LIBERIA: CRITICAL TIMES FOR THE MILITARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000901440001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 10, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 August 1984
LIBERIA: CRITICAL TIMES FOR THE MILITARY
Summary
I'M
The coup led in 1980 by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe thrust
the ill-prepared military establishment into the role of
governing Liberia for the first time since freed American
slaves founded the country 133 years earlier. The regime's
self-proclaimed goals have been to eradicate the vestiges of
domination by the Americo-Liberian elite, revive the economy
hobbled by worldwide recession and government mismznagement.
and to restore the country to civilian rule by 1986.
Four years of military rule have done little to lay a firm
foundation for the return to civilian rule. Doe's decision to
lift the lid on political activity comes at a time of
continuing economic hardship for most Liberians, and
uncertainty over what lies at the end of the transition
period. Doe's erratic behavior and indecision over his role
during and after the transition--now apparently resolved in
favor of his running or president--have added to the political
confusion.
This memorandum was prepared by West Africa Branch,
Africa Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It has
been coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and
comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
ALA M 84-10081
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J G to It C I
We believe the unity of Liberia's military will be
severely strained as it attempts to monitor and control the
transition process and protect its economic and political
interests. In our judgment, the military--divided along ethnic
lines and split over its political role and future--is poorly
equipped to play the role of a stabilizing force during the
next 18 months. Moreover, we expect these divisions to become
sharper as political activity picks up pace.
Liberia's military will remain political center stage
throughout the transition and ultimately will determine the
success or failure of the transition. While impossible to
predict with certainty, the present weight of evidence suggests
that the military may hold together, and permit a civilian
government--most likely headed by Doe--to take power. The
situation, however, is fragile and volatile and we cannot
discount the possibility of a coup that at the very least would
Whatever role the military takes in the next 18 months is
likely to influence US-Liberian relations. The military's
dependence on the US for training and materiel, along with important
bilateral communications and access agreements, will continue to
make the status of the Armed Forces of Liberia an issue central to
relations between Monrovia and Washington.
In our judgment, Liberia's military will have difficulty carrying out
its self-appointed roles as final arbiter of political disputes and the
guarantor of public order during what is likely to be a rocky transition
to civilian rule. After four years in power, the military remains divided
along ethnic lines, confused about its role in transition, and uncertain
of its place in any future civilian government. Moreover, the inability
of the military to improve its military capabilities or significantly
better the living conditions for soldiers during its tenure in power has
further undermined its ability to provide a politically stabilizing
L.- _A
Profile of the Liberian Armed Forces
rule 'by the merico-Liberian elite, the military was deliberately kept v
small, poorly equipped, and politically corrupted. From its creation in
1904 as the Liberian Frontier Force until recently, the Army's functions
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were limited to frontier defense, internal security, and occasional
international deployments such as the UN peacekeeping operation in the
early 1960s in Zaire.
The April 1980 coup came against the backdrop of the long exclusion
of Liberia's tribal majority from political and economic power, and the
lack of political and social reform following the 1979 rice riots in
Monrovia. Although many rural Liberian tribesmen, particularly the Lomas,
saw a military career as a way of getting ahead, lucrative. senior officer
positions traditionally had remained the preserve of the coastal settler
aristocracy and its coopted tribal allies.
The coup transformed the military overnight into the country's single
most important political institution. While US Embassy reporting amply
documents that Head of State Doe is in effect a one-man government, the
military has been drawn into all levels of government, including 22
soldiers who sit on the newly created 58-member Interim National
Asembly. In addition, Doe is assisted by a cabinet all of whose civilian
members hold military commissions and are subject to military
discipline. In addition, military officers also participate in the
management of parastatal corporations, county government, and the
In our judgment, the army's political activism has undermined its
already suspect ability to carry out its military mission.
Virtually a equipment is US-made but poorly maintained. The
concentration of troops in the Monrovia area--three of six infantry
battalions and most support units, for example, are deployed in or near
the capital--leaves the hinterland areas only thinly garrisoned. (See
Nor do the Liberian Armed Forces constitute a strongly nationalistic
or cohesive force.
Loyalties are rooted in tribe, rather than pro ession or c
support for commanders from other tribes is tenuous at best.
We believe the Army probably is capable of handling occasional small
scale civil disturbances, but that it would be hardpressed to respond
quickly and effectively if called on to put down repeated or widespread
demonstrations. Moreover, sources of the US Embassy doubt that troops
would be willing to fire at civilians should violent demonstrations
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occur. Most soldiers, for example, joined in the rioting and looting in
Monrovia in 1979 after the government threatened to hike the price of
Divisive Issues
Liberia's military enters the transition period divided. In our
judgment, whoever governs will have no choice but to spend a large portion
of Liberia's scarce resources on trying to balance diverse political and
ethnic interests in the military and to meet its most basic economic
needs. However, in our judgment, there is little likelihood that any
government will be able to placate or control all factions within the
military, or take the loyalty of the military for granted.
Ethnic Rivalries. Although the US Embassy reports that many
Liberians take enormous satisfaction in having a "country person" in
charge for the first time, the military is still plagued by intense ethnic
rivalries. In the view of many tribesmen, Doe's "revolution" has replaced
the traditional elitist domination of Liberia and its military with that
of his fellow Krahns. Lomas--who along with Kpelles from northwestern
Liberia accounted for perhaps three-fourths of all enlisted men prior to
1980--are still the largest group in uniform, but see their dominance
being gradually diluted by the increasing numbers of recruits from
southeastern Liberia, particularly Krahn and Kru. Several hundred Krahn
and Kru tribesmen have been brought into the Army since early 1983 despite
an official ban on new recruitment intended to hold down payroll costs.
Moreover, Kru and Krahn are disproportionately represented in the officer
corps, particularly in the higher ranks, based on their presumed loyalty
to to Daher than their military qualifications. (See Table 2)
Doe is well aware of the impact of tribalism, but appears to believe
that he has no political choice but to rely on his kinsmen. Since coming
to power, Doe has nipped in the bud at least 14 alleged milita lots
motivated at least in part by personal and tribal grievances.
In addition, Doe is
protected by a special bodyguard, largely Krahn, whose members are
personally selected by him for demonstrated loyalty.
Bread and Butter Issues. Although the military is still far better
off than most civilians, t e general decline of the economy has affected
the armed forces members at all levels, particularly enlisted men.
Paychecks are generally two months late
Moreover, inflation, food shortages, and rising civilian
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unemployment all add to the drain on soldiers' paychecks from the sizeable
number of extended family members who depend upon them. Deductions for
government development projects in their home districts further erode
soldiers' income.
necessities as uniforms and food.
IFor example,
troops concentrated in and around Monrovia were barely able to carry out
orders to deploy to the border during a temporary spat with Sierra Leone
in 1983, arriving largely in rented vehicles and carrying unserviceable
weapons. At times, the Army has difficulty in providing even such basic
There also is disillusionment in the ranks with what is seen as the
widespread corruption of senior officers. Doe himself is not immune from
from criticism, partly because of his tolerance for the corrupt activities
of his military collea ues.
Attitudes toward a Return to Civilian Rule.
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the military is anxious and uncertain 25X1
about the country's scheduled return to civilian rule and split over the
type of government best suited for Liberia.
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many in the military doubt that a civi
lian regime would be able to 25X1
manage effectively the country's economic and
political problems. On the
away from direct political activity.
We believe the appearance of widespread support for leftist parties
would pose a particularly delicate problem for the military. Although a
majority of the mi l i to ry reportedly is opposed to the election of a
leftist, civilian government, such an event probably would provoke fierce
debate in all ranks. In particular, there likely would be strong
pressures within the military to step in, void the election, and
reimplement military rule. On the other hand, we believe there are those
who are commited to returning to the barracks and believe that the
military can begin improving its military capabilities only when it steps
government would make their economic situation even worse.
The US Defense Attache points out that all ranks fear possible retribution
for misdeeds commited since 1980 and that budget cuts by a civilian
other hand Defense Minister Allison Forces Chief of Staff
Dubar, 77= dl believe the military would
best be served by returning to the barracks and letting civilians shoulder
the burden of administration and take the blame for a failing economy.
The Doe Factor. Attitudes toward the return to civilian rule are
complicated by iv ded opinion over what role, if any, Doe should play in
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the new government. Although Doe is the odds-on favorite to win the
presidential election, his candidacy will continue to foster considerable
debate in the military. Doe's erratic behavior--including his proclivity
for making spur of the moment decisions, lashing out at advisors, jailing
critics, and provoking confrontations with the US--has raised doubts among
some military personnel of all ranks about his fitness to retain office.
Many apparently fear that Doe could jeopardize US military and economic
aid that Liberia needs to survive. Others, regardless of their misgivings
'
over Doe
s administrative incompetence, believe he is the only individual
with the requisite "toughness" to ensure continued political stability.
Finally, Doe's candidacy runs the risk of worsening ethnic tensions
in the military. Non-Krahns worry that Krahn domination will increase if
Doe is elected Liberia's civilian president
On the
other hand, Krahns and other tribes from southeastern Liberia that have
particularly benefited from Doe's rule fear that their political and
economic circumstances will worsen if Doe does not become civilian
president.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
Liberia's political climate during the 18 month transition is likely
to remain uncertain and subject to sudden change. In our view, Doe will
have difficulty balancing the conflicting expectations and demands within
the military and will remain vulnerable to a coup by frustrated soldiers
throughout the transition. In particular, Doe will find it difficult to
balance pressures to maintain and even increase benefits for the military
with pressure from US and international lenders that the government
exercise greater fiscal austerity. Paradoxically, if Doe repeats the
nationalistic posturing of last spring in hopes of extracting more US aid,
he risks antagonizing those military officers who counsel against
straining relations with Washington. (See Table 4)
Doe also will be closely watched for his handling of the ethnic
factor. Continued recruitment of Krahns into the Army almost certainly
will further offend non-Krahns who already believe Doe's cronies are
preparing for civilian rule by grabbing the choicest assignments. For
their part, Krahns may become increasingly intolerant of opposition
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V V V .\ V .
politicians and any campaign rhetoric they believe threatens Doe's
electoral prospects.
We also believe senior officers will pay close heed to how open an
election campaign Doe permits.- In our judgment, Doe could provoke serious
unrest if he gives the appearance of being too blatant in his attempts to
rig the elections. In particular, Doe's
manipulating election laws to disqualify candidates
and parties for ideological reasons may not sit well with senior officers
concerned about Liberia's international image.
Although impossible to predict with certainty, in our estimation,
three basic scenarios are most probable: a grudging toleration of the
status quo by the military, a takeover by senior officers, or a coup by
junior officers or enlisted men.
More of the Same--Muddling Through. Under this scenario--which we
believe most likely at present--arms orces' "professionals" who prefer
to remain aloof from politics would carry the day. Although displeased
with some aspects of Doe's rule, most uniformed personnel would give
grudging support to Doe. This scenario, however, requires that Doe be
responsive to the needs of the military and seek the safest and least
divisive route through the thicket of conflicting political, economic, and
military demands that he will face during the coming months. Doe would
need to offset potentially unpopular moves intended to advance his own
candidacy--such as muzzling the press and selectively harassing rivals and
critics--with "presidential" gestures of forceful leadership and
magnanimity. In any event, Doe is unlikely to make significant headway in
dealing with more fundamental issues such as carrying out structural
economic reforms, curbing corruption, and improving government
management.
A Palace Coup. We believe that over time Doe's senior military and
civilian advisors could come to believe that political stability and a
restoration of Liberia's international image requires Doe's removal. Such
a palace coup could involve Doe's quiet but forceful ouster by senior
officers, his assassination--perhaps by one or more disgruntled former
military---,council members, or a more widespread and bloody takeover.
The stability of such a regime would depend in large measure on the
ethnic composition of the new government and the response of Krahn
enlisted men, the majority of whom support Doe and have benefitted by his
regime. Over the short run, however, we believe senior officers, who
reportedly enjoy respect for their professionalism among the rank and
file, could rally enough support to restore order and establish an interim
government. These officers would have little choice but to turn to
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civilian experts to keep the ?overnment fun C~ 'oning and to plead for US
understanding and increased aid.
We hold out little hope, however, that senior officers would prove
significantly more adept than their predecessors in implementing longer
term economic reforms or developing stable political institutions. While
remaining commited to a return to civilian rule, the process most likely
would be delayed as senior officers attempted to solidify their control.
We cannot discount a bloody coup by unknown junior officers or
enlisted men modelled along the precedent set by Doe. Tribal animosities
and weakened military discipline could usher in prolonged instability as
junior officers and enlisted men with little experience grapple to
consolidate their position and to find additional sources of external
aid. The new government probably would prove difficult for the West to
deal with and could threaten US facilities
in Liberia in hopes of getting more aid from Washington. Foreign
investors, already worried about the risk of doing business in Liberia,
would be further unnerved and capital flight would be likely to ensue.
The uncertainties in this situation would offer Moscow and Tripoli at
least short-term opportunities to meddle at US expense.
The United States' close and extensive ties to Liberia are well
documented. This "special relationship" makes it inevitable that
Washington will be centrally involved in whatever scenario emerges.
However, the widely shared pro-American sentiments of most of Liberia's
military officials must be balanced against the widespread and currently
fashionable prickliness over Liberia's domestic sovereignty. As such, the
US is likely to be placed in a delicate position that will make any
Washington-inspired initiatives sensitive and difficult.
Warning Signs
As uncertain and volatile as Liberian politics is likely to be during
the next 18 months, we believe certain events or policies bear
particularly close watching and could serve as signals of more significant
changes ahead. In particular, we will be paying close attention for
signs that:
-- Doe's behavior is becoming so erratjc and heavy handed that it is
alienating senior officers once loyal to the president;
-- soldiers are becoming increasingly worried that a new civilian
government will be less benevolent and less concerned with their
economic well being, or that they have not yet had their share of
the spoils;
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-- growing numbers of soldiers are expressing the belief that the
election is primarily a tribal concern and that it will either
perpetuate or end Krahn domination, or bring leftists to power;
-- economic hard times are making living conditions for soldiers and
their families even more precarious, and fueling perceptions that
Doe has forgotten the "little man".
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TABLE 1. Liberian Military Units
Unit and Location
Personnel Strength* Comment
Wish
MOD
Officers Other
List rssf. - Tan
1983
AFL Headquarters
225
300
111
185 Commanded
by Chief of Staff Lieutenant
Monrovia
General H
senior Ar
officers i
Y. Konah,
Brigadier
Director
Morris T.
Assistant
Works; Ca
Minister
Captain S.
Minister
Affairs; C
Assistant
J. Payne,
Operations
Assistant
Defense fo
enry Dubar, a Krahn. Other
med Forces of Liberia staff
nclude: Major General Kpenkpah
Deputy Chief of Staff;
General Moses K. Craig,
of Staff; Commanding General
Zaza; Colonel Stephen Blayee,
Minister of Defense for Civil
ptain Anthony P. Togba, Deputy
of Defense for Administration;
Weaka Peters, Assistant
of Defense for Coast Guard
olonel Thomas Gaye, G-2,
Chief of Staff; Colonel Jackson
Deputy Minister of Defense for
; Colonel Tommy Raynes,
Minister of
r Public Affairs
Liberian National
406
443
41
402 Commanded
by Commandant
Coast Guar
Patrick Gb
a Doe Wallace, a
Monrovia, Buchanan,
Grebo. Ma
jority are Kru;
and Greenville
has only o
of Liberia
discipline
are not su
protecting
ne Krahn. One of Armed Forces
's most efficient and
d units. Its 7 patrol craft
fficient for mission of
territorial waters.
*First column refers to government's 1984 "wish list" of preferred unit strengths.
Second column is based upon estimates made by the Ministry of Defense in March 1984.
Third and fourth columns are estimates made in October 1983 by the Armed Forces of Liberia
of officers and enlisted personnel, respectively. ~ 25X1
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Unit and Location
Personnel Strength Comment
Wish MOD Officers Other
List M. - Tank
1983
Air Reconnaissance 137 56 14 32 Commanded by Colonel S. Augustus Jarba,
Unit who allegedly uses unit's aircraft for
Monrovia Camp Ramrod private gain. Most leaders are Krahn and
Springs Payne Airfield Kru. One of Armed Forces of Liberia's
most capable units, but not all of its 10
light aircraft, mostly Cessnas, are
operational and are insufficient support
Engineer Battalion 391 421
Camp Jackson,
Bong County
54
371
Tubman Military
ca em
258
291
62
219
Camp odee
AFL Brigade
143
274
63
200
=aq uarters
Monrovia, Barclay
Training Center
Brigade Special
129
118
11
112
Unit
Monrovia, Barclay
Training Center
for the Coast Guard.
Commanded by
Colonel Stephen J.
Blayee, a Krahn. Military and civilian
construction projects are hampered by
lack of spare parts.
Commanded by Colonel
Maxwell Weah, tribal
affiliation unknown. Ministry of Defense
provides little support. Commander feeds
trainees out of his own salary. New
recruits are almost all Krahns,
semiliterate.
Commanded by Colonel
Alfred Menyeah, tribal
affiliation unknown.
Commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Joseph Largo,
tribal affiliation
unknown.
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Unit and Location
Logistics Command
Monrovia, Barclay
Training Center
Military Police
Company
Monrovia, Barclay
Training Center
Woman's Arm
Corps n1 Monrovia, Barclay
Training Center
Armored Scout
Unit
Personnel Strength
Comment
Wish
MOD Officers Other
List
rs-t- -198 Ranks
T9-93-
310
348
65
253
Commanded by Colonel John
G. Nuah, tribal
affiliation unknown. Inordinate
paperwork and low number of people mak
unit ineffective.
es
129
321
18
317
Commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel John T.
Bengue, tribal
affiliation unknown.
129
101
20
122
Commanded by Major Delisha
W. Tugba, tribal
affiliation unknown.
No WACs have received basic training.
220
71
11
63
Commanded by Captain
Joseph D. Jarlee, a Krahn. Also known
as
Monrovia, Camp 72nd Battalion. Many members are
Ramrod detailed to Executive Mansion Guard.
Thirty soldiers were trained in
Swi tzerland.
Has 12 Mowag armored vehicles,
8 operational. Not permitted 50 caliber
ammunition.
Signal Company 129 53 8 44 Commanded by Major
Monrovia, Ministry Joebious Dickson,
of Defense tribal affiliation unknown.
Infantry 2940 -
atB talions-5
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S E C R E T
Unit and Location Personnel Strength Comment
Wish MOD Officers" Other
=Is tsf. -198 ants
983
1st Infantry - 356 36 273 Commanded by Colonel Moses
Battalion Wright, a Krahn. Generally
Camp Schiefflin, lacks training and equipment, but has
Marshall Territory had training in crowd control.
Has many Loma officers, many
Krahn and Kru; Wright is Doe's brother-
in-law.
2nd Infantry - 197 27 171 Commanded by Lieutenant
Battalion Colonel Henry M.
Camp Todee Worlobah, tribal affiliation unknown.
Reportedly will respond to any political
campaign violence in Monrovia. Has had
training in crowd control, well organized
and disciplined, but no one guards
ammunition, and unit lacks water supply
and medical facilities.
4th Infantry - 204 27 143 Commanded by Colonel
Battalion Arthur B. Joloka, a
Camp Whisnaut, Krahn. Isolated
Zwedru, Cape Palmas, border patrol unit;
and Greenville understrength, poorly equipped,
ammunition is stored in a soldier's
closet.
5th Infantry - 610 76 627 Commanded by Lieutenant
a to ion. Colonel Lawrence Tweh,
Camp ubman, tribal affiliation
Gbarnga, Zwedru, unknown. Isolated
Voinjama border patrol unit.
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S E C R E T
Unit and Location Personnel Strength Comment
Wish MOD Officers Other
Liist ES?. - Ranks
198-3
6th Infantry - 259 30 199 Commanded by Colonel
Battalion Edward Smith, a
Camp Jackson Krahn. Has inoperable
Bomi Hills weapons, little ammunition; minimal
transportation, yet may be Armed Forces
of Liberia's best unit. Has Krahn, Kru,
and Grebo officers; all ethnic groups are
represented in enlisted ranks. Has had
training in crowd control; responsible
for security along Sierra Leone border
and defense of Monrovia.
Field Artillery
179
126
21
97
Battalion
o b~Tert Farm
Agricultural
600
120
27
136
Battalion
Camp o ee
Headquarters,
200
386
74
280
3rd Support
battalion
Monrovia, Barclay
Training Center
Commanded by Major David
Zaza, tribal affiliation
unknown. Has 105mm towed howitzer, 50
caliber machine guns, M40 106 recoilless
rifles, but none have been fired since
1980. Unit is understrength and does not
receive spare parts or maintenance
support.
Commanded by Colonel
Alfred Suah, tribal
affiliation unknown. No effective
leadership, no equipment, inactive.
communications equipment, no vehicles,
and
Commanded by Colonel
Randolph B. Gaye, a
Krahn. Provides
bodyguards and drivers
to senior governmental and military
officials. Bondiway detachment has no
mission--Firestone provides its own
security. B Company in Kakata has no
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Unit and Location Personnel Strength Comment
Wish MOD Officers, Other
tT. - Tanks
1983
Executive Mansion 522 674 95 660 Commanded by Brigadier
Guard General Emmanuel Sayon,
T, Zwedru in a Krahn. Has sufficient
Grand Gedeh, weapons for everyone
Monrovia in its 4 companies; carries Romanian AKM
assault rifles; Doe recently inducted
250-280 more Krahns for the unit. Other
strength estimates reach 1300. Also
performs intelligence functions for Doe;
approximately 400 new recruits will guard
Doe's mansion in Tuzon.
Belle Yellah - 27 3 25 Commanded by Captain
Special Detachment Joseph D. Kartuah,
Camp Belle Yella-TF tribal affiliation unknown. Prison
facility.
Service Support - 510 68 280 Commanded by Colonel
Battalion Raymond B. Outland, tribal affiliation
unknown. Most of its new recruits have
been for military bands.
Brigade
intelligence
Security Agency
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Table 2: Ethnicity and the Liberian Military
Pre-Doe Era The Doe Regime
Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of
Population Indigenous Indigenous ruling Cabinet,
of 2.2 Officers, Enlisted military 1984
million 1975* men, 1975 council,
1984
Mande-speaking Tribes of northwestern Liberia
Gbandi
3
- -
-
-
G i o
9
- -
14
16
Kpelle
20
8 15
11
-
Loma
6
16 60
11
11
Ma ndi ngo
4
- -
-
5
Mano
7
- -
11
-
Vai
3
- -
-
5
Kru-speaking Tribes of southeastern Liberia
Bassa
14
14
Grebo
8
12
9
11
Krahn
5
13
27
21
Kru
8
24
18
16
Gola
5
Kissi
3
Other Tribes
2
5
8
Americo-Liberians
3
- -
-
16
*No reliable service-wide survey of the military's ethnic composition has
been made since 1975. Inflation of personnel rosters to facilitate payroll
skimming by officers makes Doe-era statistics suspect. 25X1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901440001-5
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901440001-5
Table 4: US Interests in Liberia
The US has extensive interests in Liberia, particularly
military access rights that would be difficult
to duplicate elsewhere in Africa... Replacement costs for what is the largest
concentration of US government assets in Africa would exceed $100 million.
Facilities and Access Agreements
25X1
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Voice of America Transmitters and Relay Broadcasts to Africa, the Middle
Station East, parts of southwest Asia.
Access Agreements for Robertsfield
International Airport and Port of
Monrovia
Only ones in West Africa;
rent-free; useful for rapid
staging of US forces into Africa
and the Persian Gulf during
military emergencies.
The $300 million American private investment in Liberia represents the second
largest US investment in black Africa after Nigeria. This investment includes
Firestone and Uniroyal rubber plantations, the LAMCO iron ore mine, in which
Bethlehem Steel has a 25 percent interest, and affiliates of Chase Manhattan
and Citibank. Some 75 percent of US-owned shipping is under Liberian
flag-of-convenience registry, the world's largest.
T-4-1
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901440001-5
Population Density and Ethnic Composition of Liberia
POPULATION DENSITY PER
SQUARE MILE
under 40 40-90 over 90
ETHNO-
LINGUISTIC Kru
West
Atlantic
Mixed, over 90
inhabitants per
sq. mile
DEY Tribe name
Sarpo Subtribe name
ETHNIC COMPOSITION
(portent of total population)
Se(tiers vl ber
Kiss, ; 8) (l.?)
0,l (3 4)
1 S) Kpelle
(199)
1011111
13.rssa (S9)
14.7) Mand,ngo
Mende Gb.3nd, (3?3) (3 9)
(06) (2 8)
Meno
(74)
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Subject: LIBERIA: CRITICAL TIMES FOR THE MILITARY 25X1
Distribution:
Original -- Frederick L. Wettering, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Frank G. Wisner, Africa Bureau, Department of State
4 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis for Africa, INR,
Department of State
1 -- Edmund J. Perkins, Director, West African Affairs, AF, Department of
State
1 -- Joseph McBride, Liberia Desk Officer, Department of State
1 -- Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
1 ---Peter Spicer, Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa, Defense
Intelligence Agency
1 -- DDI
1--ADDI
1 -- DDO/Africa
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- NIC Action Group
1 -- PDB Staff
1--ILS
1 -- C/DDI/PES
1 -- D/ALA
2 -- ALA/PS
1 -- ALA Research Director
4 -- CPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF
2 -- ALA/AF/W
4 -- ALA/AF/W I 25X1
ALA/AF/W
(10 Aug 84)
SECRET
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