GEYDAR ALIYEV: HIS NEW ROLE IN THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
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Directorate of ~~ - -----confidelitial
Intelligence I .l ~, 7
Council of Ministers
Geydar Aliyev:
His New Role in the USSR
A Research Paper
SOY 83-10170
October 1983
Copy 482
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
Geydar Aliyev:
His New Role in the USSR
Council of Ministers
This paper was pre ared b with
a contribution b both of the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Policy
Analysis Division, SOYA,
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Confidential
SOV 83-10170
October 1983
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Geydar Aliyev:
His New Role in the USSR
Council of Ministers
Key Judgments Geydar Aliyev, former KGB chief in Azerbaijan and the head of the
Information available Communist Party of Azerbaijan, became First Deputy Chairman of the
as of 20 September 1983 USSR Council of Ministers and a full Politburo member in November
was used in this report.
1982-one of the first personnel changes announced after the Andropov
succession. Although his promotion probably was in process before
Andropov became General Secretary, Aliyev's focus on discipline and
anticorruption in Azerbaijan was in harmony with Andropov's new
policies. Whatever the political chemistry, Aliyev's leadership in Azerbai-
jan when this republic achieved an impressive economic record was
probably sufficient to recommend him for a job in Moscow as a national
economic manager.
The Azerbaijani economy grew substantially during Aliyev's years in
power, both in industry and agriculture. Comparing economic performance
in Azerbaijan with that in the USSR and Georgia, a neighboring republic,
Azerbaijani growth was impressive. The sources of growth were increased
inputs of manpower and capital, but most important was a healthy boost in
productivity.
Much of the republic's economic growth can be attributed to centrally
made economic decisions and the fortuitous conjunction of such economic
factors as increased capital and labor supply. As party chief, Aliyev was in
a good position to influence these growth factors. His style of leadership
appears to have been an important ingredient in Azerbaijan's economic
success. Three major initiatives marked his tenure:
? A massive campaign against corruption.
? An effort to build the national leadership's confidence in him and in
Azerbaijan.
? An effort to personally master the operation of the Azerbaijani economy
and a demand that subordinates also be well informed and in control.
Aliyev's career advancement, as well as special public recognition by the
leadership on numerous occasions, indicated that Moscow was indeed
impressed with his performance.
Some of Aliyev's skills and experience clearly can be transplanted to his
position on the Council of Ministers. For example, his personal attri-
butes-such as his talent for organization and administration, his shrewd
political sense, and his ability to reduce corruption in management-are
equally applicable at the regional and national levels of the economy.
Confidential
SOV 83-10170
October 1983
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Most of Aliyev's experience in Azerbaijan, however, seems ill suited to the
national level. The Azerbaijani economy is more like that of a Third World
country than that of the Soviet Union. For example, the growth in
Azerbaijan's birth rate and labor force has remained high, while most of
the USSR is attempting to conserve scarce labor resources. Moreover,
Aliyev's economic experience in Azerbaijan is not especially relevant to the
central economic problem that the Soviet leadership now confronts-
making a successful transition from extensive (increased inputs) to intensive
(better use of inputs) growth. The republic has been blessed with ample
economic inputs and has not been forced to face a stubborn decline in the
growth of productivity. Perhaps because of this, Aliyev has never been
known as an innovator or one who has thought deeply about ways to
overcome systemic weaknesses. His speeches reveal shallowness and a
desire to follow whatever course Moscow lays down-unfortunate qualities
in one now expected to take a lead in solving the country's economic
problems.
So far Aliyev appears to have settled securely into the Council of
Ministers, where his main portfolio is transportation. Andropov has given
priority to this sector's improvement and may believe that Aliyev's
managerial skills can help. Aliyev apparently has not received specific
assignments to deal with corruption and discipline, as had been widely
rumored at the time of his appointment.
The selection of Aliyev in June 1983 to present the new law on labor
collectives to the Supreme Soviet is one indication that he may be given
broader responsibilities; he could acquire substantial power in his current
position. The Council of Ministers itself appears to be gaining prestige
under Andropov; four members are also Politburo members. Moreover,
Andropov's June speech implied that the governmental apparatus might be
less subject to interference from party managers than it was under
Brezhnev
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Although Aliyev has been frequently rumored to be a candidate to become
Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) should Tikhonov depart,
such an appointment does not appear to be imminent. Thus far Aliyev has
neither the economic expertise nor the political backing necessary for the
job. In time he may acquire both. His willingness to learn in new situations,
as he did upon becoming party chief in Azerbaijan, may qualify him for
leadership of the Council of Ministers. His managerial competence and
political acumen, especially the ability to ingratiate himself with his
superiors, may win Andropov's confidence. Moreover, the deputy chairman
slot has in recent years been the steppingstone to the post of premier, and
there are only a few other obvious candidates (principally party secretary
Dolgikh and Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy). Even so, Aliyev must 25X1
still overcome the handicap of his ethnic background-traditionally a
serious barrier to the assumption of the top government and party post.
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Aliyev's Strategy and Style of Leadership
4
Fighting Corruption
6
Building Confidence
6
Learning the Ropes
7
Moscow's Perception
8
Transferability of Aliyev's Leadership Style and Experience
8
The Political Factor
10
Aliyev's Prospects
11
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Geydar Ali Rza ogly Aliyev
Born
Place of Birth
Nationality
Education
Career
Member, Politburo, CPSU Central Committee
First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers
10 May 1923
Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, Azerbaijan
Azeri
Degree in history from Azerbaijan State University, 1957
1941-69-served in succession of posts with the People's Commissariat of
Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Ministry of State Security (MGB), the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD), and the Committee for State Security (KGB), all in
Azerbaijan, culminating as chief of Azerbaijan 's KGB during 1967-69.
1945-became a party member.
1969-82-served as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan
Communist Party.
1971-became a full member of the CPSU Central Committee.
1976-became a candidate member of the Politburo.
November 1982-became a full Politburo member and First Deputy Chairman of
the USSR Council of Ministers.
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Geydar Aliyev:
His New Role in the USSR
Council of Ministers
Introduction
Geydar Aliyev was chief of the Azerbaijan Commu-
nist Party from July 1969 to November 1982 and
before that a professional KGB officer in the same
republic. Because of the relatively minor position
Azerbaijan holds both economically and politically,
scant attention was paid in the West to Aliyev's
career. In November 1982, however, at the first
Central Committee plenum following the Andropov
succession, Aliyev was elevated to the status of full
Politburo member and to First Deputy Chairman of
the USSR Council of Ministers. The political and
economic significance of such a move to the center of
power justifies a closer look at this Soviet leader-
specifically, at whether he would be an effective
national economic manager.
This paper examines the four areas that should help
determine Aliyev's potential impact in his new job:
? The economic record of Azerbaijan before and after
Aliyev's appointment as party chief, comparing its
economic growth with that of the country as a whole
and with neighboring Georgia and analyzing its
pattern and sources of growth.
? The extent to which Aliyev can be personally credit-
ed with his republic's economic achievements and
Moscow's perceptions of his performance.
? The transferability of Aliyev's leadership and expe-
rience in Azerbaijan to the national level, with
particular attention to the relevance of that experi-
ence to the problems he will encounter in his role in
the Council of Ministers.
? The political clout that Aliyev is likely to gain in his
new position and his chances for broadening his
powers and responsibilities.
The Economic Record
Azerbaijan is a small republic; it contributes only
2 percent of the USSR's net material product
(NMP).' Agriculture contributes about 25 percent of
' Net material product is similar to the Western concept of GNP,
the primary difference being that it does not include most services,
Table 1
Azerbaijan: Average Annual Growth
of Selected Economic Indicators a
Gross social product
5.6
5.4
8.2
Of which:
Industry
6.7
6.2
8.9
Fuels
2.1
2.4
0.1
Machinery
11.2
8.4
13.6
Chemicals
13.3
10.7
9.3
Light industry
5.8
6.9
8.8
Food industry
7.1
6.2
10.7
Agriculture
1.2
6.6
9.3
1.7
7.8
10.9
Azerbaijan's NMP compared with 15 percent of, the
USSR's; some 47 percent of the republic's population
still live in rural areas compared with 37 percent in
the USSR. Per capita national income is among the
lowest-in 1981 it was 1,520 rubles compared with
1,790 rubles for the nation as a whole.
Soviet statistics 2 show that the Azerbaijani economy
grew substantially during Aliyev's years in power,
notably during the period 1973-81 compared with
1961-72 (see table 1). Both the industrial and agricul-
tural sectors registered sharp increases in growth.
This record is particularly striking when compared
with the decreasing national growth rate. But individ-
ual republics, such as neighboring Georgia, also expe-
rienced high rates of growth (see figure 1). Some of 25X1
'This paper uses official Soviet data, primarily from the annual
statistical handbooks. We believe that inflation and other problems
in the data result in overstated growth rates, but they probably
reflect comparative trends in regional and national growth with fair
accuracy.
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Figure 1
Comparative Rates of Growth for
Gross Socjal Product'
Table 2
Average Annual Growth of Comparative
Economic Indicators, 1973-81 a
4.9
8.0
7.7
3.7
4.9
3.1
1.1
2.4
0.6
7.8
6.7
7.0
5.4
8.9
8.0
4.5
4.0
4.2
Labor
1.4
2.7
1.9
Capital
8.0
5.9
7.6
Productivity
0.9
4.7
3.7
Agriculture
Output
1.4
9.3
5.9
Inputs
2.6
4.9
2.4
Labor
-0.9
2.5
-0.3
Capital
8.1
8.6
6.5
Productivity
-1.2
4.2
3.4
USSR
Georgia
a Official Soviet data.
b Data are for 1973-80.
.) Y I
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this spurt resulted from the increased rate of growth
in factor inputs (a larger supply of land, labor, and
capital) (see figure 2). The most significant change,
however, was the large boost in the rate of growth of
productivity. This growth varied greatly among the
economic sectors-it was most rapid in the machinery
industry and actually fell in the fuels sector. F_~
Comparing economic performance in Azerbaijan with
that in both the USSR and Georgia during 1973-81,
Azerbaijani growth was again impressive (see table 2).
Average annual growth in inputs (capital and labor
combined) in Azerbaijan clearly exceeded that of the
USSR and Georgia. While the growth in capital alone
was not outstanding, Azerbaijani investment grew at
an average annual rate of 8.8 percent compared with
4.6 percent and 5.2 percent in the USSR and Georgia,
respectively; investment is the source of new capital
and the latest technology. The largest difference in
this comparison of economic indicators was in produc-
tivity growth. The rates achieved both in Azerbaijan
and Georgia exceeded those of the USSR by a wide
margin.
Available statistics do not entirely explain the reasons
for the increase in productivity. Major factors proba-
bly were the ability of the fledgling sectors in
Azerbaijan to borrow new technologies from the more
established industries in the rest of the country and a
better use of agricultural land. The growing gap
between the LJSSR and Azerbaijan in the productivity
growth rate may be due to the unimportance to
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Figure 2
Azerbaijan: Sources of Growth'
Average annual percent
10
Output
1961-72
1973-81
aOfficjal Soviet data.
300811 9-83
Inputs Productivity
Net material product
Azerbaijan of many of the sectors that were the major
cause of the slowdown in total Soviet industrial
production in the late 1970s, such as ferrous metallur-
gy.
Concurrent with these changes in growth rates was a
major change in the structure of the Azerbaijani
economy. The shares of output contributed by indus-
try and agriculture hardly changed, but radical struc-
tural shifts occurred within both. In agriculture (see
figure 3), cotton remained the largest crop (measured
by value of output) throughout the 1960-80 period,
but grape production nearly equaled it by 1980, and
grain decreased to a relatively minor share. In indus-
try (see figure 4), the shifts were even more dramatic
in the Aliyev years. The contribution of fuels to gross
output fell as oil output declined; it would have fallen
Breakdown of Inputs
Average annual percent
8
6
4
Labor
Capital
even more but for the growth of natural gas produc-
tion and the production of refined oil products based
partially on oil extracted outside of Azerbaijan. The
food industry took over first place with light industry
a close second, while the machinery sector also grew
rapidly. The growth of food and light industries
clearly reflected the surge in agricultural production.
Four major factors, then, figure prominently in Azer-
baijan's impressive economic performance during the
Aliyev years:
? A steady stream of new entrants into the labor force
caused by a traditionally high birth rate, in marked
contrast to the dip in the national rate of growth of
the labor force.
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Figure 3
Azerbaijan: Structure of Crop Production'
Q 1960
[] 1970
0 1980
Fruit Tea, melons,
potatoes
? Success in at least maintaining its investment
growth while the national rate of investment growth
declined.
? A remarkable boost in factor productivity, the most
distinguishing feature of Azerbaijan's growth.
? Structural changes-resources were increased more
in those sectors with higher rates of productivity
growth (machinery, light, and food industry) than in
those with declining productivity (particularly oil).
Aliyev's Strategy and Style of Leadership
Regional leaders in the Soviet Union can and do
influence decisions made at the national level as well
as those made in their localities. A strong regional
party leader, then, has it within his power to affect the
major determinants of economic growth outlined in
the preceding section:
? Investment. Allocations of investment resources by
the central party and government leadership depend
not only on economic considerations but also on 'the
lobbying expertise of the regional leadership.
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Figure 4
Azerbaijan: Structure of Industry'
1980
1965
1970
? Productivity. Among the key factors are better
organization, discipline, and management-vari-
ables that can be manipulated by a party leader.
? Structural Change. This kind of decision is usually
expected from the central economic leadership, but
the pace and success of implementation can be
influenced by regional authorities.
? Labor Supply. Local policies can affect this factor.
In Azerbaijan, however, the basic source of labor
force growth was natural increase long before
Aliyev became party leader.
These determinants of economic growth were affected
by three major initiatives that were introduced by
Aliyev during his tenure:
? A massive, prolonged campaign to root out
corruption.
? A series of moves calculated to build the national
leaders' confidence in him and his republic.
? An effort to fully understand the daily operation of
the Azerbaijani economy and an insistence that
local party and government officials exert strict
control over their areas of responsibility.
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Fighting Corruption. Before Aliyev became First
Secretary, the party was permeated with corruption
and unable to exert much control over the badly
lagging economy. According to a book published by
an emigre who was an official of the republic's party
apparatus, in mid-1969 Aliyev, then Chief of the
KGB in Azerbaijan, revealed to Brezhnev the true
extent of this corruption by showing him secret files.
Aliyev reportedly did this at the urging of USSR
KGB First Deputy Chairman Semen Tsvigun.3 Brezh-
nev became convinced that a radical housecleaning
was necessary, and Aliyev was rewarded with the
republic's top post in July 1969
Aliyev began immediate public revelations of corrup-
tion and shortcomings, and by early 1971 he had
purged almost the entire top leadership in the repub-
lic. Charges of flagrant corruption and illegality were
directed largely at low-ranking officials, while public
statements about top leaders were handled with more
finesse and were usually confined to accusations of
poor leadership and laxness. According to the emi-
gre's account, Aliyev relied mainly on KGB cadres to
replace the disgraced officials. Rampant corruption
continued, however. In 1973 another purge began,
including that of some former KGB men who had
been brought in by Aliyev. The emigre explained that
these officials were well disciplined and honest while
in the KGB but quickly succumbed to temptation
when put into prominent party and government posi-
tions.
Aliyev's commitment to the anticorruption drive be-
came his trademark. His speeches to party gatherings
were rife with detailed accounts of officials who had
erred and been harshly punished. Aliyev's report to a
plenum on errors in cadre selection in July 1975 was
typical, filling five pages of the local newspaper with
new denunciations. On this occasion alone he an-
nounced the firing of nine rayon party first secretar-
ies, five republic ministers, and the second secretary
of the Baku City Party Committee.
Aliyev publicly demanded not only that his key
personnel be free of corruption but that they subject
themselves to unusually rigorous standards designed
' Tsvigun allegedly was an in-law of Brezhnev's wife and had been
head of the Azerbaijan KGB until 1967 when he moved to Moscow
to minimize temptation. In an interview published in a
Soviet literary journal, Aliyev revealed that the fam-
ilies of republic Central Committee members and
those of equivalent rank were no longer permitted to
receive scientific degrees at the level of candidate or
higher' and were prohibited from owning private cars
and dachas.
Aliyev seems to have generally adhered to his own
high standards. There is no evidence that he was
enriched by his high office or that he gained unde-
served privileges for his family or friends. His major
fault apparently lay in trying to curry favor with his
superiors.
Aliyev's focus on corruption in Azerbaijan-although
undoubtedly politically important-probably reflect-
ed his perception that it was an obstacle to economic
progress. He spoke about this on numerous occasions.
In an interview published in an April 1980 Soviet
Life, a magazine disseminated in the United States,
Aliyev identified moral decay as the root of his
republic's economic problems. He admitted that there
were unsolved economic problems but "behind these
`purely economic' matters is the problem of the
ideological and moral education of the people."
When his colleagues finally realized that his intent to
deal harshly with corruption was serious, Aliyev's
strategy began to pay economic dividends. Although
the effects of his efforts are not measurable, we think
they contributed to the large boost in factor produc-
tivity.
Building Confidence. Moscow's economic interest in
Azerbaijan before Aliyev's appointment related most-
ly to oil and allied industries. Structural changes to
achieve a more balanced economy had been planned
in the 1960s, but local authorities were slow to
implement them. Aliyev apparently realized that, to
continue to receive the needed funds, he had to
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convince Moscow that his republic was worth the
investment and that the allocations would not be
squandered.
His anticorruption campaign was the first step in
building the central leadership's confidence in him. At
the same time he began to acknowledge publicly the
republic's economic shortcomings. For example, in an
early speech published by the local press in August
1969, he admitted that "labor productivity is rising
very slowly." (One month earlier at a session of the
Supreme Soviet, V. Yu. Akhundov, the former first
secretary, had assured his audience that "the process
of growth in labor productivity is going forward
intensively.") Aliyev's candid self-criticism reportedly
shocked his colleagues but was doubtless viewed in
Moscow as a healthy sign that the Azerbaijani leader-
ship was ready to assess the situation realistically and
move forward.
Next, he petitioned for help from the central govern-
ment in planning the economic recovery, requesting
technical guidance from the USSR Council of Minis-
ters and Gosplan. He also petitioned for additional
resource allocations and was careful to pay continuous
homage afterward to Moscow's beneficence and to
"the great personal attention of Leonid Il'ich Brezh-
nev." This assistance was formally recorded in five
major central party-government degrees during the
Aliyev years-unusual attention for a single republic
(see inset).
Aliyev's behavior bordered on sycophancy-a com-
mon practice in the Muslim areas of the USSR-but
probably helped to cultivate his superiors' confidence
in him. His elaborate praise of Brezhnev went unri-
valed by party chiefs in other republics, and, as noted,
Aliyev's gifts to Brezhnev and his entourage were
reportedly lavish. Brezhnev no doubt welcomed such
blatant support at a time when he was trying to
consolidate his power. Two other valuable contacts in
Moscow for Aliyev were KGB First Deputy Chair-
man Tsvigun and Gosplan chief Nikolay Baybakov.
USSR Central Committee-Council of Ministers
Decrees on Azerbaijan, 1970-79
1970 Two Central Committee-Council of Minis-
ters decrees on measures for developing the
Azerbaijani economy.
1975 Central Committee-Council of Ministers de-
cree on the further development of Azerbai-
jan's agriculture.
1976 Central Committee decree on measures to
develop the most progressive sectors of Azer-
baijan's industry
1979 Central Committee-Council of Ministers de-
cree on measures to develop agriculture and
winemaking in Azerbaijan
Learning the Ropes. Aliyev came to his job with no
firsthand economic knowledge. His university degree
was in history, and his entire career before 1969 was
with the KGB. His first speeches were devoted solely
to corruption and criticism of economic failings, but
he soon became more familiar with the economy and
began to make positive recommendations. He appar-
ently determined early that knowledge of the repub-
lic's economic situation was necessary not only to set a
good example but also to serve as a warning that
incompetent cadres would be unable to hide behind
their boss's ignorance.
He adopted a high-visibility profile. Local press re-
ports of his speeches and appearances were far more
frequent than those of his counterparts in other
republics. He apparently enjoyed contact with the
people and was well
liked by most of them because they believed that he
genuinely cared about their welfare. He talked at
length about the need to improve health, education,
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Aliyev's philosophy of economic management was
simple; it can be summed up as strong supervision,
discipline, and good cadre selection. He demanded
that his subordinates be well informed and held them
accountable for performance in their sector. He con-
demned the slipshod, flaccid management style he
claimed had become common during the time of his
predecessor. He expressed particular contempt for the
republic Gosplan which he accused of "feeble knowl-
edge of the true state of affairs in certain branches of
the economy" and adapting itself to "willful direc-
tives" from the former republic leadership. He often
complained about the "incorrect practice of systemat-
ic downward revision of confirmed plans." He only
rarely delved deeper into the economy's systemic
weaknesses, and, unlike other regional leaders, he did
not originate or even closely associate himself with
economic experiments in organizations and manage-
ment.
Moscow's Perception. The leadership in Moscow was
obviously impressed with Aliyev's ability to boost
Azerbaijan's economic performance. In 1976 Aliyev
became a candidate member of the Politburo. His
selection was a sign of his good standing with the
leaders in Moscow because, traditionally, the Geor-
gian party leader had occupied the Transcaucasus'
slot in the Politburo. Also in 1976, Aliyev became a
Hero of Socialist Labor, on neither a birthday nor any
other occasion when such honors are customarily
awarded. The title was presented for his accomplish-
ments in the economy, notably agriculture, and
Brezhnev declared that Aliyev had proved himself to
be an exemplary leader.
During Aliyev's tenure, Brezhnev visited Baku three
times-in 1970, 1978, and 1982. On the last occasion,
Brezhnev paid tribute to Azerbaijan's continuing out-
standing economic achievement and the campaign to
stamp out corruption, which he linked directly to
Aliyev's leadership. Recent books by other leaders-
including Premier Tikhonov and party secretary
Chernenko-also mention Aliyev's contributions to
his republic's growth.
story. Some aspects of his approach to economic
problems may be transferable to the Council of
Ministers, while others may be irrelevant to national
problems. Although evidence so far indicates that he
has received only the transportation account, we
assume that his ultimate responsibilities could be
more wide ranging.
Many of Aliyev's personal attributes will serve him
well in his new assignment at the national level. His
talent for organization and administration, his thor-
oughness, and his demand for discipline and control in
himself and his subordinates would make him an
effective member of the Council of Ministers. Second,
his long experience in fighting corruption and incom-
petence seem tailormade to bolster Andropov's cam-
paign for discipline. In fact, there are strong similar-
ities between Andropov's and Aliyev's tactics and
personal images. Both men have said that this cam-
paign is a necessary first step toward improving the
economy, and both have used a heavyhanded, blunt
approach at the beginning of their regimes. Both also
have projected an image of personal incorruptibility,
free of cronyism. Third, Aliyev's shrewd political
sense-evidenced by his success in lobbying for re-
sources for Azerbaijan and his ability to exploit the
weaknesses of subordinates-should come in handy in
the inevitable :power plays within the Council of
Ministers.
Most of Aliyev's specific experience, however, seems
ill suited to the national level. First, the Azerbaijani
economy is more like that of a Third World country
than that of the Soviet Union:
? Azerbaijan, Muslim in culture, still has a high birth
rate and a rapid growth in the labor force. The
republic leadership does not share Moscow's prob-
lem-how to conserve scarce labor resources. In
fact, Aliyev has in the past resisted Moscow's
attempts to redistribute labor from areas with a
labor surplus, such as Azerbaijan, to Siberia and
has argued instead for increased investment in
labor-intensive industries in Azerbaijan.
Transferability of Aliyev's Leadership
Style and Experience
Aliyev's style of leadership seems to have had a
positive influence on his republic's economic success
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Figure 5
Soviet Union: Azerbaijan S. S. R.
I
Mingecha )rskoye
~VOdokltranliiahche
? Azerbaijan faces the continuing problem of how to
encourage people to move off the farms and into
towns and cities so that they can be used in the
industrial labor force. This was accomplished some
time ago in the European USSR, where the problem
has become how to keep skilled labor on the farms.
I'yany
Lira
International boundary
-?- Union republic (SSR)
boundary
Union republic center
-?- Autonomous republic (ASSR)
boundary
O Autonomous republic center
- - - Autonomous oblast (AO)
boundary
O Autonomous oblast center
-~-~ Railroad
Road
o 100,000 - 500,000
? Under 100,000
Over 500,000
50 Kilometers
50 Miles
? Azerbaijan has only recently begun to change the
structure of industry from the primary sector (oil) to
a more diversified manufacturing sector, a familiar
pattern in the less developed countries (LDCs). The
national economy, by contrast, is well diversified
with technologically advanced manufacturing
sectors.
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? Azerbaijan's subtropical climate has resulted in the
production of grapes and cotton, the latter grown
solely on irrigated land. This contrasts sharply with
the USSR's concentration on the production of
grain and livestock, both heavily dependent on good
weather.
? Azerbaijan's standard of living is poor, even by
Soviet standards. In a recent study of living stand-
ards in the 15 republics, a US scholar compared
relative levels of per capita consumption and placed
Azerbaijan almost at the bottom of the scale, above
only Tadzhikistan in Central Asia. In a comparison
of international figures for per capita consumption,
Azerbaijan was on a level with Iran while the Baltic
republics approached the levels of Hungary and
Italy.
More specifically, Aliyev has not been forced to
confront the kind of economic problem that the Soviet
leadership now faces-making a successful transition
from extensive (increased inputs) to intensive (produc-
tivity) growth. Azerbaijan has been blessed with an
ample supply of economic inputs and has not experi-
enced a stubborn decline in the growth of factor
productivity. Perhaps because of these conditions,
Aliyev has paid little attention to the economy's
systemic weaknesses. Unlike the speeches of other
regional leaders-Romanov (the former Leningrad
Oblast party chief), Shcherbitskiy (Ukraine) and
Shevardnadze (Georgia)-Aliyev's speeches reveal
shallowness and a lack of innovative ideas about ways
to improve the economic mechanism.
The Political Factor
Aliyev's political status will largely determine his
influence in his new job and the likelihood of his
advancement to premier.
According to one view, Aliyev was promoted by
Andropov and probably will eventually replace
Tikhonov as premier. It is logical that Andropov
would need clients, and Aliyev's KGB background
would appear to establish a tie between the two men.
Rumors, relayed by some official and unofficial Sovi-
et contacts of US Embassy officers and academics,
moreover, indicated that Aliyev had switched his
allegiance to Andropov in May 1982 when Andropov
entered the Secretariat. Aliyev had become con-
vinced, so the story goes, that a job in Moscow was
necessary to save his political career because of two
events-the death and disgrace of his apparent pa-
tron, Tsvigun,' and the realization that the battle
against corruption in Azerbaijan would be unwinna-
ble. For Andropov, these sources asserted, this alli-
ance was beneficial because Aliyev was known as a
fighter against corruption and would be a valuable
ally in pushing the campaign for discipline.
The opposing view is that Aliyev belonged to the
Brezhnev-Chernenko faction and that he is unlikely to
replace Tikhonov as premier:
Chernenko pro-
posed Aliyev as Andropov's successor in the KGB in
May 1982, while Andropov backed the successful
candidate, Vitaliy Fedorchuk, for the post.
? The 1982 edition of Chernenko's book on the party
and state apparatus praised Aliyev's leadership in
Azerbaijan..
? Brezhnev,l (began
to push Aliyev's candidacy for the Politburo follow-
ing his visit in September to Baku, when the
relationship between the two men was warm.
? Andropov, accepted
Aliyev's move but deflected him to the Council of
Ministers rather than the Secretariat, the place for
which Brezhnev had originally intended him.
? The promotion of Foreign Minister Gromyko,
Andropov's ally, to First Deputy Premier last
March appeared to undercut Aliyev's prominence in
the government apparatus and his claim on
Tikhonov's job.
S After Tsvigun's death in January 1982, his obituary was not
signed by Brezlinev, reportedly because of an argument over the
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The truth probably lies somewhere between these two
extremes. It seems likely that Aliyev's nomination to a
post in Moscow was the result of Brezhnev's backing
and was in the works when Brezhnev died. Although
Aliyev probably would not have been Andropov's first
choice, the General Secretary may have believed that
Aliyev's obeisance would allow him to easily transfer
his loyalties to the new regime. Moreover, Aliyev's
experience in directing a relatively successful disci-
pline campaign would be immediately useful to
Andropov. If this is a correct interpretation of events,
then Aliyev probably now is in a testing period for
loyalty and professional competence.
Aliyev's Prospects
Aliyev can exert considerable influence in his current
post, particularly if he can gain Andropov's confi-
dence. Aliyev seems to have settled securely into the
Council of Ministers, where his main portfolio ap-
pears to be transportation. The majority of his
speeches since becoming First Deputy Premier have
addressed this subject, and he was recently named a
member of the high-level commission formed to inves-
tigate the Volga cruise ship disaster that occurred in
June.
Responsibility for transportation, while narrow, is of
vital importance if the economy is to become more
productive. Improving transport, in Andropov's view,
is a priority. Andropov signaled his extreme dissatis-
faction with the railroads in his first speech on
economic matters last November, and, soon after, the
Minister of Railways was fired. Andropov may be-
lieve that Aliyev's considerable managerial skills can
be put to good use in this lagging and corruption-
riddled sector.
As one of Premier Tikhonov's first deputies, Aliyev
has, in addition, been given some responsibility in
addressing broader issues. At the Supreme Soviet
session in mid-June 1983, Gromyko spoke on foreign
affairs, while Aliyev was chosen to deliver the speech
on domestic matters. He introduced the new law on
labor collectives, a milestone for the Soviets because it
defines the rights and obligations of workers and
management; it was reportedly backed strongly by
Andropov. Aliyev's introduction of this legislation
may explain why the rumor is still circulating that he
will be given the job of enforcing worker discipline.
Aliyev's position in the leadership could be further
strengthened by the increased prestige the Council of
Ministers has seemingly gained under Andropov. At
the end of Brezhnev's tenure, five Politburo members
were in the Secretariat while only three were in the
Council of Ministers. Now there are four members in
each body.
hinder Andropov the govern-
mental apparatus may be given more freedom from
the party's interference. Andropov implied as much in
his June speech to the Central Committee plenum
when he talked about ensuring "a correct distribution
of functions between the party and the state" and
avoiding the duplication of state work by "party
bodies."
If the post of premier were to become vacant today,
Aliyev's chances for promotion look slim because of
his lack of economic expertise in the specific problems
that plague the Soviet economy and his tenuous
political power at the national level. Eventually,
Aliyev may prove to Andropov that he can handle the
job of premier. Aliyev may increase his economic
expertise on the job as he did in Azerbaijan. He is a
shrewd politician and may succeed in building politi-
cal capital with the new Soviet leader much as he did
with Brezhnev. Moreover, in recent Soviet history, the
deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers moved
up to become Premier. At present there are few
obvious choices for this post. Two other possible
contenders are Vladimir Dolgikh, party secretary for
industry, and Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, Ukrainian par-
ty chief; both men have broad expertise and good
reputations in economic management. However,
Aliyev's Muslim background is a serious handicap.
Traditionally, the Russian and Slavic bias of the
Soviet elite has made it difficult for a member of an
ethnic minority to assume the top government or
party post.
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