JORDAN AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000200140002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of k:7V,%Artr
Intelligence
Jordan and
Its Arab Neighbors
Sc t
NESA 83-10360
December 1983
?y 340
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Jordan and
Its Arab Neighbors
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
NESA,
Secret
NESA 83-10360
December 1983
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Jordan and
Its Arab Neighbors I 25X1
Key Judgments King Hussein is increasingly vulnerable to political, economic, military,
Information available and terrorist pressure from his Arab neighbors, especially Syria, as
as of 1 December 1983 regional tensions grow between Arab radicals and moderates. Hussein and
was used in this report.
Syrian President Assad have conflicting views on the Palestinian issue, are
at odds on the Iran-Iraq war, and believe that each is trying to overthrow
the other's government. Paradoxically, Syria's new boldness in the region
may ultimately compel Hussein to improve relations with Damascus in the
hope of warding off future threats. We do not believe that Hussein would
go much beyond lipservice to improve relations with the Assad government, 25X1
however, particularly at a time when Syria has been implicated in several
terrorist attacks in the region, including some against Jordanians.
In our estimation, Hussein increasingly looks to Egypt as a partner to ease
his sense of isolation in the Arab world and counter Syrian political
influence. We believe, however, that he will wait for other moderate Arabs
to take the lead before formalizing his relationship with Egyptian President
Mubarak.
Hussein's unwillingness to go beyond an Arab consensus at times prevents
him from supporting proposals he personally favors, such as the US peace
initiative in late 1982. We believe the King will not accept a role in a US-
sponsored peace' initiative unless he has the explicit approval and firm
backing of key Arab states, particularly the Saudis. He fears losing the vi-
tal political and economic support provided by the Arab moderates and
does not want to invite Syrian and radical Palestinian retaliation by bold
unilateral action.
The lack of resolution of the Lebanese and PLO crises, in our view, has vir-
tually barred Hussein from joining a US-sponsored peace initiative.
Despite the weakening leadership of Yasir Arafat, we believe Hussein will
abide by the Rabat Arab summit decision in 1974 that declared the PLO
the sole legitimate spokesman of the Palestinian people. Lack of Arab
support for official Jordanian statements that Amman may consider the
Rabat decision invalid if the PLO becomes a Syrian surrogate compels
Hussein to seek a joint PLO-Jordanian approach to negotiations.
We believe Hussein still hopes an alternative Palestinian leadership will
develop among West Bankers to serve as negotiating partners if he cannot
reach an accommodation with Arafat on entering the peace process. West
Bankers still support Arafat's leadership, however, and are reluctant to act
independently of the PLO. We do not believe West Bankers would have the
Secret
NESA 83-10360
December 1983
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political will to act even if the PLO were dominated by the Syrians once
the current crisis ends. At a minimum Hussein believes he needs West
Bank cooperation and the explicit backing of key Arab states before he
would consider making a move.
In our view, Hussein expects the United States to influence Israeli policy to
bring about Middle East peace negotiations, but he is pessimistic about
Washington's willingness to press Israel for concessions. He believes the
close US-Israeli relationship highlighted during Prime Minister Shamir's
visit to Washington in late 1983 and US vetoes of UN resolutions
condemning Israel for its actions in Lebanon and the West Bank have
damaged US credibility and undermined his efforts to convince other Arab
moderates that a negotiated settlement is possible.
The drastic reduction of US aid to Jordan after Amman's rejection of
Camp David has increased Hussein's dependence on Arab support. Hus-
sein believes, in our view, that he needs US financial aid and modern
weaponry to deter potential Syrian intimidation in the event he joins peace
negotiations.
Jordanians believe the extensive media coverage of Amman's purported
plans to participate in a US-supported Rapid Deployment Force has cast
new doubt on Jordan's commitment to Arab interests, embarrassed King
Hussein, and given the Syrians new reasons to criticize Jordan. We believe
Jordan's denial of knowledge of the deployment plan presages further
moves to reaffirm Amman's Arab credentials and place a certain distance
between itself and Washington.
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Jordan and
Its Arab Neighbors
Jordan is a small, resource-poor country that is
vulnerable to political, economic, and military pres-
sures from all sides.
King Hussein, who was an outcast among his Arab
neighbors during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
views Jordan's Arab relations as essential to the
continued stability and security of his country. Jordan
has correct, if not good, relations with all Arab states
except Syria, and the King may be compelled to
improve relations with Damascus in hope of warding
off the potential threat represented by a more power-
ful Syria.
In the 1950s and 1960s Jordan's Arab relations could
be characterized generally as an alliance of King
Hussein with Arab moderates such as Saudi Arabia
against the more radical states represented by Nasir's
Egypt and its closest ally, Syria. Alliances changed
frequently during this period, however, and Jordan at
times found itself associating with countries tradition-
ally viewed as opponents.
Hussein's closest contacts were with his Hashemite
cousins in Iraq until they were overthrown in 1958.
Jordanian-Iraqi relations have since been influenced
by Hussein's relations with Iraq's chief rival, Syria;
typically, as Hussein's relations with one improved,
relations with the other suffered. Relations between
Jordan and Egypt also improved in the early 1960s,
and by 1967 Hussein had agreed to enter into the ill-
fated military relationship with Egypt that led to
Jordan's defeat and loss of the West Bank in the war
with Israel that year.
In our estimation, the Jordanian civil war in 1970-71
in which Hussein expelled the Palestinian fedayeen
probably had greater impact on Jordan's Arab rela-
tions than any other event in the history of the
Hashemite kingdom. Not only did it embitter rela-
tions with Syria and Libya, who were providing
military and financial assistance to the fedayeen, but
it also damaged Hussein's standing with the rest of
the Arab world for having taken a contrary stand on
the one issue around which all Arab countries could
rally. Not to have done so, however, would probably
have led to Hussein's ouster by Palestinians. Several
countries broke diplomatic relations with Jordan in 25X1
the early 1970s, and only Saudi Arabia continued to
provide the financial assistance that had been prom-
ised to Jordan at the Arab League summit held in
Khartoum after the 1967 war.
In 1972 Jordan's relations with the Arab states were
strained further by its United Arab Kingdom plan, in
which Hussein called for a federation of Jordan and
the West Bank. the
plan was seen as an attempt to make a separate
settlement with Israel, and the proposal did not win
any support, even among Jordan's friends.
Since 1973 Hussein has carefully cultivated relations
with the Arab world in order to avoid a repeat of the
diplomatic isolation and financial jeopardy of the
early 1970s. US Embassy officials say he worked his
way back into Arab graces by accepting, albeit grudg- 25X1
ingly, the Arab League decision made in Rabat in
1974 designating the PLO as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, even though
this brought into question Hussein's relationship with
Jordan's Palestinian population, not only on the West
Bank, but on the East Bank as well.
The King gained further acceptance in 1978 when he
joined the rest of the Arab world in rejecting the
Camp David accords and in breaking relations with
Egypt despite the accords' call for Jordan's inclusion
in the plan. For its stand, Jordan was promised $1.2 25X1
billion in annual Arab assistance at the Arab League
summit held in Baghdad that year.
Jordan's Perception of Its Regional Role
Over the years, in autobiographical writings, inter-
views, and discussions with senior US officials, King
Hussein has revealed his somewhat exaggerated vision
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a diplomatic approach to their problems.
still trying to encourage the Palestinians to undertake
of Jordan's role in regional affairs. He sees Jordan as
the geographic and strategic hub of the Middle East,
bordering on Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,
and by extension, in his interpretation, the Gulf states.
US Embassy reporting indicates that the King sees
Jordan as an intermediary and conciliator in regional
problems. This role has caused him at times to
advocate Arab positions even when he has favored
other action. For example, he accepted the leadership
of the Fez delegation last year to present the Arab
peace plan to the Soviets and Chinese at the very time
he was giving serious consideration to the US peace
initiative. More recently, according to US Embassy
officials, he has kept in contact with President Ge-
mayel through the latest Lebanese crisis and has tried
to intercede with Lebanese Druze leader Walid Junb-
latt to convince him to work toward national reconcili- 25X1
To him, Jordan should serve as an example to other
Arab states, given the King's record 31 years in power
and the country's prosperity for the past several years.
Jordan, he believes, also should help protect regional
security, first by maintaining its moderate policies
and then by contributing military and security assist-
ance to other Arab states, particularly in the Gulf.
Hussein's plans to participate in a Rapid Deployment
Force demonstrate his belief in Jordan's security role
in the area.
The King has told US officials that Jordan must work
to minimize PLO radicalism, largely because it
threatens the stability within Jordan's majority Pales-
tinian community. Hussein has successfully prevented
Palestinian terrorist strikes into Israel and the West
Bank from Jordanian soil for many years, and he is
ation.
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In our estimation, Hussein believes his longstanding
relationship with Washington enables him to promote
US interests in the region. Through his contacts with
Baghdad, for example, he has tried to bring about
closer US relations with Iraq, which broke diplomatic
relations with Washington in 1967.
Limitations on Jordan's Influence in the Region
Several key factors directly affecting Jordan's securi-
ty restrict Hussein's ability to assume an aggressive
leadership role in the Middle East. Foremost among
these is the threat posed by the unquestioned military
superiority of three neighboring states-Syria, Iraq,
and Israel. For the moment, the Jordanians see the
greatest threat coming from the Syrians, with whom
relations long have been strained, but Hussein knows
that alliances shift rapidly and frequently in the
Middle East, and he cannot ignore the potential
threat of an Iraq turned against Jordan. Jordanian
military leaders have initiated modernization plans to
enhance their capabilities, but, even after a substan-
tial modernization is completed, Jordanian force and
equipment levels will remain quantitatively and, in
most areas, qualitatively inferior to those of potential
opponents (see the table).
Embassy officials believe the Jordanians have worked
out a modus vivendi with the Israelis, with whom
Amman shares a 700-kilometer border. Jordanians
are alert to the infiltration of Palestinians who want to
strike at Israel and the West Bank from Jordanian
soil, inviting Israeli retaliation. They also are aware of
the "Jordan is Palestine" thesis expounded by former
Israeli Defense Minister Sharon and others and are
concerned that Tel Aviv eventually may decide to
move toward that goal by forcing more Palestinians to
leave the West Bank.
the King is also inhibit-
ed by ordan's heavy dependence on funds from the
oil-rich Arab countries to keep its economy afloat and
to finance Jordan's military establishment. Arab aid
and remittances from Jordanian workers in Arab
states have contributed to an unprecedented prosperi-
ty in the country, creating living conditions attractive
to both East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians and
defusing potential discontent within these communi-
ties. A significant reduction in these funds would
force Hussein to impose unpopular austerity
Jordan, Syria, and Iraq: Number of units
Total Inventories, 1982 and 1987 a
Combat brigades
14
14
26
32
42
54
Tanks
804
1,053
3,750
4,025
2,800
4,000
Armored personnel
carriers
1,060
1,410
2,600
3,400
3,685
3,000
Artillery (100 mm and
over)
358
422
1,350
1,350
1,740
2,000
Fixed wing
126
174
650
725
560
860
Attack helicopters
0
24
100
130
330
500
Total
126
198
750
855
890
1,360
a Includes serviceable equipment in storage.
b Includes combat-capable trainers.
measures, and demands for political and economic
change would increase.
US Embassy officials have pointed out that Jordan's
Palestinian community, the largest in the Arab world
and estimated at 60 percent of the East Bank popula-
tion, further limits Hussein's freedom of action. Al-
though Jordan's Palestinians are relatively well assim-
ilated, they still face discrimination in education and
employment, largely because of Hussein's need to
mollify his East Bank constituency. Moreover, the
Palestinians, more than East Bankers, traditionally
have been active politically and are impatient with
Hussein's delay in recalling the parliament in Jordan.
US Embassy reporting suggests that the Jordanians
are acutely aware of the potential for increased
Palestinian discontent as the demographic balance
shifts further in their favor. For this reason, Hussein
wants to press forward on the peace issue, at least to
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forestall another major migration from the West
Bank into Jordan. He has been limited in his ability to
do so, however, by the Rabat decision naming the
PLO as the sole Palestinian representative as well as
his own fears of retribution from those opposed to
negotiations with Tel Aviv. According to US Embassy
officials, Jordan's Palestinians have continued to sup-
port Yasir Arafat and the PLO and accept the Rabat
decision. We believe any effort by Hussein to assume
the role as spokesman for the Palestinians, unless
sanctioned by the PLO and the Arab League, would
create a strong backlash within the community.F_
unrest, and ultimately overthrow the Hashemite mon-
archy (see the box). 25X1
King Hussein in late 1983 accused Assad publicly of 25X1
continuing to undermine the Hashemite monarchy by
encouraging radical Palestinian groups such as Abu 25X1
Nidal's Black June to infiltrate into Jordan for strikes.
either in that country or at Israel and the West Bank.
In recent interviews Hussein has cited the assassina- 25X1
tion attempts against Jordan's ambassadors to India
and Italy as fresh examples of Assad's work.
also highly suspicious of each other.
back opposing sides in the Iraq-Iran war. They are
Rivalry With Syria
One of the most difficult relationships for Hussein to
handle has been with his northern neighbor, Syria.
Relations between the two countries have fluctuated
widely over the years, ranging from Syrian military
intervention in Jordan in order to aid Palestinian
fedayeen in 1970 to talks of union between the two
countries in 1976. Public statements of President
Assad and King Hussein make clear they have rival
leadership aspirations on the Palestinian question and
Syria believes Jordan supports the dissident
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, and Jordan suspects
Syria of trying to subvert the Hashemite monarchy
and infiltrating radical Palestinians into Jordan to
launch strikes against Israel and the West Bank.F_
ment with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,
Although the Jordanians publicly deny any involve-
the Jordanians have sup-
ported Brotherhood elements since late 1980. Initial-
ly, they provided asylum to Syrians escaping persecu-
tion for their Brotherhood activities. This relationship
subsequently expanded so that Brotherhood members
were used to gather information within Syria and to
conduct a covert propaganda campaign by publishing
anti-Assad literature and smuggling it into Syria.
US Embassy reporting indicates that the Jordanians
hold the Syrians responsible for several terrorist acts
in Jordan over the last few years. Jordanians believe
these were efforts to discredit Islamic groups in
Jordan, divert attention from Syria's own domestic
Hussein blames the Syrians in part for his failure to
convince Arafat to carry through on their reported
agreement that would have allowed Jordanian/non-
PLO Palestinian representatives to enter peace negoti-
ations with Israel last spring. According to US Em-
bassy reporting, the King believes the Syrians
influenced radical Palestinian groups to reject the
agreement, thereby destroying the chance for move-
ment in the peace process
We believe Hussein is even more concerned now that
Assad is supporting PLO rebel leaders who oppose
Arafat's leadership. The King fears that Syria will
destroy Arafat's position and persuade the rebels to
adopt a more radical line toward events in the region,
thereby ending any chance of resuming the Jordani-
an-PLO dialogue.
The Jordanians have pointed out to US Embassy
officials their concern over Syria's growing depend-
ence on the Soviet Union and the implications for
Jordan's own defenses of the SA-5 installations in
Syria. According to these officials, the SA-5 facility
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Suspected Syrian-Instigated Terrorist Acts Against
Jordan
The Jordanians hold Syria responsible for a number
of terrorist actions against Jordan since 1980.
Amman believes that many of these are carried out
by Syrian-supported Palestinian groups such as Abu
Nidal's Black June.
February 1981 A plot to assassinate Prime
Minister Badran was uncovered.
Five Syrians arrested.
Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon
was kidnaped; he was released in
April 1981, reportedly after the
Syrian Government intervened.
March 1981 Attempt made to blow up
Jordanian television station.
July 1982 Two separate attempts to bomb
Muslim Brotherhood facilities
uncovered-one in Amman, the
second in the northern city of
Irbid-three intelligence officers
assigned to the Syrian Embassy
in Jordan expelled.
September 1982 Explosion outside Islamic
Society center in Irbid.
February 1983
Mid-October to
mid-November
1983
Two explosions in Irbid the same
day; the first occurred when a
bomb exploded under car of local
mayor; the second at the office of
Yarmuk University President Dr.
Adnan Badran, brother of the
Prime Minister.
Three separate explosions at
Yarmuk University in Irbid, one
at the office of the university
president again.
Two explosions at US business
offices in Amman. No injuries.
Assassination attempts against
Jordanian ambassadors in India
and Italy and Embassy security
guards in Greece. One of the
guards later died.
Three explosions in Amman, and
at least four other bombs
discovered and defused.
has a range covering about half of Jordan for aircraft
flying at 20,000 feet. Jordan's inability to protect
itself from Syrian attack, in our view, increases the
King's concern for the continued stability of his
country.
Pragmatic Relations With Iraq
As Hussein's relations with Syria have deteriorated,
Jordanian-Iraqi relations have improved. Jordan has
been Iraq's most outspoken ally during its war with
Iran and has provided Baghdad with both logistic
support and military assistance. In return, Jordan's
economy has flourished through the expansion of
business ties, and King Hussein has gained an Arab
King Hussein's efforts to improve relations with Iraq
are based partly on his desire to temper the tradition-
ally radical Ba'thist regime in Baghdad and bring it
more in line with the moderate Arab states, according
to US Embassy officers. These officials say that
Hussein still believes that Iraq can be persuaded to
work toward a Middle East peace solution. In our
view, Jordan also sees Iraq as a strong ally who can be
counted on when Jordan is confronted with threats
from Syria.
neighbor willing to support his regional positions.
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King Hussein's support for Iraq also is motivated by a
realization that only Iraq among the Gulf states can
ward off the threat of Iranian expansionism in the
region. if Iran defeats Iraq
militarily and overthrows the government in Baghdad,
Iraq could become part of a Syrian-Iranian axis and
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pose a greater threat to the moderate Arabs.
Soviet air defense equipment.
We believe the extensive economic and financial
arrangements that have developed have served to bind
together the two countries. The Arab League summit
held in Baghdad in 1978 approved payment of $1.2
billion annually for Jordan in return for its rejection
of the Camp David accords. Embassy reporting indi-
cated Iraq was a leading force in establishing the
program of regular payments, in which it pledged to
give Amman $186 million annually. During 1981 Iraq
provided Jordan with about $1 billion in grants in
addition to its Baghdad payments. A portion of this
aid, went for purchases
of military equipment, including Roland missiles and
During most of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq has used the
Jordanian port of Aqaba as its main transit point for
both civilian and military cargo. A joint Jordanian-
Iraqi transport company facilitates the delivery of
these goods to Baghdad. US Embassy officials esti-
mate that Iraqi imports through Aqaba increased by
300 percent between 1980 and 1982, as other transit
routes across Syria and through the Gulf were closed
off. While these arrangements helped the Iraqis in
their resupply efforts, Amman also profited by receiv-
ing Iraqi financing to expand the port and to construct
a new highway across Jordan in addition to the
business generated for Jordan's transportation sector.
The two countries have other economically beneficial
arrangements. In early 1982 US Embassy officers
reported that Jordan and Iraq had agreed on the
supply of 160 million cubic meters of Iraqi water
annually to northern and central Jordan, which will
alleviate Jordan's increasingly serious water shortage..
agreement has been
reached in principle on construction of an oil pipeline
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the Jordanians found the pipeline project particularly
attractive because it will earn approximately $200
million in annual transit fees as well as give Jordan an 25X1
alternative source of oil. Saudi Arabia currently is
Jordan's only supplier. US Embassy officials also
believe King Hussein was attracted by the long-term
Baghdad.
Jordan has provided Iraq limited military assistance
US Embassy officials report that Jordan resisted
Iraq's requests for regular troops, but it did send to
Iraq in March 1982 a 2,200-man volunteer force
called the Yarmuk Brigade. The role of the brigade
was ill defined, however, and discipline problems
forced Hussein to withdraw it in less than a year.
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King Hussein and Saddam Husayn have developed
personal ties, frequently consulting on the war as well
as other regional issues. Saddam was one of the few
Arab leaders to support Hussein publicly last year in
his efforts to work out an accommodation with PLO
chief Yasir Arafat. Both men also have reestablished
contact with the ostracized Egyptian Government, 25X1
and, they 25X1
plan to propose Egypt's rea mittance tote Arab
League at the next Arab summit.
Despite the close ties between Amman and Baghdad,
a chill may be developing in the relationship
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have on Jordan's economy.
Iraq defaulted on its Baghdad payments this year as
its own economic problems grew because of the
prolonged war with Iran and that Iraq has turned to
Turkey instead of Jordan for importing the majority
families fought for control of the Hejaz, where the
Hashemites held the venerable position of Sherif of
Mecca. The Al Saud eventually triumphed, and the
British gave the Hashemites leadership roles in Trans-
jordan and Iraq as consolation prizes. Bitterness over
this feud has lingered and has underlain many misun-
of its goods, thereby decreasing business opportunities
for Jordan's transportation sector. This situation has
prompted a senior Jordanian Government official to
comment to US Embassy officers that Jordan is
getting little or nothing from its relationship with
Baghdad. The official asserted, however, that Jordan
will continue to place great importance on its Iraqi
ties.
Uneasy Alliance With Saudi Arabia
In our estimation, Jordan is economically and politi-
cally dependent on Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are
Hussein's key financial benefactor and an important
political ally against Arab radicalism. Hussein gives
serious consideration to Saudi opinion and usually
follows the Saudi lead in making foreign policy
decisions.
Jordan's relations with Saudi Arabia are based on
mutual concern for regional stability and internal
security, according to US Embassy officials. Both
countries fear the spread of Arab radicalism and
Soviet influence in the area. Since the Iranian revolu-
tion, they also see a threat from radical Islamic forces
who want to overthrow the Arab monarchies in favor
of an Islamic state. These concerns encourage the two
countries to consult frequently and coordinate their
positions. Through these joint efforts they try to
extend moderate Arab influence in the region.
We believe the financial connection between the two
countries has become essential to the continued pros-
perity and stability of the Hashemite Kingdom. Jor-
dan receives approximately $500 million in Saudi
financial aid annually. Another $500 million is re-
ceived in remittances from the 140,000 Jordanians
who work in Saudi Arabia.
US Embassy officers report an uneasiness in the
relationship stemming from historical animosities and
from Jordan's unwillingness to accept its dependent
role in Arab politics. During the early part of this
century, ancestors of the Jordanian and Saudi royal
derstandings between the two countries.
As the longest reigning Arab leader, King Hussein
also is sensitive to being taken for granted by the
Saudis. US Embassy officials report that he bristles at
the appearance of having to petition Riyadh and
resents the condescension that he perceives when they
give him money. Conversely, US Embassy officials in
Amman believe the Saudis are disturbed by Jordani-
an attitudes. The Saudis reportedly believe the more
sophisticated, modernized Jordanians look down on
them as backward and inherently unstable.
The Jordanians also are frustrated by what they see as
Saudi unreliability in regional politics. Jordanian
officials frequently characterize the Saudi leadership
to US Embassy officials as weak and vacillating and
complain of their timidity in inter-Arab relations.
the Jordanians frequently
point to the US peace initiative last year as an
example of Saudi unwillingness to make a firm
commitment.
King Hussein indirectly blames the Saudis for the
failure of his talks with Arafat earlier this year. He
has told US Embassy officials that he believes the
Saudis did not use their influence with PLO chief
Yasir Arafat to convince him to work with Jordan and
accept the US peace initiative. Hussein suspects that
the Saudis may even have inadvertently encouraged
Arafat to temporize by hinting that Washington
would eventually agree to deal with the PLO directly.
King Hussein also has expressed personal irritation
with Saudi leaders, according to US Embassy report-
ing, for continuing to provide financial aid to Syria
despite Syrian-Jordanian tensions, Assad's support for
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penetration of the area.
Iran, and Syrian intransigence in Lebanon. He be-
lieves Saudi funding has enabled Syria to augment its
military inventory and has permitted further Soviet
after.
Growing Relations With Egypt
Despite the break in diplomatic ties between Jordan
and Egypt since March 1979, Hussein has worked to
promote informal bilateral relations and has encour-
aged other moderate Arab states to reestablish con-
tacts with Egypt in hope of facilitating Egypt's return
to the Arab fold. Jordan's growing interest in Egypt's
regional position was demonstrated recently at a
conference in Amman, sponsored by the Office of the
Crown Prince, on "Egypt and the Arab World."
Conference attendees'-who included both Egyptians
and Jordanians, concluded, according to US Embassy
reporting, that an Egypt reunited with the Arab world
could serve as a moderating force and a counterweight
to both Israeli designs and radical Arab ambitions.
The conferees generally agreed, however, that Jordan
was too weak to take the lead in reestablishing
relations and suggested Iraq as best suited to make
the first formal overture, with Jordan following soon
Jordan's efforts to expand bilateral contacts with
Egypt have included an upgrading of the level of
representation at the interest sections in Cairo and
Amman. Both representatives have easy access to the
highest levels of their host governments. Egyptian and
Jordanian delegations also regularly visit each other's
capitals to exchange views on a wide range of issues.
Hussein and Egyptian President Mubarak have been
in contact since at least 1981, according to US
Embassy reporting, although it was not until the
Nonaligned Conference in New Delhi last spring that
the two leaders finally met.
growing sense of isolation in the region.
planning talks with, and possibly an official visit to,
Egypt. These discussions are prompted by Hussein's
Hussein and senior advisers now are
While waiting for the right moment to reestablish
diplomatic relations, the Jordanian Government has
taken a number of practical steps to enhance its
contacts with Cairo. The two governments agreed last
February to resume trade within the framework of the
1967 Jordanian-Egyptian Commercial Treaty. Under
the February agreement, Jordan will permit the re-
sumption of trade with public and private Egyptian
firms that do not deal with Israel. US Embassy
officials believe that the Jordanians found the re-
sumption of trade attractive economically, as well as
diplomatically, because it provides Jordanian compa-
nies with opportunities to expand their export mar-
kets.
Jordanian officials have started to honor Egyptian
passports carrying Israeli stamps from the border
crossings into Israel at Al-Arish and Taba, thereby
eliminating the travel restrictions on those who later
want to enter Jordan. They also have eased their
restrictions on the import of Egyptian publications. A
satellite television hookup also has been established
between the two countries, and as of late October the
Egyptian Middle East News Agency was preparing to
open an office in Amman.
Outlook
To the degree that regional tensions increase between
Arab radicals and moderates, we believe Jordan will
become more vulnerable to political, economic, and
military pressures from its Arab neighbors. Syria's
new boldness in the region, an outgrowth of its
dominant position in both the Lebanese and PLO
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OM"t
J
r
5
1 West
Tel Aviv-Yafo
Bankb
IL a
Gaza /) I Hebron ;:
ti
(
Ma'an.
Egypt
I
Arabia
a Israeli occupied
b Israeli occupied - status
to be determined
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
700903 (A02452) 1-84
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Saudi
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Secret
with Iraq. Nevertheless,
crises, may ultimately compel Hussein to improve
relations with Assad in the hope of warding off future
threats against the Hashemite kingdom. An improve-
ment in relations with Syria, however, would almost
certainly have an adverse effect on Jordan's relations
improving relations with Syria.
some senior Jordanian officials have already
begun to question the government's continued support
for Iraq in its weakened position and have encouraged
including some against Jordanians.
Ideally, Hussein would like to strike a balance be-
tween Damascus and Baghdad by maintaining his
close ties to Saddam while mending his ties with
Syria. In our view, a change in government in Jordan
in which a Prime Minister was appointed who was less
hostile toward Syria would be one way of opening up
communication between the two countries. We do not
believe that Hussein would go much beyond lipservice
to improve relations with the Assad government,
however, particularly at a time when Syria has been
implicated in several terrorist attacks in the region,
Arab world increases.
We believe that Jordan will continue to depend
heavily on Saudi political influence with other moder-
ate Arabs when addressing contentious Arab issues.
This support will become more important if Arab
frustrations mount over the Lebanese and Palestinian
issues and the chance for radical ascendancy in the
personally favors.
Jordan's dependence on Saudi money to keep the
Jordanian economy afloat will keep Hussein tied to
Saudi positions. We believe the fear of losing that
support will force him to coordinate closely with the
Saudis before making major domestic and foreign
policy decisions, particularly those that affect the
Palestinians. At times the absence of explicit Saudi
backing will prevent him from acting on issues he
In our estimation, the Jordanians increasingly look to
Egypt as a partner to ease Amman's sense of isolation
in the Arab world and to counter Syrian political
influence. They probably believe that the reinstate-
ment of a powerful friend such as Egypt would
enhance their own regional position and provide them
with the political support necessary to face growing
radicalism in the area. We believe that Hussein
remains reluctant to move ahead of other moderate
Arab states in formalizing his relationship with Mu-
barak; he will wait and take his lead, in our view, from
others, especially Saudi Arabia.
Implications for the United States
The Lebanese and PLO crises, in our view, virtually
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bar Hussein from joining a US-sponsored peace initia-
tive. Despite the weakening leadership of Yasir Ara- 25X1
fat, we believe Hussein will abide by the Rabat
decision and continue to seek a joint PLO-Jordanian
approach to negotiations unless the Arab League
formally abrogates the decision. Last spring other
Arab states ignored a Jordanian Government state-
ment that Amman would no longer be bound by the
Rabat decision if the PLO became a surrogate of any
one country, for instance, Syria. We believe Hussein
is acutely aware of this reserve and is unlikely to
invite active Arab opposition by unilateral action.
We believe Hussein still hopes an alternative Palestin-
ian leadership will develop among West Bankers to
serve as negotiating partners if he cannot reach an
accommodation with Arafat on entering the peace
process. West Bankers still support Arafat's leader-
ship, however, and are reluctant to act independently
of the PLO. We do not believe that West Bankers
would have the political will to act on their own even
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if the PLO is dominated by the Syrians once the 25X1
current crisis ends. At a minimum Hussein believes he
needs West Bank cooperation and the explicit backing
of key Arab states before he would consider making a
In our estimation, Jordan is discouraged about achiev-
ing peace in the Middle East by the perception that
Washington unquestioningly supports Israel in region-
al issues. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's visit to the
United States in late 1983 and US vetoes of UN 25X1
condemnations of Israel for its actions in Lebanon and
the West Bank have reinforced Jordanian pessimism
about US willingness to extract concessions from
Israel. Jordanian media commentaries after the US
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Jordan: Arab Share of Total Capital
We believe Jordan wants sophisticated arms, such as
F16s and mobile I-Hawks, to give it the military
strength to counter potential threats from Syria in the
event Amman enters into peace negotiations with
Israel. US Embassy officials report that the Jordani-
ans argue that Congressional conditions-that the
United States will sell equipment to Jordan only after
it decides to join negotiations-are counterproductive;
Jordan wants to strengthen its ability to deter military
action before it risks Syrian reprisals.
Jordanian difficulties in acquiring US equipment in
1981 encouraged Amman to purchase Soviet air
defense equipment. Although US Embassy officials
report that the Jordanians are not enthusiastic about
expanding their arms relationship with the Soviets, we
do not rule out the possibility that the Jordanians
might turn to the Soviets again for equipment if they
continue to be denied US equipment.
0 1978
Total 860.8
(Million US $)
79
1,631
80
2,244
81
1,532
82
1,389
veto of the UN resolution on the shooting of a Hebron
resident last summer revealed Amman's growing frus-
tration and anger with US policies. We believe Hus-
sein is especially sensitive on West Bank issues and
feels betrayed by Washington's refusal to call the
Israeli settlements there illegal and to denounce set-
tler violence toward Palestinians.
In our estimation, the strain in US-Jordanian rela-
tions has intensified because the Jordanians perceive
Washington to be opposed to providing Jordan exten-
sive financial and military backing to withstand Arab
pressures. US aid to Jordan has fallen from approxi-
mately $230 million in FY 1978 to $50 million in FY
1983 in the wake of Jordan's rejection of Camp David
and its failure to embrace the Reagan initiative. Over
the same period Amman has become dependent on
Arab financing to underwrite development programs
and to finance its military, modernization program
(see the chart).
the Jordanians are dis-
mayed by the recent disclosures by Israeli radio and
the US media of Jordan's plans to participate in a
Rapid Deployment Force, funded and trained by the
United States and designed to "protect US interests
in the region." The Jordanians reportedly believe
these revelations cast new doubt on Jordan's commit-
ment to Arab interests, embarrass King Hussein, and
give the Syrians new reasons to criticize Jordan.
Amman has accused the Israelis of trying to influence
US Congressional opinion to block US provision of
modern weaponry to Jordan. We believe Jordan's
denial of knowledge of the deployment plan presages
further moves to reaffirm Amman's Arab credentials
and place a certain distance between itself and Wash-
ington.
Hussein's unwillingness to ignore Arab opinion for
fear of endangering his country's prosperity and secu-
rity will continue to limit his freedom of action on the
peace process. Although he values his ties to the
United States, he expects Washington to understand
the constraints under which he operates and the need
to obtain meaningful concessions from Israel that will
convince the Arabs that a negotiated settlement is
possible.
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Secret
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