SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE: OBJECTIVES, PACE AND EFFECTIVENESS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director ofd
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
DA-
NOS-GAVE-OUT--OR MARK ON
Soviet Civil Defense:
Objectives, Pace,
and Effectiveness
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Memorandum to Holders
Key Judgments and Summary
NI IIM 86-10004
February 1986
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NI I I M 86-10004
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
NI IIM 77-029J
SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE:
OBJECTIVES, PACE,
AND EFFECTIVENESS
KEY JUDGMENTS AND SUMMARY
Information available as of 15 December 1985
was used in the preparation of this Memoran-
dum, which was approved for publication on 31
December 1985. The full text of this Memoran-
dum is being published separately with regular
distribution.
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PREFACE
The 1977 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet civil
defense planning remains in many respects the major comprehensive
study on the subject.' However, important sections of that paper have
been superseded by the 1981 Memorandum to Holders and a 1983 IIM,
and analyses undertaken by the intelligence agencies individually have
shed light on additional aspects of the program.2
This document incorporates Intelligence Community findings since
1981 and new data on sheltering, evacuation, and effectiveness. Al-
though not as comprehensive in scope as the 1977 IIM, it addresses those
issues that we believe to be central to an evaluation of the program's
short-term effectiveness. We do not attempt to assess Soviet prospects
for medium- or long-term recovery after a nuclear attack because of the
uncertainties surrounding the climatic and biological effects of a
massive nuclear exchange. In addition, in-depth analyses would be
highly scenario dependent. We have, however, identified those areas
known to us that we believe would have an impact on the Soviets'
capability for continuing operations in the period shortly after a nuclear
attack.
This Memorandum to Holders was prepared under the auspices of
the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. It was drafted
by the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the
Defense Intelligence Agency. Contributions to various portions of the
study were also made by elements of the US Air Force, the National Se-
curity Agenc . The
Joint Data Systems Support Center, Defense Communications Agency,
provided extensive computer support for the measures-of-effectiveness
study, while statistical support for the evacuation and shelter studies
was provided b CIA's Analytic Support Group.
This Memorandum was coordinated by the NIO/SP's Interagency
Working Group on Civil Defense.
December 1977, or NI IIM 77-029 (S NF), December 1977.
2 See Memorandum to Holders of Soviet Civil Defense: Objectives, Pace, and Effectiveness, NI IIM
81-10001) (TS Codeword), January 1981, or NI IIM 81-10001D (S NF), July 1981; and Soviet Wartime
Management: The Role of Civil Defense in Leadership Continuity, NI IIM 83-10005JX (TS Codeword),
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Civil defense is an integral part of the Soviets' strategic posture.
The Soviets see their program as providing them with an advantage
over the United States, but during a crisis period their judgments about
their freedom of action and recourse to hostilities would be based on
many military, political, and other factors beyond just a significant civil
defense asymmetry. They probably have many uncertainties about
their capability to implement their civil defense plans, as well as about
the impact of longer term nuclear effects. Nonetheless, continued
investment in civil defense over a 35-year period has resulted in a
program that-in the Soviets' view-is perceived as credible and is a
contributing element of their strategic posture. According to an alterna-
tive view, there is no indication that the Soviets believe their civil
defense program makes any but a marginal contribution to the USSR's
overall strength relative to that of the United States, or that it could pro-
duce a satisfactory outcome in such a war.'
Although current civil defense capabilities are not uniformly
comprehensive, the Soviets to date have achieved a level of competence
that permits them to focus selectively on weaknesses in the system. A
period of maintenance and stable growth appears to have succeeded the
intensive development of the late 1960s through mid-1970s, and there
have been no discernible changes of emphasis in the program over the
past several years. Spending on the four elements of the program for
which we can estimate costs remains steady at about 470 million rubles
per year, or $4.5 billion if duplicated in the United States. (These figures
should be viewed as minimum estimates only, inasmuch as many
aspects of the program are not included.
The Soviets have made considerable progress in almost all areas of
civil defense over the last 15 years. In particular, they have made great
strides in their efforts to implement plans for the protection of the
leadership and essential workers during wartime. Recent analysis
suggests that, in addition to an extensive command post network outside
of urban areas, the Soviets have a more extensive urban command post
network than we previously suspected. In Moscow, where the need for
leadership protection is the greatest, the Soviets over the last 35 years
State
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have constructed an enormous system of urban deep underground
complexes, interconnected by public and special subway lines and
as well as deep underground complexes
Deep underground facilities
connected to public subways have also been identified in several other
major cities. There are indications, moreover, that the Soviets' capacity
for underground production may be greater than we have estimated in
the past-although the extent of such efforts remains unclear.
We have identified other areas, however, that the Soviets apparent-
ly perceive as needing improvement. They experimented with a major
reorganization of civil defense in the late 1970s and early 1980s. On the
basis of statements made by Marshal Ogarkov, as Chief of the General
Staff in the early 1980s, we judge that the move was partly intended to
address problems in coordinating military, economic, and civil defense
mobilization requirements. We do not know the outcome of the
reorganization attempt
The ultimate effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program is
highly scenario dependent. Our analysis shows that, if in the course of
an ongoing crisis or conflict, the Soviets mobilize early enough to
implement fully their civil defense plans and deliver a first strike
against the United States, the program could greatly minimize the
casualties attributable to prompt nuclear effects among all segments of
the population. Immediate casualties could range from at least 162
million with little or no civil defense to at least 30 million with full shel-
tering and evacuation. Although civil defense could protect some key
economic assets, the Soviets almost certainly believe it cannot prevent
major damage to their economy
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SUMMARY
Driven by the perception that war-fighting capabili-
ties mean little without the capability for war survival,
the Soviets have contended for over 35 years with the
problems of providing civil defense against weapons of
modern warfare. The scope of their effort exceeds that
inferred by the interpretation of the term "civil
defense" in the West. Soviet civil defense is intended
to contribute to the maintenance of a functioning
logistic base for operations by combat forces, to limit
human and material losses, and to attempt to ensure
that the essential political and socioeconomic basis for
Soviet society is preserved in the postattack period.[
The Soviets' current civil defense posture is the
product of an ongoing effort to balance these doctrinal
requirements with the complexity, cost, and uncer-
tainties inherent in preparing for nuclear war. Conse-
quently, current capabilities are not uniformly com-
prehensive. The Soviets have made considerable
progress in almost all aspects of the program over the
past 15 years, however, and as a result they view the
program as credible and as one that provides them
with an advantage over the United States. According
to an alternative view, there is no indication that the
Soviets believe their civil defense program makes any
but a marginal contribution to the USSR's overall
strength relative to that of the United States, or that it
could produce a satisfactory outcome in such a war.'
Concept and Objectives
Civil defense is an integral part of the Soviets'
strategic posture. Like other military programs; it is
designed to support Soviet military doctrine and strat-
egy. The stated objectives of the program are to:
- Protect the population (the leadership, essential
work force, and general population, in that order
of priority).
- Maintain continuity of economic activity in
wartime.
These objectives have been consistent over time and
appear to reflect actual Soviet policy (see table 1).F-
Organization and Manning
Subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) since
1971, civil defense has a status within the military
similar to that of other nonforce branches. The chief of
USSR Civil Defense, General of the Army A. T.
Altunin, is a deputy minister of defense. The General
Staff coordinates civil defense activities with the rest
of the armed forces, and closely follows civil defense
mobilization plans through the Organization and Mo-
bilization Main Directorate,
Civil defense is administered nationwide on a terri-
torial-industrial basis, with civil defense staffs present
at all territorial-administrative and economic-func-
tional levels. We estimate there are approximately
150,000 full-time civil defense personnel. Operational
control of civil defense rests with the military; in
wartime, the territorial civil defense chain of com-
mand would be subordinate to the deputy commander
for civil defense of each military district (MD).
The operating elements of the program consist of 59
military civil defense units manned by 34,000 troops
in peacetime (105,000 in wartime) and an unknown
number of civilian civil defense formations that proba-
bly involve over 25 million participants. The quality of
the civilian formations varies considerably, since much
of the population apparently does not take civil de-
fense training seriously. This deficiency appears to
concern the leadership; in 1984 Altunin approved
regulations tightening training standards for the civil-
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- Liquidate the consequences of an enemy attack.
Two distinct-though related-goals may have
been factors in the proposed reorganization. Other
and Research, Department of State.
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Table 1
Objectives and Tasks
of Soviet Civil Defense
Protect the Protect the leadership
population Urban command posts
Shelters (urban and rural, blast and
fallout)
Maintain continuity Coordinate civil defense and economic We are unable to estimate the total cost of civil
of economic activity mobilization plans defense preparations in the USSR. We have assessed
in wartime Protect essential economic personnel the annual cost of four elements of the program: pay
Urban and exurban command posts and allowances for full-time personnel, the operation
for the economic leadership of the military civil defense units, construction and
Geographic dispersal (limited
implementation)
Enhance prospects
for postattack
recovery
Sheltering, dispersal, and relocation of maintenance of facilities for these units, and urban
essential workers blast shelter construction. The cost of these elements in
Ensure stable supply of raw materials and 1984 amounted to about 470 million rubles, the equiv-
utility inputs alent of about 7 percent of the estimated cost for
Buried utility lines Soviet strategic defensive forces, or less than 1 percent
Protect individual pieces of machinery and billion in 1984, with about 77 percent representing
equipment (limited implementation) manpower costs. (These estimates should be consid-
Hasty hardening ered very rough approximations because of uncertain-
Rapid shutdown ties in both the quantitative data on civil defense
Prevention of secondary damage programs and price estimates.) We emphasize that
these figures represent the cost of only part of the
Protect entire installations __a _L_..ia L_ ..,..:....,.,,...
Redundant sources of supply of the estimated total defense budget. If duplicated in
Strategic reserves the United States, they would have cost about $4.5
Provide training in rescue and recovery
operations
military reorganizations of the same period were
aimed at aligning the peacetime force structure more
closely with wartime operational plans. One effect of
these changes was to consolidate the MD commander's
authority over forces in his area. A similar outcome
could have been expected if the civil defense experi-
ment were successful, and would have followed the
trend established by the MOD takeover of civil de-
fense in 1971.
It is also possible that serious concerns over the
Soviets' mobilization capabilities prompted the move.
Marshal Ogarkov, while Chief of the General Staff,
expressed concern in the early 1980s over the nation's
ability to coordinate all aspects of mobilization-
military, economic, and civil defense.
Attitudes
Available evidence suggests that the leadership takes
the civil defense program seriously. Despite the preva-
lence of statements to Western officials that play down
the extent and significance of the program, domestic
literature continually emphasizes the importance of
general preparedness and of training activity. Contin-
ued investment and activity in an era of budget
constraints also support this view. The average Soviet
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citizen, however, apparently continues to be apathetic
toward the program, paying little attention to civil
defense lectures and regarding exercises as more of an
opportunity for socializing than for training. Although
this reduces the benefits of training and could dimin-
ish the effectiveness of the civilian civil defense
formations, we believe it has very little impact on the
rest of the program. The majority of Soviet citizens
probably would obey orders under most crisis scenari-
os. Moreover, the general disinterest of Soviet citizenry
in civil defense does not indicate a lack of purpose on
the part of the leadership-F-1
Level and Direction of Activity
It is difficult for us to measure the pace of the
program. Few areas are quantifiable, and our current
reporting is limited. Some areas such as shelter con-
struction and military civil defense unit activity
showed a marked increase in emphasis in the late
1960s and early 1970s, but appear to have leveled off
since the mid-1970s. We judge that the enduring and
cumulative nature of many aspects of the program has
allowed the Soviets to increase their civil defense
capability while maintaining a steady pace of effort.
The Soviets have achieved a level of competence
that permits them to focus selectively on weaknesses in
the system. A period of maintenance and stable
growth appears to have succeeded the intensive devel-
opment that characterized the period from the late
1960s through the mid-1970s. Although many prob-
lems remain to be resolved, we believe the Soviets
have surpassed the minimum level of achievement
necessary to impart confidence in the program's via-
bilit
With many of the basic requirements for civil
defense apparently fulfilled and evidencing only a
maintenance level of effort, the Soviets probably view
the 1980s as a time to address less tangible problem
areas. We have detected a few new areas of emphasis
over the past several years. These include:
- Mobilization capabilities.
- Rural civil defense formations.
- Allies' civil defense programs.
In general, we have been unable to discern any civil
defense initiatives in response to the deterioration in
US-Soviet relations since 1980. The lack of evidence to
that effect could be due to limited current reporting,
however, 1
Protection of the Leadership
A primary objective of the Soviets' civil defense
program is to protect and support the leadership from
the time they begin the transition to a wartime footing
to the early postattack period. We estimate that there
are approximately 179,000 officials the Soviets most
want to protect, including political and economic
leaders at all levels and some civil defense personnel.
All key leadership components probably are assigned
both urban and exurban command posts, The func-
tions of the component determine the number of its
primary and alternate command posts, their size, and
the degree of protection they offer against nuclear
effects, as well as the communications equipment,
transport, and other support provided. At the highest
levels of the national leadership and throughout the
armed forces, mobile command posts and related
communications facilities also are used, although they
are not usually available to subordinate territorial-
administrative and ministerial organizations. The pre-
sent war management structure relies primarily on
fixed command posts and probably will continue to do
so; we doubt the Soviets could carry out their wartime
management plans effectively using only mobile com-
mand posts.
The Soviets would try to relocate most of their
leadership to exurban sites in wartime. We estimate
the total number of exurban facilities supporting the
Soviet wartime apparatus to be over 1,000. Of this
number, we assess about 275 as being vital to support-
ing Soviet war-fighting operations. These belong to the
National Command Authority (NCA), national govern-
ment, ministries directing war-supporting sectors of
the economy, military districts, republics, and the 56
most important oblasts.5
5 Military service headquarters, main command posts, and theater
command, control, and communications facilities are not included.
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The vulnerability of identified facilities varies. examined in detail for this report: sheltering, evacua-
Some of the urban and exurban relocation sites are tion, and medical support. Protection of the urban
nder roun population does not receive the priority accorded to
located dee underground-
protecting essential personnel but is nonetheless an
established objective
Protection of the Urban Population
Soviet plans to protect the urban population encom-
pass a wide range of measures, three of which were
Subway systems probably provide additional shel-
tering capacity. Although we do not know the extent
to which the public systems would be used for shelter,
we have estimated the potential shelter capacity of
currently operating systems. We estimate the operat-
ing underground stations could shelter almost 600,000
people, or more than 2 percent of the population in
the cities with operating subway systems. If both
operating tunnels and stations were used, they could
shelter approximately 3.6 million people, or 14.5
percent of the population in those cities. Even if
tunnels were used, however, this latter figure repre-
sents a maximum that is unlikely to be approached,
since not all sections of the subways would be suitable
for shelter. F__1
to be smaller
We estimate the Soviets could shelter approximately
11.2 percent of the urban population in 1984.6 Shelter
capacity is higher in larger cities than in smaller cities;
our estimates show cities with more than 1 million
people could shelter 16.9 percent, those with 100,000
to 1 million people 9.3 percent, and those with 25,000
to 100,000 people 8.4 percent. Most of the shelters
identified were at places of work.
Comparison of information on shelters constructed
after 1978 with those constructed before suggests that
shelter capacity is exceeding population growth only
slightly, and that the rate of progress will soon level off
if current rates continue. We estimate the Soviets will
be able to protect 11.5 percent of their urban popula-
tion by 1994. Shelter construction at residential sites
has declined, with much of the slack taken by con-
struction at institutes. The newer shelters also appear
The Soviets will have to rely on evacuation to
protect the bulk of the population. As many as 331
cities might be evacuated in wartime, involving some
92 million people, or 88 percent of the population of
the cities. We believe the percentage of people to be
evacuated would vary according to city size since
relative urban shelter capacity increases with the size
of the city.
The complications associated with mass evacuation
under the best of circumstances could be exacerbated
by factors such as inadequate strategic warning, trans-
portation shortages, and adverse weather conditions.
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Although these problems must be obvious to the
Soviets, we do not believe the Soviet commitment to
evacuation efforts is diminished as a result,__1
The available evidence indicates that the Soviets
have taken extensive measures to provide medical
support for the population in the postattack period.
These measures include:
- Mobilization plans for medical personnel and
facilities.
- Special civil defense training for all medical
personnel.
cussed in civil defense literature. They have made
considerable progress in preparing to protect essential
workers and economic managers, and have had some
success in developing protective measures for the
following major industries: defense, machine building,
chemicals, metals, energy, transportation, construc-
tion, and communications. They also have well-devel-
oped plans for defining the wartime posture-evacu-
ated, dispersed, or relocated-of all types of economic
installations. A significant number of installations
would probably attempt to continue operations in
wartime for as long as possible, either through reloca-
tion or dispersal measures.
- Provision for emergency medical supplies and
transportation.
- Preparation for sanitation and epidemic manage-
ment teams to control disease.
- Plans for medical evacuation of casualties from
urban areas to relocated hospitals.
- Shelter for medical personnel.
The Soviets probably have significant uncertainties
about the ability of the Civil Defense Medical Service
to perform its wartime mission. Compounding the
problems presented by the number of casualties that
would result from a nuclear war may be factors such
- Availability of appropriate medical supplies and
equipment, despite stockpiling.
- Availability of qualified medical personnel.
- Problems with sanitary-epidemiology operations
demonstrated during peacetime crises.
Nevertheless, the peacetime preparations in effect
could enhance prospects for reducing casualties should
war occur
Protection of the Economy
The array of measures discussed in Soviet literature
for protecting the range of economic assets is shown in
have placed on each of these areas varies
In practice, Soviet efforts to protect the economy
appear selective rather than comprehensive and focus
on key elements of the economic infrastructure essen-
tial to war support and recovery. The Soviets have
been unable to implement all of the measures dis-
Of particular interest to us is the growing body of
evidence suggesting that underground production fa-
cilities may play a greater role in plans for continuing
economic activity than previously recognized
The Soviets have experienced difficulties in prepar-
ing the peacetime economy for the transition to a
wartime footing, despite the extensive organizational
mechanisms to facilitate the process. The magnitude
of the task confronting the bureaucracy-which expe-
riences difficulties in peacetime planning-suggests
these problems will not be resolved easily.
Previous analyses have concluded that the Soviets
would not attempt to implement preattack measures
such as evacuation or relocation unless convinced of a
high probability of nuclear attack; they probably
would wish to avoid economic disruption as well as the
possibility of triggering a US preemptive strike. None-
theless, the Soviets might try to carry out some
measures incrementally to ease the strain of mass
evacuation. Some aspects of evacuation also could be
carried out covertly, to buy additional time. (For
example, children could be evacuated under the pre-
text that they were being transported to summer
camp.) Successful implementation of these plans could
provide some protection for key assets and would
contribute to Soviet capabilities for protracted conflict
and postattack recovery
See NI IIM 85-10013, Soviet Planning and Capability for
Protracted Nuclear War (C), February 1986 (TS Codeword NF NC
OC).
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Effectiveness
We have updated our findings on the effectiveness
of Soviet civil defense in reducing casualties from a
large-scale retaliatory US nuclear strike. Estimated
casualties resulted from prompt blast and radiation
effects and from fallout during some six weeks follow-
ing the attack. (We did not assess the impact on
ultimate casualty levels of other factors, such as sec-
ondary damage, food shortages, or the spread of
disease.) Our reassessment took into account new
information on targeting strategy, population size,
shelter capacity, and evacuation planning. We also
incorporated into our model new features that provide
a more accurate assessment of the effectiveness of
Soviet plans to protect the leadership, essential work
force, and economic installations, as well as an esti-
mate of the extent to which antiballistic missiles
(ABMs) would contribute to reducing population casu-
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areas as well.
target intelligence base and the modernization of US
forces will offset many of the Soviets' gains in these
Trends and Implications
Over a 10-year period of changing budget priorities
and cooling East-West relations, the Soviets have
maintained a consistent level of effort in those aspects
of civil defense reviewed for this document. This
contributes to our judgment that civil defense holds a
relatively constant priority in Soviet planning and is
viewed as a significant part of plans for homeland
defense. The Soviets apparently recognize there is a
margin of diminishing returns for each ruble invested
in the program, and probably have chosen what they
consider to be an economically realistic level of effort
that still provides key peacetime and wartime benefits.
Full implementation of civil defense preparations
would greatly reduce immediate population losses and
could prevent damage to a limited number of econom-
ic assets. The most critical decision to be made by
Soviet leaders in terms of saving their population is
whether to evacuate. (s NF)
Soviet civil defense will require continued attention
and investment in the next decade. We anticipate that
casualty levels among the general population would be
higher in 1992 than in 1984, in both absolute levels
and in percent of the total population, with limited
gains from increased shelter capacity more than offset
growth and improvements to US forces
We have no specific evidence for the
improvements the Soviets have scheduled for their
programs to protect key leadership, work force, and
economic assets, but expect that expansion of our
We judge that the Soviets' civil defense program
weighs significantly in their perception of the strategic
balance.9 Soviet doctrine explicitly recognizes the
program's contribution to both war-fighting and war-
survival capabilities. Soviet leaders, however, cannot
be certain of the degree of protection civil defense
would afford, at present or in the early 1990s. Our
analysis of their civil defense plans and activities
suggests the Soviets are not likely to be any more
confident now than we assessed them to be in 1981
that they can carry out the full range of civil defense
measures planned for the population and the econo-
my. Moreover, although we have not detected any
change in emphasis on their civil defense program in
the aftermath of Soviet scientific speculation about the
likelihood of a nuclear winter resulting from a major
nuclear exchange, it must compound the uncertainties
about prospects for postattack recovery.
We do not expect to see a major shift in the Soviets'
emphasis on the program-either increased or de-
creased-barring a dramatic change in one of the
superpowers' strategic capabilities and doctrine. The
Soviets probably will maintain a fairly constant rate of
investment in civil defense to consolidate the gains
already attained, with attention to improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of existing assets. We
expect the Soviets to:
- Continue blast shelter construction at roughly
current rates, with emphasis on shelters for essen-
tial personnel.
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- Incorporate civil defense features into new sub-
way construction.
- Construct additional but relatively limited num-
bers of new command posts as new requirements
are generated.
- Continue to upgrade existing command post
facilities and equipment.
- Maintain constant levels of military civil defense
unit activity.
- Take additional steps to integrate civil defense
into the military, including increasing coopera-
tion with the military commissariats if the reor-
ganization did not occur.
- Aim for improvements in rural civil defense
capabilities.
- Try to redress the problems noted by Ogarkov in
coordinating all aspects of mobilization planning.
The Soviets also will continue to pay attention to such
programs as medical preparedness and economic pro-
The reorganization experiment and the mobilization
problems noted by Ogarkov suggest that the organiza-
tional structure of civil defense will continue to be
scrutinized closely by the General Staff in the next
several years. If the reorganization did not take place,
other measures probably will be implemented to
compensate for those weaknesses that prompted the
proposal. We do not fully understand the politics and
personalities of the USSR Civil Defense Staff, but
would expect additional changes when General Al-
tunin eventually is replaced.
We cannot confidently forecast the factors that
would determine the ultimate "victor" in a nuclear
conflict, or the social, economic, or military position of
the superpowers in a postattack world. Nevertheless, it
is undeniable that those capabilities and assets Soviet
civil defense is aimed at supporting and protecting
would be foremost among the factors determining the
political realities of a postnuclear era.
12
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/19: CIA-RDP90R00038R000200170001-5