MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RECONNAISSANCE IN MODERN OPERATIONS AND BATTLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302680001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 6, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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COUNTRY USSR
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
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DATE
6 December 1976
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance in Modern Operations
and Battles
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Reconnaissance in Modern Operations and Battles
by
General of the Army A. Zhadov
and
General-Mayor of Tank Troops M. Zubkov
The requirements for reconnaissance in modern operations
have increased considerably, its organization and conduct have
become complicated, and the volume of reconnaissance tasks has
increased while at the same time the time available for
completing these tasks has been sharply reduced.
Data on the enemy have to be obtained with great accuracy,
in an extremely limited time frame and over a vast space, when
the main enemy combat means are primarily in the operational
depth. Therefore, this will have to be done under conditions of
aggressive opposition to our reconnaissance, while attempts are
being made to localize or destroy its forces and means and
deceive it. Aerial reconnaissance has to negotiate a strong
enemy air defense.
It is obvious that the performance of reconnaissance tasks
under such conditions requires excellent training of personnel,
high level of technical equipping of the reconnaissance units and
subunits, and high combat readiness of these units.
In practice, however, in a number of instances, substantial
deficiencies are observed in the organization and conduct of
reconnaissance in exercises. Thus, staffs as a rule are late in
organizing reconnaissance when a meeting battle and engagement
are anticipated: reconnaissance organs are sent out after the
decision to march is made and drawn up, i.e., almost at the same
time as the march security organs, and because of this cannot be
separated from the latter. Such instances were noted in
exercises in the Far East Military District in 1965 and in the
Leningrad Military District in 1966. Aerial reconnaissance is
not being organized and conducted to the required depth, and
radio and radiotechnical means are not being deployed in time.
Reconnaissance efforts are not being expanded in the initial
stages of a meeting battle and engagement. 50X1-HUM
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Reconnaissance is conducted primarily by observation in an
offensive. It makes almost no use of aerial photography in a
battle. Reconnaissance of water obstacles is especially poorly
organized when an assault crossing is made of them from the march
in the operational depth of the enemy defense. This is what
happened in the exercises of the Leningrad and Baltic military
districts in 1966, in which reconnaissance was limited to
observation of the enemy from our shore prior to an assault
crossing of water obstacles.
The directing bodies of the exercises sometimes substitute
hypothetical data for actual reconnaissance activities. For
example, in one of the exercises in the Baltic Military District
in 1966, the directing body fully disclosed the position of the
defending troops to the attacking side, which made the attackers
overconfident. The defending troops changed their defended areas
and positions during the night. The reconnaissance of the
attacking troops found out nothing about the nature of the
defense and detected only a withdrawal of the "enemy" to a depth
of three to four kilometers. As a consequence of this the
nuclear strikes and artillery preparation of the attacking troops
on the morning of the second day, did not produce results.
There also are cases in which reliable communications with
the reconnaissance organs, especially with the reconnaissance
groups and individual reconnaissance patrols of the divisions and
regiments, are not ensured when they are separated the maximum
distance from the staffs of the large units and units.
In our view, one of the ways of eliminating the deficiencies
in the organization and conduct of reconnaissance is further,
extremely thorough study of the manuals, regulations and guides
regarding operational and tactical reconnaissance, which make it
obligatory for formation and large unit commanders of all levels
to organize reconnaissance on a timely basis, conduct it
continuously and purposefully, and define precisely its targets
and tasks, the axes on which to concentrate its main efforts, the
nature and reliability of the data and the time frame for
submitting them.
Intensive combat training of reconnaissance units and
subunits also is needed. Training practice shows that it is
desirable to conduct exercises for reconnaissance, aviation,
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special and radiotechnical subunits simultaneously with
tactical-special exercises for the rocket troops, communications
and engineer units and others. This makes it possible to assign
the reconnaissance units tasks to detect real targets under
conditions of camouflage of them, engineer preparation of the
terrain, and the presence of simulated targets and areas of
dispersal, which will exclude arbitrary situations.
We need to constantly improve and persistently work out
methods for integrated utilization of the reconnaissance forces
and means in all the branches of the armed forces to detect enemy
nuclear weapons and his main groupings, classify targets
properly, determine their coordinates with high accuracy, and
transmit data on them to the appropriate command posts quickly.
One of the conditions for accurate reconnaissance work is
continuous and reliable communications with the reconnaissance
organs. For this purpose it is necessary to accelerate the
development and introduction into these organs of radio sets with
increased operating range and secure communications equipment. In
addition, it is necessary to allocate more powerful radio sets to
the reconnaissance organs, and in some cases, when feasible, to
send out radio-relay stations following the reconnaissance
groups.
The experience of many exercises corroborates the
desirability of a method of training whereby the formation and
large unit commanders of all levels, after clarifying a combat
task and assessing the situation, first give orders for
reconnaissance, then the staffs immediately organize it.
Preliminary instructions, which orient the reconnaissance organs
toward carrying out their prospective tasks in advance, are of
great importance. This considerably accelerates sending out the
reconnaissance organs, which have to be in constant readiness for
action with their radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance means,
as a rule, already set up.
It must be noted that there are instances in the troops in
which an evaluation of the work of a reconnaissance organ is made
only on the basis of the content of the report on the enemy by
the chief of intelligence. In our view, the work of a
reconnaissance organ and the staff as a whole should be evaluated
mainly on the basis of skilful organization and positive results
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of reconnaissance.
A positive example of the work of a front commander and
staff to organize reconnaissance and concentrate its efforts on
the most important targets, is a command-staff exercise conducted
in the Baltic Military District in 1966. The commander and staff,
having received certain information regarding the disposition
areas of the missile/nuclear means of the "enemy", immediately
assigned reconnaissance aviation aircraft and several
special-purpose reconnaissance groups to reconnaissance of these
areas and accurate detection of the targets located in them, and
also targeted part of the forces and means of radio and
radiotechnical reconnaissance against these areas. Throughout
the exercise the efforts of reconnaissance were concentrated on
the most important axes and in the areas in which the "enemy"
probably was located.
We think a front, which has various reconnaissance forces
and means in its table of organization, is in a position to and
must, insofar as possible, conduct reconnaissance to the entire
depth of a theater of military operations; an army and army corps
-- to a depth of 250 to 400 kilometers, a division -- up to 100
kilometers, and a regiment -- up to 50 kilometers. Whereas a
front, army and division have the necessary forces and means to
77,TaTict reconnaissance to the depth indicated, an army corps at
present does not have such means at its disposal. And this means
that army corps which are supposed to carry out combat actions on
separate, often unique axes, will experience serious difficulties
in conducting reconnaissance.
Obviously it is time to examine the question as to an army
corps acquiring organic reconnaissance forces and means. In our
opinion, it is desirable for an army corps to have a separate
reconnaissance battalion made up of four companies (radio,
radiotechnical, and long-range reconnaissance companies and a
mixed ground reconnaissance company), and also a radiation and
chemical reconnaissance platoon. The radio and radiotechnical
companies must have equipment which can reconnoiter enemy ground
radio sets at a range of at least 250 kilometers and enemy ground
radiotechnical means -- at 150 kilometers, which will allow the
army corps to fulfil its tasks. In addition, a reconnaissance
squadron equipped with aircraft and helicopters is needed.
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When conducting combat actions under polar conditions, in
mountainous or desert terrain, on coastal or other independent
axes, the ground reconnaissance organs of an army corps have to
operate without roads. When penetrating an enemy disposition,
reconnaissance groups, patrols, and long-range reconnaissance
groups will be forced to carry out long-distance bypass
maneuvering in difficult terrain conditions. It is desirable to
send these organs out a long time before the designated
reconnaissance time period or to airlift them to certain areas on
aircraft and helicopters. In northern and other areas which are
difficult to negotiate, cross-country combat vehicles may be
used. Reconnaissance radio and radiotechnical equipment must be
mounted on vehicles having cross-country capability. In view of
the difficult conditions, aerial reconnaissance in support of an
army corps in general, and reconnaissance from helicopters by the
organic corps reconnaissance organs in particular, will have an
especially important role.
At the same time the highly important new questions of
organizing and conducting reconnaissance in modern operations and
battles have become pressing. They have to be resolved in their
theoretical, T/0 authorization, operational-tactical,
engineer-technical, economic and other aspects. New methods of
conducting reconnaissance and making maximum use of its forces
and means should be sought.
In so doing special attention must be devoted to improving
the methods by which all types of aviation conduct aerial
reconnaissance while they are fulfilling combat tasks, and also
to developing methods of assured reception of reconnaissance data
from on board an aircraft.
The question of conducting reconnaissance in force,
particularly prior to an offensive, also is important. It seldom
was conducted in recent exercises, because of the desire to
achieve surprise of attack. It is very important to achieve
surprise in going over to the offensive, but this must not lead
to rejection of reconnaissance in force if it is needed,
especially if the troops are preparing for combat actions without
the employment of nuclear weapons at that moment. In organizing
reconnaissance in force it is necessary to make fuller use of the
experience of the Great Patriotic War, in which such
reconnaissance was one of the main methods of revealing the
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nature of the enemy defense. This experience must be used in
application to present conditions.
In our opinion, reconnaissance in force also can and must be
conducted when weapons of mass destruction will be employed. In
this case it should be conducted day and night, at different
times in individual sectors and on a broad front by motorized
rifle subunits with tanks in up to company strength, and
sometimes even battalion strength when supported by artillery.
The objective of such reconnaissance in force will be to reveal
the enemy's system of defense, primarily the disposition areas of
his tactical missiles and the fire positions of artillery,
especially nuclear artillery, so that our nuclear strikes will
not be delivered against an "empty" area. The actions of the
subunits which are allocated for reconnaissance in force
immediately before an offensive, and which are rapidly
penetrating the enemy disposition, can develop into a general
offensive. In anticipation of this, reconnaissance in force
should be conducted by reinforced battalions suppqrted by
artillery and aviation.
Aerial, radio, radiotechnical, long-range, radar and all
other forms of field reconnaissance, have to be conducted during
reconnaissance in force, in order to obtain data on an
operational, as well as a tactical, scale. The tasks of
conducting reconnaissance in force during an offensive must also
be performed by the forward detachments, security organs, and
subunits and units which have pulled out ahead, which destroy the
enemy covering troops, and, exploiting the results of the
tactical nuclear strikes, reveal the main enemy forces and most
important targets through aggressive offensive actions.
In our view, the methods of conducting radiation, chemical
and bacteriological reconnaissance and the upgrading of existing
reconnaissance equipment require further study and improvement.
When organizing reconnaissance, special attention must be
devoted to increasing the effectiveness of measures for timely
collection and processing of the data obtained, the data on enemy
missile/nuclear means and other important targets first, and also
to reporting the data to the command without delay, and data on
especially important targets -- directly to the commander. In
particular, in order to greatly improve control over the
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operating reconnaissance organs, and also to considerably
accelerate the collection and processing of reconnaissance data,
in our view, mobile control and reconnaissance data collection
posts are needed at the division to front level. These posts must
be built on the basis of cross-country armored vehicles equipped
with the necessary technical means, high-speed radio
communications with automatic secure communications equipment,
and radio receivers.
The decisive condition for successful fulfilment of the
immense tasks of reconnaissance, and timely discovery of the
plans, intentions, and capabilities of the enemy under the
present complex conditions is high-level moral-political,
military-technical and special reconnaissance training of the
officers and staffs, and also excellent combat training and skill
of the units and subunits of all types of reconnaissance. The
success of this work invariably is attendant upon the officers
having thorough knowledge of the operational-tactical concepts,
procedures and methods of combat actions, armament and equipment
of our probable enemies and everything new they intend to employ.
Officers receive basic training in all these matters in
military educational institutions. However, once in the troops
they must use all available ways (lectures, group studies, war
games, command-staff exercises and troop exercises) to
persistently and constantly improve both their theoretical
knowledge and their practical skills in the work of organizing
and conducting reconnaissance of a specific enemy in the probable
theater of military operations.
It is highly desirable to make a practice of training
assemblies for intelligence officers, in which tactics, armament,
equipment, and all other new information on the enemy are studied
in detail. The major problems of the organization and conduct of
reconnaissance should be worked out by giving short problems on
specific topics and in special reconnaissance exercises to which
subunits and units of all types of reconnaissance are allocated.
It is useful to conduct training assemblies of reconnaissance
subunits by types of reconnaissance, preparing the necessary
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In reconnaissance activities in combined-arms exercises, the
umpires must not introduce any arbitrary or hypothetical
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situations for the operating troops. Reconnaissance must fulfil
its tasks as though in combat, and the commanders of the
operating sides are obligated to obtain all information on the
"enemy" only by using the reconnaissance they actually organize.
Commanders and staffs should be "punished" for their lack of
knowledge of a situation by unexpected aggressive "enemy"
actions.
Reconnaissance aviation of an air army or of the military
district air forces, and subunits of the radio, radiotechnical,
special and other reconnaissance units of the armies and military
district, have to be allocated to divisional exercises.
Through all these and other measures it is possible to
achieve a high level of field training not only of reconnaissance
personnel, but also of reconnaissance subunits and units as a
whole, to give commanders and staffs needed practice in
organizing reconnaissance and controlling its forces and means
during combat actions, and to teach them to analyze
reconnaissance data correctly and act upon them in a timely
manner.
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