CHAD-LIBYA-FRANCE: STATUS OF THE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000606510012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 9, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606510012-0
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Talking Points for DDI
Chad-Libya-France: Status of the War
9 January 1987
Tripoli is trying to salvage its position in Chad while
facing increasing pressure from N'Djamena and Paris. Qadhafi
probably believes that some quick military success in Chad is
needed both to develop a strong bargaining position in the war
and to protect his regime from a domestic backlash.
The collapse of the Libyan garrison at Fada in the face
of a Chadian Government offensive was the most costly single
defeat for Tripoli since its ill-fated Uganda intervention in
1979.
-- Libyan troops at Fada broke and ran after
offering little resistance.
-- Libyan casualties almost certainly ran into the
hundreds, although N'Djamena's claim that 780
killed is probably exaggerated. warp
The defeat at Fada almost certainly will aggravate
discontent in Libya--particularlythe Lib litar --over
involvement in Chad. y
Libyan public has been increasingly concerned about the the
prospect of casualties in Chad and that renewed combat there
last month prompted a dramatic increase in military
desertions.
-- The Libyan press continues to deny a large
Libyan presence in Chad in an effort to keep the
scope of the Fada defeat from the public.
-- Nonetheless, the Libyan Armed Forces will
probably view the fall of Fada as another debacle
brought on by Qadhafi for which the Army pays the
price.
-- Another military humiliation with heavy
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casualties could well spur coup plottin
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Qadhafi probably anticipated that his forces could
quickly subdue the Chadians north of the 16th Parallel. The
Fada defeat, however, almost certainly has prompted him to
question whether the Libyan force can even hold its ground.
There are indications that Tripoli is now taking the war much
more seriously.
-- Libyan reserves have been mobilized, almost
certainly to make additional reinforcements
available for the Chad war.
We believe Qadhafi for the moment will look for an
opportunity to hand Habre a military defeat--north of the 16th
Parallel--heavy enough to destabilize th regime in N'Djamena.
Qadhafi is willing to
sustain substantial human and material losses to topple Habre.
Once the Libyans have at least partially recouped their
losses, however, Tripoli may initiate a diplomatic effort with
France to stabilize the situation.
As long as the French stand in the way, Qadhafi is not
likely to try to push south of the 16th Parallel to defeat
Habre. Libyan strikes across that line so far have all been
demonstrative--intended to signal the risks of attacking the
Libyans in the north--and future raids are likely to be for
the same purpose.
Meanwhile, Habre believes that the momentum is still with
him and plans to continue to bleed the Libyan occupation
force.
-- Working in concert with the Chadian rebels in
the north that recently defected from the Libyan
camp, Habre is orchestrating a campaign to harass
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the Libyans in the rugged Tibesti mountains.
-- Habre also appears to be considering an effort
to overrun Ouadi Doum, the main supply head for the
Libyan force and the only Libyan airfield south of
the Aozou Strip capable of supporting fighter
aircraft.
The Chadians will need regular resupply from France and
the US to sustain operations in the north.
(that
an missiles was nearly
exhausted in the Fada assault.
-- Habre has asked France to step up its efforts
to transport supplies to the front, including
additional airdrops to guerrillas in the Tibesti
-- Habre continues to press Washington for Stinger
air defense missiles, pointing to the increase in
Libyan airstrikes over the last week.
Leaders in Paris continue to debate the desirable limit
of French support to Habre's campaign.
French leaders are very pleased with N'Djamena's
successes and remain committed to replenishing equipment
expended in battle to date. They appear divided, however, on
whether France should escalate its direct involvement north of
the 16th Parallel.
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LOA I
continues to be anxious to avoid action that will
lead to direct French-Libyan confrontation or make
an eventual negotiated settlement of the war more
difficult to achieve. Paris is trying to find the
level of force that can be exerted on the Libyans in
Chad while avoiding Libyan retaliation against
French forces and interests.
-- We do not believe, however, that Paris would
agree to a settlement that would allow for a Libyan
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606510012-0
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presence south of the Aozou Strip. We believe that
France--in accordance with its self-perception as
patron of French-speaking Africa--will remain in
Chad over the long term and continue to resist
Libyan expansionism.
o retain the lead in Chad, but have no desire
to cooperate with the US in a more general campiagn
against Libya.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606510012-0