US HOSTAGE TAKERS IN IRAN: WHERE ARE THEY TODAY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302870001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 29, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBJECT: US Hostage Takers In Iran:
Where Are They Today?
NESA M 86-20122
Distribution:
1 - Dennis Ross, NSC
1 - Robert H. Pelletreau, ISA
1 - Marion V. Creekmore, Jr., State
1 - Arnold L. Raphel, State
1 - DCI Staff
1 -DDI DATE
1 - VC/NIC
1- NIO/NESA DOC No Atts M S ---~oI Z Z
1 - DDO/NE 0IR 3
1 - C/PES P $ PD
1 - C/CSG
1 - C/NID
1 - C/PDB
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/AI
6 - NESA/PG
DDI/NESA/PG/I (29July86)
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 July 1986
US Hostage Takers In Iran: Where Are They Today?
Summary
Many of the Islamic militants who seized the US Embassy in Tehran
in November 1979 and held US diplomats hostage for over 14 months
hold high-level positions in the Iranian Government. Several dominate
the political affairs section of the Foreign Ministry, where they.nurture
each other's careers and influence Iranian foreign policy. The militants'
'spiritual leader" serves as chief state prosecutor. The militants are key
representatives of Iran's radical factions that generally support violent
export of the Islamic revolution, continuation of the war with Iraq, and
uncompromising opposition to normalization of relations with the
United States. The status of the militants probably is an important
indicator of the direction of Iran's foreign and domestic policies. A
lessening of their role could be a measure of the regime's desire for
better relations with the United States.
Hosein Sheikh-ol-Esiam, one of the instigators of the Embassy takeover and a
member of the militants' leadership council, today serves as Deputy Foreign Minister for
Political Affairs, a position he won as a direct result of his role in the hostage episode. He
is the most Influential of the hostage takers and a powerful proponent of a radical foreign
policy.
This paper was prepared by I Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis, Persian Gulf Division. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division,
25X1
25X1
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Sheikh-ol-Eslam's radical faction is involved in constant infighting with conservatives
in the Ministry who oppose the radicals' approach to foreign policy. The conservatives
oppose violent export of the revolution and adhere to traditional norms of diplomatic
behavior. Trying to maintain some distance between these two groups is a pragmatist
faction led by Foreign Minister Velayati, willing to adopt whatever policies seem to further
Iran's national interests. On most issues the pragmatists have sided with conservatives to
curb radical excesses. Khomeini has followed his usual practice of attempting to maintain
a rough balance between the radicals and conservatives. In a speech in 1984, he curbed
the power of the radicals by calling for Iran to have normal diplomatic and political
relations with most countries.
Khomeini's guidelines have allowed the pragmatists to broaden Iran's international
ties, especially to Western Europe, but Sheikh-ol-Eslam continues to wield considerable
influence over Iran's r e l a t i o n s with Third World countries and with Islamic fundamentalist
movements worldwide.
Recent administrative changes have shown Sheikh-ol-Eslam's continuing clout.
All but one of the 10 current department chiefs reportedly are Sheikh-ol-Eslam's
loyalists who were involved in the seizure of the US Embassy. Skeikh-of-Eslam recently
promoted one of these, Ibrahim Rahimpur, from department chief to Director General for
Asian and Pacific Countries. Rahimpur's predecessor, Ali Ahani, became Director General
for the Americas and European countries, handling relations both with the US and the
USSR. Ahani's predecessor, Mohammad Reza Sadr--also a hostage taker--assumed a
high-level position in the Interior Ministry.
Several of Sheikh-ol-Eslam'S proteges--all hostage takers--have become
ambassadors. Kia Tabatabai, assigned to the Foreign Ministry's protocol department soon
after the hostages' release, has served in Moscow since 1983. Ayatollah Hadi
Khosrow-Shahi served as ambassador to the Vatican until mid 1986, and currently is
special adviser to the Minister of Islamic Guidance. We lack conclusive evidence to
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confirm press reports that while in Rome he was a linchpin in Iranian terrorist activity in
Western Euro e. In any event, he was an important figure in Iran's propaganda network.
Mehdi Ahari Mostafavi, identified as a guard during the hostage takeover, was
appointed a UN delegate in 1981 and then headed the Foreign Ministry's Western Europe
department before being appointed in 1985 to his current position as Ambassador to
Austria and Iranian representative to the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization in Vienna. In an interview on Austrian television, Mostafavi denied
involvement in the hostage incident.
Ali Reza Salari has had a rapid rise in Iran's foreign service. A radio announcer
during the revolution, he became deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry department
responsible for Western Europe in 1983, chief two years later, ambassador to Belgium in
1985, and this year assumed the additional positions of ambassador to the European
Community and to Luxembourg. Western dipolomats describe him as intelligent but prone
to using Islamic rhetoric in conversation. When Belgium, earlier this year, closed the
Iranian cultural center in Brussels because of its suspected role in propaganda and
intelligence activities, Salari publicly warned that the safety of Belgian diplomats in Tehran
could not be guaranteed.
Another hostage taker, Javad Mansuri, has used his post as Deputy Foreign Minister
for Consular and Cultural Affairs to establish a separate power center in the Foreign
Ministry. Mansuri's Influence stems from contacts within the Revolutionary Guard, which
he once headed, and from his position as a member of the Central Committee of the
Islamic Revolutionary Party, Iran's only legal party. A religious zealot, Mansuri oversees
many cultural propaganda programs that actively promote export of the revolution. He also
controls scholarships and exit permits for students studying abroad, duties which extend
his Influence beyond foreign policy.
Although both Mansuri and Sheikh-of-Eslam are radicals and often in conflict with
Vela ati they sometimes compete with each other for influence within the Foreign Ministry.
The Hostage Takers' Guru
Mohammad Asgar Musavi-Khoiniha, a radical Islamic fundamentalist ideologue,
functioned as spiritual adviser to the hostage takers. After the hostage crisis ended in
1981, he was elected to the first post-revolutionary parliament and served as one of its
deputy speakers. He then became a personal adviser to Khomeini and organizer of the
annual pilgrimage of Iranians to Mecca. Khoiniha's ambition was to run for president in
1985, but Khomeini prevented Khoiniha and other radicals from running. Khomeini wanted
to maintain the existing balance among regime factions by keeping in power the more
moderate incumbent, All Musavi-Khamenei.
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As a consolation, Khomeini in July 1985 appointed Khoiniha as Iran's prosecutor
general. Khoiniha has used the post as a platform to push his leftist-oriented policies,
waging a campaign to imprison Iranians who attempt to reclaim property seized by the
Islamic regime after the Shah's overthrow.
Khoiniha has focused on persons who have returned after fleeing Iran when t e c erics
took over. Khoiniha's campaign has angered both more moderate officials who support the
return of illegally seized property as one means of encouraging private entrepreneurship;
and other radicals--including Prime Minister Musavi--who are attempting to attract back to
Iran expatriates possessing critically needed technical expertise. These tensions are likely
to persist with no clear winner as long as the regime continues to postpone making a
definitive decision about the relative role to be accorded the private sector and the state in
the economy.
Outlook
The hostage takers' successful careers indicate the continuing influence of their
revolutionary ideology and hardline anti-US stance. None has shown any sign of having
second thoughts about his role in the embassy seizure. They usually turn aside
interviewers' questions about guilt or apologies by justifying their actions on grounds that
the US used the embassy as an espionage center and engaged in criminal acts under the
Shah.
Iranian radicals, including the hostage takers, are contending for power with moderate
and conservative groups. The coalitions are roughly evenly matched, with Khomeini
wielding ultimate authority. Factional infighting will intensify after Khomeini dies.
Regardless of who emerges on top, the hostage takers are likely to continue to occupy key
positions and wield considerable influence in determining policy.
One way the regime could signal clearly a desire for better relations with the United
States would be to remove some or all of the hostage takers from important positions,
especially those that involve them directly in determining policy toward the US. The
diminution of the hostage takers' influence over time also would improve the prospects for
better relations.
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