NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 21 OCTOBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
+C Y # 265
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
21 October 1983
Top Seciet
CPAS NID 83-247JX
copy 2 8 5
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Top Secret
Contents
Grenada: New Regime ............................................................ 1
Central America: Contadora Foreign Ministers Meet ............ 3
Nicaragua: Oil Supply Problems ............................................ 4
Pakistan: Violent Protests Resume ........................................ 5
Western Europe: Mass Peace Demonstrations ......................
Togo-US: President Eyadema's Visit ...................................... 9
Cuba-US: Concern About Radio Marti .................................... 10
USSR: Andropov's Whereabouts ............................................ 11
Hungary-USSR: Evading INF Countermeasures .................... 11
EC-US: Dispute on Specialty Steels ........................................ 12
Persian Gulf: Combined Military Exercise Ends .................... 13
Special Analysis
Lebanon: Shia Discontent ........................................................ 14
Top Secret
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GRENADA: New Regime
of sending troops.
The apparent execution of Prime Minister Bishop and three of his
cabinet ministers is causing a wave of revulsion among regional
leaders, but Havana almost certainly will support the new regime short
Armed Forces Commander Austin has announced that he will
head a 16-man Revolutionary Military Council that will govern
"temporarily," but the role of former Deputy Prime Minister Coard in
The Council has declared a four-day, 24-hour curfew to last until
Monday morning, and curfew violators are to be shot on sight. The
streets reportedly were calm on Thursda , with no apparent threat to
the 800 to 1,000 US citizens in Grenada.
democracy in Grenada.
Caribbean governments have reacted with shock and disgust to
the deaths and the military takeover. They have called for a return to
press reported that Bishop spent the day visiting industrial sites in
southern Cuba and President Castro was host at a reception for him
Bishop stopped in Havana on 7 October on his way home from
Eastern Europe, according to the US Interests Section in Havana. The
that eveninq.
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Comment: The nature of the relationship between Coard and
Austin is not known, so it cannot be determined whether the power
struggle or the violence is over. During the crisis Havana probably
decided to support whoever came to power. Castro, almost certainly
concerned about US intentions, probably will move quickly to shore
up the regime with intelligence and more military and political
advisory assistance.
Havana now may have a more doctrinaire, pro-Cuban regime in
Grenada, but one that will be less popular at home and less appealing
in the region. The Cubans' first public statement left room for
continued relations with Grenada and probably was designed to
minimize criticism of the Cuban role in Grenada. Other Caribbean
governments probably will ostracize the new government from
regional organizations.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
CENTRAL AMERICA: Contadora Foreign Ministers Meet
draft a treaty for later approval by the Central American countries.
Foreign Ministers of the Contadora countries-Mexico,
Venezuela, Panama, and Colombia-meet today in Panama to try to
Minister, supplementary agreements will be bilateral. He said
Nicaragua and Honduras are already working on their own versions.
The Colombian Vice Foreign Minister told the US Embassy he
anticipates that the draft treaty-based on the statement of
objectives approved last month-will be short and general but will
have specific annexes. According to the Panamanian Foreign
Nevertheless, the current high level of tension in the region,
particularly in Nicaragua, has lent a sense of urgency to the task.
Comment: It will be difficult to work out a draft treaty that will
be acceptable to all the Central American states, and reaching
subsequent agreement on specific annexes may prove impossible.
to upstage the OAS General Assembly.
The Sandinistas apparently have justified their decisions to seek
UN debate on Central America on the basis of the deteriorating
security situation. No date has been set, but the Nicaraguans may try
Top Secret
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Top Secret
NICARAGUA: Oil Supply Problems
seeking alternative means to assure resupply
The Sandinistas, who are faced with the threat of more insurgent
sabotage and with refusals by oil suppliers to arrange shipping, are
fuel shortages to continue at least through the end of October.
Corinto destroyed between 10 and 20 percent of the fuel capacity
there-some 2.4 million to 4.8 million gallons. According to the US
Embassy, however, as a result of the attack, the Sandinistas expect
the recent attack on the port of
essential functions.
Comment: The size of Nicaragua's oil stocks is uncertain, but
until recently the Sandinistas were receiving normal oil shipments
from Mexico while rationing supplies to the retail market. Earlier this
month the Sandinistas increased retail fuel prices by 40 percent.
These measures probably have enabled them to accumulate at least
enough of a reserve to continue military operations and other
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Too Secret
Boundary representation is-':
not necessarily authoritative.
21 October 1983
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Top Secret
Antigovernment demonstrations have flared up again in Pakistan,
and there are new reports of Soviet training of Pakistani subversives.
New violence occurred in Sind Province yesterday, although the
climax of the Muslim religious holiday of Muharram passed early this
week without the anticipated sectarian clashes. Opposition sources
claim that at least 10 persons were killed and several hundred
arrested when ciover t militia swept through several villages in
the Sind.
Lawyers staged protest marches yesterday in nearly all of
Pakistan's major cities. The most serious encounter occurred in
Punjab Province, where the US Consulate in Lahore reports that an
attempt by leftist students to join between 500 and 1,000 protesting
lawyers was blocked by the police. The US Embassy in Islamabad
reports the government is increasing pressure on the me i limit
coverage of internal political developments.
A Pakistani diplomat in Moscow has told the US Embassy that at
least 200 Pakistanis, and possibly as man as 2,000, are bein trained
in the USSR in political subversion.
their coverage of the opposition movement.
Comment: The demonstrations by lawyers appear to be their
most successful protest so far. Although the lawyers have long been
the most disaffected of Pakistani opposition groups, they have not
attracted much popular support. The government's efforts to limit
coverage may even be provoking some larger newspapers to increase
Top Secret
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Top Secret
WESTERN EUROPE: Mass Peace Demonstrations
The peace protests throughout Western Europe this weekend are
likely to attract large but generally peaceful crowds, although sporadic
violence is probable in West Germany and Italy.
West European peace groups have carefully planned the mass
demonstrations this weekend in London, Paris, Rome, Madrid, and
Brussels, intending them to culminate years of opposition to INF
deployments. West German missile opponents also have scheduled
regional protests in Bonn, Hamburg, and Stuttgart featuring marches,
peace festivals, and human chains linking important military
installations. Peace groups will hold a followup demonstration in
The Hague on 29 October.
In some countries, leftist political parties and trade unions
that were ambivalent about active involvement are providing
organizational support to increase the size and impact of the
demonstrations. The Walloon Socialists have given a boost to the
weak Belgian movement, and the Dutch Labor Party and the Trade
Union Federation have increased the strength of the peace groups in
the Netherlands.
The already large West German movement is receiving some
additional support from the Social Democrats and the German Trade
Union Federation. Chairman Willy Brandt is to address Bonn's big
rally on Saturday.
The West German Government has anticipated major
demonstrations. It is seeking a Bundestag mandate next month for
INF deployments, in order to refute accusations of subservience to
the US.
Comment: Demonstrations are likely to be large in all basing
countries. The turnout in the UK probably will be smaller than on
previous occasions, however, partially because protest activities by
the women at Greenham Common have alienated moderate
supporters.
Although most of the protests are likely to be nonviolent, .
autonomous and terrorist fringe groups in West Germany and Italy
may try to provoke clashes with the police. The US Embassy in Rome
reports that "Autonomia" terrorists are planning provocations with
the Embassy as one of several targets. Nonetheless, the police are
well prepared to handle demonstrations.
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,.Ton Sebret
President Gnassingbe Eyadema
President since coup in 1967 ... 47 ... pragmatic
and politically astute ... returned country to civilian
rule in 1980... respected mediator in regional
disputes.
21 October 1983
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9 21 October
1983
TOGO-US: President Eyadema's Visit
Moderate, pro-Western President Eyadema, who visits
Washington next week, is preoccupied with Libyan efforts to
undermine his regime and with the seizure of power by leftists in
neighboring Ghana and Upper Volta.
earlier this year.
As Minister of Defense, Eyadema maintains close control over the
military, which is dominated by his fellow northerners. The Army was
exempted from a promotion and wage freeze imposed on civilians
in Togo following the Libyan-backed coup in Upper Volta in August.
Comment: Tripoli has been trying to subvert the Togolese
Government for years. Although the latest incident was not a serious
threat, Libyan leader Qadhafi appears to have increased his meddling
and intelligence cooperation to counter the threat from Libya.
Togo remains dependent on France for financial and security
assistance, but Eyadema may ask the US for increased economic aid
better off than their neighbors in Ghana and Upper Volta.
Togolese realize that, despite Eyadema's shortcomings, they are
Eyadema's authoritarian rule has brought stability to Togo. Many
political and economic dominance to northerners.
40 percent of the population, resent their loss under Eyadema of
Longstanding ethnic and regional differences, nevertheless, are a
potential source of turbulence. Southerners, who make up nearly
of provoking protests
Deteriorating economic conditions could increase public
dissatisfaction with the government. Earlier this month Togo
rescheduled its debt for the third time since 1979 and received a
standby IMF loan. The US Embassy reports that the government
probably will avoid takin any additional austerity measures for fear
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Top Secret
a Cuban spokesman threatened publicly to "respond with all
means" to Radio Marti, and Foreign Minister Malmierca later
denounced it at the UN General Assembly. Havana told the US
Interests Section in Havana last month that, even if Radio Marti
operated within the context of the Voice of America, it almost
certainly will prevent resolution of the issue of mutual radio
interference. Cuban officials did not attend a meeting scheduled for
yesterday with the US in Mexico City to discuss the radio interference
issue
Comment: Cuban jamming and counterbroadcasts to the US in
English are a virtual certainty as soon as Radio Marti comes on the
air. The initial counterbroadcasts, however, are unlikely to create
massive interference with US commercial broadcasting stations.
Havana probably will first want to evaluate the impact of Radio Marti
on the Cuban population.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
USSR: Andropov's Whereabouts
will not take place this month.
General Secretary Andropov was to visit Bulgaria on 25 October,
but the US Embassy in Moscow reports that there are rumors the visit
his current whereabouts.
His last two reported appearances were on 18 August, when he met
with US Senators in Moscow, and on 28 September, when he talked
with South Yemeni leader Hasani. There is no information available on
with Sofia.
Comment: Andropov has not made a public appearance in
Moscow for over two months, which is longer than any such absence
since he became General Secretary. The meeting with Hasani appears
to have been outside of Moscow during Andropov's vacation. The
postponement of his trip to Sofia could be due to the state of his
health or to other more pressing but unpublicized activities. It does
not, however, appear to result from the current tensions in relations
HUNGARY-USSR: Evading INF Countermeasures
Contacts of the US Embassy in Budapest claim that the regime
has won the USSR's reluctant agreement not to deploy nuclear
missiles in Hungary as a response to NATO INF deployments. The
contacts contend that only some new Soviet missile-tracking radars
will be placed in Hungary. They also say that the Soviets are urging
all their Warsaw Pact allies to increase defense spending and that
debate is continuing over restricting contacts with the West as a
countermeasure. They are confident that Budapest will not increase
its defense ex enditures and will continue to maintain good relations
with the West.
West tensions.
Comment: Short-range FROG and Scud nuclear missiles are
already in Hungary and probably will be replaced eventually with
SS-21 and SS-23 missiles, regardless of NATO's INF deployments.
The Hungarians may have objected to a Soviet proposal for
accelerating the deployment of these missiles as a public response to
NATO INF. Hungary's efforts to evade participation in strong
countermeasures reflect its hope of protecting relations with the
West-particularly economic relations-from any increase in East-
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EC-US: Dispute on Specialty Steels
Top Secret
EC ministers earlier this week agreed to urge Washington to settle
the dispute over US restraints on imports of specialty steels. The
Community has rejected the most recent US offer to reduce tariffs on
several products as compensation for the duties and quotas it
imposed on EC specialty steels last July. It is seeking tariff reductions
worth at least $500 million, more than double the recent US offer, and
has filed a complaint against the US with the GATT. The EC has set
30 November as the deadline for a compensation agreement with the
US.
Comment: The Community still wants to avoid aggravating the
dispute, but it may retaliate unilaterally if a compensation agreement
cannot be worked out soon. The ministers' deliberations indicate that
EC might raise tariffs on US oranges, computers, office equipment,
radio and TV equipment, textiles, and steel tube and pipe fittings.
About 45 percent of US exports of computers and office equipment
goes to the EC.
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Tog Secret
Gulf Cooperation Council's "Peninsula Shield" Exercise, October 1983
Ira
N.
i
Iraq-Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone ,
r
Riyadh
Ethiopia
26)Md F
Olt
uwait
Gulf of Oman
Muscat
Iran
Bahrain
AJtagama
of Hormuz
1Joint military O hbi-
. eitercisg o
4 nkacl `
Yemen Arab People's Democratic
Republic Republic of Yeme
(N. Yemen), (S. Yemennnnnnnn)
Arabian
Sea
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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PERSIAN GULF: Combined Military Exercise Ends
The first combined military exercise by the six-country Gulf
Cooperation Council ended last weekend in the United Arab
Emirates. The maneuvers featured two assaults against fixed
positions by infantry units supported by armored cars, artillery,
helicopters, and fighter aircraft. Before the exercise, Kuwaiti troops
moved overland some 650 kilometers to the UAE, and the Saudis flew
airborne troops 1,450 kilometers across the peninsula.
Comment: The exercise seems to have gone as planned with no
serious mishaps, a major accomplishment. It demonstrated the
growing military cooperation among the states and their capability to
transport troops and execute military maneuvers outside their home
territories. Combined air and naval exercises are being planned for
next year.
Top Secret
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.:Tog) Secret
Mediterranean
Syria
Maronite
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholic
L,z~D Mixed Maronite.and
Shia Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Druze
Mixed Druze and
Greek Orthodox
Population shifts caused by the June
1982 Israeli invasion are not depicted.
0 20
Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Special Analysis
Continuing cease-fire violations in the suburban slums of south
Beirut, Where many Shia Muslims reside, underscore the potential for
a renewal of major fighting if President Gemayel remains unable to
start the national reconciliation talks. Although the Shia make up the
country's largest sect, they have almost no help or attention from the
central government. During the fighting last month, Nabih Barri, the
leader of the major Shia faction, tried to extract concessions from
Gemayel, but he avoided using his Ama/ militia against the
government. If reconciliation talks falter, Barri will be under greater
pressure to discard his moderate course.
Shia leaders oppose partition because it would leave many
members of the sect in south Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley under
Israeli and Syrian control. They believe that a strong central authority
is the only hope for a unified Shia community, and they are pushing
for more Shia influence in the government. Barri and other Amal
officials, however, are pessimistic about prospects for unification.
Barri has told US Embassy officials recently that he wants
increased Shia representation in the cabinet. He also will insist on
more seats for the Shia in any new national assembly. Shia deputies
would push for economic programs that would benefit the sect.
In addition, Barri indicated that he wants Shia to command the
Army and head the security and intelligence services, posts which
traditionally are reserved for Christians. He probably calculates that
this would improve the ability of the Shia to protect themselves.
Last month, when the Lebanese Army battled Druze and
Palestinian forces in the mountains of the Alayh and Ash Shuf
Districts, the Druze and the Syrians urged Bard to order Shia
militiamen in Beirut to stage an uprising against the government. Barri
restrained his forces, however, and also refused to join the opposition
National Salvation Front. The Amal leader's actions apparently reflect
his belief that negotiations with the government hold the best hope for
gaining Shia objectives
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Major Shia Factions
Organization Leader Comments
Approximate
Militia
Strength
Amal (Hope) Nabih Bard Barri has largest secular fol- 5,000
(moderate) lowing in Shia community;
group favors central govern-
ment but demands more
power for Shia; based in Beirut
suburbs.
Islamic Amal Husayn Musawi Terrorist-prone breakaway 200 to 300
(radical) group from Amal; Iranian- Lebanese;
backed; aims for conversion of 500 Iranians
Lebanon into an Islamic state
linked to Tehran; based in
Bekaa Valley.
Hizb Allah (Party of Unknown Terrorist-prone; Iranian- Less than 100
God) backed; probably based in
Bekaa Valley.
Union of Muslim Sayyid Muhammad Terrorist-prone; has operation- Less than 100
Students Husayn Fadlallah al and ideological links with
(radical) Islamic Amal; based in
Beirut suburbs.
Democratic Socialist Kamal,al-Assad Kamal al-Assad is speaker of None
Party (conservative) Lebanese National Assembly;
leader of old-line Shia politi-
cians; an "establishment"
man; has no influence with
younger Shia generation.
Higher Shia Islamic Muhammad Mahdi Shaykh Shams al-Din is recog- None
Council Shams al-Din nized as. religious leader of
(conservative) Shia community and is; rival of
Barri for influence among Shia.
Top. Secret
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Tension in Beirut
The situation around Beirut airport remains potentially explosive.
Opponents of Barri's moderate approach probably are fostering
resentment in the surrounding Shia slums by portraying the
Multinational Force as a biased occupation force that in recent weeks
has directed return fire only at Muslim targets.
At the same time, a variety of armed groups that Barri does not
control are free to initiate firefights in the area patrolled by the
Multinational Force. These groups include the Lebanese Communist
Party, the Communist Action Organization, and the Muslim Student
Union, a pro-Iranian Shia faction that has sought to undermine Barri's
leadership.
Outlook
To reduce the threat of a Shia uprising, government officials have
argued that Shia interests can only be advanced by supporting the
government and the Army. The Shia, by joining forces with Syrian-
backed Lebanese factions against Gemayel, would ensure the
fall of the government and the partition they want to avoid. The
government's argument was persuasive during the fighting last
month, even thouah Gemayel apparently offered no reward for Shia
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Top Secret
Hints of a national redistribution of power, however, almost
certainly have caused the Shia to expect that they will benefit from
any new arrangements. As a result, some Shia will now be more prone
to violence if they believe their aspirations are frustrated. In the event
of an uprising in Beirut, the US would find it difficult to draw "red
lines" in the capital or to provide significant military support to back
up its commitment to the Lebanese Army.
By pursuing a negotiated settlement of Shia demands, Bard has
staked at least part of his- prestige on the favorable outcome of the
reconciliation process. Protracted or inconclusive talks are likely to
erode his influence over the Shia and result in violence that might
again propel Lebanon toward an all-out civil war.
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