally. For
data on domestic exports and retained imports, see Table 5.
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Exports
1963 1967
Million Percent of Million Percent of
US $ Total US $ Total
Crude rubber
318
28
246
19
Coffee
31
3
41
3
Pepper
19
2
20
2
Cotton
piece goods
27
2
17
2
Sawn timber
10
1
16
1
Pineapple
12
1
15
1
Rice
29
2
14
1
N
Palm oil
7
1
13
1
Other
682
60
889
70
1,135
100
1
271
100 H
,
Imports
Crude rubber
266
19
244
15
Synthetic fabrics
29
2
49
3
Rice
56
4
46
3
Cotton piece goods
41
3
45
3
Coffee
14
1
29
2
Pepper
17
1
21
1
Palm oil
8
1
14
1
Pineapple
9
1
14
1
Other
958
68
1,130
71
Total
1,398
100
1,592
100
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Foreign Trade of Singapore
1960-67
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
2/ 1965 a/
1966 2/
1967
Value (Million US $)
1,136
1,081
1,117
1.135
906
982
1,103
1,271
71
74
82
91
97
113
130
N.A.
1,332
423
1,295
1,319
1,398
1,137
1,244
1,329
1,592
tt
447
469
568
529
591
614
N.A.
C)
Index (1960 = 100)
100
95
98
100 80 86
97
112
100
104
115
128 137 159
183
N.A.
100
97
99
105 85 93
100
120
100
106
111
134 125 140
145
N.A.
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Table 6
Foreign Trade of Singapore, by Major Countries
1967
Exports
Million US $
Percent of Total
Malaysia 359
28
Of which: West Malaysia a/ (270)
(21)
Indonesia 131
10
South Vietnam 102
8
United States 80
6
United Kingdom 69
5
Japan 51
4
Other 479
39
1, 271
100
Imports
Million US $
Percent of Total
Malaysia 350
22
Of which: West Malaysia a/ (274)
(17)
Japan 179
11
Indonesia 152
10
Communist China 125
8
United Kingdom 116
7
United States 80
5
Other 590
37
1,592
100
a. Formerly Malaya.
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SECRET
Singapore: External Medium-Term
and Long-Term a/ Public Debt Outstanding
as of 31 December 1967
Thousand US $
Total
Disbursed
Total external public debt
83,109
33,465
Debt repayable in foreign
currency
74,663
32,660
IBRD loans
71,365
29,362
UK government loans
3,298
3,298
Debt repayable in local
cu
rrency
8,446
805
Suppliers credits
8,446
805
a. 1)"bt With an original or extended maturity of one
LI6clr or !pore .
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010081-1
Million US $
Singapore's estimated share
of Malay-Borneo Currency
Board's exchange assets
Singapore government
Government agencies and
other public authorities
Official reserves
Less commercial bank's
foreign exchange liabil-
ities
1960
90.2
110.5
47.4
248.1
169.0
417.1
104.8
Net reserves 312.3
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967 a/
88.4
87.6
88.8
89.5
89.9
98.3
162.1 b/
131.9
167.5
194.3
179.8
159.7
171.3
278.1
70.2
72.1
63.2
65.6
55.3
65.8
51.0
290.5
327.2
346.3
334.9
304.9
335.4
491.2
159.7
174.3
162.5
185.6
236.1
243.5
170.3
450.2
501.5
508.8
520.5
541.0
578.9
661.5
113.3
109.0
102.6
151.1
207.3
203.6
109.0
336.9
392.5
406.2
369.4
333.7
375.3
552.5
a. Data for 1967 is not comparable with other years, because Singapore's share of the
Currency Board's assets was underestimated up to that time. Thus, of the apparent in-
crease of $64 mit'ion, perhaps $60 million is a statistical adjustment. It should also
be noted that the sharp increase in Singapore government foreign assets largely repre-
sents the end result of a windfall inflow of capital from Hong Kong in 1967 as well as a
shift out of Malaysia into Singapore treasury bills in 1967.
b. Including $138.3 million foreign assets of the Singapore Currency Board.
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