CONFIRMATION HEARINGS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE-DESIGNATE CASPAR WEINBERGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000707060051-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 51
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Confirmation Hearings of Secretary of Defense-Designate
Caspar Weinberger
Washington, D. C.
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SENATOR JOHN TOWER: ...We will proceed to questions.
I'll reiterate that we will follow the ten minute rule, and I
ask all my colleagues to please voluntarily stay within the
ten minute rule.
Mr. Weinberger, there's been press speculation that
your appointment signals some change in the defense policy of
the incoming Reagan administration. There's been some suggestion
that perhaps your views on defense and defense spending are not
compatible with those expressed by Governor Reagan during the
course of the campaign and that there might be some change in
policy.
I'd like to give you the opportunity to present your
views on the commitment of Governor Reagan to national defense
and what you consider your own role to be, and whether or not
indeed your views are compatible or incompatible with those ex-
pressed by Governor Reagan during the campaign.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE-DESIGNATE CASPAR WEINBERGER: Well,
Senator, I feel there is full compatibility. I have talked with
the Governor several times on the general subject and over the
years and very recently. I think there is complete agreement
that it is absolutely essential that we, first of all, improve
the readiness, all aspects, really of the readiness of the
forces that we now have. And I think that, simultaneously --
and it's hard to assign any priority between the two; I think
we have to proceed simultaneously. We have to begin to improve
the strategic balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union.
I think there has been a gap opened, and I think
that gap has to be closed. And I think that both of these
goals would be undertaken with the general purpose of trying
to -- or have the goal of deterring anyone from taking any
action that would be harmful to our nation or to its citizens.
And from my point of view, this involves everything from acts of
terrorism and violence against our diplomats and our citizens up
to and including possible attacks on the nation itself. I think
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that only if we have the forces and the weapons, and only if
we have the firmness and the resolution and the will to act
when it's required, and, perhaps even more important, only if
it's perceived by others that we have these strengths can we
avoid the repeated actions that have been taken against our
citizens and other problems that we're all familiar with that
have been occurring too often in recent years.
As long as we are perceived by any potential enemy,
or by our allies, for that matter, to be ill-equppied or weak or
irresolute or guilt-riodden or unwilling or unable to do anything
except be patient, then I think we can expect perhaps increasingly
hostile actions against our people abroad, and, to my mind, actions
that would weaken our position in the world. And we've seen a lot
of these in Afghanistan and Angola and Iran and elsewhere.
I spoke of readiness. And I think that that's a sort
of general term. But what I mean by readiness encompasses a
very large number of things. We have forces In being. I think
many of them are under-strength. I think that we've not had the
fuel or the ammunition for full training. Certainly the compen-
sation of the uniformed services I think has to be improved. I
think we have to bring these existing units up to strength In
performance and equipment and training. And I think that this
would also require, this general aspect of Improving readiness,
that we, as an American people, again try to -- and this would
be one of the very highest priorities that I would like to work
on -- that the American people try to regain the respect and
the honor and the appreciation that I think we should all feel
for people in the uniform services.
This used to be the feeling of the country. I would
very much like to see it again and would like to make this a
very high priority of what I would propose to do in the next
few years.
People in the uniforms are not militarists seeking
glory abroad in a lot of bold and disastrous ventures. But
they're shouldering, really, the burdens that enable us to
continue to live in peace and freedom. And I think we should
honor them for it.
As far as Improving that strategic balance that I
mentioned as a sort of simultaneous priority, not a second one,
but a simultaneous priority, I think that involves starting and
continuing various weapon systems that will give us sufficient
strength so that anyone who plans a sort of attack will correctly
perceive that we retain a full ability to respond, to deliver
a return blow of such strength that they will be deterred from
launching that kind of attack. And I think this requires that
we conduct a very consistent policy of Increasing our strength
and that we conduct ourselves and our relations with all of our
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friends in such a way that they will believe and that they will
join us to the utmost of their ability in securing the basic goal
i n w h i c h we a l l have an equal interest. And that, of course, i s
the maintenance of peace and freedom for us all.
Those would be the priorities or the philosophy, if
you like, with which I would approach this task, if I should be
confirmed.
SENATOR TOWER: Thank you very much, Mr. Weinberger.
I'm delighted to note that your perception of priorities is very,
very compatible with my own. I am particularly delighted that
you recognize the necessity of addressing our manpower and per-
sonnel problems immediately, in that they do impact rather
seriously on our state of readiness. And I'm delighted to see
that you're prepared to take on that problem at the outset.
SENATOR TOWER: ...The Senator's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes Senator Cannon.
SENATOR HOWARD CANNON: Thank you very much....
ANNOUNCER: ...So we now resume the questioning with
Senator Cannon of Nevada.
SENATOR CANNON: ...formidable task. Our adversaries,
the Soviets, are probing our resolve on many fronts. As a nation
we ve stood still for the past ten years because of our mistaken
trust In the SALT process while the Soviets have pushed on in
virtually every field. Wherever we look, there is reason to
worry. A recent article in "Aviation Week" highlighted the sea
trials of the Soviet's latest submarines, their Typhoon and Alpha
class subs, which have twice the displacement of our latest Tri-
dent submarine. Not only are they twice as big, they're double
hulled, with more than ten feet of separation between hulls filled
with water, which, by all reports, makes them virtually impene-
trable. Also, they reportedly are Titanium-hulled, can dive
deeper and can outrun anything we have. In fact, the speed
differential is so great it's alleged that our Mark-48 torpedo,
our best and biggest, can't catch the Alpha sub.
Now one of the things that has made our nation great
in the past has been our supremacy of the seas. As a maritime
power, we were able to move wherever we needed In World War 11,
in Korea and in Vietnam. As an energy dependent nation, we need
to maintain that capability to import raw materials, particularly
oil. For the Soviets to field these new submarines. they had
to start ten years or more ago. For us to do the same will take
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a similar lead time. In my view, this demonstates the stealth
of the Soviets and the fallacy of not insisting on on-site
inspection in any of our SALT negotiations. To depend upon
satellite surveillance is sheer nonsense. What we now need is
a crash program to develop a missile of sufficient implosive
power to nullify the new Soviet subs. Unless we do, we will
witness a change in the balance of sea power and sea warfare.
Are you aware of this new threat? And if you are, is
anything being done about it?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Well, Senator, I am
aware of it as a result of recent briefings. And without comment-
ing on the performance characteristics of the Soviet subs, I do
think that this again illustrates one of the problems of the
strategic imbalance that I mentioned a few moments ago when you
were at another hearing that have to be redressed. And there's
no question at all that these things do take a very long lead
time and that when a lead of this kind, a strategic lead or a
strategic imbalance is established, we then have to address
the most rapid measures that will be effective in doing that.
And certainly one of the things, one of the options
that would have to be examined very carefully and, if proven to
be effective, brought on line as soon as possible, would be the
implosive effect that you just mentioned. We have to secure that
or some other means.
But this is the kind of development that has been taking
place. And we have to, and, I'm sure, can match it.
SENATOR CANNON: Another area of concern is tank war-
fare. Now the British have developed a laminated armor consisting
of steel and plastic plates that, according to newspaper articles;
makes bazookas bounce off like pop corn. The Soviets have now
adopted this technique. And so we need to develop hyper velocity
kenetic energy penetrators to meet this new Soviet challenge.
Have you been briefed on this new development, and are
we doing something about that?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Not on that one speci-
fically. I have not, Senator. But I would certainly ask for it.
And I would assume that we would have full briefings on all of
those matters.
Again to get back to a ,point that I raised in connection
with procurement earlier, we have had a tank in procurement for
a very long time. And I would hope one way or another to try
to shorten that time and, at the same time, secure the most ef-
fective weaponry possible. And if there's a new development of
that kind that has been developed by the British, then I would
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certainly think that we would want to make every effort to share
in that throughout the NATO system.
SENATOR CANNON: Of course, the additional areas that
are of concern to me are the lasers and the particle beams which
are very important that we move ahead on.
Now another question pertains to the triad missiles,
the subarines and the strategic bombers. In the missile area,
the MX is very much on my mind because of its impact on my home
state of Nevada. There's a lot of speculation about the adminis-
tration's intentions in reference to continued reliance on the
Minuteman. Whatever's done should be decided promptly to avert
any unwarranted delay.
Do you have any information on what is to be the status
of the MX program?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: No, sir, not finally
or conclusively. And that would involve, in the new administration,
a rather full-scale presentation and discussion since it's a major
issue, as you indicate, from a number of points of view, with the
President. And I've not had the opportunity either to sufficiently
educate myself or to have briefings of that kind.
But I am aware of a number of the issues involved. I
don't have any doubt at this point that a strengthened missile
of the MX type is necessary. I do think, as I indicated earlier,
that the problem requires that we get some kind, some sort of
protected site, some kind of site that can effectively be utilized
without very earlier discovery and identification by the Soviets,
and hence subjected to the same form of potential problem that
some of the existing sites are that are now targetted.
SENATOR CANNON: This committee provided in the legis-
lation that not more than 50% of the MX program could be located
in any one area, namely Utah and Nevada, prior to a study of the
split basing mode. And the report is due back to the committee
by February 1st. Is that report on target, as far as you know?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: The Department has
advised me that they are working on that report. I am not advised
as to whether it is on target or not. But we could certainly find
out for you.
SENATOR CANNON: Now the conference report on the FY 81
DOD Authorization Act states that the Secretary of Defense shall
pursue full-scale engineering development of a strategic bomber
with the ability to perform the missions of a conventional bom-
ber, cruise missile platform and nuclear weapons delivery system
in both the tactical and strategic role, with an initial operational
capability of not later than 1987. Further, the Secretary shall
submit a status report to the Committee on Armed Services of both
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houses by March the 15th, 1981, including comparisons of the B-1,
derivatives of the B-1 and the FB 111 aircraft.
Now that certainly is going to be a big order. Of
course the conference committee didn't expect a new Secretary of
Defense when that order was written. But I think that this is an
important matter that needs to be addressed. And I, for one
certainly hope that you will be submitting that report on schedule
by March the 15th.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Well, my information Is
that that has slipped a bit by the department. I gather that there
is a possibility of supplying some comparatively rough figures on
the various options within a few weeks of the settle date, but
that the detailed kind of figures which I would expect, and which
I know the committee would expect, will be delayed a few months
beyond that.
I will certainly make every effort, if I am confirmed
and take office, to speed that up. But the information that I
have at the moment is that there is likely to be some delay or
some slippage in that particular requirement.
SENATOR CANNON: There is an article in the January
5th, '81 Issue of Newsweek, captioned "A Soviet War of Nerves,"
and it talks about the Soviet subs moving dangerously close in
August of '78 to the East Coast of the U. S., and thereby signi-
ficantly raising the threat to five SAC bases along the East Coast
from South Carolina to Maine, where B-52 and FB-111 bombers were
stationed. And of course, General Ellis, the Commander of SAC,
has recommended to this committee stretching the FB-111 fuselage
as an interim measure now to provide some adequate capability in
that area.
My time is up. I don't -- I was going to ask if you
have any v iews on that.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Well, that is one of the
options. And another is to .proceed with a modified B-1. And there
are other options. And it Is this, as I understand it, that the
Department is now developing figures. But I am told that there
may be more delay than I guess any of us would like to see. And
I don't assign any blame or fault for this. But I would certain-
ly regard it, as you say, as a major decision and one that ought
to be made very quickly, because, again, in my view, decisions
are extremely important, even if we don't get the very finest or
latest of technologies that could be in.
I know that when I was running the budget'a few years
ago, seven or eight now, the B-1 was almost ready for production.
And it was called back, to the best of my memory, for some redesign
because some new technologies had become available. And the result
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is, as you know, we not only do not have it, we do not even have
authorization for it any more.
So that I do think it's vital to get decisions and get
them made and proceed on them. And what is being studied by
the Department in response to the conference committee is the
material necessary for such a decision.
SENATOR CANNON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR TOWER: This concludes the first round of ques-
SENATOR TOWER: It's my understanding that Senator
Levin has additional questions. Senator Levin?
SENATOR CARL LEVIN: I have additional questions. I
don't know if I have additional time. I think I could wind up
in perhaps five more minutes, if I had that much time, Mr. Chair-
man.
SENATOR TOWER: Go ahead and proceed. If you can,
Senator, we'd like to wind up by 12:30. And that would obviate
the necessity of a meeting this afternoon.
SENATOR LEVIN: Well, I'd be happy to cooperate with
that. And my additional questions beyond that could be for the
record.
As part of the equation which you look at to determine
who's got more horsepower, I've looked at the following sources,
our Department of Defense and the International Institute of
Strategic Studies, on the military balance. And I'm going to
now quote from their findings and wonder whether you agree with
them in terms of the equation and in terms of that real gap, as
you put it.
Would you agree that NATO, the NATO nations compared to
the Warsaw Pact nations have about 200,000 more men under arms?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE: Well, Senator, I'm not really
familiar with those specific studies that you cite. My impres-
sion is, on the basis of the briefings and the examination I've
been able to make is that the ground forces facing the NATO nations
-- the ground forces of the Soviet-Union facing the NATO nations
have superiority at the present time.
SENATOR LEVIN: In terms of numbers?
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SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: I'm sorry.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: No, in terms of over-
all effective strength.
SENATOR LEVIN: Let me just read you a few figures....
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Surely.
SENATOR LEVIN: ...to see if you quarrel with any of
these or disagree with them.
In terms of anti-tank guided weapons, do you have any
problem with this figure, that we have twice as many of them as
do the Warsaw Pact nations?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: I'm not really in a
position to comment on that. I think we have a very good capa-
bility and a very good actuality in anti-tank guided weapons
at the moment. But again, there is a vastly -- there is a very
large number of Soviet tanks that are capable of being brought
to bear on the NATO forces.
SENATOR LEVIN: Well, sometimes we just look at the
tanks and we don't look at the anti-tank weapons. And I'm won-
dering whether It's part of your review of that equation you've
looked at the anti-tank weapons....
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Well, I do indeed,
because I think what I have to look at is the means of redressing
what I can this imbalance as quickly as possible. And I think
that one of the ways you obviously would try to do that would
be defensive weapons of this sort rather than trying to match
tank production, which has a very large disparity.
SENATOR LEVIN: Running through just a few others and
I'd just ask you the question at the end of the list, and this
is just some samples. Those studies view our capacity of
strategic and tactical airlift as superior, our capacity of
amphibious lift vastly superior, our quality of tactical air-
craft, especially in air-to-air modes, superior; the capabilities
to replenish naval combatants superior; the numbers of major
surface combatants, 400, compared to Warsaw Pact, 235; quality
and reliability of allies, superior; lethality of our artillery
and rockets, superior; numbers and quality of sea-based tactical
aircraft and carriers for offensive strike missions, far superior.
And I'm not going to go into all the rest. But I'm wondering
whether or not you have any differences with those that you
know of, and, if not, whether you've taken them Into account.
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SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Well, Senator, I do
have differences with some of those that you have mentioned. And
it may be on the result of imperfect information or additional
Information that might change those views.
I do feel that there are some inferiorities in some
of those categories in which you've cited the NATO nations, in-
cluding ourselves, as having a superior capability. I would
certainly want to examine it very closely. I would not want to
rearm American on the basis of rumor, so to speak. I would cer-
tainly want to be as sure of our facts as we could be, and that's
why I think our intelligence capability has to be Improved.
But I would want to act decisively on the best informa-
tion available. And I have to say that I do have some disagreements
with those characterizations you've just quoted.
SENATOR LEVIN: Could you enumerate a couple for me?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Well, I would be a
little surprised if the airlift capability that we would have
is that much superior. I would be a little surprised about the
effectiveness of combatant vessels. And again, I'm not as much
interested In the total number of vessels as I am in what they
can do and where they are and where they can be based and how
effectively they can be brought to bear. And it's in those
areas of effectiveness that I have some concern.
I f someone has counted up the numbers on both sides
and seems satisfied with the ratio of numbers, that's one thing.
I'd like to go a lot further and find out what it is that those
individual numbers can deliver and where and when and how accur-
atel y.
And so these would be the areas in which I would want
to indicate some dissent from those conclusions. I hasten to
add, however, that I haven't studied that particular report. I
have had other briefings. And what I have found I find to be
thus far quite disquieting. If there is other evidence, I'd like
to see it too.
SENATOR LEVIN: Do you believe that we should have a
statutory limit on the number of high school graduate that we re-
cruit, that there be a required, fixed percentage of high school
grads in the Army?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Generally, as I men-
tioned before on all of these things, I have suspicion of fixed
quotas, of fixed percentages. I much prefer to look at the people
Involved and their own capabilities.
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SENATOR LEVIN: I think I better save the rest of the
questions. There may be others who have questions, Mr. Chairman.
I do have some for the record.
SENATOR TOWER: There are no other senators seeking
the recognition.
SENATOR LEVIN: Then I'll use my last two minutes then,
if that's all right with the chair.
Several times during the campaign, Governor Reagan
stressed the need for more....
[Inaudible, off-mike comment, followed by Senator
Stennis Incorporating questions of Senator William Proxmire
into the record.]
SENATOR LEVIN: Several times during the campaign,
Governor Reagan stressed the need for more careful targetting of
federal procurement to assist areas experiencing severe unemploy-
ment problems. And I'm wondering whether you share that concern?
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Well, I think that my
understanding is that nearly a third of the recent Defense Depart-
ment contracts were let in areas of unemployment, labor surplus,
or however you want to phrase it. I think that it is a matter
of concern, of course. In the final analysis, I don't think you
can use the procurement process, and I don't think the Governor
intends to use the procurement process, to redress a social pro-
blem. I do think that you have to use the procurement process
to produce, at the least possible cost, the most effective and
best equipment that we can have.
And quite frequently that can be done, as the recent
experience has demonstrated, with nearly a third of the contracts
going to areas where there is high unemployment. That has to be,
should be a factor in everybody's mind. But in the final analysis,
I don't think that you can utilize the procurement process to cure
an unemployment problem. I think we have to attack the root cause
of that, which is the economy ahd the need for more job producing
stimulation and encouragment of more job producing activities
everywhere, and all the rest.
But if you're speaking about the Mayback (?) Amendment,
I have to to l l you I do not favor repeal of it.
SENATOR LEVIN: Let me try to clarify, at least in
my own mind, something you said this morning, which I think
is really critical.
[Clip of Senator Tower reminding Senator Levin of
the press of time.]
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SENATOR LEVIN: I just have one last question, if the
time Is there, actually. I want to go back to the Persian
Gulf for one moment, because I think it is critical to the
national interest. In fact, I think you said this morning you
believe that the Persian Gulf area is vital to our national in-
terests.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Yes, I do.
SENATOR LEVIN: But you left me with two inconsistent
positions, and perhaps that's in my mind, and, if so, could you
clarify.
One position is that the commitment should be renewed.
Nothing should be done to detract from the commitment to preserve
our vital interests In the Persian Gulf. The second statement is
we don't have the military capability to carry out that commitment.
I view those as either watering down a commitment so that it has
very little deterrent value, making it well nye on useless.....
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: Senator, I could
possibly clear up the confusion by saying that I think the way
in which the commitment was given was extraordinarily clumsy and
ill-advised. I think that it was done not with advance consulta-
tion, as Is, In my opinion, required, and not in such a way that
indicated that the feeling of our military presence there was
necessary and was a vital part of the interests of the countries
concerned, as well as of ourselves and the Western world. But
I also think that we can help to carry out that commitment with
what we have. But I do not believe we have the strength now to
insure the completion of that commitment. And I think we should
do something about it as quickly as possible.
But I don't think there's any watering down involved
or any -- I don't think there's any interpretation of global or
geoeconomic theory or policy that could possibly conclude that we
d i d not have a v i t a l interest I n the Arabian Gulf area.
SENATOR LEVIN: I'm not suggesting that. What I am
suggesting Is that when you say we don't have the power to carry
out that commitment and at the same time believe it should be
renewed or It should not be watered down, that you're giving
very different signals, and that I believe you're giving a con-
fusing signal which upon -- I hope upon further study you would
not persist in.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WEINBERGER: I don't think so,
Senator, because I think that It is perfectly possible and
proper to recognize and be aware of the vital necessity and
nature of a particular part of the world. And the whole Arabian
Gulf area Is clearly in that category.
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I do think that we have to recognize that while we
do have an interest and can properly, with the consent of the
countries involved, make that kind of commitment, we may have
to take additional actions at home and additional encouragement
to our NATO and other allies to help that be carried out. And
it was in the latter connection that I was speaking. I think we
do need additional actions to help us carry that commitment out
conclusively and finally. I think we can make a start on it. I
think we have. We already have some AWACS planes deployed there,
and that, plus some other things, is what I think we have to do
and continue to do, perhaps on an increasing scale if the countries
involved desire It.
But I don't think there's anything confusing or incon-
sistent in recognizing the vital nature of that area of the world
to ourselves and the Free World, and recognizing also that this
recognition and this commitment invovles a continuing commitment
to increase our ability to help us this commitment out.
I do think that part of the problem is the way in which
the commitment was given.
SENATOR LEVIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Weinberger. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR TOWER: Mr. Weinberger, thank you very much....
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