THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03-02194R000200810001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 5, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
-a a.yii d4'~`..
Intelligence Report
THE STALIN ISSUE AND
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
5 July 1968
RSS No. 0030
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THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
Since the ouster of Khrushchev in the fall of 1964
the domestic political scene in the Soviet Union has wit-
nessed a struggle for power within the leadership. Two
of the key figures in this struggle, Brezhnev and Shelepin,
have attempted to gain the support of the old-guard party
apparatchiks by espousing orthodox policies; of the
two Shelepin has been the more aggressive and Brezhnev
in general the more cautious, but thus far Brezhnev has
clearly gained the upper hand in the competition. Accompa-
nying the struggle has been a gradual but continuing
reversion toward the ideological orthodoxy, rigid controls,
and repression which characterized the Stalin years. One
aspect of this move toward orthodoxy has been the resur-
rection of Stalin's reputation and the cleansing of his
tarnished image, developments which many Soviet citizens
fear may mark a return to "Stalinism."
The reign of Stalin covered some 30 years, more than
half the history of the Soviet Union. It was a period of
intense industrialization, of forced mass collectivization,
and of the great sacrifices of World War II. It was also
a period of terror and repression during which millions
of Soviet citizens died in the purges. Although the term
"Stalinism" has a number of connotations, to Soviet
citizens in general and to the intellectuals in particular,
the term conjures up memories of total police control.,
repression, terror, purge trials, and labor camps. It is
in that context that the term is used in this paper.
The scope of the paper is limited to the general
use by the leadership of the Stalin. issue in the struggle
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for power and the practical implications of a rehabilita-
tion of Stalin for intellectual freedom in the Soviet Union,
The paper does not deal with specific policy implications
often involved in the use of the issue--such as military
expenditures, agriculture, nationalities problems. Neither
does it deal with other policy questions dividing the
leadership.
Chief, DDI Special Research Staff
Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It was
prepared by the Special Research Staff and coordinated
with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office
of National Estimates.
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THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
Since the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964 a gradual
restoration of Stalin's political respectability within
the Soviet Union has coincided with a return to more orthodox
policies and increasingly repressive methods of dealing with
non-conformists. The issue of Stalin's rehabilitation has
been used by various leaders, most notably Brezhnev and
Shelepin, in their attempts to attain the top position in
the Party hierarchy. The aim of each has been to gain the
support of the party apparatchiks, both high and medium
level, many of whom were dismayed and felt threatened by
Khrushchev's reformist tendencies. Thus, each has tried to
demonstrate that he and he alone is the legitimate leader
of the party faithful. In order to do so, each has sup-
ported orthodox views and each has attempted to reach
around the reformer Khrushchev to Stalin in an effort to
establish a direct line of legitimacy from Lenin.
Thus far, Brezhnev has prevailed over Shelepin in
the ongoing struggle for power; in order to do so he adopted
the neo-Stalinist position first assumed by the Shelepin
faction. Brezhnev has also managed to stave off attempts
by moderates within the leadership, represented by Podgornyy
and Kosygin, to push their own policy views; in the process
he has apparently gained a measure of support from them,
possibly by convincing them that the alternative to him
was even less desirable--e.g., Shelepin. However, while
Brezhnev has emerged as the strongest of the Soviet leaders,
his position is still limited by the nature of the leader=
ship; for a majority of the Soviet leaders has a vested
interest in preventing Brezhnev from acquiring too much
power.
The Issue And What It Means
The Stalin issue evokes a great emotional response
among those who suffered during the Stalin years and fear
a return to the harsh repressive methods of those years.
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At the same time the issue has great political significance.
To Communists, history is not a matter of academic concern;
rather it is a vital element in political life. Communist
ideology is based upon the inevitability of a certain
historical progression, and the continued justification
of the system as it exists is based upon the perpetuation
of that concept of history. Thus, all policies must at
least have the appearance of conforming to the ideology,
and for this reason each successive Soviet regime has felt
the need to rewrite Soviet history in order to support its
own policies.
The classification of Stalin touches upon the very
nature and legitimacy of the world's foremost Communist
system. It was impossible to denounce Stalin without
placing in question the myth of the party's infallibility
and undermining its ideological authority; this is precisely
what happened in the Soviet Union following Khrushchev's
1956 denunciation of the Stalin period and its cult of
personality. The continuing but gradual rehabilitation
of Stalin is part of an attempt to return the party and
the system to a position of ideological legitimacy. The
damage done to the party's credibility by the denunciation
of Stalin took its toll in the morale of the party apparat-
chiks. Thus the rehabilitation of Stalin also represents
an attempt to reassure these old-guard--and by nature
conservative--cadres that the party retains its legitimacy
and authority.
Khrushchev's attack on Stalin represented an attack
on orthodoxy and inflexibility; it was the beginning of a
drive for change. In general, those who support continued
de-Stalinization are those who also favor change, reform,
and liberalization. They tend toward pragmatism and prefer
to adapt theory to the needs of the country rather than
vice-versa. Their inclination toward reform in general
creates an atmosphere conducive to more open discussion
and, as a result, more freedom. A positive characteriza-
tion of Stalin, on the other hand, suggests a more rigid,
dogmatic approach to politics and economics. Those who
view the Stalin era in a favorable light have generally
argued the case for doctrinal continuity and have empha-
sized the ideological role of the party. Their approach
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necessitates tight control and close supervision of the
pragmatists and the intellectuals, and a corresponding
lessening of personal freedom.
Alignment within the hierarchy on the Stalin issue,
as well as on other policies, is quite complex, and the
assignment of classifications to individuals and groups
is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. It nonetheless serves
the purpose of identifying and highlighting shades of
difference in approach and in points of view. There are
several groupings within the leadership which might well
wish the rehabilitation of Stalin--but for different reasons
and to different degrees. The old-line apparatchiks who
tend to be dogmatic would, in all likelihood, welcome a
return to an atmosphere of tight control and rigid, un-
questioned views; this is the atmosphere in which they
rose to the top and in which they would feel more comfort-
able. Individuals who seem to fit this description, best
represented by Suslov, will be referred to as orthodox.
Another, seemingly more coordinated, group of
individuals took the early lead in actively pushing an end
to criticism of Stalin's cult of personality and in urging
tighter controls on the content of published material.
For this reason they are referred to as a neo-Stalinist
faction. Their main purpose seems to have been to capi-
talize on the views of the orthodox apparatchiks in order
to gain support in their drive for power. This faction
is composed primarily of young members of the hierarchy,
many of whom came-up through the Komsomol and have been
closely aligned with 3helepin. The neo-Stalinists have
dem.amstrated an ability to be quite pragmatic, unlike
the orthodox grouping, and even to shift positions in
order to attain their main goal, the acquisition of the
instruments of power.
On the other side of the political spectrum, the
moderates or pragmatists see a need for change and reform
in the Soviet Union and tend away from rigid, orthodox
positions. Kosygin and probably Podgornyy (at least at
one time) belong in this category. They would be inclined
to oppose a rehabilitation of Stalin. Even more to the
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reform side of the spectrum are the liberals. The member
of the hierarchy who came closest to representing this
position, Mikoyan, was dropped from the Presidium in March
1966. The main strength of the liberals is found among
the intellectuals--for example, the chief editor of the
liberal journal Noviy Mir, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy. The
intellectuals want morTreedom to write, to speak, and
to dissent. They have actively opposed the restoration of
Stalin's image.
Shifts in policy concerning various aspects of the
Stalin issue are reflected first in the intellectual com-
munity. Reversion to a favorable view of Stalin has required
historians and writers to adhere to the new line. The re-
Stalinizers have demanded that criticism of Stalin cease
and, in the past three years, they have had considerable
success in efforts to untarnish Stalin's historical image.
The re=!Stalinizers also demand that written material be
judged according to the principles of socialist realism--
which means that, when writing on the Soviet Union, criticism
is out of order and only the achievements and promises of
Communism may be discussed. In order to restore Stalin's
political respectability, therefore, it has been necessary
to reimpose prescribed, rigid formulas, and to clamp down
on non-conformists.
Increasing pressure on intellectuals to conform has,
in fact, accompanied the gradual rehabilitation of Stalin.
In the three years since Khrushchev's ouster, the regime's
warnings, threats, and outright repression have intensified.
Frustrated in their efforts to continue their moves toward
greater freedom and frightened by what they considered to
be a move back toward Stalinist methods, the intellectuals
have responded with demonstrations, petitions, and letters
of protest. These, in turn, have resulted in even stronger
measures by the regime--including expulsion from the party,
arrests, commitments to mental institutions, and incarcera-
tion in labor camps. The result has been a spiraling cycle
of action and reaction resulting in increasingly harsh
measures.
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Alignment of Forces
The regime's moves toward harsher policies have
generated considerable public opposition, and have been
accompanied by--indeed are a part of--an ongoing struggle
for power within the hierarchy. In the first few months
after Khrushchev's ouster, the new Soviet leaders were
preoccupied with establishing their positions and organizing
their forces. Both Shelepin, a neo-Stalinist, and Podgornyy,
a moderate, seemed to be in fairly powerful positions, with
Brezhnev seemingly occupying a middle ground. The existence
of this somewhat diffused political situation was reflected
in the lack of a clear policy on culture, resulting in
considerable freedom for the intellectuals. Liberal articles
were numerous and criticism of Stalin widespread.
If any faction seemed to have a slight edge at the
time it was the moderates. Apparent Presidium-level
supporters for a: moderate policy included Podgornyy,
Kosygin, and Mikoyan, while those who clearly seemed to
favor a hard line were Shelepin, Shelest, and Suslov. With
the Presidium divided in this manner, a balancing group,
conservative by inclination and headed by Brezhnev,
possessed considerable power to swing votes in favor of
one group or another. Polyanskiy and Kirilenko probably
belonged to this group.
Infighting Begins
Brezhnev apparently saw his biggest threat as coming
from the moderates. In February 1965 an attack was launched
against Khar'kov Oblast, Podgornyy's former bailiwick; the
author of the article was Shcherbitskiy, the First Secretary
of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Brezhnev's old power base. In
the same month members of the neo-Stalinist faction (Pavlov
and Yegorychev) attacked those who criticize the period of
the cult of personality. Thus, the struggle for power had
begun, with the moderates coming under attack from both
the neo-Stalinists and Brezhnev.
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By the early spring of 1965 the backers of a
rehabilitation of Stalin had a well-coordinated campaign
underway to restore Stalin's World War II image. Although
Brezhnev's statements at the time were not so harsh as
those of such neo-Stalinists as Moscow City Chief Yegorychev
and Komsomol First Secretary Pavlov, he must have supported
the proposal to restore Stalin's reputation and have swung
a decision in favor of it. He probably had various reasons
for doing so. In order to justify Khrushchev's ouster it
was useful to demonstrate that Khrushchev had strayed from
the true party line; thus, if virtually the whole period
of party rule was not to be in disrepute, the respectability
of the Stalin era (and of Stalin himself) must be restored.
Secondly, Brezhnev too was fighting for the leadership
and must have felt that he needed the support of the
orthodox apparatchiks.
The decision to rehabilitate Stalin was implemented
first with respect to Stalin's image as a wartime leader.
Various military leaders made increasingly favorable
comments concerning Stalin as a wartime leader. The mili-
tary has been in the forefront on the Stalin issue no
matter which line the party has adopted--always using the
issue to defend the prerogatives of the military. When
de-Stalinization was the line, the military criticized
Stalin for not listening to the professionals. Now, they
began to praise him because he did listen. Another indi-
cation of the trend was the parfial suspension in the
spring of 1965 of the program of rehabilitating Stalin's
victims. This partial rehabilitation of Stalin was given
official sanction in May 1965, when Brezhnev became the
first member of the hierarchy to mention Stalin's name in
public; at this time he referred to Stalin as the wartime
head of the State Defense Committee.
In the summer and early fall
of
1965
the
liberals
fought back against the onslaughts
of
both
the
neo-
Stalinists and Brezhnev. Publication of rehabilitations
of Stalin's victims was resumed and a number of liberal
articles appeared. In early September a liberal defense
of the intellectuals, signed by Pravda editor Rumyantsev,
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a possible associate of Podgornyy, appeared in Pravda.
This counterattack by the liberals was, however, sFort-
lived. Rumyantsev was fired in mid- September and
replaced by Zimyanin, a Belorussian closely associated
with Belorussian leaders Mazurov and Masherov, both of
whom were to express neo-Stalinist opinions subsequently.
Also in September the writers Daniel and Sinyavskiy were
arrested for having published works abroad; this marked a
victory for a hard-line approach.
Shelepin's Bid Fails But Hard-Line Prevails
Shelepin's drive for power, begun in February 1965,
intensified throughout the summer and early fall; but it
had been decisively defeated by the December central
committee plenum. The Party-State Control Committee
which he headed was abolished, and he was removed from
his position as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
However, the moderates also received a set-back at the
plenum, indicating that the strength to strike at Shelepin
had not been mobilized by them, although they might well
have supported it. Podgornyy replaced Mikoyan as Chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a position with
far less political power than his position on the party
Secretariat, which he lost. Furthermore, Mikoyan's
removal indicated that this strong supporter of a moderate
position was on his way out. Thus, the net gainer at
this time was Brezhnev, who probably had gained the support
of Suslov by supporting orthodox views,
Brezhnev's support for re-Stalinizing and the need
for conformity had been revealed in the publication in
October 1965 of an article by an apparent protege of his,
Trapeznikov, instructing propagandists that the period of
the cult should not be viewed negatively and indicating
that this applied not only to the question of wartime
leadership but to other aspects of the period,;such as col-
lectivization and industrialization. A Pravda article the
following January instructed historians to stop describing
the Stalin era as the period of the cult of personality,
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as this time in history had been characterized by many
positive achievements. Consequences of this move toward
orthodoxy include the arrests in September 1965, and trial
the following February, of the writers, Daniel and Sinyavskiy,
for unauthorized publication of their works in the West.
The 23rd Congress
On the eve of the 23rd Congress, which opened in late
March 1966, there were numerous reports that Stalin would be
formally rehabilitated. A number of hard-line articles and
speeches given during this period supported the rumors,
as did the apparently well-coordinated program to improve
Stalin's historical reputation. The rumors were also sup-
ported by the resurrection of a number of Stalinist terms--
such as cosmopolitanism, sharpening of the class struggle
(used in reference to the 1930's), and enemies of the peo-
ple. The prospect of a rehabilitation of Stalin drew
strong negative reactions from several foreign Communist
countries and frightened reactions from Soviet intellectuals,
who sent Brezhnev a letter urging that Stalin not be
rehabilitated.
Perhaps in response to these reactions the Soviet
leaders stepped back from a full-scale formal rehabilitation,
and when the congress opened only the vestiges of such a
program remained--the restoration of the terms Politburo
and General Secretary. While the return of these Stalinist
terms was purely symbolic, it nonetheless demonstrated
the mood of the Soviet leadership and suggested the direction
in which it wished to go. Brezhnev's acquisition of the
title General Secretary set him apart from his colleagues,
distinguished him from Khrushchev, and identified him with
Stalin, the only other Soviet leader ever to hold this
title.
Brezhnev's success was further reflected in the
fact that both the moderates and Shelepin again suffered
set-backs at the congress. Mikoyan was dropped from the
Politburo; Shelepin, apparently at this time, was assigned
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responsibility for light industry, a clear step down for
him. Brezhnev and the orthodox element in the party
gained, however. Pelshe, the Latvian First Secretary
and reportedly a Suslov associate, became a full member
of the Politburo, and Kunayev, a Brezhnev protege, became
a candidate member. The continued strength of Shelepin's
views was suggested by the appointment as a candidate
Politburo member of Belorussian First Secretary Masherov,
who, while not a protege of Shelepin, supported many of
the same views.
Brezhnev's speech at the congress was mild compared
with some of those which followed, indicating that in spite
of the adoption of an increasingly hard-line stand, pressure
by the neo-Stalinist faction for even harsher methods con-
tinued. Some of these speakers called for administrative
action against non-conformist writers, and such liberal
journals as Noviy Mir and Yunost' received strong criticism.
After the congress these threats were halted for a period,
perhaps because of the sharp protests, both foreign and
domestic on the eve of the congress, or possibly as a
result of Shelepin's defeat.
Perhaps encouraged by the failure of the congress
to formally rehabilitate Stalin and the reassurances given
to them that Stalinist times would not return, the liberals
proceeded to write and publish a number of articles in the
late spring and early summer of 1966. In particular,
there was a temporary upsurge in the program of rehabili-
tating Stalin's victims, and a number of articles criticizing
Stalin for his role in collectivization appeared. This
initiative was quickly squashed however, and articles
casting Stalin in a favorable light soon predominated once
again.
In spite of the prevalence of a conservative
influence, the liberals continued to voice opposition
throughout 1966. In February and in the summer, two
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meetings were held, one to discuss a book by A. Nekrich
criticizing prewar preparations, and the second to discuss
the third volume of the History of the CPSU. At each of
these meetings those in charge lost control and attacks
were launched by participants on Stalin and the personality
cult. A number of petitions also were circulated; for
example, in December a group of intellectuals protested the
passage of a decree extending an article of the RSFSR
criminal code to include any form of "slander" of Soviet
society; the intellectuals feared that_this would open,the xVia:y for
further represssion of the intellectuals. Also in December
Literaturnaya Gazeta published an article demanding a
truthful examina on of the past. Orthodoxy still dominated,
but resistance to the pressure to conform continued.
Leadership Tension Continues-
Friction within the leadership was reflected in a
debate which was waged in the press during the summer and
early fall of 1966. The issue was that of collective
leadership versus individual responsibility and all factions
participated. The neo-Stalinists opened the debate with
several articles stressing the importance of collective
leadership and warning of the dangers inherent in the impo-
sition of one-man rule. They received support from an
unlikely direction--the liberals who used the cult of per-
sonality and the resulting violations of legality to
illustrate the evils of one-man rule. Both of these
factions clearly had a vested interest in retaining col-
lective leadership and in preventing Brezhnev from
acquiring too much power.
Brezhnev and his backers responded to the concerted
attacks with several articles emphasizing the need for
responsibility and discipline, stressing the importance
of individual leadership, and quoting Lenin to the effect
that irresponsibility must not be permitted to hide beneath
references to collectivity. Brezhnev also responded by
mentioning favorably that most notable of individual leaders--
Stalin; in a November speech in Tbilisi, he referred to
Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary."
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A rigid, orthodox policy clearly prevailed in
early 1967. The rehabilitation program was halted and
refurbishing of Stalin's image continued. Dissident
intellectuals were arrested, particularly in the Ukraine
and Leningrad, where party leaders Shelest and Tolstikov
supported the neo-Stalinist line. Other examples of the
ascendancy of orthodoxy were the harassment of Noviy Mir
and the replacement of two key members of its edi riaT
board, and the expulsion of the historian Nekrich from
the party in July for his criticism of Stalin's handling
of the prewar situation.
Shelepin's Defeat
With the moderates on the defensive, Brezhnev and
his followers next turned their big guns on Shelepin. In
May 1967, Shelepin's protege Semichastnyy was removed as
head of the KGB and the following month the most outspoken
neo-Stalinist, Yegorychev,was removed as Moscow City First
Secretary. Shortly before his dismissal, Yego:rychev had
reportedly attacked the leadership at a Central Committee
plenum for its handling of the Middle East crisis. Shelepin
was apparently held responsible for Yegorychev's attack
and his power was curtailed; in July he became head of the
Soviet Union's trade union organization and then in
September he was removed from the secretariat.
In the face of Brezhnev's organizational victories,
Shelepin's backers began to issue more warnings in the
press against high-handed leadership methods. As they
had in 1966, they again stressed collective leadership,
but they came down most strongly on the right of party
members to criticize their superiors, citing the dangers
involved in having a leader who cannot take criticism.
Two of these articles used the cult of personality (one
directly and
one
indirectly) to illustrate the dangers
inherent in
the
imposition of one-man rule--meaning
Brezhnev's.
The
adoption in both 1966 and 1967 of an
anti-Stalin
line
of argument by Shelepin's neo-Stalinist
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supporters was an indication of their desperation. Finding
themselves in a vulnerable position, they used arguments
best suited to help prevent both the acquisition of further
power by Brezhnev and their own subjection to more political
defeats. Some individuals not in sympathy with Yegorychev's
views might also have feared the precedent set by
Yegorychev's abrupt dismissal.
The defeats suffered by Shelepin and the neo-
Stalinist faction in the spring of 1967 briefly encouraged
the liberal intellectuals. At the end of June several
articles critical of censorship and urging its abolition
were published, but almost immediately they were repudiated
and the hard-line reaffirmed by articles in the central
press. The arrests and trials of dissident intellectuals
continued; clearly the defeat of Shelepin did not entail
a corresponding defeat for hard-line policies.
Postlude and Prospects
During the first few months of 1968, the atmosphere
of threat and repression grew still more menacing. Intel-
lectuals were prosecuted for "anti-Soviet" activities;
liberal articles and anti-Stalin references disappeared
from publication.
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Brezhnev continued to gain strength and to hack
away at Shelepin's position during the first half of the year.
,Jn April, First Secretary Katushev of Gorkiy.Oblast, who had
supported Brezhnev on several occasions previously,
became a Party Secretary and, in May, Shelepin's protege
Pavlov was relieved of his position as Komsomol Chief.
Late in March Brezhnev delivered his most militant cultural
statement to date. Emphasizing the importance of ideology,
he described the "sharp ideological struggle" being waged
and charged that bourgeois imperialists were trying to
influence Soviet citizens. He attacked Soviet renegades
and hypocrites who fall into the imperialist net and warned
that they would not go unpunished. He again announced that
what he termed ideologically "weak works" would be given a
strict appraisal. Less than two weeks later a central
committee plenum adopted a resolution calling for a further
tightening of ideological controls. While it seems clear
that Brezhnev's speech and the resolution were at least
partially in reaction to the revolutionary liberalizing
events taking place in Czechoslovakia in early 1968, both
were consistent with the trend which had existed in Soviet
policy over the previous three-and-a-half years.
While the current atmosphere is less restrictive than
that of the Stalin years, when terror and repression were
the order of the day, it is much more stifling than that
which existed during Khrushchev's tenure. The situation
varied under Khrushchev; when he was relatively strong
there was a corresponding relaxation of ideological con-
trols, and when he was on the defensive (for example
in late 1962 and early 1963) there was a tightening in
cultural policy and less freedom of expression. Nonetheless,
the current clamp-down far exceeds in severity any clamp-
down which occurred during the Khrushchev years.
At the present time there seems little likelihood
of a return to a more liberal policy. Over the past three-
and-a-half years there have been few personnel changes at
the highest levels of the party, but those that have
occurred have tended to strengthen the hard-line forces
apparently dominated by Brezhnev. As long as the leader-
ship balance remains essentially intact the prevailing
policy is likely to remain orthodox and, if anything,
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become more repressive.
On the other hand there would also appear to be
a limit to the extent of regression to Stalinist tactics
as long as the current leadership structure remains. In
1956 when Khrushchev in his "secret speech" condemned
Stalin's crimes he implicitly pledged that such methods
would not again be employed,,thus limiting the potential
for control by an individual and laying the groundwork for
the sanctifying of collective leadership. While the
rehabilitation of Stalin and the crackdown on the intel-
lectuals have raised the spectre of a complete return to
Stalinist terror tactics, such a reversion virtually
presupposes the ability of one individual to impose his
will and authority. Barring a crisis situation in which
one man might have to make the decisions, the diversity
still existing within the Politburo would seem to work
against such a possibility.
Each member of the hierarchy, whether moderate or
orthodox, has an interest in preventing any other indi-
vidual from acquiring too much power. Thus, although
Brezhnev is quite clearly first among equals, and is more
secure than ever before, his power in far from unlimited.
For example, while he has undermined Shelepin's position
considerably, he has not yet been able to oust him from
the Politburo, and a number of Shelepin's supporters
remain in important positions. Each member of the
hierarchy has a vested interest in seeing that Brezhnev's
ability to exert his will remains limited.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200810001-3