NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010037-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: August 14, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
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Top Secret
August 14, 1975
N? 669
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 14, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Carvalho's refusal to
take sides may undercut dissidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PHILIPPINES - NORTH VIETNAM: Marcos
apologizes to US for Hanoi communique . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CAMBODIA: Two new deputy
prime ministers named . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
NIGERIA: New federal capital
and more states under study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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JAPAN: Recent terrorism prompts
new international moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? 7
FRANCE: Nuclear industry
reorganized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ISRAEL: Additional patrol
boats under construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
PORTUGAL
Portuguese security chief General Otelo de Carvalho, one of the members of
the ruling triumvirate, yesterday criticized both factions in the struggle for power
between pro-Communist Prime Minister Goncalves and dissident officers in the
Armed Forces Movement. Instead of taking sides, he offered his own radical plan
for putting the "revolution" back on course.
There is not yet enough information to estimate whether Carvalho sees his plan
primarily as a vehicle for taking power himself or as an alternative program to which
all the warring factions of the Movement could rally.
Carvalho revived the idea of bypassing both the Communist and
non-Communist political parties with popular organizations avowedly intended to
forge "direct links" between the military and the people. A similar proposal, when
advocated by the armed forces general assembly in July, was widely criticized and
was a major factor contributing to the Socialists' withdrawal from the coalition
government. Their withdrawal, in turn, precipitated the present crisis.
The Carvalho alternative was presented at a hastily called meeting of military
officers, including the three regional commanders, heads of certain military units,
and representatives of the Movement-a group that reportedly numbered about 100.
Press reports indicated that at least three of the nine dissidents responsible for the
antiregime document now circulating in the armed forces were at the meeting. His
proposal is not likely to gain much support among the dissidents, but it may appeal
to apolitical officers who see the current crisis as a partisan fight between
Communists and non-Communists.
Carvalho, who many of the dissidents thought was on their side, by suggesting
an alternative plan will probably divide the Movement even further and complicate
Portugal's effort to sort itself out politically. His move, no matter what his motives,
will sap the dissidents' backing.
From all indications, the dissidents led by former foreign minister Antunes are
still collecting signatures for their petition. One late report suggests the dissidents
have not yet presented their petition to President Costa Gomes, as had been
reported. If the dissidents do not make their move soon, they are likely to lose the
momentum that still appears to be in their favor. Support is coming even from
unexpected sources. For example, the Lisbon light artillery regiment, considered the
most radical unit in Portugal, split between supporters of the manifesto and those
against it.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
These divided loyalties within the military will make public order all the more
difficult to maintain. Rival civilian demonstrations are scheduled in Lisbon today.
One extreme left-wing group that uses anti-American slogans to attract support is
sponsoring a march that will terminate at the US embassy.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 14, 1975
President Marcos has formally apologized. to the United States for the joint
communique establishing diplomatic relations with Hanoi. He stated that the
Philippine representative had no authority to sign it and that it is therefore invalid.
The communique, which was signed in Hanoi on August 7 and broadcast
publicly by the North Vietnamese two days later, contains several provisions
unacceptable to the US:
--Manila promises not to let the US use Philippine territory "to oppose the
Vietnamese people."
--Manila affirms that all property belonging to the former Saigon government
should be returned to the new communist regime.
--Manila affirms that no Vietnamese "lured or forcibly taken out of Vietnam"
are in the Philippines.
Marcos told Ambassador Sullivan on August 13 that he will instruct the
Philippine ambassador in Paris to inform his Vietnamese counterpart that Manila
regards the communique as invalid and that negotiations for diplomatic relations are
to continue on the basis of the status quo ante. Marcos said Manila will inform its
partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations about what has happened,
and is ready to give the US whatever assurances are needed that no former South
Vietnamese equipment will be returned to Vietnam. The North Vietnamese have
already used the communique to criticize Thai refusal to return such equipment.
Marcos is aware that Hanoi will try to hold Manila to the communique and will
probably not be willing to resume negotiations. He also assumes that Vietnamese
propaganda will publicly accuse Manila of buckling under to US pressure and
reneging on a signed agreement. The communique debacle is an acute diplomatic
embarrassment, and Marcos is likely to suffer a setback in his campaign to establish
his nonaligned credentials and erase Manila's image as a US client.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
Phnom Penh has named two more leading communists who reside inside the
country as deputy prime ministers, further eroding the position of Prince Sihanouk
and his supporters in the leadership structure.
According to an announcement from radio Phnom Penh on August 12, widely
traveled leng Sary, who probably holds a top position in the Khmer Communist
Party, is deputy prime minister for foreign affairs. Up to now, Foreign Minister Sarin
Chhak, who is a Sihanouk loyalist and is based in Peking, has handled most foreign
contacts for the new communist regime. Son Sen, a member of the central
committee of the Khmer Communist Party and former chief of staff of the
Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces, is the new deputy prime
minister for national defense affairs.
Although the announcement did not refer to Deputy Prime Minister and
Defense Minister Khieu Samphan, nothing in the new appointments suggests a
downgrading of his position. Khieu, more likely, has been playing the role of
Cambodia's actual prime minister. The aging Penn Nouth, who holds the title,
remains in China and appears to play no part in affairs of state.
According to an NCNA broadcast, Khieu Samphan plans to make an official
visit to China beginning tomorrow, accompanied by leng Sary. The Cambodian
leaders may wish to confer with the Chinese to balance the recent visit of a
high-ranking North Vietnamese delegation to Cambodia. They could also intend to
meet with Sihanouk, if he returns to China from North Korea.
Additional evidence of leng Sary's prominence is the fact that he will head the
Cambodian delegation to the foreign ministers' conference of nonaligned countries
to be held in Peru in late August. Sarin Chhak will serve as his deputy. Other
delegation members will include Chan Youran, Cambodia's ambassador to Senegal;
Thiounn Prasith, an official at the Royal Government of National Union embassy in
Peking; and two other unidentified National United Front of Kampuchea Politburo
members. There has been no indication of any plan to include Sihanouk in the
delegation. Attendence at the nonaligned conference will mark Cambodia's first
participation in an international event since the communists came to power in April.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
The new military government has appointed panels to examine the feasibility
of relocating the federal capital from overcrowded Lagos and whether additional
states should be created within Nigeria's federal system. With this swift action, the
regime has given the impression of forward movement on domestic problems.
Head of state Brigadier Muhammed, a northerner, has not committed himself
on either issue, presumably because both involve tribal interests and are politically
sensitive. The capital, for example, is now located in a predominantly Yoruba state
in the southwestern corner of Nigeria. Northerners and minority peoples in the
central part of the country favor moving it farther north.
The disparity in the size and wealth of Nigeria's 12 states has been an even
more serious source of complaint among minority tribes and some groups within the
larger tribes. These elements regard the creation of more states as a means of gaining
a stronger voice in the federal system.
The establishment of more states would provide the new regime an opportunity
to assign additional governorships to aspiring military officers. The government
would, however, run the risk of opening a Pandora's box of agitation for the
creation of numerous tribal-oriented, economically weak mini-states.
The present system of six northern and six southern states dates from 1967,
when former head of state Gowon replaced the four existing regions., The political
balance Gowon provided among Nigeria's competing regional and tribal interests was
one of his main achievements. Rivalry between the regions during the early 1960s
had been responsible for the breakdown of civilian rule, two military coups, and a
civi I war.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 14, 1975
The Japanese Red Army's latest terrorist incident on August 4 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, is causing increased international resistance to such acts.
Although those terrorists were successful in their goals, international reluctance
to grant them asylum, particularly in nonaligned countries, was noteworthy. They
were accepted reluctantly by Libya after two days of hesitation, and then only for
"humanitarian reasons." Although the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
supports the Japanese Red Army, most Middle East countries declined to harbor the
terrorists. Moreover, many even refused them flight clearance en route to Libya.
Several countries have called anew for increased international cooperation to
control terrorism, greater use of INTERPOL, and more airport security. Japan is
particularly sensitive to such incidents, and Tokyo can be expected to press for
international solidarity in refusing to negotiate with terrorist groups during any
future incidents of a similar nature. Yesterday, Prime Minister Miki suggested
holding an international antiterrorism conference specifically addressing denial of
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 14, 1975
President Giscard has approved plans to reorganize the French nuclear industry
that will allow the French government to exercise greater control while limiting the
involvement of US companies.
Under the plan, the French capability for constructing nuclear power stations
will be concentrated in Framatome, a Westinghouse licensee. At the same time, the
French government is applying pressure on Westinghouse to convert its license
agreements into cooperation pacts. Giscard has also asked the French Atomic
Energy Commission to buy into Westinghouse's 45-percent share of Framatome.
All of these measures will enhance French control of the conventional nuclear
reactor business by concentrating the capability for this construction in a company
that will be dominated by French interests. The reorganization may put
Framatome's only domestic competitor, a General Electric licensee, out of business.
The move should prove an effective response to recent media criticism that the
nuclear industry has been undergoing "quasi-colonization" by the US, but Paris still
is in no position to declare French independence in technologies that are considered
vital to modern military and economic power. Last year, France had to consider
whether to withdraw from or to continue support for the European space
program-and specifically for the costly Ariane space launcher-which would draw
funds from France's own space agency budget. Giscard opted for the European
program on the grounds that it is the only viable means of achieving a European
capability to build and launch operations satellites without relying on the US or the
USSR.
In May, Giscard ended a bitter 12-month debate by approving the merger of
France's largest independent computer firm, CII, with the US-dominated
Honeywell-Bull organization. An independent French computer capacity has been a
Gaullist article of faith since the mid-1960s. The left opposition too has accused
Giscard of selling out to the US. Giscard responded by stressing that France would
maintain a clear majority-53 percent-in the new company and would have the
power to veto policies not in the French interest, Improved access to the US market,
moreover, would mean that the company could eventually become a profit-making
concern, instead of a constant drain on the public purse, thus saving jobs.
The three decisions-"European" for the space program, "US" for the
computer industry, and "French" for the nuclear industry-have a common thread.
In each case, Giscard demonstrated flexibility and pragmatism in choosing the
course that would best ensure the advancement of French capabilities in the
strategic high technologies.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
ISRAEL
The Israelis have begun constructing additional Reshef-class guided-missile
patrol boats. The US naval attache in Tel Aviv recently observed work on three of
the boats at a shipyard in Haifa; he estimated that the first of them would be
launched within three months. The attache was told that Tel Aviv has no plans at
this time to produce any of the boats for export.
Israel has built six Reshef-class boats during the past two years, and funds for
the construction of six more have been authorized. The Reshef is a larger version of
the French Saar-class guided-missile boat and is more heavily armed. It has also been
modified to permit long-range operations at sea.
The Reshefs, which saw combat during the October 1973 war, can carry as
many as eight Gabriel antiship missiles. Israel produces two versions of this
missile-one with a range of about 22 miles and the other about half that. Four of
the boats currently are stationed at Sharm ash Shaykh in southern Sinai, from where
they can patrol the entrance to the Red Sea. The other two boats are stationed in
the Mediterranean.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
FOR THE RECORD
August 14, 1975
EGYPT: A higher council for nuclear power, headed by President Anwar
Sadat, has been established, according to the Cairo press. The council is to formulate
plans for Egypt's nuclear energy development and perhaps the eventual achievement
of a nuclear weapons capability. The Egyptians do not have the capability to
develop nuclear weapons with their own resources. Establishment of the council at
this time suggests this is mainly a propaganda ploy in response to the recent
publicity on Israel's nuclear capability.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
The Labor government's stewardship of Australia's defenses has been both
controversial and nationalistic. Labor set out in 1972 to forge a new defense posture
predicated on a restructured defense relationship with Australia's traditional allies,
greater domestic industrial participation in meeting defense needs, centralization and
streamlining of the higher defense apparatus, economy, and conversion to a
peacetime armed forces capable of rapid expansion. The basic premise of the
government's defense policy is that Australia faces no serious threat to its security
for the next 15 years.
Labor's Defense Program
Since coming to power in 1972, Prime Minister Whitlam has reduced Australia's
identification with US security policies, has restructured defense arrangements with
the US and the Commonwealth, and has adopted a more visable role in regional
affairs. The government has also redefined its military pacts to avoid automatic
involvement of Australian forces. The Australia - New Zealand - US (ANZUS) Treaty
is accepted as the basic security guarantee, but planners envision its invocation only
if Australia is attacked directly. US base and facility agreements have been
restructured, consistent with revived Australian nationalism.
The Laborites have pursued programs designed to cut back defense
expenditures in the interest of economy and to improve and modernize the entire
military industrial infrastructure over the next 15 years under a "total-force"
concept. Although a number of defense programs have been implemented over the
past two years, progress toward greater self-reliance has been limited and the defense
policies are generating considerable domestic debate over the deterioration of
military capabilities.
Defense Minister Morrison, who succeeded Lance Barnard in June, has shown
more sensitivity to the defense debate than did his predecessor. Morrison has
publicized a number of recent projects that stress greater self-reliance and defense of
Australia, including a restructuring of military training curricula toward problems of
continental defense and the disclosure of plans for the procurement of sophisticated
weaponry.
Defense Reorganization
The reorganization of the Australian Department of Defense is probably
Labor's most controversial endeavor. It has involved the dissolution of the service
departments, meshing of Supply with the new Department of Manufacturing
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Australian Defense Posture
+ Major Air Bases
A Major Army Posts
z Major Naval Stations
arrrlOrrth
Richmont t
Molbourne
thousand Personnel
84.3 83.3 88.9
73.9
1111
72 73 74 75
Caber 6orrnmertl Years
Australian Defense Expenditures
Australian Dollars in Billions
72
14%
13
11%
74
Le%
75
2, Defense Share
of GNP
-4 1-
tabor Government Years
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 14, 1975
Industry, and the centralization of service functions in the Defense Department
staff. The final phase, to be completed by November this year, will be the creation
of the position of chief of Defense Force Staff to replace the chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee (JCSC).
The objectives of the reorganization are to provide more efficient personnel
and supply management, to ensure central control of operations, and to produce
greater economy in defense spending. Some 5,000 civilian positions have been
abolished so far, and the command structure has been streamlined. Although rising
unemployment in the domestic economy and Labor-enacted improved service pay
and allowances have enabled the government to maintain satisfactory strength levels,
over 1,000 officers-about 10 percent of the officer corps-have left the armed
forces since 1972. The departures, mostly from field-grade ranks, have included
competent staff and technical officers, causing a serious reduction in technical
expertise and morale.
The most controversial aspects of the reorganization are the role of civilians in
military management and the apparent diminution of service chiefs' responsibilities.
Most management functions have been resubordinated from the service chiefs and
the chairman, JCSC, to senior civilians under the control of the defense secretary.
The new chief of Defense Force Staff will assume command authority and be the
principal military adviser to the government. Although the service chiefs will lose
much of their control over personnel, logistic, and procurement activities, they will
gain enhanced command authority under the chief of Defense Force Staff.
Another facet of Whitlam's defense policy involves reorganizing and upgrading
Citizen's Military Force and several smaller reserve organizations into the Australian
Army Reserve. The Citizen's Military Force comprises two divisions and has a total
enrollment of about 25,000 personnel, who receive two weeks of active duty
training each year.
Defense Budget
During the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1975, the government spent $2.05
billion on defense. That represents 9.5 percent of total government expenditures and
2.7 percent of the gross national product, substantially lower than the 3.5 percent of
GNP that Labor promised to spend when it came to power.
Over 60 percent of defense spending is devoted to helping servicemen and
civilians remain abreast of inflation; about 5 percent is devoted to procuring new
equipment. Spending patterns do not yet bear out the expressed policies of
modernizing the armed forces and expanding the defense industrial infrastructure.
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AUSTRALIAN FORCE COMPARISON TABLE
(Selected Years)
Army
19711
1973
1975
Infantry Division Hq.
1
1
1
Infantry Battalions
9
9
6
Armor Battalions
1
1
1
Artillery Battalions
4
4
3
Cavalry Battalions
1
1
1
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions
0
1
1
Aircraft
64
81
77
Navy
Ships
Aircraft Carriers
1
1
1
Destroyer/ Escorts
12
13
12
Submarines
4
4
5
Gunboats
20
20
14
Mine Countermeasures
6
6
4
Aircraft
Fighter-bombers
8
12
11
Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft
21
27
27
Transport, Utility, Helicopters
31
33
17
Air Force
Attack Aircraft
0
0
24
Fighter Aircraft
134
97
60
Bomber Aircraft
13
11
11
Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft
20
22
22
Transports, Helicopters, Utility, Trainers
316
299
308
Early Warning Radars
3
3
3
Height of
Vietnam
Involve-
ment
Liberal Labor
Country Govern-
Govern- mein
ment
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
Expansion of domestic defense production is a key government objective. The
total needs of the armed forces, however, are not sufficient to make a more
extensive and sophisticated defense industrial base economical. Consequently, the
prospect of attaining this goal is remote, and the armed forces will continue to be
dependent on foreign sources for arms.
The defense industrial base-government and privately owned-constitutes 13
munitions plants, 3 major shipyards, and 3 major aircraft factories-all that is left of
the some 140 plants in operation during World War II. These, plus other private
industrial firms, are capable of producing a wide range of vehicles, ordnance, small
arms, some radio equipment, patrol craft, light aircraft, and major surface
combatants. Most sophisticated systems and technical equipment must be purchased
abroad.
Defense Capabilities
In the past, Australia has always had access to the military industrial complex
and supply system of an ally-either the UK or the US. Without such access, the
ability of Australian forces to defend their own territory is questionable. The
Australian armed forces have no rapid reaction capability, and in outlying areas
would have difficulty maintaining a fighting posture. They are not armed, trained, or
organized to respond quickly should protection of Australian interests in Asia be
required.
The Army
Conversion to a peacetime army and the termination of conscription resulted in
an almost immediate' 25-percent drop in personnel strength and a reduction of
ground force units. Still, the strength of the army is greater than at any time since
World War 11, except during the Vietnam era.
Although all combat elements are seriously understrength, the army retains a
wide range of support units, a well-developed infrastructure, and training facilities
suitable for large-scale mobilization. Army strength is just over 31,300, but the
officer corps is being maintained at a level to staff an army of 36,000 men.
Training is basically at the battalion level, and the army is no longer able to
conduct effective brigade- or division-echelon operations. In addition, much of the
experience gained in Vietnam is being dissipated rapidly by the high level of officers
who are retiring or leaving. The army is deficient in antitank weapons,
reconnaissance and armor equipment, and artillery. At full mobilization, the army
would be seriously deficient in combat and support units.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
The Navy
The navy has not suffered from many of the personnel problems affecting the
army because it has always been a volunteer service. Its basic weakness is its size
relative to the area of operations, which extends to Hong Kong. The 16,200-man
navy has 13 surface combatants-the average age is 15 years-and 5 submarines.
Anticipating an aging inventory of combatants during the 15-year strategic
assessment period, the government has ordered refitting and modernization to
extend ship life. Aside from two new patrol frigates ordered from the US, no
additional ship purchases are planned.
Ship readiness is high, though budget constraints have forced reductions in
training. Seaward defense capabilities in the southeast are generally good, but
elsewhere they are marginal. The navy has no amphibious assault capability, no
ship-to-ship missiles, and its ship-borne antisubmarine warfare capabilities are
limited.
The 2,000-man navy air arm remains dependent on the air force for training
and support and has a poor pilot-to-aircraft ratio. It has no all-weather capability,
and its aircraft are not well suited to defend Australia's aircraft carrier.
Antisubmarine warfare capabilities are hampered by the reluctance of the
Australians to use submarines in training.
The air force also is an all-volunteer force. The 21,500-man air force has 425
aircraft, and major tactical units comprise one reconnaissance, two attack, and three
fighter squadrons. Although the caliber of personnel and training is comparable to
the US, the air force is too small for a country of Australia's size. Two thirds of the
fighter force is in Malaysia, while the remainder are concentrated at east coast bases.
Other problems include a limited early warning ground-controlled intercept
capability, the absence of a land-based air-defense missile system, and shortages in
air-defense artillery. Antisubmarine warfare reconnaissance capabilities, although
limited, will be upgraded by the acquisition of eight P-3 Orions ordered from the US
in 1975.
The main impact of the Whitlam government on the air force has been the
consolidation of its support infrastructure. Allocation of aircraft maintenance
contracts to private industry has resulted in an overall deterioration in maintenance,
especially for transport aircraft. The air force remains heavily dependent on foreign
equipment sources.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 14, 1975
contingency operations and training.
regionally destabilizing influences and to participate fully with its allies in military
The Labor government's progress toward establishing a more self-contained
defense force is being hampered by its own tight-fisted spending patterns and by
persistent weaknesses in the defense establishment, heretofore offset by the nation's
close ties to the US and the UK. Greater economy and efficiency have apparently
been injected into defense management, but the costs and technological
requirements of the comprehensive improvements advocated by the government
appear more than any government can justify as long as it contends that there is no
threat. The government's policies are resulting in a reduced capacity to deter
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP79T00975AO28000010037-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP79T00975AO28000010037-0
Top Secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP79T00975AO28000010037-0