NORTH YEMEN: PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000300280002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
for Political Stability
North Yemen: Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
Seer-et
NESA 85-10124
June 1985
Copy 3 7 9
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a?`"~f Directorate of
Intelligence
North Yemen: Prospects
for Political Stability
This paper was prepared by
contribution from
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.F-
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
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Secret
NESA 85-10124
June 1985
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North Yemen: Prospects
for Political Stability
Key Judgments The regime of President Ali Abdallah Salih is firmly entrenched in power
Information available in North Yemen. The Salih government has a better chance than the likely
as of l May 1985 alternatives to achieve stable political and economic development. In
was used in this report.
addition, many of the President's key advisers are friendly to the United
States, and development of North Yemen's recently discovered oil reserves
by US firms will bolster ties between Sanaa and Washington. Although
Salih seeks more direct relations with the United States and probably
would like to reduce the sizable Soviet presence in the country, he is likely
to retain close relations with Moscow to facilitate his ability to play off the
superpowers to Yemen's advantage.
No group outside the military-security apparatus currently threatens the
regime, although some tribal leaders, Islamic extremists, and pro-Soviet
leftists oppose Salih:
? Tribal shaykhs have more authority than the government in much of the
countryside, despite the regime's efforts to extend its control and services.
? Islamic extremists are fragmented and partly co-opted by the govern-
ment, but they might mount assassination attempts against Salih or other
key regime figures.
? Most North Yemeni military officers have been trained in the USSR,
and some probably have been recruited by the Soviets. They could work
to erode Salih's military support if he threatens Moscow's interests I 25X1
The discovery of promising amounts of oil has brightened the outlook for
the country's primitive economy, but the find also is challenging Salih to
prevent unrealistic expectations of higher living standards.
The oil discovery will strain relations with Saudi Arabia and South Yemen,
since both claim territory near the find. If Salih cannot convince Riyadh
that Sanaa's financial independence does not threaten Saudi interests, he
risks increased Saudi intervention in North Yemeni politics. North and
South Yemeni forces clashed in early 1985 on the border near the oil
discovery, and tensions in the area persist
Salih's past performance strongly suggests that he is an adaptable and
skilled politician, and future oil revenues should help him strengthen his
position. He is likely to deal effectively with his countrymen's increased
economic expectations and deflect the most likely external challenges
during the next few years
iii Secret
NESA 85-10124
June 1985
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If Salih were assassinated by a lone gunman, the network of relatives and
fellow tribesmen he has constructed over the past five years would manage
the succession, and the complexion of the regime would remain much the
same, at least in the short run. In the unlikely event that Salih were killed
as a result of a conspiracy, however, the government's policies could change
significantly. Few of Salih's potential successors under such circumstances
would be as well disposed toward Washington, and most would be far more
hostile.
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Regime Support
The Economic Challenge 7
Salih and the Single Bullet 12
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North Yemen: Prospects
for Political Stability
Since taking power in '1978, Ali Abdallah Salih has
survived at least three assassination attempts, weath-
ered a Libyan-sponsored coup attempt, stalemated
South Yemen in a border war, and defeated a South
Yemeni-backed insurgency led by the National Dem-
ocratic Front (NDF). Salih has completed one five-
year term as president and was elected to another, a
striking development given the early fragility of his
regime and the frequency with which Yemeni presi-
dents were assassinated in the 1970s. During his six
years in power, Salih has outmaneuvered other politi-
cal actors, strengthened the country's internal security
forces, and encouraged the exploration that produced
an important oil discovery in July 1984.
Salih Consolidates Power
The stability of the current regime in Sanaa is largely
due to President Salih's political skills. We believe
that Salih, who before 1978 was a relatively obscure
Army officer, has gained popular recognition as the
undisputed national leader of North Yemen. Just
after taking power, Salih took the opportunity of a
border war with South Yemen to prove himself as
commander in chief by fending off the South Yeme-
nis. The two major arms agreements that followed-
with Moscow and Washington-elevated his standing
as a leader capable of dealing with the superpowers to
Yemen's advantage and gained him the loyalty of the
military. Sanaa's defeat of the Aden-backed insurgen-
cy in 1983 reinforced his prestige as a capable leader,
and his advocacy of Yemeni unity in subsequent
meetings with South Yemen's President tapped a well
of Yemeni nationalism and pride.
toward a one-party state.
absence of well-developed political institutions, he has
relied on his family and tribe to provide a cadre of
loyal lieutenants. With the creation in 1982 of the
General People's Congress-an amalgam of legisla-
ture and political party that blends Arabism, Islamic
fundamentalism, Yemeni nationalism, and
Ba'thism-Salih has begun inching the country
Salih has structured the North Yemeni Government
apparatus so that there is considerable bureaucratic
overlap and institutionalized competition within the
government. Most ministries share responsibility with
other offices; this makes it harder for potential politi-
cal opponents to develop an independent power base.
Salih has also replaced officials, blaming them for the
government's failures because of infighting in the
government. Salih reshuffles his Cabinet at will,
drawing on a pool of technocrats who enter and depart
the government at his whim. The frequent turnover
often gives the impression of movement where there is
none and decisive action where there is in fact
government indecision.
Regime Support
Salih's Inner Circle. Because the country has few
developed political institutions and Salih heads what
is essentially a praetorian regime, decisionmaking
power is concentrated in his hands. An inner circle of
advises Salih on sensitive political matters, helps him
watch over the government and the military, and
helps him make important foreign and domestic poli-
cy decisions.
To guard against coups, Salih has given the com-
mands of key military units to inner circle members.
Military units led by group members have overlapping
responsibilities and are positioned to defend against
coups from other units. As a result, a military move
against Salih is unlikely to succeed unless several
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Figure 1
North Yemen: Instability Indicators,
1978, 1982, and 1985
? Low concern
? Moderate concern
? Great concern
Col. Ali Abdallah Salih became President of North
Yemen in July 1978 with Saudi backing. A career
military officer with no formal education and little or
no previous political experience, he has emerged as
an independent actor in both Yemeni and regional
politics. Ambitious and cunning, Salih has retained
office through his control of the military and security
services, his skill in factional politics, and the ab-
sence of a sufficiently able or powerful opponent. He
has installed close relatives, fellow tribesmen, and
trusted friends in key military and government posts
and has ruthlessly disposed of perceived rivals.
July
1978
Jan
1982
Feb
1985
Tribal discontent
?
?
?
Ethnic/religious disagreement
?
?
?
Demonstrations and riots
?
?
?
General economic deterioration
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
Organization capabilities of opposition
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
Discontent of military
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
Regime repression/brutality
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
Prospects for major regime change or
policy change during next six monthsa
?
?
?,.
Prospects for major regime change or
policy change during next six months to
two years a
?
?a
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of the symbols of Yemeni nationalism.
North Yemen has achieved an unprecedented degree
of political stability under the Salih regime. Our
concerns about the government's ability to overcome
foreign-backed subversion diminished when Sanaa
committed its best troops tollghting leftists in the
southern portion of the country in mid-1982 and the
insurgents withdrew into South Yemen in early 1983.
In addition; we have seen the Salih regime make
gradual but steady progress in increasing its legitima-
cy by its commitment to economic development, its
modernization of the military, and its manipulation
Although we know little about the ambitions of its
members, we believe the inner circle is loyal to the
President.
challengers, however, are weakened by the fact that
they depend on the same constituency that supports
the President, according to US Embassy officials. We
agree with US Embassy officials that to remove Salih
from power a challenger in the inner circle would have
to dismantle the system of political alliances that
supports them both.
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The Military. The North Yemeni military is the most
cohesive and powerful institution in the country and
the Salih regime's principal instrument of political
control. The US Embassy reports that eight of the 10
regional governors have military backgrounds. Mili-
tary checkpoints, patrols, and garrisons are the cen-
25X1 tral government's only effective presence in many
areas outside the major cities.
Even before Salih came to power, the military domi-
nated politics in North Yemen. The military was at
the forefront of the 1962 revolution that led to the
establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic, and it
ousted an ineffective civilian government in 1974.
Salih's two predecessors-Ibrahim al-Hamdi and
Ahmad al-Ghashmi-were also drawn from the
Army.
In deference to the military's influence and power,
Salih has spurred its development. He has expanded
the size of the armed forces and purchased more than
$1 billion in arms since 1979. Even though North
Yemen's forces are less capable than those of many
countries in the region, Sanaa's officers show greater
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cording to US Embassy officials.
Although an indispensible prop of the regime, the
military is.Salih's greatest potential challenge. Salih
pays careful attention to the military by personally
scrutinizing senior appointments, strengthening coun-
terbalancing groups like the security services, and
cultivating civilian power centers such as tribal
shaykhs, according to US Embassy reporting. Presi-
dent Salih is his own defense minister and has
appointed a weak chief of staff, in our view, to
strengthen his authority and prevent potential rivals
from using the offices to create power bases. US
officials have reported that orders directing the move-
ment of military units must be personally authorized
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Salih has been careful to co-opt potential military
rivals. For example, Lt. Col. Mujahid Abu Shawarib,
who demonstrated his military skill in the 1979 border
war with South Yemen and who has blood ties to
powerful tribal leaders, was given the post of Deputy
Prime Minister for Domestic Affairs-a high-sound-
ing but largely powerless position. We share the view
of the US Embassy that most military commanders
have not built personal followings that might be used
to subvert Salih's authority. The one possible excep-
tion, according to the Embassy, is Deputy Chief of
Staff Lt. Col. Ali Muhammad Salah, who has ob-
tained a reputation among his military peers and the
general public as a powerful and capable officer.
Other Security Forces. In North Yemeni politics, the
National Security Organization (NSO) ranks second
in importance to the military. Although the service
probably has only 3,000 officers and employees, ac-
cording to Embassy reports, it wields considerable
power. Its mandate to arrest and question is largely
unfettered, and the NSO monitors all government
agencies and political activity in the country.
The NSO helps maintain President Salih in power by
suppressing domestic dissidence and identifying po-
tential coup plotters. Although many of the NSO's
officers are poorly educated and trained, we believe
they do a creditable job in maintaining internal
security. The NSO's responsibilities include:
? Tracking groups that might threaten the regime,
such as Islamic fundamentalists, Ba'thists, and
Communists.
? Identifying key dissident leaders and covert cells.
? Collecting foreign intelligence.
? Conducting operations against foreign targets and
monitoring embassies in Sanaa.
The elite paramilitary Central Security Force (CSF)
of the Interior Ministry probably is the primary
anticoup force in Sanaa. Consisting of about 5,000
men and possessing equipment ranging from riot-
control gear to armored personnel carriers, according
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to Embassy reports, the CSF could be called upon to
put down dissident demonstrations or quell a coup.
The CSF is commanded by Deputy Interior Minister
Muhammad Abdallah Salih, the President's full
brother. It has participated in military campaigns
against the dissident NDF and currently mans night-
time checkpoints in Sanaa and performs other physi-
cal security functions.
control.
Popular Support. The Yemeni population is -generally
politically apathetic, and its support for the regime
lacks enthusiasm. Salih has been careful not to antag-
onize important civilian groups, such as Sanaa's busi-
ness community, by interfering with the traditional
independence Yemenis have had from government
Salih's attempts to broaden civilian support for the
regime have only been partly effective. His most
prominent initiative, the convening in August 1982 of
the 1,000-member General People's Congress, has not
led to the development of a mass political party, a key
goal of Salih, according to Embassy reports. Elections
to rejuvenate the People's Constituent Assembly, the
nominal legislative branch, have not taken place, and
most members were appointed before Salih's acces-
sion to the presidency. Both organizations have little
role in policymaking and serve to confirm decisions
Salih has already made
Internal Challenges
We concur with the US Embassy's assessment that no
group outside the military-security apparatus presents
a credible threat to the regime. Still, Salih has
enjoyed his relatively lengthy term in office partly
because he has not challenged longstanding Yemeni
political traditions, which circumscribe the authority
of the central government. The Embassy notes that
the President commands the Army, but his authority
beyond the barracks is limited.
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Tribes. North Yemen's independent-minded tribes
pose a potential challenge to the regime, even though
Salih has skillfully cajoled and placated them. The 25X6
Salih regime has extended government control beyond
the three main cities-Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeidah-
and in insurgent areas, but the tribes hold sway in
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most of the hinterland. Tribal shaykhs, for the most
part, regard the central government as a challenge to
their traditional authority. They, however, have been
willing to cooperate with the regime when it has
served their purposes, such as against leftist insur-
gents.
President Salih uses generous financial subsidies and
offers of government employment to co-opt tribal
leaders, but he sometimes employs force against
recalcitrants. The Office of Tribal Affairs serves
principally as a conduit for government payments to
the tribes, with tribal leaders receiving stipends rang-
ing from $1,400 to $4,200 per month, according to
US Embassy officials. Salih sometimes imprisons
troublesome tribal figures, adopting the tribal prac-
25X1 tice of taking hostages to ensure the good behavior of
rivals.
Under the Salih regime, the once sharply drawn lines
between the government and the tribes have been
blurred, according to US officials in Sanaa. Although
the tribes resist government penetration of their terri-
tory, many tribesmen hold important positions in
Sanaa's civilian and military elite.
Important tribal leaders such as Abdallah al-Ahmar
and Deputy Prime Minister Mujahid Abu Shawarib
continue to enjoy a relatively free hand in the north-
ern tribal lands, according to US Embassy officials.
Their political role on the national level has been
reduced, however, because the continued buildup of
the armed forces has shifted the balance of power
decisively in favor of the central government.
Though still heavily armed, tribesmen no longer pose
a serious threat to government troops in a convention-
al military battle nor do they threaten to march on
Sanaa and oust the government as they once did.
Should the recent oil discovery in Marib Province
provide the central government with new revenue, the
strength of the tribes will be further eroded because
Salih will have enhanced means both to offer tribes-
men financial enticements for cooperation and to
punish recalcitrants with military force.
North Yemen's tribes are fragmented by sectarian
and cultural differences. Shafei tribesmen in the
south are Sunni Muslims; northern Zaydi tribesmen
are Shias. This religious split causes few serious
problems for the regime and may even help it retain
power, since social and cultural differences between
the Zaydi and Shafei communities virtually preclude
a concerted movement against the central govern-
ment. Moreover, Shafeis tend to be more modernized
than Zaydis and look more to the government than
the tribe for social benefits.
Endemic feuding further erodes the tribal threat.
Armed conflict is frequent-even among different
parts of the same tribe-particularly among the
Zaydis of the north. Disputes over honor, water, and
women can lead to revenge killings that sometimes
last for generations, weakening the political cohesion
of the tribes
Islamic Fundamentalists. Islamic fundamentalist
groups, although not yet an overt threat to the regime,
have shown unexpectedly strong-and growing-po-
litical influence over the last two years,
The fundamentalist
movement has broad support because North Yemenis
sympathize with its glorification of Islam and many of
its goals. Because most Yemenis are politically apa-
thetic and xenophobic, few become active supporters.
The Islamic fundamentalist movement in North Ye-
men, however, appears to be fragmented and partly
co-opted by the government. North Yemen's National
Charter-a document similar to a constitution-is
plentifully supplied with Koranic quotations and
paeans to Islam.
Islamic fundamentalists limit the regime's room for
political maneuver, especially concerning relations
with Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union, and force
the government to defer to Islamic sensibilities when
there are conflicts between the government's secular
programs and Islam, in our view. The possibility of
foreign sponsorship-particularly from Iran-and the
covert character of some fundamentalist groups sug-
gest that a small band of extremists might be capable
of mounting assassination attempts against key
regime figures
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Islamic Fundamentalist Groups in North Yemen
'or positions on Rural Development Authorities,
Brotherhood candidates took a majority of contested
Muslim Brotherhood
Egyptian origin. Follows founder Hasan al-Banna's
principles. Includes as members Egyptian profession-
als and Sudanese. Largest group in North Yemen.
Vocally anti-American but relatively moderate.
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Takfir wa Hijra
Egyptian origin. Extremist spinoff of Muslim Broth-
erhood. Small size.
"Leftist " Muslim Brothers
Blend Islamic fundamentalism, social justice rheto-
ric, and Marxist approach to politics.
Hizb al Tahrir al Islami
Palestinian and Syrian support. Extremist. Covert
oriented.
Wahhabis
Operate from network of religious institutes. Look to
Saudi Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Bazfor support. Have
paramilitary organization.
Al Jihad
Remnants of group that assassinated Anwar Sadat.
Small size.
;eats despite Salih's vigorous oppositio
Leftists. Leftist influence reached its peak in 1981
and early 1982, when Salih appeared on the verge of
making substantial concessions to the Aden-backed
We believe that Salih now has intimidated or co-opted
most of the country's ideologically amorphous leftists.
Nevertheless, the propaganda of leftist opponents of
the regime has played up Salih's unwillingness to
confront the widely disliked Saudis-particularly over
border issues-and his alleged "betrayal" of the 1962
revolution. These are themes that are particularly well
received among residents in the area bordering leftist
South Yemen.
Al Jabha al Islamiyya
Paramilitary organization. Formed in 1979 to fight
insurgents. Recruits Zaydi (Shia) tribesmen. Less
active since late 1983.
and anti-Islamic regime.
Khomeini Supporters
Small but active. Attract Yemeni Shias who see
revolution in Iran as triumph over alien, pro-Western,
The Economic Challenge
Dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the
economy could weaken the regime's support, but most
North Yemenis are inured to economic hardship, and
the recent oil discovery will benefit the country over
the long run.
North Yemen is the least developed country on the
Arabian Peninsula:
? Despite efforts at development during the 1970s,
much of the population lives in areas without roads
and electricity and where government authority is
minimal.
? Subsistence agriculture is restricted by a domestic 25X1
labor shortage and harsh climate. 25X1
? Until the recent oil discovery, few commercially
% The Muslim Brotherhood first demonstrated political
strength in North Yemen during 1982
it won 25 of the 50 elected seats on the
exploitable minerals were found.
appointed another 25 members to dilute the Brother-
hood's strength. In municipal elections and contests
Permanent ommittee of the General People's Con-
gress, a quasi-legislative body charged with prelimi-
nary work on a new constitution. President Salih then
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a Estimated.
b Projected.
The economy is heavily import dependent, with one of
the worst trade imbalances in the world-exports
typically cover less than 1 percent of imports. Remit-
tances from expatriates, largely workers in Saudi
Arabia, provide the bulk of. the foreign exchange to
cover the trade deficit. The labor shortage caused by
the departure of about 1 million Yemeni workers,
however, has inflated domestic wages, while remit-
tance income has increased the demand for imports.
Foreign aid, primarily from Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf oil producers, is the other primary source of
funds for covering the trade gap. Recently, however,
the Gulf-wide recession has caused government trans-
fers to decline from $439 million in.1982 to an
estimated $150 million last year. As a result, foreign
exchange reserves have been drawn down and now
cover only three months of imports.
plan and sharply reduced growth rates. Real GDP
growth has averaged only 2 percent in the last two
years-slightly less than population growth-com-
pared with a 6-percent average annual rate between
1978 and 1982. Because many families hold "mat-
tress money" as a buffer against hard times, to date
there has been no observed increase in public dissatis-
faction with government handling of the economy.
We judge that North Yemen's economy will not
improve this year, for Sanaa probably will try to
continue to limit imports and rebuild foreign ex-
change reserves. The estimated increase of $8.2 mil-
lion for investment and development spending in the.
1985 budget, however; would make it difficult to
reduce or maintain low import levels. We estimate
remittances and foreign aid will remain at their 1984
Sanaa implemented a series of austerity measures-
lower government spending, higher taxes, and higher
tariffs on consumer items-in mid-1983 to deal with
its deteriorating financial situation. The current stabi-
lization of Sanaa's foreign payments came at the cost
of scrapping most of its second five-year development
levels.
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Figure 2
North Yemen: Economic Indicators, 1978-85
Real GDP Growth
Percent
a Estimated.
b Projected.
Foreign Exchange Reserves
Billion US $
Consumer Price Growth
Percent
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The discovery of oil in the Marib region brightens
North Yemen's otherwise gloomy economic picture.
The potential benefits of the find are enormous, in
both economic and political terms. Although foreign
exchange earnings from the export of crude oil are
probably four years off, Sanaa will reap some benefits
sooner. Oil-related construction activity-production
facilities, pipelines, roads, and port expansion-should
get under way within a year, according to US Embas-
sy sources. In addition, a recently awarded small-
refinery project should be completed in early 1986.
We judge that the discovery has also-dramatically
changed North Yemen's status in the eyes of foreign
Because export earnings are still several years away,
the discovery of "promising amounts" of oil has
presented Yemeni officials with the challenge of
preventing a boom atmosphere. Some Yemeni expa-
triate workers are returning prematurely to North
Yemen, seeking work generated by the oil discovery.
According to the US Embassy, the Yemeni business
community has started to make grandiose plans,
despite government efforts to dampen excessive expec-
tations. Still, the news came at a propitious time for
Sanaa because businessmen had been increasingly
critical of government policies associated with cur-
tailed growth.
As expectations rise, Sanaa probably will attempt to
secure its power base and broaden its influence by
distributing the benefits of oil-fueled economic growth
to a broad spectrum of the population. The govern-
ment is likely to concentrate on building infrastruc-
ture and increasing health and education levels, en-
deavors that will help satisfy competing business,
tribal, and religious interests. Most of the initial
returns from oil production will be used to make
payments on debts incurred on oil development pro-
jects, but Sanaa may not be able to delay projects that
respond to popular expectations of higher living stan-
dards based on oil revenues.
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External Challenges
Saudi Arabia. ' Saudi fears of a more independent
North Yemen were stimulated by Sanaa's oil discov-
ery, and we believe they will intensify once North
Yemen constructs oil production facilities. Riyadh's
influence in Sanaa will not wither soon, however,
since North Yemen will still need Saudi financial aid
until oil revenues begin to flow.
The Saudis traditionally have been less cautious and
more assertive in dealing with North Yemen than
they have been in their relations with any other state.
Riyadh often treats North Yemen more like a prov-
Maintaining the support of Saudi Arabia-difficult
during the best of times-is one of North Yemen's
major concerns. Sanaa.depends on the Saudis to
provide budgetary assistance, underwrite Sanaa's
trade deficit, and fund development projects
Other longstanding irritants trouble relations between
the two countries, including the ill-defined border
drawn by the Treaty of Taif after the Saudi-Yemeni
The Oil Discovery
North Yemen's first oil discovery was made in the
Marib region by the Hunt Oil Company in June 1984.
Since that time, Hunt has drilled six wells, with all
but one producing oil. Initial estimates of oil produc-
tion potential-which range from 100,000 b/d to
300,000 b/d-are premature, and Hunt expects to
drill 50 more holes to delineate the first field.
In April, Hunt reached an agreement with Sanaa for
the construction of a 10,000-b/d refinery adjacent to
the oil discovery. The refinery is expected to be
operational in one year and will produce gasoline,
fuel oil, and diesel fuel but will satisfy only about
half of North Yemen's demand. Plans for the con-
struction of the pipeline and the port facilities at Salif
still are being developed. Although Hunt Oil is the
only company currently drilling in North Yemen,
British Petroleum recently was granted an oil-
exploration concession, and four other concession
applications are under consideration, exhausting all
potential exploitable oil resources in the country.
war of 1934. Sanaa deflected Riyadh's efforts to
demarcate the border on Saudi terms during a border
clash in early 1984, but the issue remains unresolved.
threat of a renewed insurgency persists.
South Yemen. South Yemen also harbors designs on
North Yemeni territory.' In 1981, Aden openly sup-
ported the National Democratic Front insurgency in a
bid to seize control of a sizable portion of southern
North Yemen, if not to overthrow the Salih regime.
North Yemen's forces drove the insurgents and volun-
teers from Aden back into South Yemen, but the
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Forces from Sanaa and Aden clashed briefly in
January 1985 in the poorly demarcated border area
southeast of North Yemen's oil discovery. Shuttle
talks between President Salih and President Hasani
produced an agreement to disengage forces and estab-
lish a "neutral zone" between the two countries. As of
May 1985, Aden and Sanaa continued to regard each
other's military deployments across the border warily.
Sanaa maintains about five brigades in the area and
We agree with US officials in Sanaa who judge that
penetrations of the NSO do not in themselves threat-
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Aden three.
The Soviet Union. Salih's relations with Moscow are
excellent, but the potential for Soviet subversion poses
a latent challenge to the regime. Moscow has been
involved in North Yemen since 1928, when it signed a
Friendship Treaty with Sanaa-the first such accord
with an Arab country. The two sides upgraded this
agreement to a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
in 1984. According to US officials, many Yemenis
believe that Moscow's support prevented the Saudi-
backed royalists from winning in the civil war that
followed the republican revolution, and the Soviets
have become well entrenched through their military
assistance program. The most rapid expansion of
Soviet influence came in 1979, when the number of
Soviet advisers increased sharply as Salih received
some $700 million in Soviet arms. Currently there are
500 to 650 Soviet military advisers and technicians
and 100 to 200 economic and other specialists in
North Yemen,
We estimate that more than 1,000 Yemeni
military personnel are training in the USSR. Moscow
also offers some 450 academic scholarships a year to
Yemenis to study in the Soviet Union; approximately
750 Yemenis study there now.
Virtually all of North Yemen's officer corps has been
trained by the Soviets, and some North Yemeni
officers probably have been recruited by Soviet intelli-
gence. This may give the Soviets the opportunity to
erode Salih's military support if he threatens Mos-
cow's interests.
en the regime.
Outlook
Salih has managed adroitly a North Yemen that had
grown accustomed to poverty and isolation. Most of
the tactics he has used are appropriate for an environ-
ment in which only a few political actors have inde-
pendent bases of support. The discovery of oil will
require Salih to modify his political approach. He will
have to deal, for example, with the newfound strength
that oil almost certainly will give to merchant elites.
New prosperity=despite its potential pitfalls-proba-
bly will make Salih's position more secure. His past
performance strongly suggests that he is adaptable
and will find ways to accommodate his countrymen's
increased demands for government services. These
demands, in our view, will increase the regime's
opportunities to increase its popularity by portraying
itself as responsible for the fruits of prosperity.
tive meddling in North Yemeni politics.
The potential for a shift in the balance of power on
the Arabian Peninsula resulting from a more prosper-
ous North Yemen, however, will also affect the Salih
regime's stability. Reassuring Riyadh that a more
financially independent regime in Sanaa does not
threaten Saudi interests will be critical, and Salih
must, in our view, exploit the oil discovery without
souring relations with Riyadh. If not; he risks giving
the Saudis more reasons to step up their often disrup-
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far better cards than Aden.
Sanaa will bolster its marginal military superiority
over South Yemen as oil revenue makes possible the
purchase of more advanced weapon systems and
larger inventories. As Sanaa's free market economy
strengthens, moreover, North Yemen will become
even more able to withstand Aden-backed subversion.
We expect Salih to continue to pay lipservice to
Yemeni unity, but act in recognition that Sanaa holds
Oil revenue will allow Salih to achieve greater balance
in his relations with Moscow. We believe that he has
been uncomfortable with his reliance on the USSR
for military aid, but he has had no alternative, given
the poor state of the Yemeni economy. We envision
greater trade with the West as a result of the oil
discovery and a relative weakening of Soviet influence
in North Yemen.
He, however, is unlikely to end the country's close ties
with Moscow. He will still need to maintain his
largely Soviet-equipped military. More important,
Salih views the Soviet presence as an important
counter to Saudi influence and a vehicle for playing
off the superpowers to Yemen's advantage.
Salih and the Single Bullet. Our relatively optimistic
view of the Salih regime's ability to cope with future
opportunities and challenges rests on the assumption
that President Salih will not be assassinated
Salih is a wary and diffi-
(
Virtually all Yeme-
ni men have access to weapons, and a disgruntled
tribesman or soldier might hit Salih with a lucky shot.
Highly cohesive groups of disaffected Yemenis-such
as Islamic fundamentalists with foreign support-
conceivably could organize a conspiracy to eliminate
Salih. Unless the plot included members of Salih's
family, however, we believe it would fare little better
than an attempt by a lone gunman. Involvement by
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enhance a conspiracy's chances of success.
If Salih should die sometime in the next few years, Ali
Muhsin or Muhammad Abdallah probably would
replace him. An assassination by a lone gunman
would not be seriously disruptive. We judge that the
network of relatives and fellow tribesmen he has
constructed over the past five years would manage the
succession, and the complexion of the regime would
change little. A conspiracy involving some of his
intimates, however, would throw the government's
inner circle into disarray. We would expect substan-
tial violence among competing groups, and a different
type of regime-though still dominated by the mili-
tary-might well emerge. The prospects for prolonged
unrest would be greatest if foreign powers supported
the competing groups or if Islamic extremists sought
to dominate a new government. We believe that such
developments would spark enough disaffection and
turmoil to rekindle a serious insurgent challenge to
Sanaa and could even lead to civil war.
Implications for the United States
Of the alternatives, a continuation of the Salih regime
has the best chance of maintaining the degree of
stability and. economic development that could lead to
an increase in US influence and a reduction of Soviet
influence. Many of the President's closest advisers are
friendly to the United States, and he has often
indicated that he favors a more direct relationship
with Washington. For example, Salih has asked to
meet with the US President, according to the US
Despite the substantial influence
Moscow has in Sanaa's military elite, Salih has
cultivated several pro-US advisers and sought to
balance pro-Soviet voices in his councils. In our view,
Salih's advisers would be replaced in the event of a
coup, weakening those who advocate less dependence
on Moscow. We judge that few of Salih's potential
successors outside the inner circle would be as favor-
ably disposed toward Washington, and we believe that
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