NORTH KOREA-USSR: HOW CLOSE CAN THEY GET?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000605840001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 March 1986
North Korea-USSR: How Close Can They Get?
Summary
The improvement in relations between North
Korea and the Soviet Union since 1984 reflects
P'yongyang's determination that only Moscow can
provide the critical elements of economic and
military aid needed by the North, as well as
Kim I1-song's greater tolerance for the current
trends in Soviet--compared with Chinese--domestic
and foreign policies. The North has increased
support for the USSR's nuclear disarmament
initiative and its call for an Asian security
This memorandum was prepared by the Korea Branch, Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 25 March 1986 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia
D i v i s i o n O C A
..
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PY of 47
EA M 86-20034C
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Moscow has provided the first relatively modern
fighter aircraft to enter P'yongyang's inventory in
20 years and new antiaircraft missiles. More Soviet
help could increase the North's military advantage
over the South considerably.
We expect any further improvements in bilateral
ties to be part of a long and gradual process, in
part because North Korea's needs are far greater
than the USSR's willingness to supply. The North is
unable to pay for all its economic development
needs--oil, raw materials, and plant and equipment--
and the Soviets have not provided large credits. In
addition, differences on key policy issues remain.
The Soviets are reluctant to bless Kim Chong-il
publicly as a successor to his father, for example,
and so far have shown little sympathy for North
Korea's demand to cohost the Olympic Games.
Finally, we expect Moscow will continue to control
the arms supply spigot carefully. Nonetheless, we
do not expect short-term frustrations or current
policy differences to bring an about-face in Soviet-
North Korean relations.
Warming Relations
Soviet-North Korean relations are the best they have been
for decades. We believe this improvement, which dates at least
from Kim I1-song's May 1984 visit to Moscow, in part reflects the
North's increasing concern over South Korea's economic advantage
and its potential for cutting the North's military edge:
-- Pyongyang almost certainly believes only the Soviet
Union can provide technologically sophisticated weapons
to counter South Korea's acquisition of F-16 fighters
and its indigenous development (however marred by
technical problems) of the K-1 tank.
-- The North Koreans clearly look to the Soviets for
economic help in their losing battle to keep pace with
the burgeoning South Korean economy.
In our view, P'yongyang's closer ties to the Soviet Union--
at the expense of relations with China--also derive from shifts
in its attitude toward the leadership in Moscow and Beijing.
After the Sino-Soviet split Kim Il-song identified North Korea's
own brand of Communism with Mao's independent and indigenous line
and with China's then hostile posture toward the West. Soviet
claims to hegemony in the world Communist movement and Moscow's
subsequent policy of East-West detente further pushed the North
toward Beijing and reinforced cultural and Korean war generated
bonds to the Chinese. The economic reforms of Mao's successors,
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however, almost certainly have appeared considerably less
congenial to the North, which continues to emphasize central
controls. Just as important, China has developed economic ties
to South Korea, which for P'yongyang can only call into serious
question Beijing's willingness to carry a brief for its Korean
Indeed, by the early 1980s, the more openly adversarial
Soviet relationship with the United States, and its contrast to
Beijing's rapprochement with Washington, only underscored the
changes in the policies of the North's one-time closest ally. We
believe the North is well aware that China essentially accepts
the US presence in South Korea as part of a counterweight to
growing Soviet power in Asia--a de facto Chinese position at odds 25X1
with P'yongyang's core security interest for over 30 years. 25X1
Pay-Offs From the Warming Trend
For its part, North Korea has become more supportive of
Soviet security policies. P'yongyang, for instance, departed
from its traditional habit of ignoring superpower summits by
praising Gorbachev's performance in Geneva and supporting his
nuclear disarmament initiative. In addition, subsequent North
Korean statements moved closer to backing Moscow's proposal for
an Asian security conference and, for the first time, expressed
solidarity with the Soviets' client regime in Afghanistan. F_
The Economic Dimension
Beset with problems ranging from energy shortages to
transportation bottlenecks, and anxious to launch its new seven-
year plan (already postponed two years) in 1987, Pyongyang is
looking to Moscow for help in improving its sluggish economic
performance. In December the Soviets agreed to provide North
Korea with at least one nuclear power plant; we expect North
Korea's accession to the Nuclear Nonprofileration Treaty the same
month was a condition for that assistance. P'yongyang clearly is
a reluctant NPT signatory--it refused to publicly acknowledge
adherence--but we believe its pressing energy needs outweighed
its desire to avoid placing limits on a future nuclear weapons
option.
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-- North Korea's chronic energy problems were temporarily
exacerbated last fall, when the largest of its two
supertankers was sunk in the Persian Gulf.
North Korea also imports Chinese crude but can use it
at only one of its refineries. ~ 25X1
Given the North's bad debt repayment record, its limited
export potential, and resultant difficulty in importing from the 25X1
West, the North Koreans clearly are hoping for additional
economic benefits from their improved relations with Moscow
We have not seen much evidence so far of generosity from
Moscow. The Soviets have said publicly that the 1986-90 trade
agreement signed in late February calls for a doubling of
combined exports and imports during 1986-90 over the 1981-85
period, but they have not given a breakdown for exports and 25X1
imports. Moreover, most of the publicly listed projects
involving Soviet equipment have been under construction for years
and are nearing completion.
We can only 25X1
conclude that Moscow is holding off on other commitments because
it knows North Korea cannot afford all it has requested and
because the Soviets are unwilling to offer a large financial
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assistance package. F__1
We expect the Soviets to remain tight-fisted. The USSR has
long been tough on its East European allies and appears to be
cracking down even harder now, making it unlikely to take a
different tack with the North. Moscow has increasingly demanded 25X1
balanced trade and repayments on debt obligations. And, with
production problems at home, we do not believe the Soviets are
likely to be generous with their oil or other raw materials.
Military Deliveries
Despite North Korea's: economic problems, the military
remains P'yongyang's number-one priority and the area that has
shown the greatest payoff from improved ties to the Soviets.
South Korea's most important edge on the North--its superior air
force--is in danger of eroding as the Soviets begin to supply 25X1
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such systems as the Flogger-G variant of the MIG-23 fighter-
interceptor. The Flogger-G is the first relatively modern
fighter to enter the North's inventory in over 20 years, and the
first major weapons system supplied by the Soviets since the
early 1970s. If Soviet deliveries continue as we expect, the
North Koreans will have at least a full regiment of 40 Floggers
this year. The fighters will significantly improve the North's
dated air fleet.
In a further effort to update its aging air force, 25X1
P'yongyang is establishing an indigenous production capability
for jet fighters--probably a copy of the Chinese F-7, an improved
We cannot estimate future production rates for an aircraft
industry that has yet to produce a fighter; nor do we know how
many MIG-23s Moscow will provide. If the Soviets provide only a
single regiment of Floggers and domestic production moves slowly
for the first few years, Seoul's favorable position would
probably remain the same through 1989. The Flogger-G is not
significantly better than the F-4E Phantom, the best fighter now
in the South Korean Air Force.
North Korea's
s are essentially equivalent to South Korea's most numerous
fighter, the F-5 E/F. None of these aircraft approaches the
capabilities of the F-16s the South will begin receiving this
year.
At this point, there is some evidence to suggest Moscow will
provide only one regiment.
-- After the initial flurry of deliveries--the Floggers
came in three shipments from May to August 1985--they
ceased. It could be that the 26 MIG-23s constitute a
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token Soviet contribution similar to shipments of 24
SU_7 Fitters and 22 MIG-21 Fishbed-Js in the early
Given the pattern in Soviet deliveries of SA-3 equipment--
which picked up in 1986, -we 25X1
expect fighter deliveries to resume. the Soviets supply two
regiments (about 80 aircraft) of MIG-23s and the Chinese help
North Korea overcome early hurdles in fighter manufacture, the
South's lead in air power would shrink markedly rather than
increase as Seoul had planned.
Even so, we do not expect the air balance to shift to the
North's favor during this decade. Such a development would
require considerably larger Soviet deliveries of new aircraft,
such as the MIG-29--an unlikely occurrence because the Soviets
are just beginning to deploy this system with their own forces.
We expect South Korea's air advantage, at best, to hold at the
current level or decrease somewhat by 1989. In either case,
Seoul is unlikely in this period to compensate in the air for the
North's significant advantage on the ground. 25X1
We expect, in fact, the North Koreans will increase their
edge in ground force capabilities, but largely through their own
efforts. P'yongyang employs its own ingenuity and production
base--using technology supplied by Moscow and Beijing in the
1960s and 1970s--to arm its forces with large numbers of self-
propelled field and antiaircraft artillery and armored
vehicles. Rumors persist that the Soviets will provide T-72
tanks, but we have seen no evidence that North Korea will soon
field a modern tank to rival the US-designed K-1 now being
produced in the South. Although we cannot rule out future
provision of the T-72, available evidence indicates the North is
looking to its own industry for new armor vehicles. 25X1
North Korea is developing and fielding a 25X1
new light tank based on 1960s technology imported from the Soviet
Union and China. 25X1
We also have no evidence that Moscow is providing Pyongyang
with an offensive chemical warfare capability, although the
Soviets have supplied the North with chemical de_contaminatinn
inaustry, possesses large quantities of decontamination
equipment, and trains its forces in a chemical environment, the
US intelligence community believes North Korea does have a
limited chemical warfare capability.
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ecause the North as a arge c emical
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Many weapons in the North's inventory that fire high
explosive shells would be equally capable of delivering chemical
munitions, including nine to 12 FROG-7 launchers and an unknown
number of rockets capable of reaching 70 kilometers into South
Korea from positions near the DMZ. North Korea also has at best
a few Scud-B missiles with a 300-kilometer ran e. 9x1
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In sum, we have seen both Soviet support--and a lack
thereof--in the North's continuing force improvement. We do not
know how far the Soviets are willing to go in providing weapons
to P'yongyang, nor what they would demand or settle for in
return. The North clearly cannot pay for large numbers of
weapons. In our view, Moscow might see future weapons deliveries
as insurance for continued permission from the North for
overflights during collection missions against China and US and
South Korean forces. The Soviets may believe that such
deliveries eventually could lead to air and naval access to bases
in North Korea. We would expect P'yongyang to resist making any
concessions that appeared to denigrate its sovereignty. The
North might, however, be willing to lend more support to Soviet
policies even at further expense to its ties with China.
Defining the Relationship: Where Are the Boundaries?
The warming trend in Soviet-North Korean relations suggests
that both countries have reassessed and adjusted their positions
in the Soviet-Chinese-North Korean triangle. There are, however,
obvious barriers to more extensive improvements in bilateral
ties.
Careful Soviet control over the flow of military and
economic assistance, in our judgment, reflects
continued Soviet distrust of an unpredictable ally and
the constraints on such help imposed by North Korea's
limited ability to pay.
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-- Better Soviet-North Korean relations have not
fundamentally altered P'yongyang's fierce independence
or the almost certain backlash should the Soviets
attempt to interfere in its internal affairs.
-- Nor will the North completely discount its historical,
cultural, and political ties to China, despite the
clear drift away from Beijing because of the turn in
China's policies since the 1970s.
The relationship is also constrained by substantive
differences on key policy issues. While the Soviets on one
occasion used private talks with US officials to pay lip service
to North Korea's call for tripartite talks with the United States
and South Korea, the issue was completely ignored in the
communiques after Premier Kang Song-san's visit to Moscow in
December and Foreign Minister Schevardnadze's return trip to
P'yongyang the next month. The Soviets, in our view, are wary of
a forum where they are excluded, especially if it includes the
Chinese. They undoubtedly are aware China has sent repeated
messages through US diplomats encouraging t,rinartlte talks and
has even offered to host them in Beijing. 25X1
A related potential trouble spot is the idea floated by some
Soviet officials that Moscow might back cross-recognition of the
two Koreas. Soviet Communist Party International Department
Deputy Director Kovalenko last month told Japanese Socialists
that he believed cross-recognition was the only possible solution
to the Korean imbroglio. According to South Korean officials in
Tokyo, the Soviet Embassy subsequently told the Japanese
Socialists to forget Kovalenko's remarks. But the South Koreans
speculate that the comments reflect the private view of the
Soviet leadership. North Korea firmly opposes cross-recognition
because it would legitimize the division of the peninsula. And
we are certain that P'yongyang would be troubled by a public
Soviet contradiction of a basic North Korean policy. 25X1
The Olympics are another sore point. Moscow and its allies
have given lip service to the North's cohosting demand but have
not replayed P'yongyang's threat of a Socialist and Third World
boycott unless North Korea gets its share of the Games. Only
Cuba, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Ethiopia so far have issued
boycott threats. We expect the North to continue to push hard
for as much of a face-saving compromise on "sharing" the Olympics
as it can get, but we also believe it underestimated Soviet
determination to avoid another boycott and has been compelled to
backtrack on the cohosting issue. 25X1
In addition, Moscow and P'yongyang continue to disagree
about selected international issues. For example, North Korea
continues to recognize Prince Sihanouk's disparate anti-
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Vietnamese coalition in Kampuchea. This position is perhaps a
residual effect of Kim I1-song's personal friendship with
Sihanouk rather than a matter of policy. Nevertheless, if the
North Koreans break their pattern of inviting Sihanouk to
P'yongyang, it will be a sign that the North is moving closer to
Soviet positions (and further from China's) on yet another
Finally, we believe Soviet-North Korean relations are
directly affected by Moscow's attitude toward Kim I1-song's
succession plans. The Soviets clearly are reluctant to give
their public blessing to Kim's designation of his son, Kim Chong-il,
as his heir. We do not know whether the Soviets invited the
younger Kim to attend their recent Party Congress, but we believe
his absence--despite months of speculation that he would attend--
indicated frictions over his status. North Korean reports of
Schevardnadze's meetings in P'yongyang placed the elder and
younger Kims side by side. Soviet reports of the same meetings,
however, barely mentioned Kim Chong-il. Although Schevardnadze
invited the elder Kim and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam to the
USSR by name, the only possible invitation to Kim Chong-il was an
oblique reference to "other invitations." 25X1
In part, this Soviet attitude probably stems from Moscow's
objection to North Korea's version of "Socialism in One
Family." But the Soviets may also be uneasy about the policy
inclinations of the younger Kim.
Moscow may perceive him as pro-Chinese. Beijing gave him the red
carpet treatment when he visited in 1983, and the Chinese have
been far less reticent about accepting his eventual accession to
Notwithstanding these clear limitations, both sides have
gained from the new direction of Soviet-North Korean relations.
We do not expect short-term frustrations or current policy
differences to bring an about-face in the current trend in
bilateral ties.
Implications for the United States
The benefits from the improvements in Soviet-North Korean
relations that have accrued to both Moscow and P'yongyang work
against US and South Korean interests in several ways. Moscow's
willingness to improve the quality of its military exports to the
North increases the threat to the South. While the Soviet
diplomatic engagement on Korean issues is likely to introduce a
complicating factor in the North-South Korean dialogue, we do not
know whether the Soviets are counseling P'yongyang to be flexible
in these talks. On the one hand, good relations with the Soviets
could boost North Korean confidence in pursuing the dialogue.
But if Moscow judges that it should distinguish its advice on the
North-South talks from its principal competitor for influence in
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P'yongyang--the Chinese--the Soviets could be inclined to inject
a negative rather than positive note in the process. 25X1
On the other hand, increased Soviet influence in Pyongyang
offers potential leverage on some troublesome issues. On the
nuclear front, for example, the USSR has strictly enforced
international nonproliferation guidelines with Third World
recipients of its nuclear technology. Although nothing can
guarantee against a determined North Korean effort to develop
nuclear weapons, we believe Soviet-North Korea nuclear
cooperation will increase Soviet and international controls over
a suspect nuclear program. 25X1
We also believe Moscow's carefully calibrated military
assistance program still indicates a Soviet concern with North
Korean intentions. Mindful of the potential for escalation in a
region where the security interests of the Chinese, the Japanese,
and the United States intersect with their own, the Soviets
continue to have reason to modulate carefully their militar
assistance to an already powerful North Korean force. 25X1
The future of Soviet-North Korean relations will depend, in
part, on US policy. We believe the North has moved to improve
its political relations with Moscow partly to enlist Soviet
diplomatic help in pursuit of its primary goal--removal of US
forces from the peninsula. We expect Pyongyang to continue to
work both sides of the street--using the Chinese to convey its
interest in direct contacts with the United States and the
Soviets to remind Washington that its troops in Korea threaten
Soviet as well as North Korean interests. The willingness in
P'yongyang to endorse inclusion of the Korean issue on the
superpower summit agenda--after years of ignoring that option--
suggests that P'yongyang may be more hopeful that any progress on
this score will come through Moscow rather than Beijing. 25X1
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Distribution:
Copy 1 - OEA/NA/Korea/File
2 - Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President (Old Executive Office Bldg.
Room 298)
3 - William Sherman, State/EAP (Room 6205 Depart. of State Bldg)
4 - Harriet Isom, State/EAP/Korea
5 - Celia Conlon, State/EAP/Korea
6 - Jay Taylor, State/INR/EAP
7 - Bill Eaton, State/INR/EAP/Korea
8 - Jay Sloan, DIA/DIO/Korea 25X1
11 - James Kelly, DOD/ISA
12 - Wallace Knowles, DOD/ISA
13
14 - NIO/EA (7E-62)
15 - NIO/Economics
16 - C/PPS/DO (DO1)
17 - C/EAD(5E18)
18 - OGI/IIC/PI
19 - 21 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch
22 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch
23 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch
24 - OEA/NEA Division
25 - OEA/China Division
26 - OEA/SEA Division
27 - D/OEA (4F18)
28 - C/Production/OEA
29 - FBIS Analysis Group
30 - DDI
31 - Senior Review Panel
32 - PDB Staff (7F30)
33 - 37 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7G07)
38 - CPAS/ILS (7G50)
39 - C/PES (7F24)
40 - NIC/AG (7E47)
41 - DDO/EA Division (5DOO)
42 - DDO/EA (5C19)
43 - DDO/EAn (5C19)
45 - OEA/NA/Korea
46 - OEA/NA/Korea
47 - OEA/NA/Korea
25 March 1986
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