THE OUTLOOK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MISSILE WEAPONS FOR THE GROUND FORCES, BY [CHIEF] MARSHAL OF ARTILLERY S. VARENTSOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402790001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 22, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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COUNTRY USSR
"Perspectives of the Development of Missile Armament of Groun
Troops", written by Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergey S. Varentsov.
The article appeared in the 1961 Second,Editior. of a special
verRion of VoveTlnava Mysl (Military Thought
"Perspectives of the Development cf l~issiie
Armament of Groun3 Troops", by ,C^~ief
Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsoti~
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 :CIA-RDP10-001058000402790001-4
"PerspPc`-..es of the Deveiop~~e~:, o:' h:issiie
Ariaament of Grour:d Troops"
by
Marshal of Arti,~.lery S . Varentsov
Tne main factor determining the radical changes in operational
science which have occurred ir. the last two or three years has been
the sharp increase in power of the artillery strikes which can be
brought to bear ir. the operations of a front ( front ) any of an srn:y.
Moreover, whereas previously the heaviest artillery strikes were
delivered in the direct vicinity of tY,e front line, against ob-
3ectives (obyekt) loceted in the tactical zone, while the weight
of this fire lessened as depth (glubina) increased, under present
conditions the weight of artillery strikes is, in;practice, inde-
pendent of the distance of the ob~ecti7res being fired upon from the
front line. Even heavier strikes can be brought to bear on those
of the enemy's important operational objectives which 1'ie in the
deep rear than against objectives in the tactical zone and the
closest operational depth.
The ability to administer crushing nuclear strikes throughout
the entire operational depth of the enemy and against the principal
objectives of the strategic rear ha.s given modern operations a new
quality. In the conduct of operations of a front or an army, the
whole of the territory occupied by the opposing enemy troop for-
tpation (gruppirovka) and all the elements which make up. this for-
mation a::?e involved in direct comua% actions from i.iie outset.
It is general~y acknowledged that firepower (ogon) has become
the deciding factor in an operation, determining its plann-i~g, the
sequence in which it is conducted, its course and its final results.
The main constituent of modern firepower, understood in t3~e broad
sense, is nuclear strikes directed against the most important enemy
troop formations, against his nuclear weapons, his communications
centers, his control posts, and the objectives in his rear area.
?
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50X1-HUM
A modern rro
1 ri ~ .73~ ~ ~?",GUj :I:ear.s Of ~e1 i1'c r' ", , ~? ?
These car_ ;;~ prc,, is _onal' y %i -'-K r~?- _ ear s :rikes.
idea in'.o two groat-; '_t.~ n::~'
ro j ~ 1~ grv4:;a tr~,cps anti airbr_ rre- (GL-ia-
r,u^iear weapor_s (ir. co^;ired o Pr f ~~-.,nnyy;
fleet there will be a this rp , 3tlor.s i'-yclti~ng a ~ror.~. an3 3
g. out - r_a.va~ nugiear weapons ~ . The
first group - the ^~:cie~r ~rissile weapons of the ~roazd troops -
plas the decisive role ir. {'non; a.ld arny links (zveno). This is
con.'irzned by an analysis of the capabilities of the varic~;s delivery
vehicles (nositel) fcr r_:zciear charges (zarya3), by the levees of
missile technology wric~ ha been res^!;ed, and b;,~ +f.e pe~?spectives
of the furtt:er developr~ert of armament which have been projected.
The presence of :nissiie troops in the comaositior. (sestav)
of a front, an army, o:- a division allows the temc~o of an of-
fensive operation tc be sharply increased and to be carried to a
considerably greater depth.
The new possibilities of operational groupings (obedineniye)
aPPeBT'ed, as we know, with the inclusion in their composition of
missile large units ,(soyedineniye) and units (chest) equipped With
missiles with nuclear charges. A frcnt received missiles wit's
nuclear charges with a power of several tens of kilotons and a
range of up to 250-340 kms (type R-300 missiles). In the compo-
sition of an $.rrr~ were included missile brigades equipped With
missiles with nuclear charges of approximately the same power as
those of a front a.:;d with a range ?f 150-170 kms (type R-170
missiles). For the armament 'of a division missiles were received
with nuclear cl-,axAes of a nr,v~r ~_ f ~,o~,,.,..~ _
several tens of kilotons, with a maXimum~effective range ana
(dalroboynost) of 30-~0 1Qas (type R-30 missiles).
Such missile e.r~ert was received by a front at a period
vher an offensive operatiui`1 in the Wes? European theater of
coz~bat operations Was still rlanned to advance to a depth of
x+00-500 1Qns at an average rate of 40-50 kms a day. At the
present time the penetration capacity (probi:rnaya sgosobnost)
of motoriz.~d rifle and tank divisions, which hss been increased
~Y times, al?.ows the depth of an offensive operation to be
increased to 1,000 - 2,000 kms, so that, in practice, it embraces
the entire depth of the West European theater of combat operations,
?1 S~etivT
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In th1S COT1IIeCtlon, nati:ra~lf, t."?e !~Lat'J+-1G?: "u.'.':S'~.-, '~r[:el,':~._ ...._
caratilities of the nuclear-^:issile wesr~:.s kT:_'_~ .._re ~:s~'~~~:__e~
in tree co~^:position of a front c;;rresp:~r.~1 tc tae ne~~ re ~` re:~:er:`.~
which arise.
Ar: analysis of a modern offers i~. e c_,r ra`.' ".. cf a front ar~~ of
an army, ar~d of the conditions cf tre use c:' ~.issiye tro::ps in such
ari operation, shows that it is esser.+ iai to i:~~~luae t'r:e new n,.ici E'a:'-
missile weapcr~s in the compos'_tior. ;;f a fror_t. It is ifl~ow-_ that
the introduction of nuclear-:ni ssi-~.e weapons i ~~tc tie grour_c troops
has exerted a decisive influence or: t'~:e ~hara~t4_r or their ~o^icat
operations. Ir: turn, the new ecn~itcr:s of ~sTM:~at operatiors
which arise fre:a this influence the de,~e~;;p-ne::t of .rissile weapons.
What perspectives of the development, of missile armament of
the ground troops in the next few years present themselves?
An analysis of present-da;~ operations is insufficient for a
correct answer to this questyon. ?t is necessary also to look into
the immediate future and to determine how the operations of ground
troops may develop subsequently.
In acialyzing a modern operation, we consciously concentrate
our main attention on the offensive operations in the initial
period of a war, since it is clear that in accordance with tr,e
increase of the power of nuclear weapons and of the increase in
their supply to the most prnre rful armies of the world, the sig-
nificance of the operations ii: the lnitiai perivtii ui a wa.t x~
continually increasing. The larger the scale ors which nucleo.r
a i ti?_ _. _ ._ , _ _ ? b.., ~. ; ,.., ; r i r+ r. n ~ o n f t h ~
weapons &.T'r. C7u~ilJycu, ~,ic el ~.4~..: =.~ .-._- ..-m--- -- --- -
results of tze first strikes on the ene~:y. It is natural to
sL~.ppose that the operations in the initial period of a =,~a+~.re
war may exert a decisive influence or. the progress of tre ws.r and
may subsequently also determine its outcome.
The massive employment of nuclear weapons can orly produce
the expected effect if its results are exploited to the maximum
ty the ground troops, with the aim of seizing the territory
occupied by the enemy, of dEpriving the Ene.;~; of freedom of
maneuver, and of opportunities to regroup his forces which have
- ~+-
__. _` .
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been rc~ated or overwnei.^~ed y n':c_ a -
massive emp',oy~*ient of ruciear weapons itse'~f prede*.e-~*:_nes
necessity for offensive actions.
One of the most irrporta_^.` quail*. ies cf a modern; offe..s ive
ogeratiori b-y a front and ar. arizti; is high ::;obi Alt, (:~:anevre^.r.o_~t j .
In operations during trie initia~ period of a war this quality is
e:tpressed in its clearest form.
In operations in the initia] period cf a War the ,.:fissile troops
of a front will occupy attack pcsitiora at a distance of ?C-100 kms
from the ccntact line (iiniya soprikosroveriya) oftthe~t,^^p^.~ FroTM.
these positions they ca.n strike the ene*ay to a dep:'r, c_ ~7--~'~~~ ~`~^==
from his forward area (perer3nyy kray) ? Witt. a dept'r; of operation
of a front of 500-600 kms this is, in ail, only a third of the
complete depth of the operation.
Consequently, the missile troops of a front are at present not
in a position to fulfilLthe task of inflicting a simultaneous i~u.clear
strike on the whole depth of an operatior_ of the front. As a result,
the enemy will be able to concentrate his reserves and his means for
nuclear attack and to regroup (privcdit ?roysk~ v poryariok) after
? our first blow against the rear of his group of armies.
e
h
e rang
In order to hit deep objectives which are beyond t
of fire of the nuclear-missile we aponwrichainrturn dependssupon
troc s of a front must move forward,
p ~ ~,_ ~ ..._~ ..,~.,oa ri f1 P and tank divisions.
the aavcu:cc vi ~.?~ ??w ~~_ _ -- --
I?. fig fully realized that the enerc:,v wil.~ attempt to make use
of the Zone which is out of range of our nuclear-missile il~C iOr
the concentration of his resources for an atomic attack and for
the subsequent launching of strikes against our advancing troeps.
According to ava,ilabi~ inforrne.tion, very active work is
being carried out in the United States of America on the "Pershing"
missile, whose range of action whould reach 1,000 - 2,000 ins.
This missile is seen by the leading military circles in the USA
not as a strategic weapon but as a weapon which is intended for w e
within the composition cf a group of armies. Efforts are also
being made to increase the range of the "Redstone" array missile
tc 600-800 kms.
-i-
d
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~-
A front car, oppose t'r.ese ?eapc cf t:~e ~:re::;,? w'_ ~._ ~~?::pa:at_':el;y
weals ard, ir. the present P'V0, ins~uf:~_iertly reiia.-le stri'Kes b~.
the front's air support (fronto~Ya.ya a?.?iatsiya) . 1t :.s tru= t~.at
one ca^. count on action agair_st cb iec gives whic are ~o^ated in a
zone which is out of 'range of the r.:issile weapons cf a front, by
missile~~troops of strategic desigraticn (strategicheskogo
naznac?-ier:iya), apart of whose strikes ;:ar_ be allocates;. t;; the
support of the front. However, it is obvious that tre main attention
of the strategic missile troops will be concerarated c:~ the f~l-
filment of thP.,.ir main tasks, ana than the interests o_` the front
will be satisfie3- only if a saitab~e reserve of their coTbat
capabilities .exists. ~
Ir. the course of ar. operation, missile troops a.re compelled
to make up for thei?- insufficient maximum effective range by move-
ment. If in an offensive operation which is moving at 30-40 kms
a day, the missile units of asi army can be limited to one change
oP location for each two or three days of the advance, they. when
the rate of the operation increases to 100 kms a day, they must
-~
move every day.
The experience of exercises and calculations shows that at
every moment during the progress of an operation, up to 50 percent
of the missile troops are on the move. In individual cases, when
the troops are completing a rapid advance (stremitelnyy brosok),
the simultaneous movement of up to three Quarters of the missile
troops of a front becomes necessary. For instance, missile units
aimed with missiles of type R-170 occupy launch sites (startovaya
pUZii.siya~ 3v-jv isms it~tli i.i1C eueucy tuna, iII wusey~.lel,c:C, i,ile
extent of their range (zapas ikt?. dalnosti) is 100-J_20 kms. If the
troops move forward 100 ktr!s in one day these units will be, in
practice, unable to carry out even frontal firE, to say nothing of
shifting fire (manevr ognem) onto the flanks of the army. They are
therefore forced to begin moving ,approximately half of their
battalions {divizion) eitherjust as the advance begins or within
a few hours.
The need to achieve high mobility of missile units and in
this way to increase the time in whi~:h they are in action has made
it necessary to review a series of technical questions in the
preparations for nuclear-missile fire. Thus, as a result of
important scientific-research and practical work carried out by
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tre troops, by scientific establish,~.erits and learned irst~~tuticrs,
the time needed to prepare for the launch of a missile has been
sharply reduced. For instance, the prelau~zch prepara.ier. of ar:
R-170 rrissiie has been shartened fra:n 2 hours to 3; minutes, the
time far the preparation of data has been reduced from 95 to ~-10
minutes, and the duration of the tapegraphical and geodetic work
in the tying-in of the launch site (privyazka start?ovoy pozitsii)
from 24 hours to 1.5 to 2 hours. Hawever, the possibilities of
cutting do'~n time by this technique a~rP not limitless. Ir. addition,
in changing site, thF march itself takes up a considerable part of
the t i.me .
In the course of an operation, as a result of inadequate range,
not less than half the missile troops of a front are excluded from
action. Thus, in exercises the battalions of a missile brigade
armed with missiles of the type R-170 made from ~+ to 5 moves in the
course of a front operation, wasting up to 15-20 hours on each of
them. As a consequence of this each battalion is excluded from
active firing for 3-~+ days of the total time of the operation.
Frequent moves of the missile units of a front and an army are
also unfavorable for other reasons. Moving battalions in the course
of an offensive op?-ration, we are forced to deploy them in an area
where a considerable number of nuclear strikes ma;,' oe delivered
against tr.er. by the enemy. At the moment it is still difficult to
imagine how such an area will look tram the point of view of
__~ _r _..a;,,e,.+{~.A :~r,ntaminatior.. One thing which is
clear is that the choice of site locations and the deployment of
missile units under these conditions will not be as simply done
as it is in exercises.
Qne of the manifestations of the high mobility of a modern
operation is the need, which occurs comparatively frequently during
its course, for the transfer of the main thrusts (usiliye) from one
direction tc ar_otrer. This transfer will be expressed first of
all in the shifting of nuclear-missile strikesythat is to say, in
the concentration of the fire of missile large units and units in
a new direction. The deficiency in maximum effective range of
the missile troops can not be made up by maneuvering on wheels
(manevr kolesami) because the mobility of modern missile troops
does not exceed that of tank and motorized rifle divis'_ons. The
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?
wr; rob e~': or e 'ra far cr tre~^~in -~~~usts
method y i .. tr,e 1 t:. ~ , ~ . E,~ ~ ; ~~,r?e
only b "._ p e eratie:: car- be ; :~deG ~s .~, _
of a front ir, the co::.rse of ~~ P _
a shift of fire of t:se r~is~ile tw'oiEeisy orlytwi}r it-e t~:e` i i;~ its ^~fl`r
they occupy, (With maneu~e.~ or. ~a;voes)?
these locations in order to acr lave securit; i-. refeat?C
However, for this they oust naturally have a suitable maxim~..u~
effective range.
Calcula:.io:1s show that in order to carry out a sr'-`+ of `ire
in a zone cf a front where the missile uri-cs are positioned ir, site
locations at a normal (up to 7C-iGG k