TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 20, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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D
Directorate of
Intelligence
Review
MASTER. Fill COPY
0o NOT GIVE OUI
Terrorism
OR MARK ON
Me ~~1rv?~ rot. ~r
See~ct
G1 TR 83-002
20 January 1983
?y 353
25X1
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Secret
Terrorism
Review F___1 25X1
1 Lull in West European Terrorism
(OGI)
3 Arms Seizure Leads to Arrest of Possible Accomplice in Papal Shooting {
(OGI)
5 Guatemalan Terrorists Target Presidential Families
(OGI)
7 Yasir Arafat-The PLO's Consensus Leade
(OGI)
13 Special Analysis:
French Counterterrorist Attitudes-How Equal? How Fraternal?
(OGI)
25X1
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Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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Secret
Lull in West European
Terrorism
Prominent international terrorist groups remain rela-
tively inactive in Western Europe with the exception
of the Iberian peninsula and United Kingdom.F_
In Spain, probes by the two major Basque terrorist
groups ETA/M and ETA/PM (Fatherland and Lib-
erty-Military and Political-Military) and by
GRAPO (the Communist First of October Antifascist
Group) toward an accommodation with the new So-
cialist government, although never promising, have
come up empty. GRAPO has dropped its unilaterally
announced truce; ETA/PM has indicated that it has
no intention of pursuing negotiations with Madrid;
and ETA/M has continued its pattern of frequent and
lethal terrorist attacks. In Portugal, the Popular Force
25 April (FP-25), after a yearlong period of inactivity,
has recently conducted a series of robberies-presum-
ably to bankroll future operations.
Elsewhere, terrorists have been inactive, either be-
cause of effective law enforcement and security or
because of local accommodations between terrorist
groups and the authorities
After a surge of activity by anti-American terrorists
in mid-December, West Germany has been quiet.
Enhanced security measures, in our view, have in- 25X1
creased the difficulty of attacks against US military
housing areas and personnel by such local groups as
the Revolutionary Cells and Red Army Faction
(RAF) "legals." We believe RAF has been crippled
for the time being by arrests in late 1982 of three key
operatives. It may be reorganizing and absorbing new
personnel, a process likely to prevent operations for
months. In Italy, we believe the Red Brigades remain
in disarray because of a series of significant law
enforcement successes over the past several months.
Kingdom, and Austria are holding.
25X1
operations against Turkish and, perhaps, American
targets worldwide, including France, to avenge the
disappearance of prominent Armenian Tashnak Party
official Avram Ashdjian from Beirut on 29 Decem-
ber. Black June's truces with France, the United
Army for the Liberation of Armenia. We believe
Armenian terrorists may start a number of new
The French Government has kept the lid on in France
by cracking down on'indigenous terrorists, particular-
ly Direct Action and the Corsican National Libera- 25X1
tion Front and by arranging truces with such interna-
tional groups as Black June and the Armenian Secret
There have been no attacks by major Palestinian
groups in Western Europe since September. Grou125X1
affiliated with the PLO remain under the PLO ban
moderate PLO leadership is --
reestablishment of terrorist support structures in
Western Europe and training of operatives.
still under radical pressure to rescind the ban and that
Arafat has approved contingency measures, including
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Secret
Arms Seizure Leads to Arrest
of Possible Accomplice
in Papal Shooting
A small-time arms dealer who may be linked to the
weapon used by Mehmet Ali Agca against the Pope
was arrested on 11 January in Austria
According to the US Embassy in Vienna, Austrian
customs authorities at a border crossing with
Czechoslovakia seized a truck carrying 300 pistols
and rifles hidden under a declared cargo of ammuni-
tion on 11 January. Among the weapons confiscated
were Czechoslovak-made 7.65-mm CZ-70 and 9-mm
CZ-75 pistols and unidentified Italian small arms.
Arms described as Soviet submachineguns and
Kalashnikov-type sniper rifles were also seized. These
may, however, be of Czechoslovak manufacture.
In a separate but probably related incident, Austrian
police subsequently arrested two weapons dealers-
one of whom, Horst Grillmayer-may be linked to the
9-mm Browning Hi-Power pistol used in the attempted
papal assassination.
shortly after the papal shooting, Grillmayer denied
any knowledge of the weapon and subsequently disap-
peared.
Italian authorities have indicated they will charge
Grillmayer with complicity in the unsuccessful assas-
25X1
sination of the Pope. They will probably also attempt
to trace the Italian arms seized in Austria to deter-
mine if any had been sold to KINTEX-the Bulgari-
an state-controlled foreign trade organization. Italian
authorities in Milan recently claimed to have uncov-
ered what one official described as the world's larg125X1
illegal arms smuggling organization, and the invests-25X1
gating magistrate has publicly alleged that Bulgaria i.
a key contact point for this traffic
Of equal importance, however, are the Czechoslovak 25X1
weapons seized in Austria.
25X1
French authorities also
claim that Israeli Embassy Second Secretary Vacov
Barsimantov was assassinated with the same 7.65-mm
Czechoslovak pistol in April 1982 that was used to kill
US Military Attache Col. Charles Ray in Januar,-25X1
1982 in Paris
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We suspect, however, that Ray and Barsimantov were
killed with a Czechoslovak submachinegun and not a
semiautomatic pistol. According to French media
reports, ballistics experts who examined the spent
cartridges have determined that the ammunition used
in both attacks had been fired from a weapon with a
vertical ejection system. The only Czechoslovak 25X1
7.65-mm weapon with this kind of ejection is the
Model 61 "Skorpian" submachinegun-P-27, CZ-50,
and CZ-70 7.65-mm Czechoslovak pistols all have
standard Mauser-type right-hand ejection ports. De25X1
spite its relatively low-powered cartridge, the Skor-
piari is an ideal terrorist weapon because of its small
size and high rate of fire. When fired in the semiauto-
matic mode, its metal stock can be folded forward
giving the weapon the appearance of a large pistol
such as the one described by eyewitnesses to the
Barsimantov attack. 25X1
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Guatemalan Terrorists Target
Presidential Families
The kidnaping of the daughter of Honduran President
Suazo in Guatemala City on 14 December and the
abduction in October of Guatemalan President Rios
Montt's nephew were conducted by a new terrorist
coalition, the Revolutionary People's Movement
(MRP). L
the group was orga-
nized by dissident militants frustrated by the inability
of the Guatemalan left to unify and coordinate opera-
tions. Membership is reported to be drawn from the
Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), the
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Guerrilla Army of
the Poor (EGP), Our Movement (NM), and the Mili-
tary Commission (COMIL).
Rios Monti's nephew, kidnaped on 13 October, was
rescued by security forces 41 days later in a shootout
in Guatemala City, during which two of his abductors
were killed. The kidnapers had demanded the release
of a young woman, an MRP activist, in exchange for
his safe return. Rios Montt-maintaining the govern-
ment's hardline policy-publicly vowed that he would
not negotiate with the kidnapers and, fortunately, his
nephew's rescue was successfully effected
In the case of President Suazo's daughter, the
that a 12-page manifesto be published in some 20
major newpapers in Central America and Mexico and
broadcast over national radio and television in Guate-
mala. These conditions were'met, despite a Guatema-
lan Government decree prohibiting dissemination of
subversive material. On 23 December, President
Suazo's daughter was released unharmedF___1
The aim of the operation, we believe, was to humiliate
and to erode public confidence in both the Guatema-
lan and Honduran Governments. MRP demands,
relatively inconsequential and easily met, were proba-
bly designed to place the Rios Montt government in a
"no-win" situation. Compliance would demonstrate 25X1
that the government lacked resolve to carry out its
policies. On the other hand, if the government prohib-
ited publication, it would appear inflexible and inhu25X1
mane, and its relations with Honduras would have
been strained. 25X1
25X1
The Guatemalan Government was particularly adept
in its handling of the incident 25X1
Using
the same formula employed when the son of inist25X1
of the Interior Mendez Ruiz was kidnaped in the
spring of 1982, the government permitted the family
to arrange for publication of the manifesto without
public retreat from its hardline policy of nonnegotia-
tion with terrorists. The night of the Suazo abduction,
Mendez Ruiz, a sympathetic and persuasive speaker,
appeared on nationwide radio and TV and placed the
onus squarely on the kidnapers. Appearing concerned
and compassionate, he expressed themes and argu-
ments that were replayed by the media throughout
Latin America. 25X1
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Yasir Arafat:
The PLO's Consensus Leader'
We believe Yasir Arafat's number-one priority is to
maintain his leadership of the Palestine Liberation
Organization. and his position as spokesman for the
broad-based Palestinian movement. Sensitive to the
complex political differences among Palestinians and
the broader Arab community, Arafat has finely honed
a consensual decisionmaking style, which has helped
him to retain the leadership of the PLO for 13
turbulent years. Throughout his career, he has ac-
quired and exploited power by shrewdly playing off
factions, alternately propitiating both his moderate
and more radical factions to avoid splitting the move-
ment. At the same time, his unwillingness to risk
losing his across-the-board support has inhibited Ara-
fat from taking more decisive actions. In our judg-
ment, this pattern of gradual and incremental change
in PLO policies is likely to persist
ment to Israel's elimination
Arafat has an impressive ability to be all things to all
people. A master of ambiguity, he skillfully blurs
conflicting images:
? He is able to project a moderate image to the
Palestinian intelligentsia, the moderate Arab world,
Western leaders, and the mass media, implying he is
on the verge of recognizing Israel's right to exist.
? Concomitantly, he is able to convey to the more
radical Palestinian guerrillas a sense of militant
determination and an image of steadfast commit-
Arafat has a number of other qualities that have
contributed to his long tenure in office. These include
a proven capacity to withstand stress, a demonstrated
perseverance in pursuit of his personal and political
goals, a belief that he is uniquely qualified to lead the
Palestinian resistance, a strong sense of self-esteem,
and freedom from the constraints of ideological dis-
putes.
On the international scene, as within the PLO, Arafat
is nonconfrontational, never allowing himself the lux-
ury of vendettas. Arafat goes to great lengths to avoid
polarizing the major powers into friend/enemy camps.
Rather, he treats them all as actual or potential allies,
always stressing the commonality of interests rather
than dwelling on points of difference. Arafat would
undoubtedly welcome a dialogue with the United
States, but not at the price of unconditional recogni-
tion of Israel, since in all likelihood this would destroy
his consensus leadership of the PLO. Yasir Arafat
will not, in our opinion, support any issue or agree-
ment that seriously threatens his leadership.
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Secret
Special Analysis
French Counterterrorist
Attitudes-How Equal?
How Fraternal?
Since last summer the French Government has react-
ed with varying degrees of firmness to the terrorist
threat, apparently willing to be forceful with indige-
nous French groups but softer with international
terrorist groups[ _j 25X1
The present situation reflects tensions, which persist
despite President Mitterrand's nationally televised
announcement on 17 August that the government
would intensify its antiterrorism effort in part by
restructuring and strengthening the security forces.
The day after Mitterrand's announcement, the Cabi-
net, invoking a 1936 law that bans private militias,
outlawed the French terrorist group, Direct Action.
The Cabinet termed it a "movement composed of
people favoring violent actions, in contact with foreign
extremist movements and organized for commando
actions, calling for armed struggle and the use of
terrorist methods."
At approximately the same time "that Direct Action,
by its own admission, was busy in Paris last summer
with a series of anti-Semitic attacks, the Corsican
National Liberation Front (FNLC) ended a 15-month
bombing moratorium, in effect under the Mitterrand
government, with some 60 simultaneous bombings on
the island. The government had been attempting to
defuse Corsican dissidence by offering amnesty to
separatists and holding elections for the island's first
regional assembly in the fall of 1982. Separatists
boycotted the elections and the new year has brought
a surge of violence, with eight bombing and shooting
attacks against nonnative residents who refused to go
along with a new FNLC tactic-the imposition of a
"revolutionary tax." The FNLC also changed its
modus operandi with at least one assassination at-
tempt.
The French Government reacted by outlawing the
FNLC-the leading separatist organization-again
invoking the 1936 law. To further emphasize the
harder line, the government named as coordinator of
security forces on Corsica Robert Broussard, widely
celebrated in France for his success as head of
France's antigangster squad. The appointment of
Broussard, who has a reputation for ruthlessness,
suggests that Mitterrand is ready to modify, and
perhaps abandon, his earlier policy of fighting nation-
alist-inspired violence with political reform. Mitter-
rand emphasized in his annual New Year's address
that Corsica would remain French and that terrorists
would feel the full force of French law. Presumably
the Breton separatists, who have been waging an
intermittent and less violent terrorism campaign, will
also take heed 25X1
In contrast, the government seems unprepared to
pursue a consistent policy regarding terrorism perpe-
trated by the Armenians in France. Armenian terror-
ists have, in the last seven years, gradually spread
their assassinations across Western Europe and final-
ly reached out to Canada, the United States, Austra-
lia, and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria). More Turkish
officials have been assassinated and Turkish installa-
tions bombed in France than in any other country.
France also has the second-largest concentration of
ethnic Armenians in the world, and the French Gov-
ernment is wary of the political clout of large Arme-
nian communities in Paris, Marseilles, Nice, and
Lyons.
25X1
In August the French leftist newspaper Liberation
referred to a charge that Louis Joinet, a member of
the Prime Minister's staff, had negotiated a truce in
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January with the subgroup of the Armenian Secret
Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) known
as "Orly." The truce, which committed the French
not to arrest non-French Armenians, was broken by
the arrest in June of an Armenian terrorist wanted in
the United States. A French court ruled against
extradition, and the terrorist was released to another
country.
the
French Government last year quietly arranged an
accommodation with the radical Palestinian Black
June Organization (BJO) under which BJO would
unspecified French gesture.
leaders have blackmailed or tried to blackmail offi-
cials of Italy and Switzerland into leniency toward
ASALA operatives or, in the case of Italy, discontinu-
ation of the processing in Rome of refugees from
Soviet Armenia. In the event of noncompliance,
ASALA has threatened to resume terrorist operations.
in the country in question or against its installations
or personnel in other countries.
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In spite of this uneven French Government counter-
terrorism record, we believe that the government is 25X1
attempting to control terrorist groups, domestic or
international, on French soil. The US Embassy in
Paris notes that the upcoming visit of Justice Minister
Badinter, who is a specialist on extradition, may lead
to modification and updating of France's extradition
treaty with the United States. This would represent
forward movement in the French Government's
"war" on terrorism. The security problem in France,
which created a public uproar last summer and led to
Mitterrand's TV address, remains an issue, and mu-
nicipal elections, scheduled for March, could be ex-
ploited by the opposition and pressure the French
Government for concrete progress in the terrorism
arena. 25X1
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Statistical Overview
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982 a
Private parties, tourists, 8
missionaries, and students
1 3 1 4 0 4 5 1 0 2 2 30
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982 a
Total 77
North America 3
Latin America 10
Western Europe 42
USSR/Eastern Europe 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 0
Middle East and North Africa 16
Asia/other 5
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
34 76 72 55 95 73 90 50 56 38 30 746
7 8 8 6 1 6 8 2 6 1 2 58
6 22 20 21 11 17 11 11 18 12 4 163
9 25 25 17 65 25 37 24 22 15 15 321
2 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 3 . 3 0 16
3 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 13
4 12 15 9 11 13 24 5 3 3 1 116
3 8 1 2 5 10 6 4 3 4 8 59
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks,
1981 and 1982
Car bomb in Baghdad
killed 2, wounded 130;
Ankara airport attack
killed 9, wounded 70.
Assassination and bombing
in Greece killed 2, wounded
70; bombing in Central
African Republic killed 4,
wounded 100.
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Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in
international terrorism. It provides commentary on their back-
ground, importance, and wider implications.
13 December 1982 Mexico
Some 500 members of the Committee for Popular Defense (CDP), a leftist
Mexican organization, vandalized the exterior of the US Consulate in Juarez
during a demonstration, causing extensive damage. Despite the fact that the
Consulate had requested additional security, police protection was inadequate. The
demonstrators said they would return in 20 days. An official protest has been
lodged with the Mexican Government. 25X1
using a nationalist facade-are more likely responsible. 25X1
23 December 1982 Israel
A bomb threat was received by the US Embassy in Tel Aviv from a caller who
claimed credit in the name of a previously unknown group, "The Organization
Against Foreign Military in Lebanon." The caller gave no further details, and a
thorough search by Embassy security failed to locate an explosive device.
Although this particular "group" is not known to have claimed any previous
terrorist acts, two little-known groups with similar names have taken credit for
past attacks against Israeli, Fatah, and US interests (including the attack against
US Ambassador. to Lebanon Dean in August 1980). Despite the implication of one
or possibly several separate nationalistic Lebanese groups or individuals, the
apparent lack of anti-Syrian activities suggests that radical, pro-Syrian factions-
29 December 1982 Lebanon
In Beirut a Central Committee member and chief of intelligence for the Armenian
Tashnak Party Avram Ashdjian was kidnaped en route to his office. Armenian
spokesmen have blamed the Turks. 25X1
1 January 1983 Haiti
Three persons were killed and 10 injured by a car bomb that exploded near the
Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince. Credit for the attack was claimed by the
Hector Riobe Brigade, which first surfaced in July 1982, when it unsuccessfully
attempted to blow up a bridge in an isolated Port-au-Prince suburb and accidently
wounded an American tourist. 25X1
Turkey
The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) has sent
threatening letters to Turkish diplomatic installations. According to the Turkish
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press, numerous "visiting cards of death" have been received by Turkish diplomats
throughout Western Europe. 25X1
4 January 1983 Spain
In San Sebastian suspected Basque terrorists planted a bomb at the state-
controlled news agency EFE. The explosion damaged equipment, but no injuries
were sustained because the terrorists forewarned EFE, and the building was
evacuated beforehand. ETA/Military is suspected of the attack, which was
claimed as a response to EFE coverage of Basque news.
An armed gang derailed a train on the outskirts of Lisbon and stole $167,000. One
policeman was wounded. The raid may have been conducted by the Popular Forces
of 25 April (FP-25) which has perpetrated robberies to bankroll their terrorist
operations and which has recently become active after a yearlong hiatus.
Turkey
In Istanbul the recapture of notorious Revolutionary Way (Dev Sol) terrorist
Celaleddin Can at a safehouse in a suburb of Istanbul also netted security officials
large quantities of explosives and detailed surveillance. notes of prominent Turkish
and foreign officials, including US Consulate officials. 25X1
7 January 1983 Spain
In Bermeo two Spanish naval officers were injured in a machinegun attack by
suspected Basque terrorists. Both officers were in civilian clothes and were
attacked as they left their residences. Details of the attack indicate careful
surveillance of the targets, which has been the modus operandi of ETA/M in its
8 January 1983 Spain
In Hendaye, France, a spokesman for the VIII Assembly of the Basque Fatherland
and Liberty/Political-Military Wing (ETA/PM) announced the group will not
negotiate with the Spanish Government for a cease-fire or truce and will begin a
new campaign to obtain "revolutionary taxes." The spokesman reiterated
ETA/PM's assurances that it will commit no armed actions in French territory,
which appears to be an attempt to mollify French security concerns regarding
Basque terrorist activities in France.
Israel
Three Palestinian groups have claimed credit for the grenade attack on a civilian
bus in Tel Aviv that resulted in at least 12 injuries. On 10 January the PLO's Nic-
osia press office said an unidentified PLO unit had carried out the operation. The
Secret 18
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attack was the first in some time not involving preset explosives and the first major
incident of this type in that city in several years. The PLO's Saiqa and the non-
PLO Black June Organization also took credit, but we cannot confirm either of the
claims, which have been made to generate publicity. 25X1
Lebanon
In Beirut the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) mailed a
three-page printed brochure to foreign embassies accusing the "American and
Western mass media and political circles" of a concerted strategy against the
Armenian national liberation movement. No direct threat was made against any
country except Turkey; however, it appears several countries in which Armenian
terrorists are imprisoned received the brochure. 25X1
25X6
Spain
In San Sebastian the ETA Political/Military Wing VIII Assembly (ETA/PM)
kidnaped the son of a local industrialist and gave the shortest deadline ever, seven
days, for ransom payment. ETA/PM lacks funds and needs to demonstrate its
credibility after the 30 December police rescue of a previous kidnap victim. The
extremely short ransom deadline directly challenges the Spanish Government's
promise to strangle ETA financially by preventing payments of ransom and
revolutionary taxes 25X1
11 January 1983 Spain
In Madrid the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) an-
nounced that it had ended its two-month truce with the Spanish Government. The
communique accused the Spanish Government of breaking the truce and an-
nounced that GRAPO was ready to conduct operations against the regime.
Despite the death in a police shootout of GRAPO leader Juan Martin Luna in De-
cember and Spanish estimates that the group now contains only 12 active
members, GRAPO has shown considerable ability to overcome severe setbacks in
12 January 1983 Turkey
In Ankara 740 suspected members of the Marxist organization Dev Sol went on
trial for murder, kidnaping, and robbery stemming from an aborted takeover of
the Black Sea town of Fatsa. This trial may spark some terrorist reprisals,
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especially around 28 January, which is the anniversary of the death of the founder25X1
of the Turkish Communist Party.
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