US MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA: POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR A US-SOVIET SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
f, / lG 25X1
Central Intelligence A&-ncy
Y'A /e_ Was hiroon,D.C20505
DATE k 4DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
DOC NO 'S/(/ /rJ (6' ?0O ya,X
OCR 3
P&PD I
1 May 1986
US Military Action Against Libya:
Possi a Implications for a us-Soviet Summit
Summary
Soviet actions and recent private comments by East Bloc officials suggest
that Moscow does not want to escalate tensions with the United States over
Libya. Even after the postponement of the meeting between Secretary Shultz
and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Gorbachev returned to the subject of the
summit, stating that one could take place 'if the appropriate international
atmosphere' develops. The USSR's rhetorical stance has left open the
possibility of further Soviet action, however, including the deferral of this
year's summit. In considering such a step, the Soviets would have to weigh
the prospects for progress on bilateral issues, and on arms control in
particular, against their concern about losing prestige by proceeding with
preparations for a summit while Washington was pursuing actions perceived as
challenging to the USSR.
This memorandum was prepared by
the Off
ic
e of Soviet
25X1
Analysis. Comments are welcome an
may be d
25X1
the Chief, Strateg
ic Policy Di
vision,
25X1
SOV M 86-20042X
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
 i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
Shultz- evar na ze meeting was largely a symbolic expression of support for
Libya and a way to save face with the USSR's Arab allies:
Moscow's postponement of the
-- A senior Soviet official in a major West European embassy said to an
American official that in his opinion, the US action had embarrassed
the USSR before its Arab allies and had left it with no choice but to
cancel the meeting. To have gone ahead with the meeting, he said,
would have compromised Soviet interests in the Middle East.
Moscow seems to be avoiding actions that would lead to heightened
tensions with the United States over Libya or that could encourage Qadhafi's
adventurism. While the USSR has offered diplomatic and political support to
Qadhafi and promised to bolster Libya's "defense capability," it has shied
away from any specific commitment to come to his aid militarily:
Moscow's authoritative reaction to the US air strikes--in a government
statement and remarks by Gorbachev--has left open the door for a summit this
year but also laid the rhetorical groundwork for canceling it, depending on
future US actions in the international arena:
-- The USSR Government statement on 15 April demanded an "immediate end"
to US actions against Libya and warned that "otherwise, more far-
reaching conclusions will have to be drawn." It noted that prior to
the latest US attack, the Soviet leadership had warned that continued
US actions against Libya "could not but affect" US-Soviet relations.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000505020001-8
 I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
In his speech to the East German party congress on 18 April, Gorbachev
said that Washington and European capitals should realize that such
actions are doing direct harm to dialogue between the United States and
the USSR. He said there "should be no pretending" that US-Soviet
relations can develop independently of US behavior in the international
arena.
Soviet leadership statements and media commentary indicate that Moscow is
not viewing the US air strikes as an isolated incident but rather as a
manifestation of a broader US policy aimed at intimidating the USSR with US
militar stren th
Washington was acting in "quite the opposite direction."
-- In remarks to journalists in Potsdam on 20 April, Gorbachev said that
if the US Government continues its current policies, which he said were
exacerbating the international situation and destroying the spirit of
Geneva, this could "deprive of value all plans for a future meeting."
-- In an address to East German workers on 21 April, Gorbachev said that a
summit could take place if the "appropriate international atmosphere"
develops and it will be justified if it leads to "real shifts toward
disarmament." He said that the USSR was ready for this but that such
readiness was not evident in Washington at the moment and that
In talks
with East German workers on 21 April he cited US policy toward Libya,
Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan as examples of an alleged US policy of
"neoglobalism," and Soviet media have condemned US naval operations in the
Black Sea, the supplying of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to rebel groups in
Angola and Afghanistan, the cutting of the Soviet UN staff, and continued US
nuclear testing. In a speech on 22 April, Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze also asserted that there was an "organic link" between the
"bursts of bombs" in Tripoli and Benghazi and US nuclear explosions in
Coupled with this purported concern about the overall direction of US
policy are signs of an apparent skepticism in Moscow about the value of
had begun to manifest itself since the Geneva meeting.
Even before the air strikes, Gorbachev had begun to voice increasing
pessimism about the overall course of US foreign policy since his meeting last
November with President Reagan. In an 8 April speech in the Soviet industrial
city of Tolyatti, he charged that the United States had launched, "with new
force," an anti-Soviet campaign. He claimed that Washington was trying to
find "any pretext".to wreck an improvement in the international situation that
N it Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000505020001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
pursuing a dialogue with the United States if it did not lead to concrete
results on arms control issues. In his Tolyatti speech, Gorbachev observed
that the Central Committee had received "numerous letters" of concern from
Soviet citizens who worried that the West would make a "spurt forward in arms"
under the cover of peace and "fruitless" talks. Apparently attempting to
allay any such concerns, he asserted that this would not happen and that the
arms race "will not wear us out." In his address to the East German workers
he reiterated this theme, saying that "Soviet people" often ask whether the
United States "will not deceive us" and use the talks as a cover for building
up its military muscle to acquire military superiority. He said the USSR will
not be deceived and will not permit negotiations "to be used as a
It is unclear what impact the US air strikes may have had on Moscow's
calculations with respect to the summit. If there are differences of view
within the leadeship on the value of holding a summit, the US airstrikes may
have made it more difficult for Gorbachev to proceed with summit planning.
Moscow almost certainly would prefer to play the summit card to influence
the Administration's deliberations on bilateral issues, particularly on arms
control, rather than expend it in reaction to the Libyan situation.
Nonetheless, Soviet commentary and leadership statements suggest that an
underlying concern in the Kremlin is the extent that US military and foreign
policy actions make the USSR appear lacking in resolve, unsupportive of its
allies, and weak-nerved in the face of demonstrations of US military
strength. Against this backdrop, another US military action against Libya
might well prompt Gorbachev to announce that the Kremlin's planning for a
possible 1986 summit has been deferred. Such an action, or even a stronger
statement, would be motivated less out of interest in showing support for
r if Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
Libya than by a perceived need to demonstrate resolve toward Washington in the
face of a variety of US actions perceived to be challenging the USSR. Moscow
would weigh the consequences of such a move against its assessment of the
potential political, diplomatic, and propaganda value of a summit to its
efforts to moderate the Administration's policy by engaging it in a political
r if Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
2 - D/SOVA
1 - D/OSWR
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/EURA
1 - D/OGI
1 - DDI Action Staff
1 - SA/IA/DCI
1 - DD/SOVA
5 - OCPAS/IMC/CB
1 - Fritz Ermarth, NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - NI0/EUR
1 - C/ACIS
1 - DDO/SE/RR
1 - EO/NIC
1 - NIC/AG
1 - Herbert Meyer, VC/NIC
1 - FBIS/AG
- SA/SOVA
- EO/SOVA
- C/ES/CIB
- C/DEIG
- C/NIG
- C/RIG
- C/SIG
C/DEIG/DID
- C/DEIG/DEA
- C/NIG/EPD
- C/NIG/DPD
- C/RIG/EAD
- C/RIG/TWAD
- C/SIG/SF
- C/SIG/SP
- C/SIG/SF/D
- C/SIG/SF/0
- C/SIG/SF/N
- C/SIG/SP/V
- C/SIG/SP/S
- C/SIG/SP/W
- -SIG/SP/W
- SIG/SP/W Typescript
- SIG/SP/W Chrono
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
External Distribution:
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Ambassador Jack Matlock
National Security Council
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
Mr. Michael Armacost
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Room 7240
Department of State
Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Room 6226
Department of State
Mr. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State
Mr. Mark Parris
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
Mr. Bruce Burton
Office Of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
Mr. H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Room 7327
Depa.rtment of State
Mr. Jim Holmes
Director, Office of Strategic Planning,
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Room 7430
Department of State
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000505020001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
Ambassador Morton Abramowitz
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531
Department of State
Mr. Dick Clark
Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research
Room 6535
Department of State
Mr. Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 4758
Department of State
Mr. Robert T. Strand
Director, Office of Political-Military Analysis
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6638
Department of State
Mr. Mark Lowenthal
INR/SFA
Room 6524
Department of State
Dr. James Timbie
Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of
State for Strategic Policy
Room 7217
Department of State
Mr. Peter Rodman
Chairman, Policy Planning Council
Room 7311
Department of State
Ambassador Richard Ellis
Commissioner, US SCC
Room 5843
Department of State
Ambassador Paul Nitze
S/ART
Room 7208
New State
Ambassador Max Kampelman
S/DEL
Room 7208
New State
If Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
Ambassador Ronald Lehman
S/DEL
Room 7208
New State
Ambassador Maynard Glitman
S/DEL
Room 7208
New State
Ms. Avis Bohlen
Room 7208
New State
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Room 4930
New State
Mr. Louis V. Nosenzo
c/o Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A
Department of State
Mr. Victor Alessi
c/o Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A
Department of State
Mr. R. Lucas Fischer
c/o Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A
Department of State
Mr. Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A
Depa.rtment of State
Mr. Robert Ashdown
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5923
Department of State
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
Dr. Henry Cooper
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 4498
Department of State
Mr. Thomas Simons, Director
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Mr. David Schwartz, Director
Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy
Bureau Political/Military Affairs
Room 7317
Department of State
Mr. Craig Dunkerley
Office of European Security and
Political Affairs
Room 6227
New State
Rear Admiral Dean Sackett
Deputy Director for International Negotiations
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E1008
The Pentagon
Major General Donald 0. Aldridge
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E 959
Pentagon
Major General William Burns
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E959
The Pentagon
Lt. Col. W. Fedor
AF/INET
4B 136
Pentagon
CIA Rep NMIC
DIA/SSO (JSO-1)
Room 2D801-A
The Pentagon
Lt. General Leonard H. Perroots
Director, DIA
3E258
Pentagon
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet
Political/Military Affairs
Room 2C238
The Pentagon
Mr. James McCreary
DIO for Strategic Programs
and R & D
DIA Room 2C238
Pentagon
Col. Frank Keough
D-I-5, Rm. 1E821
Pentagon
C Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505020001-8