ELECTRON TUBE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600050387-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 387
• Publication Date: April 5, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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r;..1 CLASSIFICATION SECRET
GLNIKAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Electron Tube Research, Development and Production
A.
Vacuum Tubes (Background)
1. Foreign Influences
2. Vacuum Tubp Activities in the USSR (General)
4. Insti utea6 H(yazinor(Moscow)
5. Political Ideology and Tube Research
B. Vacuum Tube Techniques, Production and Materials
1. General Assessment
2. Production
3. Materials and Techniques
4 Research
C. General Tubes
1. Class Bulb
2. Metal-ceramic
D. Special Tubes
1. Cathode Ray
2. Modulator
T-R
Subminiature
5. Image Converters
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COUNTRY USSR
PLACE
ACQUIRED
Electron Tube Research, Development
and Production
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DATE DISTR. S APR 54
NO. OF PAGES 17
11 . 1.. .. ItR 11 H1
. ~ T ?. .[Y11f ? 1 1 Y I.
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E. Magnetrons
1. Basic Data
2. Magnetron #10 (German RM 4032)
3. Magnetron #8 (Early warning?)
4. 'Rising Sun'
5. Magnetrons in 40-150 MC Region
6. Techniques
Tables I and II (Magnetrons)
F. Klystrons
1. General Description of Klystrons
Table III (Klvstronel
0. Transistors and Crystal Detectors
1. Transistors
2. Crystal Detectors
Appendix
A. Vacuum Tubes* (Background)
1. Foreign Influences on Vacuum Tube Technology.
a. "in the immediate post-World War II period Soviet activities
in vacuum tube technology were influenced very strongly by
the German developments, methods, techniques and personnel.
the original Soviet idea might have been to
pattern their vacuum tube build-up in accord with the,Qen
guided in its plans and programs much more strongly by
the USA developments than by the German re commendal; ions.
They continued to exploit fully the German technolcigical
know-how, their shop and production techniques and their
testing and production tools. They had the German ispecialists
in the USSR survey and analyze their war-time and pest-war
research and development, and were willing to adopt those
that fitted their plans and requirements. They used Germans
to design and build new devices, testing tools and equipment
and to establish several well-organized modern vacuum tube
institutes and plants. It was, however, the American
methodology that the Soviets were impressed by, and tried
to master. One of the important continuing fobs that the
German specialists were expected to perform for the So%riets
was to elucidate the USA vacuum tube technology and its
developments. It got to the point that the best way foi' a
German to convince the Soviets of the merits of his
proposal was to claim that it was based upon an American
development.
* ote: The term 'vacuum tubes' is commonly
d to include a wide variety of electronic
devices, as well as transistors which'replace
vacuum tuber. 'Electron tubes,' a generic term
used in the' title of -this report'," is eosj
into more widespread use to cover this wide
range of airoudV components]
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believe that American methods as a whole are betteresuited8
to ,their purposes than the German, and that the American
products lend themselves to much easier production processes
in the USSR than the German. The second reason is that the
American high-frequency technique is greatly superior to
the German. Thirdly, American electronics progress in
World War Ii was exceedi,,iriv we,,
Communications Equipment a. "All vacuum tube institutes of MCEI (the Ministry of
Industry) are directed by the
Second Main-Administration Group (for vacuum tubes), the
Chief E ineer of which is /f'nu7 Sorokin
Each of these institutes eaded by a
oa
roe Of W1,
are very
administra
'a
high quality technical men.
Each institute has also a political commissar, who,
however, do not interfere in technical matters.
b. "In addition to MCEI vacuum tube institutes there are some
vacuum tube capabilities i
n other institutes of MCEI
(ie, Radar Institute in Moscow and_i the institutes of
other ministries. Of these
of the Soviet m&vv_ et- s..-__ __ _--_ the best are those
"A.'ll Soviet institutes are organized to be fully self-
isufficient, and in theory at least capable of all
'activities required to support their operations. All
main vacuum tube institutes have their independent
research and development faciliti
es, they design and
produce their own testing equipment, they have their own
workshops, they produce
do their own raw material and also
their own metallurgical and chemical work as required.
Three reasons for this Soviet procedure which is quite
foreign to the normal German procedure are: (1) reliance
upon a host of suppliers located frequently at great
distances from the vacuum tube plants in laboratories,
the tremendous distances in the USSR coupled with poor
transportation makr,the flow .of :peterial slow and
hazardous; (2) the specialized needs of th..vacuum
tube institutes for relatively small quantities or high.
quality material not generally produced elsewhere, and
(3) the desire of the Soviets to have as many operating
units as possible in any eventuality similar to the
invasion of the USSR by the Germans in World War II.
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these ?meetln s communal very effective. At
B problems are discussed and' recommendations
are made for assignment of problems to one or mcrequalified organizations. When the project is assigned of to
o one institute, a special p committee is selected from members other institutes
to pass on the
given progress and
htandeth'e At
best s so solution is to several institutes solution is accepted
for all., t is method works very satisfactorily
in the USSR,
a
p zed problems in their field.
good deal of thought and preparatory work is required for
such meetings and that they are consider
d
p g,ess and problems of
all others biannual meetings areheldof representatives of all
institutes on s eci
li
orderto
pateunnecessary duplication keep on the ro
informed of effort and to
3. Svetlana GE?oup (Leningrad)
of MIT in the field of ,radar, or the~Bell Teleph ~honu"" Labo `'te ies
in the field of telecommunications. Poratories
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b. "The Svetlana inatitute 'grew out of the old Marconi plant in
Svetlana whi
h
ommun
ist Party ideology, are quite independent and yet are
left unmolested because of their technical su a- it
e? Svetlana engineers are not influenced by the 50X1-HUM
c
manufactured transmitter tubes. It is one of the
oldest and best electronics groups in the USSR; it is here that
-Qv uovieteieccronica specialists at present were
trained. (Zuzmanovaki is one of them.)Svetlana men are not
only id goo engineers, they are regarded as an outstand-
ing lotof people and are welcomed in any other plant, or
institute. All new vacuum tube institutes in the USSR have
several Svetlana men assigned to them to serve as a core in
technical administration and activities. There were four or
five Svetlana men in Fryazino, and the same number in Novosibirsk
and Tashkent where some Svetlana people were stationed even
during the war.
example, there was the instance of the former leader of Svetlana
being imprisoned for political unreliability in 1947 without any
detrimental effect upon Svetlana personnel.
d. "There is also another facet of the special position of the
Svetlana groups it is a.closed fraternity and its influence can
be just as strong in support of progress as against it. An
interesting case to support this opinion occurred in 1939/40.
A Soviet article was published on magnetrons* in which the
author, N F Ale v, appears to have made the basic discovery
of the use off' resonant cavities in connection with magnetrons.
It is known that this article had some influence on German
magnetron developments during 1941/42 this 50X1-HUM
Influence was not greater because the Germans at that time were
primarily interested in tunable magnetrons and missed fully
the potentialities of the fixed magnetron technique so well
recognized by the British). In the U33R Alekseyev's work was
wholly disregarded by the Svetlana people, responsible for this
field of activity, because Alekseyev was not one of the Svetlana
group and worked with =,apitza in another institute.
Notes This sight refer to an artie]a annaar.- 50X1-HUM
pp 1297-13 , ysv lairovv which was
translated and published in !larch 1944 issue of IRE Proceedings)
dotes The fact that the Soviets ignored this development is one
of the most ?3pificant factors in the :history of Soviet micro-
wave tube development. The Soviets missed a major discovery'
and exploited only one part of magnetron technique--- continuous
wave gansrationj
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Institute 160-.Fryazino (Moscow)
ma...~
presence there of the, largest group of?German specialists. 50X1-HUM
Two-thirds of the well-trained in
radar and high-he German specialists r ^"w "
frequency work and
electronics and in the specialized field of vacuum tubes
by the Soviet Communist ideology or the demands for Party
line purity. There are many Party members among Soviet
vacuum tube specialists. There are
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Soviets techniques apparently recognized th=-eir -r potnt al in inetesting
eiassignedoRh most is field, of the noto Genlyntmspecialists
the
to this meet the needs ofthe t: j ruts but for'
,,.=G gsrcral 'ueneiit of all vacuum
tube institutes. The Institute ractically all its built measuring devices and these were better than 50X1-HUM
those produced in Germany.
b. "Once the Soviets recognized the importance of laboratory
equipment, the German engineers received considerable assis-
position tance in to their
obtain work theon such necessaaaiPm'nt. They were in a
ryeven those other-
w
to inltiatep~through ise not obtainable because of scarcity and were encouraged
foreign-made equip enth ofrspecialized design or~performance
characteriatlcb, Other Germans and myself inFryazino asked
on many? occasions for the purchase abroad of American-made
laboratory equipment advertised in USA technical periodicals
and dot them.
Political Ideologa and Tube Research.
a. "No hindering effects were evidenced in the whole field of
only are not members of the Party, but are quite outspoken
in their non-Party views without any apparent penalties.
b. "Although there are such cases as a past scientific leader
of Svetlana who was imprisoned for his political views and
7n 7 Katzmann who, as a Jew, was not considered reliable
and remove rom Moscow to Novosibir however. t re are other
cases such as that of Mai Chee-lastni who 50X1-HUM
was caught in an attempt to desert t e es an who
was not punished (in the USSR the penalty for his act is
death) but, in addition, was placed in charge of sub-
miniature tube development and production in Kalinin and
was permitted to-travel frequently to Leningrad which is
in the zone of severe security restrictions, and of L`nug
Zuzmanovskiy who was quite candid in his views of the
highest Soviet officials without any detrimental effect
upon his professional position.
c. "In institute 160, as in all others, there was a political
commissar. He was totally ianoant in technical matters
and had nothing to-do with scientife tctlvities 50X1-HUM
of personnel of the Institute, but handled such matters as
procurement of materiel. Thl a indicative of 50X1-HUM
the general situation in the In regard to the vacuum
tube and electronics fields. The Soviets are too anxious
to use all their capabilities in. building up their potential
to permit their political views' to interfere with this goal,
at least at present.
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B. Vacuum Tube Techniques, Production and Materials
1. General Assessment.
a.
-- i-cuugnlzea oy
the Soviet leaders towards the end- -o-of--, World War II in that
they ,were pinpointed and analyzed during the immediate --
11 war period and most of these weaknesses were allevated 50X1-HUM
by 1951/52. By that time the Soviets had built a number of
well-operated and effective institutes for the development
and production of all modern vacuum rubes.
--, -01-vu he war-
time and post-war progress of German and American technology;
recognized the importance of effective laboratory and
production measuring and testing techniques and set up
special facilities for developing and producing testing
equipment. They fostered a new generation of vacuum tube
apecialists,theoretically well-trained in Soviet educational
institutions and providedplentiful facilities for their
practical on-the-job training in electronics and vacuum tube
i
the nstitutes. Therefore, although the Soviets are still behind
USA lttshed field of
in the USSR for 'future growtha anhind expansion, besioand
the growin? Soviet vacuw. +++ti pOteuti 1 should be watched
closely.
"Soviet vacuum tube specialists have been guided to a large
ex hodology, technology and progress 50X1-HUM
C. "Although originally the Soviets concentrated on outright
copying of American methods and end-products, the period
of imitation by the Soviets of American tube technology
has passed,, and original native developments by the Soviets
or basic native redevlopments of foreign ideas should be
on the increase. Specific examples of post-war original
Soviet efforts are the multi-cavity high-output, high-
efficiency magnetron in the 40-150 cm region, the 'Samovar'
klystron and the high-quality theoretical work of Zeitlin
on space charge in the reflex klystron.
2. Tube Production.
b. "At Fryazino one department was established in 1948 to
design tube machinery and develop methods and means for
tube production. (There were 200 to 300 enaineerm in
this department.)
At
ts operation of this department the
performance and output of-this department was poor due
to severe lack of sproialists,? inadaqutte cols, wager
experience in this field eiad Door coordination with other
in wit . 61AVMU "anumery? 50X1-HUM
n
e
t
t
in Wit; equal y and uantity/of Soviet sp
ici
alists
an
d
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with the determination of the Soviets to improve their
vacuum tube production, the work of this department must
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0. "Phosphors were initially imported from Germany, one of the
~Iw -w...._- i-_.-- -- --? ' - -
c. "Althofi
was primarily w ~rittoy with
a large preproduction
tube
production plant. there were some ?n
automatic units organized on the American production line
basis, each unit handling ona step-by-step basi's all the
required operations. Only, general type tubes were produced
there at the rate of .a tubeeach five to eight seconds. Thus
some 10,000 tubes an hour could be produced there, amounting
to an,effective output of, some 5,000 good tubes per hour based
upon a 50% , rejection tubes irate which was computed on the basis of
ratio, to the total number of tubes produced.
Note: Some caution should be exercised in
e use of German reports on Soviet vacuum tube production
and rejection rate of vacuum tubes. Since most Germans
were not permitted tovisit:the Soviet production plants
they might be familiar with the quality and quantity of
vacuum tubes produced in preproduction runs on the
experimental,basis.'" It is, therefore, possible that their
figures might not apply to the true large-scale production
runs in the Soviet production plants)
have improved. J although the Germans in
center for and ign and production totof tube n production equip
or des p q A-
peerhyhapore effective, Soviet institutes must
be doii,g the same work as the tube production
activities in the USSR 'cou no have been supported by
theend-products of the Fryazino department for d ai% and
production of vacuum tube equipment.
no mac nes
er ma e, the same type whicheareof the
by American tube concerns, purchased
there were some German automatic machines a(Funkenwautomaten)?
There were two of these in Novosibirsk. Some 16 such
automats were in Berlin at the end of the w
removed by the Soviets
3ealex machinea so ava able at Fryazino,
3. Vacuum Tube.Materials and Techniques
a. "Special work on tube cathode production and materials was
done at the Moscow cathode plant. The equipment in this
plant was German which was removed by the Soviets from the
Telefunke #2 plant in East Berlin. This Moscow plant0
was planned to be large enough to supply the. whole
needs in cathodes.
b. "Until about 1950 the Soviets were forced to use standard
nickel, which was not good quality for cathode processes.
The difficulties in obtaining pure cathode nickel were
largely administrative. The Ministry of Metallurgy was
not interested in adjusting its production processes to
provide a small quantity of high quality nickel and ultimately
the Ministry of
n
laboratory was .stab by the Soviets for production of
phosphor. the quality of this phosphor is
fu13 aslsble with fhft of GezwAn phosphor. Also an
LWO
Later a a
eola1
ohenist in Poasa,o with good resulti1RQ11 by a Gersan
1C11Ly
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j r.F
was removed by the Soviets
from the Heyden Plant in Dresden.When this supply was
exhausted-work was initiated at Fryazino on developing
substitute materials 'and onthe production. of thorium
oxide. Seri lties were' encountered, which
difficulties are generally well known and ara
available in Frazino -11, thorium oxide material was
h
are some deposits of mica in Northern Sib
fluctuates widely -25%to+15%. Mica"was carefully handled
by the Soviets and?was'graded into three classes: (a) for
hilh-.orgnera tpupose technique; for The use
only ,gowenP'tu and
(c forfreeneral ur of f m mica in
e ac that it does not last, particularly under con-
ditions~of over andyunder heating. Operating conditions
in the USSR are?ver hard on tubes as line voltage
the only ?oo arum oxide in the USSR
istha sup iplsup ed b the Heydpn Plant; others were not
good enough, the robl
unsolved in the USSR.
the quality of um oxide is a matter of luck
and the success of Heyden is due to such luck and the
characteristics of the raw material used.
"The Soviet mica was of poor quality. This is based upon
+. t, f t
I consi era le. work
as done b the armans on s thetic mica
In the summerof
an important request came from MCEI to a German
specialist to study the replacement of mica by ceramic
Note: Analysis o ov a gen
, - - t u b e s by T C indicates that the quality of mica used
in these tubes is very good and in fact somewhat superior
in quality to ours. It is therefore possible that source
was not familiar with the mica situation in the USSR or
that mica supplied to the development institutes in the
USSR was of poorer quality than that available to the
production plants]
the use by the Soviets of oxygen-
_re_opper, a asic Soviet requirements for copper for
tubes (including magnetrons) were (a) suitable electrical
characteristics (b) easy machining. The Soviets have had
no trouble with copper and they have had enough experience
with copper in other industrial uses so that normal quality
copper was considered by the Soviets to be good enough for
Note
There
have been other indications that Soviets have been keenly
aware of characteristics and importance of oxygen-free
copper and concerned with the availability of such copper
for this use)
"In general, the Soviets are quite familiar with all modern
problems and progress in vacuum tube techniques and methods
and have proven capable of adapting the foreign develop-
ments and ideas to their purposes. The Soviets are
presently doing very capable research in the vacuum tube
field. They are capable of originality although not adverse
to borrowing ideas from abroad. Older specialists such as
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ng neers, for example, Zuzmanovskiy
andAlekseyev's work on magnetrons, Zeitlin's work on
klystronsVogelsohn's work on gas tube technique. The
Soviets are very imaginative and stubborn people and
permit experimental work, at times very costly, on prob-
lems which would not be tol r tedin Germany or, the USA;
ie, 'Samovar' which would have been abandoned
elsewhere, intense wor on-10 megawatt and higher
magnetrons.
h. "The following sketch 7Fig 17 is of the kreuzaonde device
Svetlana engineersare being augmented in this regard by
very capable young engineers fully comparable if not better
than young German
i
a
to each evice consists ets of electrodes at right angles
th. These
of se were used in the electrolytic
trough toobtain two r
fight-angle components of th
e
magnetic field. The device was of considerable laboratory
use at Fryazino.
Research.
KREUZSONAE (FIG 1)
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a. "All research in the USSR, including the work on vacuum
tubes was centered in and coordinated by the Academy of
Sciences in Moscow and by biannual meetings of the
research leaders of the important tube institutes
jee par 2d abov). Some of the tube research was
centered in an inat Kharkov, presumably for the
Ukraine that the good work done there
was felt in a institutes.
b. "Special problems relating to cathode Droblems wer
,centered in Kievl
excellent work was supposed to be done there.
C. General Tubes.
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2. Metal-Ceramic
a. "The metal-ceramic tubes made at OSW were of the World War II
? . .- __ _ _
type and coast ...
coon;
~ 04- Go
the German grid due o w er variations in grid-to-cathode
spacing.
c. "In the summer of 1946 the German group at 06W experimented
with a new form of grid to reduce the grid-to-cathode
spacing and improve high-frequency cut-off characteristics.
b. "Metal-ceramic tubes were produced at Novosibirsk. The
LD-12 grid was in the form of a woven mash iee Appendix
Fig 2a and 2 b7. this grid is i i
9SCP..T
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D. Special Tubes
1. Cathgde Ray Tubes
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A glass form was stamped in the form of a cathode and.a
grid mesh was machine-engraved on it. The grooves of the
mesh were filled with carbonand a copper grid was
produced by electrolysis. The work was stop ed when the
cone usion ~~ the
u e m g ave een used n a special computer then under
development, most probably for a ballistic computer, is
based on the type of special accuracy requirements supplied
to the Cathode'Ray Department at Fryazino and on special
work on testing devices which the Germans werA aat~o,a r,.
At Fryazino a special oscilloscope was built to study the
build-up time of magnetrons.
-km woo uoeu for ooservl the cathode ra trace.
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"Dr Roethe worked on dark trace tubes at OSW. Development
work on these tubes was continued in the USSR. In 1950
the work was considered so secret that the Germans were
not ermitt work on it. FnVI_ui inn
Note: In line with repeated statements that the normal Soviet Procedure was to 50X1-HUM
eliminate Germans from the classified projects whenever
their development was completed or proceeded to the
point that it could be completed b the Soviets,. it is
possible that elimination of the 50X1-HUM
German specialists rom further work on dark trace tubes
might have meant that the Soviets considered the project
sufficiently advanced for production or pre-production
engineering)
"There was a special development in 1946 at OSW on a
high-speed writing cathode ray.tube. The principle used
in 1--},a.. "-- ---- - ? -
2. Modulator Tubes.
a. "AI first the Soviets tried spark gap modulators for high
efficiency jobs but the methods, were given up when they
later developed high efficiency hydrogen thyratrons and
Of special interest was the Soviet use?of the
tec niique- to maintain the hydrogen pressure at constant
at Fryasino. This is a half-tee watt b p
plate-
anode voltage of 35000 volts. no trouble 50X1-HUM
was experienced with this tube.
was very good and the wa The
no about 50?. The
5 AC 21 tube was an interesting one developed and roduoed
was tiravQ in 1y;11/rjw
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Magnetron NO .1 Clta netrona were numbered for ease of discussion during
expe a an y
This ' pons lacin~development s innInatn10 the Man 50X1-HUM
is in contrast to information obtained from other German cow.
returnees who stated thxt-therewa
salarge.production of this
tube already in effect.
Magnetron No 2
This, tube is in the planning stage only, and is designed. for
1 cm operation (30,000 Mc/S). The proposed construction would
follow the wartime TelefunkenLMS-14 tube.
Magnetron.No 3
This tube is acopy of US725 magnetron Which was designed
for the H2X X-band blind bombing radar. This is called "Meddo"
by both Germans and Soviets
Magnetron Nn 4
is a This tube,
type 7' is designed for It
similar in design to the German
LMS 3 . A copper tuning ring is mechanicallymoved towasd,and.'
away from. the, cavities.
Magnetron No 5 ,
The tube is a "Rising Sun," fixed tuna pulse type 1-band
magnetron. Development is not yet complete ee Appendix, Fig 57.
Magnetron No 6
This is a copy of a Canadian tube of the CV series, S-band.
Magnetron No 7
This tube is.CN, mechanically tuned magnetron designed for
Jamming. flee Appendix, Fig 6.7 An inductive ring is used for
tuning in a manner similar to be No 4, and German type IM-32.
Magnetron No 8
This tube is an 3-band, pulse-type, fixed-tuning, 2-megawatt
peak power such as would be used for early warning. Its efficiency.
is about 60 - 70%, and frequency stability 115,000. The internal
structure,-coupling device and test equipment were designed by
Soviet engineers. The teat equipment is reported to have filled
a room of about 300 sq ft floor area. The tube development took
three years, requiring seven or eight Soviet engineers.
Magnetron NO 9
This tube was designed by the Soviets, without GerrAn assistance.
It was rumored to have 10 Mf or larger power output by having the
equivalent of a number of two cavity magnetrons in parallel. The
tuning was accomplished by.wave guide techniques and had a range
from 40 to 150 M. It is probably intended for early warning.
MS .etran ro 10
This tube is a copy of the German RM 4032, called the "zero slot"
to it ? 3ft e? ioe g a ram
?? t
field. Two tubes are made--one of` a range from 0.8 to 3 dm, seOther
from 3.0 an to 12 on. '1!e main use or this tube is experimental.
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 Nomenclature
~a net z~oi
h'z
Magnetron
Magnetron
lagnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
No. 1
No 2
No 3
_12-4- -
1o 5.. ----
No 6
No 7
No 80*
No 9
1o IOMW
avelength, cm
0.5
1.0
3.2
?3.0.
3,2 - a.5
9 - 10
9 - 10
10.0
-
410,0150
Two 1odele
-
'
0.&.3
iaed
or Tunable
Fixed :
--
unable
Fixed
Fixed
Tunable
Fiord
Fixed- ?
ltmab]e
gda
sEulse or CW
CI
CW
es
se
Anode Voltage
--
------
-
- -
000,
A-Ij
2000-3000e
Anode Current
Duty c'cle
300-400 ma
21 s
1-1,000 or
eater Supply
-
Thor ozdde
Directly
Da oxide
-7
heater.
boated
beater
thode-
_ ---
- --
- - -
----?__---
------------
-------..----
-----
sten
Out t Poser=
pu
_-
500-600 11
---
80.100 Mi
? 01
2 Mtf
Hid1. si!
fw T' _
aillisatts
Application
_i
Meddo -
Radar
Jamming
-
Radar
Radar
Jamming
atlar,N ?
laboe+a~aey
Development Data
Start
Similar to
Copy
1949
1947
Copy
1946
1946
Completion
Now in
Teleiunken
Intermittent
Not cai-
1948-49
1949
Special remarks
experi-
LMS-1l,
In preprod.
plete
mental
only in
rtage
-
stage
planniog
sta"
Production Data
Bass Ro-
In 1949
200
dnced in
several
1948
--
---
P-W Elm
''Where Developed
Moscow
-
ry
1087_
F
asino
Pr yasiao
lrpadso
a1sfs
egsipwt
Where Produced
Saratcr
]duo
In pro-
O 401
900
ductia-
u3
2
T
* ompara a ev Dusan. ing the war by-the berme took one-.
Inside of magnetron wets developed by Soviets coupling and external 'plumbing' by Germsirs.
+-* Equals German RU-4032
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SECRET
-17-
1, "Soviet kl stron work
was influenced by both German and US
desijzns /see Table TTT_nava 1 ;
a. "Klystron #1 the tube isa copy of a General Electric
.42 cmtube , scaled up. The Germans in Fryazino were
asked to produce such a klystron for use in testing gear
for'8 mm crystal detectors, but found it a hard job. In
order to speed their work,' the Soviets supplied Fryazino
with this klystron,and some, additional testing gear,
which was produced elsewhere.
b. "Klystron the Soviets #2 is a copy from a US prototype as copied by
viets from a,1949 1950 IRE publication. The
tuning"rangewas claimed to be 2.5 to,12 cm,"and the
tuning was accomplished by mechanical control of the
cavity Liee Appendix, Fig #9 .
c. 'aKlystron #3 and #4 were copied from the US Western
Electric 725 k1Ystron and German LD copy
-20,which was a
of the same prototype. Klystrop #3 was tuned around 3,2
cm and used for 'Meddo' radar; #4 was tunable from 28 - 29
cm and represents a variation of #4.
"Klystron#5 is the' 'same was
copied by the Germans during the war, Down as LD-25,
or klystron 1 (Siemens-Halske),
e. "Klystron #6 is a shortened version of #5. Both these
tubes have a glass envelope and use an external tuning
cavity.
G. Transistors and Crystal Detectors.
1. "The USSR work on crystal detectors was based upon the German
developments in 03W. In 1950 a plant was established in
Prvaz1no to ,we w.+Pe ., ~..re silk det-_t-.__
-O v_.;rw`
procedures. Attempts were made in Moscow to manufacture
these detectors following the American procedure. Results
were rumored not to be very good and best work was done
with the German method. The second step was the intro-
duction of germanium detectors. These were first made in
Institute 28 in Moscow but with relatively little success
and in 1950 Fryazino started to produce germanium detectors
in small quantities on*,experimental basis. Some production
was done at Fryazino, primarily for Institute 160's require-
ments. The main work of production of crystal detectors
must have been done elsewhere.
2. "It was only in 1952, that basic
development and researen c was initiated by the Soviets
on transistors. The background of knowledge was available
to the Soviets in American publications. There was a book
by William Shockley which became available in the USSR in
January 1952. A special committee was established in MCEI,
consisting of the best specialists in the Soviet Union, to
work out the fundamentals of transistors. Everyone was
very optimistic though[ t e opt s un.
founded.
SECRET
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Nomenclature
Klystron No 1
Klystron ]io 2
Klyatron L; 3
Elyatron No 4
YVetron No 5
E]ystron No 6
Ds Type
go 725
1 10-1
1 1C-2
W a v e
08
2.5 -
a
28-2
e
5! Ultaff*
,000
~_.
t
ut Pow
..tt
`
- - -
Sam as
d
is
pplicatioa
Deae
nz~iag
Experimental
N_`Ltab and
a
as
t 10-1 but
device
Ga
7
P
'
Development Data
a
Ma
ro
aadltled In
Start
1949
1 year
1951
totypss
Completion
1952
At 0SN (m-?.0
Variation
ftediRl remarks
Ccwv of US t:
of 725
Production Data
36PAgag, etc
e Developed
oscovr
TInet 1os?)
Pryawino ~
fteum
ere Produced
Moscow
Svetlaaa
9?et
land is
(presently
prodoetion
believed to
be in pro-
duction in
S
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 50X1-HUM
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600050387-8
on wor
Table
s,know
itiona
91 t
be,sc
produc
crysta
speed
klyst
produ
2 is
s fro: nge wa
3 accoi
?e, App,
~3 and
T25 k1;
~d for
)resen
5 Is
the Gf
)n 1 (:
'E6is
ag1a
on crJ
.n OEW
,ttempt
a fol]
Lot to
n metY
maniun
n Moac
yazinc
itiea
yazinc
in wo=
done
1952,
d rese
The
in An
okley
A ape
the be
undaas
e, the
not k
ELEMENTS (I)
CATHODE (2)
GRID-OV- (3)
GRID 2000 (4)
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LD 12 GRID
Pi .2a and 2b - Details of Metal-Grasic Dubs LD-12
BEAM FORMING
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I METALLIC SHIELD
2 G D ~_
3 GRID 2
4 ANODE'
5 CATHODE
6 ENVELOPE
LATER MODEL OF ABOVE TUBE
CATHODES IN-LINE AS IN SDZI
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CATHODE
HEATER
ENVELOPE
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Pala 3''
MAGNETRON NO. 7
STRAPS (3)
-VANES '(2)
CAAf$TY (I)
(4) TUNING
RING
Pig. 6 - NWatrm No. 7 - Jamir
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Page I&
A-A' OPENING. FOR OUTPUT COUPLING 'TO
THE WAVE GUIDE (I)
(2) CAVITIES
Fig. 7 - lwgatraa Is, e - Rftr. pN7 lhraiI!
50X1-HUM
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DIAGRAM APPROX. 10" NO.9
(2)
ARRANGEMENT OF CATHODES (I)
No. 9
I TUNING SLUGS
2 OUTPUT COUPLING TO WAVE GUIDE
3 NIEPELLEN
4 ELECTNIOW GUN
s1g.9- uy"m r.. 2-*amble
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IN SEVERAL CAVITIES (2)