MILITARY THOUGHT: THE FUNDAMENTAL SCHEME OF A FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL V. BOSKAKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403670001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 13, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Fundamen al Scheme of a Front Offensive Operation
by
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Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov
The concept of the "fundamental scheme of an operation" is
not familiar to our readers, so we shall define at once what we mean
by it.
All operations of one war are waged by almost one and the
same mea is of armed combat, and most often the organizational
forms of troops in all operations likewise remain unchanged. Thus,
within the extreme diversity of the specific features of the front
offensive operations of the Second World War, one can discern
specific traits characteristic of almost all of them. This was also
noted in the operations of the First World War.
The substance of these general traits characteristic of all
operations of a given war and taken in total we propose to call
the fundamental scheme of an operation. By summarizing the
basic characteristics of operations into a single scheme, it is
easy to understand not only the substance and meaning of ea,ch
of these characteristics, but also the mutual relationship and
meaning of them in the operation as a whole. Such an examina-
tion of the basic characteristics of an operation of the last war
is very convenient and makes it easier to establish graphically
their suitability or unsuitability under modern conditions and to
determine the fundamental scheme of an operation in a future war.
The fundamental scheme, put forth by us, of an offensive
operation of a front ir the period of the Second World War ;diagram
1) is not a copy of any operation that took place. Nonetheless,
arnong the great number of operations, there is none whose basic
and fundamental characteristics would not be reflected on the
given diagram.
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We shall make clear why the fundamental scheme of a front
offensive operation in the last war was the way it was.
The basic features of an operation are determined first of all
by what type of armed forces, what arm of troops is the main one
and what constitutes the basis of their combat strength. As is known,
in the last war the chief means for conducting military operations
and the basic combat strength of the armed forces were ground
troops, consisting of combined arms armies (which in turn con-
sisted of rifle divisions) and partly of large units of armored
troops (tank and mechanized corps organized by brigades).
Besides this, the level of development of industrial production,
science, and of technology in many countries was, by the beginning
of the Second World War, already high enough to guarantee produc-
tion of a variety of military equipment and arms. This also per-
mitted the belligerents to bring their operational art out from the
stagnant position in which it found itself at the end of the First
World War. At the same time, it was still impossible to bring
about complete motorization of all ground troops, as a result of
which the basic combat complement of armies and fronts remained
the rifle divisions. The quantitative growth and the qualitative
development of artillery, aviation, and other means of neutrali-
zation, the raising of their destructive capabilities, striking
power and range of operation still could not essentially alter their
roles as combat and operations support weapons.
The aviation, artillery, chemical, engineer, airborne ani
other arms of troop.; with all of their combat equipment only
assisted in accomplishing major combat and operational tasks,
but independently they could not completely accomplish them.
By virtue of this, the outcome of combat and c r: a= operation
depended mainly on ?le success of the operations of the infantry
divisions, which constituted not only the basis but also the abso-
lute majority of the forces of ground troops. The destruction of
the most important groupings of the enemy's ground troops was
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the main purpose , the basic content of operations and of combat
operations in general. In this, all attention was concentrated on
routing the enemy in the tactical and immediate operational depth,
where the significant part of his infantry divisions was located.
This was reflected in essence in the whole character of the
last war and in the methods and forms of conducting combat opera-
tions, including the fundamental scheme for mounting an offensive
operation of a front.
The depth of a front operation was determined by the disposi-
tion of the ground troops, the means for reinforcement, the control
points, the rear installations and the basic forces of the tactical avia-
tion of the grot? of enemy armies, and was 200 to 300 kilometers.
An offensive began, as a rule, with a breakthrough of the
solid front of the enemy's combat formations on the most impor-
tant axes and swiftly developed to the immediate operational depth,
frequently leading to the encirclement of enemy troops. Such a
method of conducting an operation was the only one possible,because
the weapons of neutralization in that, period, with all allowance for
their concentration, could not by themselves destroy the enemy's
divisions of ground troops and the means for their reinforcement.
Our analogous divisions could rout, destroy, or capture the person-
nel of the enemy divisions only when they had the necessary superi-
ority in forces and with advantageous operational preconditions.
Under these conditions,an important role in taking the decision
for planning a front operation was played by the choice of the axes
for the main and auxiliary strikes, the concentration on those axes
of the necessary forces, and the establishment Over the enemy of
a superiority which guara-iteed the success of combat operations.
The theory of the main strike was fundamental in the operational
art of the period of the Second World War. Therefore, the main
strike also occupies the most important place on Diagreve 1 ..Puich
we cited. 50X1-HUM
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The exploitation of a breakthrough was accomplished by commit-
tirkg tank and mechanized troops into the battle, which assured high
speeds for the offensive. The study of the operatlonal exploitation of
a breakthrough utilizing a mobile arm of troops, of the deployment ci
this aim of troops, and of the bases of the organilation and prepara-
tion of its large units was also the most important in the operational
art and in the military science of tbat Period las" a itliO16.
In the fundamental scheme of a front offensive operation pf the
last war there was shown the use of large units of armored troo-es for
purposes of operational exploitation of a breakthrough and completion
of the encirclement of the basic grouping of the enemy': troops.
Obviously, there is no need to prove that the fundamental
scheme of a front offensive operation of the last war can no longer
express the content of an operation in a modern nuclear/missile war.
Consequently, the problem consists of discovering in what
measure the new fundamental scheme of an operation in a modern
war differs from the former scheme, which elements from the old
scheme retain their significance, which will disappear completely.
and which will be transformed under the new conditions.
The degree of these differences is determined by the changes
which occurred in the postwar period and which can occur in the
future, primarily in the development of the productive forces and
the political conditions of life in a society. The significant devel-
opment of the productive forces of a society and of the weapons of
armed combat cannot fail to cause a substantial change in the forms
and methods of conducting combat operations in modern warfare
and, certainly, introduces specific corrections into the fundamental
scheme of a front operation.
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The basic means of armed combat and of the basic combat
strength of the belligerents, as we have already examined earliei
will not be divisions of ground troops and not ground troops as a
whole, no matter how they might be supplied with the weapons neces-
sary for conducting a mobile war, but nuclear/missile weapons and
the troops which assure their use, the destruction of which is the
main oal of the miljta operatj,s of the belli erer,ts.
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In connection with this, the number nf divisions in the com-
plement of a front will decrease significantly, and additional large
units and units which ensure the use of nuclear/missile weapons
will be included however, this does not mean a belittling or nega-
tion of the important role of ground troops in routing of the enemy.
The role of ground and airborne troops will be determined by the
need to complete the rout of an enemy who has been subjected to
nuclear strikes, to take and consolidate an area, to establish the
forward edge of contact with the enemy's troops, and to protect
and defend the operational rear area.
The content of the fundamental scheme of a front offensive
operation in moc4ern warfare must also specify all of this.
Considering the nature of nuclear/missile warfare, one can
raise the question: will a front offensive operation take place at
all? Will the war not end with the conduct of the initial massive
nuclear/missile strike in conjunclion with the utilization of chemi-
cal and bacteriological weapons? Indeed, at the moment there
exist bases for raising such questions. It is enough to cite, for
example, the possibility of the complete annihilation of whole
countries by nuclear weapons in short periods of time. Despite 50X1-HUM
this, however, we consider that the operation as a specific form
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of armed combat is also retained if, modern warfare. It is impos-
sible to reduce a future war only to an initial strategic nuclear strike.
Such a strike, unquestionably, is a definite part, a stage, of such
an operation. After these strikes an attempt must be made to con-
duct simultaneously and successively a series of operations in
various theaters of military operations and operational axes. The
basic content of these operations will be the conduct of powerful
nuclear/missile strikes and vigorous actions by ground and air-
borne troops, the Air Force, and the Navy.
The main purpose of a modern operation, as is known, is the
destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons. The front,
which operates in specific demarcated lines and under the condi-
tions existing in one theater, cannot carry on combat against, for
example, intercontinental missile bases located on different conti-
neuts because it does not have the necessary intelligence organs
and weapons of destruction. It is clear that it is necessary to call
on the weapons of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High
Command for combat against them.
In connection with this, the place of the front operation in
modern warfare will be determined, in our view, by which enemy
nuclear weapons the front must destroy, under the given conditions.
It is known that the nuclear/missile weapons of the USA are dis-
tributed in groups: the weapons of operational-tactical designation
for ground troops, with limited tactical-technical potentialities,
the majority of which are located close to the line of contact of
the troops,and a part.not farther than 100 to ISO kilometers; medium
range missiles (2,000 to 3.000 kilometers), which are distributed
at a depth of 500 to 1, 500 to 2.000 krnfrom the line of contact of
the belligerents; and finally intercontinental missiles with a range
of 8,000 to 10, 000 kilometers or more.
The front's composition will be changed, depending on which
group (groups) of nuclear/missile weapons it must destroy. Thus,
if the mission of a front is to destroy and annihilate the operational-
tactical nuclear/missile weapons and the first echelon of ground
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troops, then its composition can be close to that currently accepted
and the depth of such an operation will not change substantially in
comparison with the experience of the last war. In this case,the
destruction of the operational and strategic nuclear/missile weapons
and the following echelons of ground troops, located beyond the
limits of the depth of the front operation, must be accomplished with
weapons of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
or it will be necessary to organize either a group of fronts or a com-
mand and staff for the theater of military operations with the appro-
priate combat weapons to perform these missions.
In our view, the most acceptable version of the mission of a
front is the liquidation of all nuclear/missile weapons designated
by the enemy for combat on a given axis and dictributed within the
bocnclaries of a given continent. In this case, the meaning of a
front as the basic level of command in the organization of armed
combat is preserved and removes the necessity of establishing
intervening levels (a group of fronts or a command for the theater
iif military operations is eliminated). The General Headquarter,/
is thus freed from carrying out the missions which the front forma-
tions are able to perform. Besides this, destruction of the enemy's
nuclear/missile weapons requires the immediate deployment of the
operations of ground and airborne landing troops throughout the
depth of the given axis. This will be more difficult for the General
Headquarters of the Supreme high Gormand to carry out than
for the front, which has these troops at its disposal and is able
to organize their coordinated operations. In this case, the nuclear/
missile weapons located outside the boundaries of the offensive
zone and of the mission of the fronts and chiefly on other continents
and on the ocean will be destroyed by weapons of the General
Headquarters of the SUprerne High Command.
In connection with this, the depth of a front operation must
be sharply increased, and this will be its new identifying charac-
teristic. It should be noted that the calculated depth of a front
operation since the last war has frown repeatedly. In the postwar
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years it was 300 to 400 kilometers, with the appearance of nuclear/
missile weapons it was 500 to 600 kilometers, and at the present
time it reaches 1,000 kilometers and more. 50X1 -HUM
It seems to us that the depth of a front bperation, as well as
the width of its offensive zone, must be defined on the basis of the
role of the front in routing the enemy. Taking the above statements
into account, we consider that the depth of a moderq_ front opera-
tion must reach 2,000 to 3, GOO kilometers. All enemy nuclear/
missile weapons designated for combat in a given axis will be
distributed within the boundaries of this area. The width of the
front zone will also grow to 500 to 700 kilometers and more. -
Thus, the front operation of the future must become an actual
ssaml r_L../istli which meets the modern requirements for the
simultaneous destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons
throughout the depth of a given theater of military operations.
In the operations of past wars, simultaneous fire effect
against the entire depth of the enemy's defense could not be
realized because of the lack of sufficiently powerful and long-
range weapons of neutralization (with the exception, of course,
of aviation) and in practice did not exert a decisive influence on
the outcome of an operation. Nuclear/missile weapons permit
accomplishment of the simultaneous neutralization of the enemy
at a depth of hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, and the
full motorization and mechanization of the armies and the mass
us c of airborne troops ensures the swift transfer of operations to
the operational depth where the enemy's basic weapons of nuclear
attack will be located. In connection with this, modern front opera-
tions will be distinguished Mainly by the delivery of massive nuclear/
missile strikes on the enemy's nuclear weapons and other important
objectives and by the quick exploitation of the results of these strikes
by ground and airborne landing troops. 50X1 -HUM
An essential modification will occur, in particular, in the
operations of the ground troops. Tull motpriaation and mechanisation
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of ground troops, it would seem, facilitates swift operations for the
purpose of the most rapid penetration into the enemy's operatic--1
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depth, of exploiting the results of the nuclear/missile :,trilces
delivered against him, and of completing his rout However, the
possible speed of advance of large units of ground troopb and the
rate of the offensive (100 kilometers and more per 24-hour period)
still will not guarantee the immediate gaining of nuclear anu other
targets oi operational significance or their destruction.
Fven the maximum speeds of a modern operation allow an
enemy to reorganize to r: zertain degree. to transfer the surviv-
ing nuclear weapons to other regions, to bring up new forces from
the zone of interior, and to organize resistance -to the attacking
troops. Therc;ore, we must look for something else, namely, for
the operations of troops with significantly greater speed than that
which ground troops have.
During the Civil War and the Second World War the assign-
ment and skillful use of the mobile arm of troops as an independent
operational category yielded great advantage, and there are no
grounds to consider that in modern warfare this principle will not
be accepted.
The conduct of deep operations and the transfer of vigorous
operations to a significant operational depth of the enemy's forma-
tion in short periods of time will be more essential now than in
past wars Therefore, the significance of the rno!'ile arm of
troops not only does not decrease,but even inc rra
The mobility of troops must be such that they can get to
regions where the enemy's nuclearilAissile weapons are located
literally just a few hours after the delivery of our nuclear strikes
and before the enemy succeeds in re-establishing his own combat
effectiveness and in eliminating consequences of these strikes.
This can be achieved only by airborne landing troops, as
well as motorized rifle units and large units, transferred to the
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enemy's operational depth by air transport. However, one must speak
not of the dropping or landing of separate operational airborne landing
forces into the enemy's deep rear area, but of the massive use in
the operation of airborne and motorized rifle troops as a mobile arm
of the troops.
Reviewing the fundamental scheme of an operation in modern
warfare (Diagram 2), I should like to draw the reader's attention to
the question of the principle of the mein strike and its role in a
modern operation. We examined this problem in detail in an article
published in the first issue of the Special Collection in 1960. Under
modern conditions, to attach the operations of the basic forces of
the front and primarily of nuclear/missile weapons to a specific
axis, even a very important one for the operations of ground troops
in the front zone, is completely incorrect. The concentration of
forces and weapons on a specific axis in an operation can no longer
be a definite operational principle and must be replaced by the
principle of concentration of the basic efforts of a front on the
destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons and the basic
groupings of his ground troops. In this, the ground troops of a
front will function not as large groupings and not on a solid front,
but on several axes as separate large units and even as units,
while carrying out a broad maneuver during the operation.
As an example, I should like to note the decision taken by
the commander of the southern side in an operational exercise
In 1960. One of the most important characteristics of this deci-
sion, in our view, is that in it several new means of conducting
an operation under conditions of the mass use of nuclear/missile
weapons were shown. The need to create cumbersome groupings
of ground troops which are a good target for the enemy's nuclear
attacks is precluded by the solution in the operation.
Such will be, in our opinion, the basic characteristics of
an offensive operation of a front in a future war which also must
determine the outlines of the fundamental scheme of this operation-
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The diagram presented reflects these characteristics and cd j
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looked upon as typical for a front offensive operation.
This diagram shows that the primary weapon for routing the
enemy in an operation is nuclear/missile weapons and not ground
troops and that divisions of ground troops and airbornt. troops are
used only for purposes of completing the enemy's destruction.
The operation begins with a powerful nuclear strike on the
nuclear/missile weapons and the basic groupings of ground and
airborne troops, the aviation and the navy of the enemy. Simul-
taneously with this strike or immediately thereafter the troops of
the first operational echelonshift to the offensive, and an airborne
landing operation is carried out. Graphically the destruction of
nucleaz weapons and the defeat of the enemy's troops by the
nuclear weapons of a front are indicated on the diagram by areas
of complete neutralization and by zones with high levels of
radiation.
The basic groups of missile troops and the fundamental
apportionment of missions among them are reflected on the dia-
gram. The lase of medium range missiles with a firing range of
up to 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers, which are designated for the
destruction of the troops of a group of the enemy's armies and
nuclear/missile weapon* within the limits of this range, must
be closely coordinated with the operations of the first operational
echelon of the ground troops and airborne troops which have been
thrown into the immediate operational depth. The use of long
range missiles with a firing range of 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers
must be coordinated with the execution of basic airborne land-
ing operations in the operational depth of disposition of the
enemy's troops. It is possible that the number of classes and
groups of nuclear/missile weapons can also be different if
this depends on considerations of an economic or teckmical
nature. From an operational viewpoint, however, it is suffi-
cient to have missiles of the indicated classes as the weapons
of a front. \
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The most important principle of a deep operation is expressed
on the diagram as the simultaneous neutralization by nuclear weapons
of all of the most important targets and primarily of the enemy's
weapons of mass destruction, his ground and airborne troops, and
his aviation in the entire depth of, their possible disposition to the
borders of the continent, in conjunction with the offensive of the
first echelon of ground troops and with the operations of powerful
airborne forces in the deep operational rear area of the enemy.
The ground troops have been represented as two echelons.
The first operational echelon consists of two armies consisting in
all of 12 to 15 divisions and designated for completion of the rout
of the troops of the enemy's group of armies. The second opera-
tional echelon consists of one army with 7 or 8 divisions; whose
mission is not to develop success in the operation, as was done
formerly, but defense of the operational rear area of the front
and combat with the operational airborne landing forces of the
enemy during the whole operation. The large units of the second
echelon of the front can be utilized in case of the need to augment
the efforts of the attacking armies of the first echelon and also
as operational landing forces. The divisions which have been
operating in the first echelon and have lost their combat effec-
tiveness are removed from combat and are used to fill out the
complement of the second echelon.
The airborne landing troops are represented on the dia-
gram as an airborne army consisting of three or four airborne
divisions assigned to seize a landing area for the operational
landing forces of the front, and also for coordinated operations
with the first operational echelon of the ground troops.
On the whole, according to the diagram of an operation,
the composition of a front consists of four army commands in all
uniting 25 to 30 motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions.
As is known, during the last war approximately 30 to 35 and
more divisions were included in the composition of a front.
Considering that now the front`a sone will be increased by two
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or three times, the number of divisions of ground troops and airborne
troops in a modern operation will be reduced approximately by three
times. 50X1 -HUM
.As rough operational calculations show, a front needs approxi-
mately 250 to 300 nuclear (including about 50 hydrogen) warheads
with an overall yield of 120,000 to 150, 000 kilotons to accomplish
its missions. Up to 100 missile launching mounts and about 30 to
40 delivery aircraft are needed by the front in order to utilize these
warheads. With effective use of this quantity of nuclear/missile
weapons, about 25 to 30 missile bases and depots of nuclear war-
heads, 30 to 40 airfields, 25 to 30 divisions of ground troops,
15 to 20 naval bases, and other objectives can be destroyed.
The forces and weapons of the front will be echeloned to a
depth of 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers. A depth of distribution 01 the
forces of a front of 200 to 300 kilometers, as was the case in the
last war, does not answer the new conditions.
A front control echelon of the existing organization will no
longer be able to direct a front operation conducted according to
the proposed scheme. The modern field control echelon of a
front, besides a headquarters, must have commanders and staffs
of the missile, ground, and airborne troops, aniiaircraft defense,
and aviation. This will correspond to the composition of the
front and the particular features of troop operations in the
operation.
A front operation, obviously, must be planned by stages.
The first stage, for example, might include the neutralization
and destruction of the enemy's main forces and weapons. The
main content of it must be the repelling of the initial nuclear
strike of the enemy and the delivery of the first nuclear/missile
strike by forces of the front. The second stage can consist of
completing the rout of the enemy's forces and weapons. Its
content will be an offensive by ground troops the 0'" on of
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landing operations, and the delivery of nucledrimissile strikes during
the offensive.
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In our opinion, this is the way the fundamental scheme of a
front offensive operation in a future war must appear.
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Legcnd to Diagram 1:
1. Reserves of a group of armies (5 to 10 percent of the
forces).
2. Second defense zone and reserves of the armies (10 to 15
percent of the forces of the group of armies).
3. First (main) defense zone (75 to 85 percent of the forces of
the group of armies).
4. Army - 10 rtifle divisions.
5. 2nd echelcti (reserve) of the army.
6. Tank division, tank corps, mechanized carpi'.
7. Army - 9 rifle divisims. 2nd echelon of the front.
8. Army - 7 rifle divisions.
9. 2nd echelon (reserve) of the army
10. Army - 5 rifle divisions.
11. Reserve of the army rifle division.
12. Rifle division.
13. Mol,ile group of the front - tank army (tank corps,
mechanized corpS).
14. Second echelon (reserve) at the front (army rifle corps).
15. Depth of a front operation - 200 to 300 km.
16. Depth of an army operation - 120 to 150 km.
17. Depth of the disposition of troops and rear service elements
of the front - 200 km.
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?
Diagram 2! fisudaftental Scheme of a Front Offensive Operation in a Modern War
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/24: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403670001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/24: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403670001-6
"..Leger-1.21JIEE111.11:
1. Airbornelanding army - 5 or 6 divisions.
2. Neutral countr,e'.
3. 1 army - 5 to 7 divisions.
4. Medium-range missiles (range 1,000 to 1,500 km).
5. Long-range missiles (range 4,000 to 5,000 km).
6. Echelon of airborne landing troops (airborne lanaing army-
3 or 4 divisions).
7. Tank division.
8. Taak diviEian.
9. Tank division.
10. 2 army - 5 to 7 divisions. 1st operational echelon of ground
troops.
11. 2nd operational echelon of ground troops (defense army of the
operational rear area) - 7 or 8 dlTislocs.
12. Depth of echeloning troops of a front - 2,000 to 3,000 km.
Depth of the frunt operati6n - 2,0 to 3,000 km.
50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/24: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403670001-6