MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF AEROSPACE OPERATIONS IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302390001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 24, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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24 September 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
SUBJECT
William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Characteristic
Features of Aerospace Operations in the
Initial Period of War
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is
part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR
Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought". This article is a discussion of
prospective US and British aerospace operations, which may
include the employment of ICBM's, medium-range missiles, and 50X1-HUM
strategic aviation with satellite support, as well as the
operations of missile submarines and carrier strike forces. The
capabilities and objectives of these, and also of tactical air
forces and operational cruise missiles, are analyzed and possible
courses of action described. This art e appeared in Issue No.
4 (65) for 1962.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict
need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of
reference_neports from this nablicatiyin ha/ve,been assigned
William W. Wells
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1962
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
DATE
24 September 1976
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Characteristic Features of Aerospace
Operations in the Initial Period of
War
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 4 (65) for 1962, of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of-Articles of
the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is
General-Mayor of Aviation A. Kuvinov. This article is a
discussion of prospective US and British aerospace operations,
which may include the employment of ICBM's, medium-range missiles,
and strategic aviation with satellite support, as well as the
operations of missile submaPines and carrier strike forces. The
capabilities and objectives of these, and also of tactical air
forces and operational cruise missiles, are analyzed and possible
courses of action described. The article concludes with a brief
discussion of current trends in the development of aerospace
operations and their significance in a future war.
End of Summary
Comment:
After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published
three times annually and was distributed down to the level of
division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end
of 1970.
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Characteristic Features of Aerospace Operations
in the Initial Period of War
(According to Foreign Views)
by
General-Mayor of Aviation A. Kuvinov
In working out the theory of operations of aerospace forces,
the military commands of the US and Great Britain at the present
time subdivide them into the following types: missile operations
of intercontinental ballistic missiles, missile operations of
medium-range ballistic missiles, strategic air operations,
operations of missile submarines, operations of carrier strike
large units, air defense operations, antimissile defense
operations, and operations of tactical air forces and ground
forces in a theater of military operations.
Although these operations are carried out by different means
and have their own specific features, they are all regarded as
integral parts of a single plan for a global nuclear offensive
and directed towards achieving the overall objective.
"Aerospace operations of all types," indicates the US Air
Force Manual, "are interconnected and they are integral parts of
overall strategy; and all types of aerospace forces -- from the
viewpoint of capability -- are interdependent. Therefore, their
actions must be appropriately coordinated."*
According to the views of the military commands of the US
and Great Britain, the missile operations of intercontinental
missiles will be characterized by their rapidity in time and high
effectiveness in results. One of the indications of the rapidity
of missile operations is considered to be the capability of these
missiles to cover the distance from the site of their launching
to the target in 25 to 30 minutes. Among the indices of the
effectiveness of missile operations the Americans usually class
the yields of missile warheads capable of producing destruction
over a large area.
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*Basic Doctrine of the US Air Force (Aerospace Doctrine). US Air
Force Manual, AFM 1-2, 1 December 1959. Publishing House of the
Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, 1960, p. 19.
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The high effectiveness of missile strikes is determined by
their tactical-technical specifications. The accuracy of
intercontinental missiles is continually increasing. Thus, the
value of the average probable error is already now equal to
0.0004 of the firing distance. With tha use of megaton nuclear
warheads and with such a probable error, the majority of the
important stationary targets will, in the opinion of American
specialists, be reliably destroyed. They consider, for example,
that if 263 thermonuclear strikes are carried out on the US with
an average TNT equivalent of about five million tons each, the
132 major military targets and many different industrial
complexes, as well as 71 major cities, will be destroyed.
The most important requirement placed upon missile units and
large units is that their combat readiness for delivery of the
first nuclear strikes be as high as possible. For instance, a
15-minute combat readiness time is established for
intercontinental ballistic missile squadrons.
Missile subunits can carry out both salvo and single missile
launches. The most typical method of employing intercontinental
ballistic missiles in missile operations is considered to be a
massed strike by simultaneous salvos of the maximum number of
missiles in conjunction with individual launches.
What are the capabilities of missile units in this respect?
Atlas-E, Atlas-F, and Titan-2 ICBM squadrons are capable of
conducting salvo firing of all nine missiles available in their
armament; Atlas-D squadrons can conduct salvo firing of three
missiles with an interval of up to 15 minutes between salvos;
Titan-1 squadrons can conduct a salvo of six missiles and after
10 to 12 minutes a second salvo of three missiles.
ICBM squadrons in whose armament there are Minuteman
missiles will, according to the calculations of American
specialists, be able to conduct salvo firing with five missiles
with an interval of three to five minutes between salvos.
Consequently, the 50 missiles available in the armament of such a
squadron, with salvo firing, can be launched within 40 to 50
minutes after the moment of the first launch. 50X1-HUM
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Thus, already in the initial stage, missile operations will
be characterized by high volume and intensity.
From the data cited, it can be seen that the reserves of
intercontinental ballistic missiles -- if additional units of
fire are not produced (according to known data, the Americans are
producing one unit of fire so far) -- may be expended within the
first two hours after the start of a nuclear offensive.
Missile operations of intercontinental ballistic missiles
can begin in extremely short times upon declaration of a combat
alert. This is favored by the high degree of combat readiness,
the availability of reserves of missiles at the launching
positions, and also by the fact that the targets for every
missile are predetermined and that a final reconnaissance of them
before the delivery of strikes is considered inadvisable.
When conducting missile operations, the Americans, taking
into account the possibility of an antimissile defense,
contemplate maneuvering the trajectories of missiles for purposes
of hitting important targets or reinforcing the actions of
strategic aviation and naval forces in separate areas in support
of the accomplishment of the tasks of the nuclear offensive. The
main axes of the employment of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, according to the US Air Force Chief of Staff, General
LeMay, will pass through the aerospace regions of the northern
strategic axis.
Becoming an important factor in the support of missile
operations of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the next
three to five years will be the military satellite systems, for
instance, reconnaissance, geodesic, communications, weather, and
superlong-range detection satellites.
Unlike the missile operations of intercontinental missiles,
operations of medium-range missiles are planned to be carried out
from the territory of countries allied with the US (Great
Britain, Italy, and Turkey and subsequently also of the other
states of the British-American bloc). The squadrons of Thor and
Jupiter missiles belonOng to the air forces of these countries
can use nuclear warheads only with the consent of the US command.
Therefore, the planning of operations of medium-range missiles
will apparently be done on a coalition basis but under the
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direction of the Americans. Besides that, these operations must
be most closely coordinated with the operations of the armed
forces of the theater of war and primarily with the operations of
the nuclear offensive in a theater of military operations.
The objective of the operations of medium-range missiles
will be participation with the other types of aerospace forces in
the destruction of the nuclear potential of a country of the
opposing coalition. The targets at which medium-range ballistic
missiles will be primarily aimed are the operational and
strategic missile bases located within range, nuclear warhead
depots, airfields of long range aviation, naval bases and ports
of basing of nuclear weapons carrying ships, as well as important
industrial centers, air defense centers, and large strategic
reserves located near the theaters of military operations.
The depth of missile operations of medium-range missiles,
with the location of their launching positions at a distance of
1,000 kilometers or more from the borders of the countries of the
socialist camp, does not exceed 2,000 to 2,500 kilometers.
Ballistic missiles sort of directly build up the efforts of the
aerospace forces of the theater of military operations, which
operate to a depth of 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers. Here it should
be taken into consideration that the distribution of actions by
depth is to a certain extent arbitrary. Targets against which
the use of medium-range ballistic missiles is planned can also be
located in the zone of actions of the means of the theater of
military operations. Besides that, neutralization of a number of
targets at a distance of 1,000 kilometers beyond the zone can
also have a direct effect on the success of accomplishing the
tasks of the nuclear offensive in the theater of military
operations, in particular on the fulfilment of the task of
disrupting the strategic deployment of the armed forces and the
approach of the strategic reserves from the interior of the
country. The close connection between these operations is also
confirmed by such exercises of the allied armed forces of NATO as
FALLEX-60 and CHECKMATE.
Missile operations of medium-range ballistic missiles, like
those of intercontinental ballistic missiles, will be
characterized by great activeness and rapidity. The combat
readiness of missile units is high. They are on 15-minute
readiness, and the number of launchers and control means permits
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employing the whole unit of fire in one salvo. Advance
designation of a main target and an alternate target for each
missile affords the possibility of employing them from the very
beginning of a nuclear offensive. Switching missiles from the
main target to the alternate target is done in 15 minutes. In
case of changing the main target and the alternate target, up to
two hours is spent to produce the appropriate calculations. The
accuracy of firing ballistic missiles has grown considerably, and
at the present time the average probable error for Thor missiles
is 0.04 percent of the firing distance, and for Jupiter missiles,
0.06 percent. For instance, in firing 3,000 kilometers, the
average probable error for the Thor missiles equals 1.2
kilometers, and for the Jupiter missiles, 1.8 kilometers.
Operations of medium-range missiles in the near future will
be supported by the same military satellite systems as
intercontinental missiles.
Of all the possible operations of aerospace forces,
strategic air operations are at the present time the foundation
of the nuclear offensive. The American and British military
commands plan to conduct them with heavy and medium bombers
available in the Strategic Air Command of the US and the Bomber
Command of Great Britain. True, the forces of Great Britain are
very insignificant and amount to only about seven percent of the
strategic air forces of the US.
The objective of a strategic air operation will be the
destruction of the military-industrial and primarily the nuclear
potential of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist
camp, as well as ensuring for the US and British commands seizure
of the strategic initiative.
The main targets of destruction for strategic aviation will
be the same as for the medium-range missiles.
Strategic air operations of the nuclear offensive of the
initial period of war will, from the very beginning, acquire a
global scale and be carried out with maximum intensity. These
operations, from the point of view of the grouping of qm-Tiummay
be planned according to several variants.
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As shown by the experience of the exercises of recent years
of the US Strategic Air Command, STAR BURST, CHESS GAME, STAR
PLAY, and the maneuvers of the allied armed forces of NATO,
FALLEX-60 and others, two variants of the conduct of operations
may be most typical.
First -- delivery of the initial strikes with strategic
aviation inthe everyday grouping of forces, i.e., with the main
forces (about 55 percent) from US territory, in cooperation with
the strategic air forces stationed in the European and Pacific
zones.
Second -- delivery of the initial strikes by strategic
aviation with the execution of a preliminary regrouping of the
forces of medium bomber aviation to the air bases of the European
and Pacific zones.
It is known that the US in two or three days can create air
groupings in these zones with a strength of 750 aircraft, which,
considering the strategic aviation of Great Britain, will
constitute up to 43 percent of the forces of strategic aviation.
The first variant of conducting strategic air operations
conforms to the principle of surprise, since it hinders detection
of the intentions of the US command; however, it limits the
possibilities of employing the largest number of aircraft as a
result of the great distance of strike targets from the places of
basing (7,000 to 10,000 kilometers) and the difficulties in
refueling aircraft in the air. The experience of numerous
exercises shows that the American military command is devoting
much attention to the first variant.
The second variant is more advantageous from the point of
view of the possibility of maximum allocation of forces to
deliver the initial strike, but conforms less to the principle of
surprise. The concentration of considerable forces of strategic
aviation in the European and Pacific zones (no matter what
pretext it is done under) can be detected by strategic
reconnaissance.
Employing strategic aviation according to the second variant
is most probable under conditions of a sharp growth in 50X1-HUM
international tension or of escalation of a local war into a
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general war. In this situation a number of overt measures can be
carried out to increase the combat readiness of the armed forces
and regroup forces, as was done by the NATO countries in the fall
of 1961 in connection with proposals of the Soviet government
about concluding a peace treaty with Germany.
Strategic air operations, regardless of what variant they
are conducted by, will take on the character of intercontinental
operations and shuttle operations, as well as of operations
carried out from forward air bases. In this connection, the
Americans consider that prolonged use of forward air bases under
the conditions of a nuclear war is hardly possible. However, if
the American and British military commands are deprived of the
possibility of using these bases on the very first day of the
war, then on subsequent days they will be forced to go over to
conducting only intercontinental air operations, which will
drastically reduce the intensity of combat actions.
Strategic air operations are planned to be conducted with
the exploitation of all air axes, northern, northwestern,
western, southwestern, southern, far eastern, and northeastern.
The most important of these are the northern, northwestern,
western, southwestern, and northeastern axes, on which over 90
percent of the forces may be used.
Based on the experience of exercises of the US Strategic Air
Command, the operational disposition of strategic aviation during
a nuclear offensive may be as follows:
in the first 24 hours, a raid by the main forces
in two or three echelons of aircraft with a duration
of actions of two to four hours and intervals of
four to six hours between raids;
in the second 24 hours, strategic bombers operating
in echelons of single aircraft or small groups will
deliver strikes on new targets and repeat strikes on
those targets not destroyed the first day;
in the third 24 hours, continuation of actions in
echelons. The duration of continuous actions in
echelons may reach approximately 50 hours.
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The first day, on which it is contemplated to use up to 70
percent of the strategic aviation deployed in the continental US,
100 percent of the aviation deployed at forward air bases, and up
to 60 percent of the nuclear warheads issued for the nuclear
offensive, is regarded as the most intense.
The combat capabilities of the strategic aviation of the US
and Great Britain, stemming from the tactical-technical
specifications of the aircraft, the areas of basing, and the
means of support, permit making certain generalizations on the
nature of its employment during a nuclear offensive. Heavy
bomber aviation (B-52 aircraft), exploiting its single-squadron
basing and the availability of considerable refueling means (two
tankers for three bombers), can be fully employed on the very
first day of the offensive, i.e., one sortie can be carried out
with the participation of all the combat-ready aircraft, taking
into account the duration of the flight (15 to 20 hours) under
the condition that they return to air bases in the continental
US.
Carrying out a repeat sortie should be considered possible
only on D3. On D2 may be employed the aircraft put into service
above the 70 percent of combat-ready ones accepted by the
Americans in operational estimates, as well as the heavy bombers
participating in shuttle operations.
Medium bomber aviation (B-47, B-58, Victor, and Vulcan
aircraft) deployed in the continental US can be two-thirds
employed on the first day, and that based on forward air bases,
completely.
Combat actions can be conducted on D2 employing one-third of
the forces based in the continental US and employing repeat
sorties of medium bombers from forward air bases.
It is quite probable that combat actions on D3 will be
carried out by means of repeat sorties of aircraft that have
returned after the initial strike to the air bases of the
continental US, and partly by employing aircraft remaining
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forward air bases.
Thus, in the course of a three-day nuclear offensive, heavy
bomber aviation is capable of carrying out up to two sorties, and
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medium bomber aviation, up to 2.5 to three sorties. It is
presumed that 20 percent of the aircraft participating in the
operations will be used for radar support.
Acquiring ever-growing importance in the support of air
operations are the satellite systems. Among them are
reconnaissance satellites (Samos), navigational (Transit),
weather (Tiros), communications (Courier and Echo),
superlong-range missile detection (Midas), and geodesic (Anik and
Hector).
Among the other operations planned in a nuclear offensive, a
large place is set aside for operations of missile submarines.
The objective of such operations will be destruction of the
nuclear means of our navy. The main tasks of these submarines
are the destruction of missile bases, naval bases, bases of
nuclear weapons submarines, nuclear weapons depots, airfields of
naval aviation, and shipbuilding yards and aircraft construction
plants.
A characteristic feature of the operations of missile
submarines consists in the fact that the preparation to carry
them out requires more time than for stationary missile means.
The conduct of such operations is involved primarily with the
necessity for the arrival of the submarines in the initial areas
of combat actions. True, for purposes of achieving greater
secrecy of this arrival, the US command intends to constantly
keep over one-half of the missile submarines at sea near their
designated fire positions. Organizationally, in the near future
the operations of these submarines are planned to be conducted by
squadrons with a strength of nine submarines each.
In calculations of the combat capabilities of missile
submarines, allowance is made for the rather considerable
probable error of the Polaris missiles, which is as much as 2.5
kilometers. Also having an effect on their launch are the speed
of the submarine, the depth of its underwater position, and the
degree of roughness of the sea. Therefore, it is to be expected
that each submarine, having 16 missiles, will receive four or
five targets apiece when accomplishing combat tasks in an
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Considered one of the most important and difficult problems
in conducting operations of missile submarines is controlling
them and coordinating their actions with other aerospace means.
According to existing views, when delivering strikes with
missiles, submarines must operate singly at a definite distance
from one another. Therefore, control must also be handled for
each submarine separately. All this requires dependable two-way
communications. Their first long-range cruises showed the
inadequate reliability of control of the submarines by the
network of existing long-wave radio stations. To solve this
problem powerful new types of radio stations are now being
developed that permit establishing high-speed teleprinter
communications.
The beginning of operations for delivering nuclear strikes
with Polaris missiles is planned to be closely tied in with the
launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
In the nuclear offensive plans, a definite place is
allocated to operations of carrier strike forces. The
effectiveness of these operations is determined by the high
readiness of the carrier strike large units. The objective of
operations of carrier strike large units is the destruction of
the nuclear means of the opposing side in the zones of the
strategic rear adjacent to the theater of military operations and
in the theaters of military operations themselves.
The main targets for the delivery aircraft of carrier-based
aviation are submarines and ships equipped with nuclear weapons
located in naval bases and at sea, airfields of the long range
aviation and front aviation, and missile launchers and depots of
nuclear warheads and mine weapons.
It is planned that the operations of carrier strike forces
will be coordinated with the operations of strategic and tactical
aviation for the purpose of building up their efforts in
accomplishing tasks to gain aerospace superiority.
It is necessary to note that the US and British commands are
particularly counting on the conduct of operations by carrier
strike large units, considering these forces the most survivable
by virtue of their mobility. The basic combat element
participating in an operation is the carrier strike group. The
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distance between two such groups forming a carrier strike large
unit may vary within the limits of 50 to 100 kilometers. After
the sortie of the delivery aircraft against the targets, the
aircraft carriers, maneuvering in a specified area, change their
positions. The operations of carrier-based aviation are planned
to be conducted with a large number of small groups and single
aircraft.
The US and British commands plan to keep the main groupings
for conducting operations of carrier strike large units in the
eastern part of the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean Sea, and in
the Far East.
Operations of tactical aviation and operational cruise
missiles (Mace and Matador) form the basis of a nuclear offensive
in theaters of war and theaters of military operations.
The objective of such operations is to gain nuclear and air
superiority in the theater and guarantee the offensive character
of combat actions for the troops deployed here. The main targets
of the delivery of strikes of tactical aviation in a theater of
military operations will be front missiles, airfields of front
aviation, nuclear warhead depots, radar centers and troop control
centers, and groupings of troops, especially tank formations.
The main requirements placed upon the actions of the
tactical air forces are that they begin suddenly, have the
character of massed strikes, and ensure the destruction, first of
all, of enemy nuclear means in the theater of military operations.
In the interests of ensuring the suddenness of the initial
strike, the crews of the delivery aircraft of tactical aviation
are previously targeted against specified enemy targets in the
theater of miltary operations which are planned to be destroyed
upon the declaration of "R"-hour* without a preliminary final
reconnaissance.
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*The signal upon which nuclear weapons are employed in a theater
of war by the US Commander-in-Chief.
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As the experience of the large exercises of recent years of
the allied air forces of NATO shows, the actions of tactical
aviation will be characterized by high intensity which may
manifest itself in up to three sorties per aircraft in the first
24 hours, up to two sorties in the second 24 hours, and up to one
and a half sorties in the third.
For the purpose of delivering massed nuclear strikes,
operations of the tactical air forces are planned to be conducted
with a large number of small groups and individual aircraft
operating simultaneously on a wide front and to a great depth in
conjunction with salvo and individual launches of cruise
missiles. Characteristic of the actions of these means will be
flights at maximally low and maximally high altitudes for the
purpose of paralyzing the efforts of the air defense.
In operations of the tactical air forces, the US command
plans extensive maneuver of forces and means from one
operational-strategic axis to another, as well as cooperation
with the various branches of the armed forces in the theater of
war, in particular with the aerospace forces of the naval forces
of the theater of military operations. Besides that, the
American command also plans cooperation with the strategic
aerospace forces.
Having examined several characteristic features of the
operations of aerospace forces in the first days of the initial
period of war, it is necessary to dwell on the question of
coordination of the actions of aerospace forces, in particular on
the sequence of their commitment to combat actions.
What are the requirements placed upon aerospace operations?
Above all, they must be sudden and interconnected and ensure the
fulfilment of the overall strategic concept of the nuclear
offensive. "The basic US strategy," declared US Air Force Chief
of Staff, General LeMay, "is a sudden strike with all available
forces and means. The US must deliver such a strike first." The
absence of exercises which would simultaneously involve all
available aerospace forces and show the sequence of their
commitment to a nuclear offensive, deprives us of the opportunity
of referring to the experience of them.
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In the military theoretical literature of the US and Great
Britain, this question is treated only in a general way. For
instance, the American military writer R. Hubler wrote in one of
his books, "The first wave is made up of powerful supersonic
intercontinental missiles, after which follow supersonic manned
aircraft; after this subsonic cruise missiles and manned aircraft
will go into action; then the attack will be renewed with the
employment of ballistic missiles, followed by a second wave of
supersonic bombers, etc., until all our might is utilized."*
A similar point of view was also expressed by former US Air
Force Chief of Staff, General White. "The raids of our manned
bombers," he declared, "may be preceded by the strikes of our
missiles on enemy targets."**
As we see it, what is common to the statements quoted is
that the strikes of intercontinental ballistic missiles and
manned strategic bombers mutually complement each other, with
missiles being the first to act against the targets. On this
point there is no doubt. However, this by no means indicates
that the intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium-range
missiles, strategic aviation, and aerospace forces of the theater
of military operations will have the same "R"-hour. The
tactical-technical specifications of these means are completely
different. Thus, whereas to cover the distance from the US to
targets located in the territories of the countries of the
socialist camp requires six to nine hours for strategic aviation,
for intercontinental missiles it is only a total of 25 to 30
minutes.
In endeavoring to achieve the suddenness of an initial
strike of maximum possible yield, the US and British commands, in
our opinion, are at the present time going to concentrate
attention on ensuring the commitment of the forces of strategic
aviation as the most numerous delivery means of nuclear weapons,
without allowing long operational pauses between the initial
strike of the missiles and the initial strike of the aircraft.
The view exists that a massed take-off of bombers may be detected
mainly by the radiotechnical means of the air defense of the
countries of the socialist camp, i.e., at the limit line of
long-range radar detection. Therefore, the flight time to this
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*R. Hubler, Strategic Air Command, New York, 1958, p. 152
**Air Force, September 1959.
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Page 17 of 19 Pages
limit line may be exploited by the US command to reduce
operational pauses. This thesis ?is confirmed by the experience
of the combat training of the US Strategic Air Command.
In the American press it has been mentioned that upon a
signal of alert after suspicious objects are noted on the radar
screens, the bombers of the Strategic Air Command take off and
head towards targets located on the territory of the Soviet
Union. For four hours and 20 minutes they are under so-called
positive control. If in this time the crew does not receive the
final order to continue the fulfilment of the assigned task, the
bombers turn back at the moment when there are two hours of
flying time left to the Soviet border.
Thus, the problem of approaching the strike targets without
going into the zone of long-range radar detection is being worked
out.
A schematic diagram of the sequence of the commitment of
aerospace forces in a nuclear offensive when operating according
to the first variant may be presented in the following form (see
diagram) [diagram missing].
From the variant of the commitment of aerospace forces to
combat actions being considered, it follows that the strategic
aviation is put into the air first. The take-off of the
strategic air units will evidently be made to depend on the
length of their flight routes to the limit line of long-range
radar detection of the air defense of the countries of the
socialist camp. After the take-off of the strategic air units
will follow the take-off of carrier-based aviation; and upon its
approach to the limit line of long-range detection, the
intercontinental ballistic missiles and the medium-range
ballistic missiles will enter into combat actions, and then the
aviation and missile means of the theaters of military
operations.
In the future, when the role of strategic missiles in the
system of the armed forces of the US and NATO has changed and
they become the basic delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons, the
sequence of the commitment to action of all the means of
aerospace forces will also be different. Strategic aviation will
cease to have a decisive influence on the operational disposition
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of aerospace forces in a nuclear offensive and missiles will make
up the main forces of the first wave; the aircraft of strategic
aviation will enter into the composition of the second and
subsequent waves. The commitment of forces in a global nuclear
offensive can be presented in one of its variants in the
following form:
first wave: intercontinental ballistic missiles,
medium-range and operational-tactical missiles;
second wave: strategic aviation from forward air bases,
tactical and carrier-based aviation of the theaters of
military operations;
third wave: strategic aviation from the air bases of
the continental US.
The combat alert, i.e., the beginning of combat actions
under the conditions being considered, can be declared for all
units and large units of aerospace forces simultaneously; but the
strikes will be delivered with a break in time depending on the
tactical-technical specifications of the means of attack and
their distance from the strike targets, thereby constituting
separate waves of a single nuclear offensive operation.
Consequently, the contemporary development of the military
science and military art of the US is characterized by the
persistent endeavor to expand the scale of modern war, to bring
new means of combat into its conduct, and to develop the theory
of employing them.
On the basis of an appraisal of the arsenal of aerospace
weapons and the plans for their development in the near future,
one can come to the conclusion that up to 1964-1965 air and
missile operations will prevail, then missile operations will
become dominant. Subsequently, when missile-carrying space
bombardment systems become the main strategic means of combat,
the operations of these means will have the nature of space
operations.
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This trend in the development of aerospace forces and the
military art of the US and Great Britain must be studied from all
aspects and be taken into consideration by us for the purposes of
successfully accomplishing the tasks of defending our country and
the whole socialist camp.
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