ARTILLERY COLLECTION: THE MANEUVER OF MISSILE UNITS IN AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 15, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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COMI Y : USSR
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AF It Y COLL CrICN: The Mnneuver of Missile Onits
in an feD. ive Operation" 50X1-HUM
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The Maneuver of Missile Units in an Offensive Operation.
In conditions of employment of atomic weapons and the
increased capabilities of combined-arms large units, armed
combat acquires a character of high maneuverability and
will develop in wide areas. 'For this reason, in modern
operations ,.there is a particular increase in the importance
of maneuver of forces and weapons and especially of fire
(manevr ognem) on the battlefield in order to strike
crushing blows against the enemy. The leading role in
routing the opposing enemy grouping is played primarily by
atomic weapons.
By using mass atomic strikes in the main direction
and against the basic enemy grouping it is possible to
inflict decisive destruction. on to enemy and ensure a
swift offensive by tanks and infantry, without having to
concentrate (uplotnyat) their battle formations. Moreover,
the massing of atomic strikes for resolving the main missions
in an offensive operation is not possible without a wide-
spread maneuver of missile and rocket units.
The maneuver of these units on wide areas along the
front and in depth in order to mass fire against enemy
objectives is one of the sort important conditions for the
attainment of success in combat and in an operation.
Therefore, the art of employing missile units in a modern
operation, depends on the ability to maneuver them.
A skilfully prepared and timely executed maneuver
of fire creates favorable conditions for troop operations
in wide zones, and allows then to carry out their missions
with considerably smaller forces and in greater depth.
Conversely, fire passivity, the untimely maneuver of units,
procrastination in preparing and carrying out powerful
fire strikes o.uring the operation, can lead to heavy
losses from enemy fire, can put the troops into an un-
favorable position, and thus lessen the effect of toe
initial strike and slow down the tempo of the offensive.
Atomic strikes are the basis of sass fire of missile
units. Their tremendous firepower, their high destructive
action, and long range of fire expand to a great exteIt'
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the capabilities, and heighten the significance, of the
maneuver of fire. A timely executed maneuver of fire by
missile units with the use of atomic ammunition may
eliminate the necessity for maneuver and employment of
large masses of tanks and infantry and also conventional
artillery using conventional ammunition, or considerably
reduce the scales on which they are used.
In view of its depth and the importance of the
missions to be solved, the maneuver of missile units
acquires not only a tactical but also an operational
significance. Therefore, the organization of the
maneuver of these units and of their fire must be the
main concern of the commanders of artillery of a front
and an army and their staffs during the course of an
offensive operation.
The main role in maneuvering missile units must be
played by the maneuver of fire, because by this means a
quicker solution of the missions and surprise of fire are
achieved to a greater degree.
Fire and maneuver are interrelated factors. Mass
fire in a number of cases is impossible without the
maneuver of missile and rocket units.
One should not make contrasts and draw a definite
line between the maneuvers of fire and the maneuvers of
missile units. Any maneuver of missile units has as its
final aim the provision of the capability to inflict fire
strikes against the enemy, i.e., in the interests of
delivery of fire.
The capabilities of maneuver of fire, apart from
other conditions, are also determined by the relatin"--hin
of the grouping and of the disposition of combat formations
of missile units to a specific situation. It follows that
in the course of an operation, in order to create conditions
for a wide maneuver of fire, it will also be necessary to
resort to a maneuver of units. 50X1-HUM
When firing atomic ammunit4.on it is sometimes
necessary to resort to muneuvering (chancing the location
of) launchers in order to create the best conditions for
carrying out the fire missions because the effectiveness
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of firing atomic ammunition of given or available yield
also depends on the conditions of fire (primarily on the
range of fire).
When organizing the maneuver of units (subunits),
one should strive to restrict them to essential limits
through the fullest utilization of the ranges of fire
and fii,e maneuver capabilities. Moreover, one should
take into account the effectiveness of fire (dispersion
of rounds) and the possibility of the certain destruction
of the targets ly available ammunition, including atomic
ammunition.
The concept of maneuvering missile units should
not be limited tc t: a maneuver of fire and of subunits
(units). For these units a wide maneuver with atomic
ammunition and the accompanying technical equipment will
also be characteristic, in&-omu_ch as they carry out
their main missions in the operation with atomic ammunition.
Maneuver with conventional ammunition was also carried
out in the past. However, for obtaining decisive results
one had to move to a great quantity of ammunition, which
required a great deal of transport, effort, and time.
In modern operations it is enough to move a
comparatively small amount of atomic ammunition to the
required direction in order to ensure in a short time
the capability of destroying the main enemy grouping or
the most important enemy objectives and creating favorable
conditions for the operations of friendly troops.
Maneuver with ammunition of missile units will
consist of redistribution and timely dispatch of ammunition
and special fuel to subunits and units which are capable of
getting ready to strike against the enemy in the shortest
possible time.
The need for maneuver with atomic ammunition may
arise fairly often, because their quantity among the
troops will be restricted, and for this reason it will
not be possible to have it always available in reserve 50X1-HUM
in sufficient quantity in all directions.
Maneuver with at'mtc ammunition also takes place
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when the necessity arises of supplying charges of the
required yield for the solution of specific fire missions,
when due to conditions of the situation the fire missicr
cannot be performed with the ammunition available.
To ensure maneuver with atomic ammunition, it is
essential to have reliable means of transport, for instance,
helicopters specially equipped for these purposes and
special vehicles which are capable of delivering the
ammunition quickly and reliubly to the place required.
Maneuver with missile units and their fire will
depend on the character of the missions being carried
out by the troops, on the availability of these units
and their capabilities, and also on the availability of
atomic ammunition and the order of its use.
During the course of an offensive operation, the need
for maneuver of missile units will arise mainly for the
solution of such important miscinns as rnmhating enc.mv
weapons of atomic attack and reserves, repulsing his
counterattacks and counterstrikes. securing the entry into
the battle of second echelons and reserves, supporting
troops when crossing water obstacles in force from the
march, and also when surrounding and destroying large
enemy groupings and when transferring the efforts of the
troops from one direction to-anptber.
One of the most important missions of missile units
is the destruction of enemy weapons of atomic attack.
When resolving this mission, one must take into acc.:'.,nt
that the enemy has powerful means of atomic s:ttazk and
in fairly large quantity.
It suffices to say that a USA army corps of modern
organization at medium strength can have up to 80-85
various guns and rocket launchers capable of using atomic
ammunition, a field arwy can have up to 250-270, and an
army group something like 500.
The overwhelming majority of them (up to 90-95 percent)
will be located within the limits of the first zone of
defense, the remainder (5-10 percent) - at a distance of
30 to 100 kms and further.
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The distribution of the means of atomic attack along
the front will allow the enemy to launch strikes against
our troops from varying directions.
It is obvious that if these weapons are not destroyed
in time, or at least their striking power is not weakened,
one cannot expect the operation to be successful.
It should be stressed that this mission will be
resolved by the combined efforts of missile units,
conventional artillery, and aviation.
The missile units will be called upon for combat
with enemy means of atomic attack located in depth. For the
destruction of enemy weapons of atomic attack located at
an inconsiderable distance, conventional artillery should
also be used and, in the first place long-range guns,
because one must not count on a missile with an atomic
warhead being used on every enemy installation.
It is perfectly clear that the mission of combating
the weapons of atomic attack cannot be carried out
successfully without a wide and rapid maneuver of fire
of missile units.
The maneuver of these units with she aim of combating
enemy means of atomic attack will have to be carried out
not only during the course of the operation, but also
during preparations for the operation, especially for the
purpose of supporting the forward movement and deployment
of friendly troops for the offensive.
The success of combating enemy means of atomic attack
will depend to a great extent on the timely state of
readiness of missile units to carry out destruction of
the enemy's weapons immediately after detection. Therefore,
during preparations, as well as during the course of the
operation, a certain quantity of launchers and atomic
ammunition must be in constant readiness to inflict strikes.
Prior to the beginning of an operation, several firing
positions should be prepared in different directions and
at varying distances from the enemy, as well as access roads
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to them and cover for the units carrying out the maneuver
to these positions.
The maneuver of fire and of subunits (launchers) in
these conditions must be executed with precision and speed,
because otherwise the enemy will have an opportunity to strike
first.
At the same time the mission of destroying enemy atomic
weapons must be resolved by the subunit which can be prepared
to deliver the strike iii the shortest time, irrespective
of whether these weapons are located in the zone of this
or that large unit or formation.
Sketch 1 shows an example when, in the zone of advance
of an army, a "Corporal" guided missile (URS) battery is
spotted on its left flank moving to a launching site.
Moreover, the battalion of the engineer brigade is unable
to hit this target from the firing pooitions it occupies
because it is out of range, while the second battalion is
in the process of occupying its firing positions.
It is obvious that in this case, for the destruction
of the enemy "Corporal" battery, it is essential to call
upon a battalion of the neighboring 21st Army zone.
When resolving the destruction of the means of atomic
attack, an important role is played by the time necessary
to carry out the strike, because this is connected with
the duration of stay of enemy atomic weapons in their
positions and the tactical-technical characteristics of
the weapons and used for their destruction.
For instance, to deliver the assembled "Corporal"
guided missile from the technical site to the launching
site, including setting it up, arming it, and the launching
process, would take the enemy about two hours. It follows
that from the moment of spotting the forward move of the
enemy battery to the launch position until the strike is
delivered, not more than one to one and a half hours should
elapse.
When organizing the destruction of enemy leans of
atomic attack, it is essential to consider the time of possible
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This can be done only by the widest maneuver of fire
of missile units of tactical desigastion in the entire
zone of the army and neighboring zones, and the missile
units of operational-tactical designation in the zone
of the entire front and even in a sector of the neighboring
front.
The maneuver of missile units and large units and of
their fire becomes most important when the second echelon
of a front (army) is committed to battle.
As a rule, the second echelon of a front is committed to
battle from the march.
In these circumstances, in cooperation with aviation,
by a mass atomic strike, before the second echelon in
committed, decisive destruction must be inflicted on the
enemy, his main grouping should be weakened to the maximum
degree, his identified means of atomic attack should be
destroyed, and thus create favorable conditions for the
deployment and commnitmint to battle of the second echelon,
as well as for a swift development of the offensive.
This can be achieved by a mass atonic stri!3 using
the major part of the missile units of the front.
It was sometimes noticed during s number of exercises
that for solving this problem the atomic strikes were
planned, in the main, immediately in front of the designated
line-of commitment of the second echelon, to a short depth,
and were tined for the actual moment of departure of the
second for the previously designated line. Such delivery
of atomic strikes did not have the desired effect.
Supporting the commitment of the second echelon of a
front in modern conditions consista in the first place of
preventing the enemy from carrying out a mass atomic strike
during the period of forward movement And deployment of
the army for commitment and also to prohibit a counteretrike
and counterattacks by the enemy reserves.
Indecision and procrastination in destroying
readiness of this or that subunit for the delivery of a
strike, and to use in the first place such means as will
ensure the fulfillment of the mission in the shortest possible
time.
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echelon of the front toward the lice o
means of atomic attack when the second echelon Sslbeing
brought forward for commitment to battle may e
the second echelon su.fferGlgk.eavy ssas from eaimmass
enemy atomic strike an3 big obliged
lengthy and exhausting fighting.
Therefore, the most important missic - when the second
echelon of a front is being committed to aotion is the
destruction of the enemy means of atoand
reserves which are moving up, especially Sketch 1).
Artillery, by its fire, must also support swift
development of the offensive into the depth of the enemy
defense. In these conditions the missions of missile
units of operational-tactical essignation support, must obeeinto
the main those of ionran8deepe fire
-lying enemy objectives
destroy the most important
(means of atomic attack, troop concentrations, reserves
moving up, etc)
For the solution of missions in backing up the
its
commitment of the second echelon and the support
operations in- *hes depth of the enemy defense, an -
appropriate grouping of artillery must be created
beforehand,, and its combat jormatiofs chosen with the
aim of fulfilling its assigned fire missions both during
the commitment and in support of the further open a icna
of the second echelon.
This will entail a partial regrouping and also the
maneuver of independent missile units.
Partial regrouping of missile units will also be
required when it is necessary to strengthen the second
echelon of the front, by resubordinating them from the
command either of the first echelon itself or from
units under direct command of the front.
Maneuver by missile units must be completed in
such a way aa''to ensure their readiness to open fire
at the start of the forward movement of the second 50X1-HUM
f commitment
Experience in exerc
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shows that it is expedient
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to change the subordination of missile units of tactical
designation to the formation (cbyedineniye) of the second
echelon of the front in the area of concentration, located
some 40 to 50 kms from the line of commitment, or directly
in combat formations. As a rule it is expedient to
resubordinate missile units of operational-tactical
designation to combat formations already formed at
prepared siting areas. This will ensure the timely readi-
ness of missile units and large units to open fire.
On bringing the second echelon of the front into
battle, when the time factor is vital, it will be more
usual to resort to fire maneuver of missile units
(including switching from one army zone to another),
rather than to regroup them. For tactical missile units
it will be more normal to carry out a broad maneuver by
subunits, in order to concentrate their efforts on the
more important axes, since this is dependent on the
operations of troops in wide zones, in separate directions,
and with wide gaps between the units and large units, which
will certainly restrict the possibilities of fire maneuver.
The threat of being subjected to counterattacks and
counteratrikes by highly mobile enemy reserves will arise
in modern operations such more frequently than in the past.
The capabilities of missile units will allow the
offensive side to disrupt the count ers trike of enemy
reserves at its very inception by the destruction of the
reserves in the areas of concentration (unloading areas)
or at the beginning of their forward movement for a
counterstrike.
For the execution of this mission it may be necessary
to carry out a maneuver by these units.
During tae course of an operation a situation may
arise when the troops of a front may go over to the
defensive with part of their forces in order to repulse
the counterstrike of a powerful enemy grouping, while
the main forces continue the offensive.
In this case the necessity arises of resolving two
mission at the
i
same t
me: to support the offensive of
the main grouping of the front and ensure the reyulainw
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of the enemy counterstrike.
It is quite underatandable that the solution of these
missions will be carried out in the first place by maneuvers
of the fire of missile units froindi~idualcsubunitsaoftthese
but the necessity of regrouping
units should not be excluded.
The change of location ofmi issile
the course of an operation is o
general complex of measures connected with the maneuver of
artillery.
It has to be organized and carried out in such a
way as to ensure the constant readiness of the necessary
number of subunits and units for the delivery of atomic
strikes, first of all against the enemy means of atomic
attack. Proceeding from these requiremerte, it is
advisable as a rule to move battalions of *i siiletunits
of tactical designation battery by battery, and a
same time their first move should start with captu th
by friendly troops of the enemy a
the occupation of the siting area within the limits of the
combat position or, behind it. The state of readiness of
the battery in the new siting area determines the movement
of the remainder of the battalion to the next siting area.
Ths length of the bound will dependtoonn th$edanngfemofe-
fire, the speed of the troop of!ensive,
ment, and the time required for the deployment and prepa-
rations for firing in the now area.
The longer the range of fire of the system, the longer
the
may be the bound during the atiement. Nevertheless,
main determining conditions when solving the problem cf
the sequence of movement should first of all br the
ensuring of constant readiness to strike the enenyoto a
mzzimun depth, and the uninterrupted fire support
troops by atomic strikes.
During the course of an operation, subunits of missile
units must be in constant to destroy in the
of atomic attack and other impo
depth of the enemy defr_sesT(her~~ne~~er$p~~'ao tcon heeenemytions,
reserves moving up, etc).
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means of atomic attack will ae located within the defenses,
as a rule at a distance of 8 to 12 kms from the line of
forward enemy subunits. Fer this reason the possibility
should be envisaged of conducting the fire of missile
units of tactical designation to that depth at any given
moment of the operation.
kms by the time it is completed
Below is given an example of'one of the variants of
calculation showing how the depth of fire effect on the
enemy will be changing from the beginning to the end of
the move of part of a battalion to a new siting area.
Let us presume that the system has a raflge of fire
of some 30 kms. Let us take the possible length of the
bound to be 1/3, 1/2, and 2/3 of the range of fire. The
battalion's departure position is 8 kms from the main lines
of resistance. The speed of advance of the troops is.
3 to 4 kms per hour. On an average two hours will .
required for the movement, deployment, and preparations
for opening fire from the new siting area. During that
time the advancing troops will move forward a distance of
old firing positions will be correspondingly leseenad.
For instance, in one case, when the length o. the
bound is equal to 1/3 of the range of fire, that is, 10 kma,
at the start of the move with the occupation of the combat
position by the infantry (we shall take its depth as being
equal to 5 kms), the depth of strike at the enemy from the
old firing positions will be in t' region of 17 kms at the
beginning of the move.
Then the part of the battalion that has been moved is
ready for firing from the new firing positions (in about 2
hours), the depth of strike from the old firing positions
will be reduced by 6 to 8 kms and will be about 9 to 11 kas.
In another case, when the length of the bound is e;;ual
to 1/2 of the range of fire, or 15 kms, at the beginning of
the move with the moving up of the infantry into the new siting
area, the depth of strike at the enemy from the old firing
positions, which at the beginning of the movement was 15 kms,
will be reduced to 6 to 8 kas by the end of the move, and
finally, if the length of the bound equals 2/3 of the range
of fire (20kms), the cbpth of strike will be 10 kas at the
beginning of the movement but will be reduced to I to 3
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By making similar calculations for systems with
various possible ranges of fire, it is possible to draw
up a table of the possible depths of strike at the enemy
at the beginning and at the end of a move, depending ca
the size of bound of the wove.
J'
Range of fire of the system:
7
Depth of ztrire at the enemy
Length of bo' zii movement
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1/3
Range
of fire
25
112
Range
of fire
15
1
7
14
2/3
Range
of fire
10
1
3
16
It is apparent from the table that in the case of
systems with a range of fire of about 20 to 30 kms, it is
most advisable to carry out the move battery by battery,
fixing the length of the bound within the limits of 1/3
of the range of fire.
!or systems with a range of fire of 40 to 50 koss,
the move is adva.ntagecusly carried out when the bound is
fixed to within 1/3 to 1/2 of the range of fire.
The move with a length of bound of 2/3 of the range
of fire is not advantageous, as is clearly shown in the
table and the examples cited. Nevertheless, such conditions
as, for example, the setup of the enemy defense, the nature
of the disposition of possible objectives for destruction,
the reciprocal distance of the zones and lines of defense,
conditions of the terrain and the condition of the road
network, may great iy influence the practical solution of
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problems of movement and distribution in possible siting
areas .
These peculiarities are related first of all to the
very long bounds of movement and with the lengthy period
required for deployment and preparation br firing by the
The examples cited of the sequence of mcves are examinea
in general lines and are Sased on calculations, and they may
not always in the proper degree answer the specific conditions
of the conduct of a battle and an operation. For this reason,
when organizing a move the specific tasks and operational
conditions should be taken into account. For instance, if
the enemy has been reliably neutralized in the first zone
of defense, when the move is carried out in the interests
of an atomic strike on tie second zone of defense, the
main part of the missile units and subunits of tactical
designation can be moved battalion by battalion d'rectly
into the area of the firing positions from which this
mission can be carried out. Those units and subunits
whose range of fire ensures the destruction of enemy
objectives in the second zone from the firing positions
they occupy will start the move after it has been occupied
by our troops.
In all cases of organizing a move, part of the subunits
of missile units of tactical designation must be kept in
readiness to destroy newly identified enemy means of atomic
attack.
In the course of the develonment of an operation in
the operational depth, the tempo of the cffensive may be
fairly high, and for this reason it will be difficult to
carry out a consecutive move battery by battery. In such
cases it is advisable to move separate batteries with pre-
pared atomic ammunition behind the infantry and tank combat
formations at a distance of 5 to 7 kas. Such batteries
will be able to occupy a position swiftly in case of
necessity and get ready to open f ire. The remainder of
the battalion will be able to move consecutively from cover
to cover.
the move of subunits of missile units of operat#onal-
tactical designation has a number of peculiarivies compared
with the movement of missile units of tactical designation.
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missile units from new siting areas.
The nature of the terrain and the condition of the
movement routes have a great influence on the time of the
move.
The condition of roads (the width of the roadbed, the
steepness of ascents and descents, and the radius of turns)
and bridges must answer the appropriate requirements
permitting the carrying out of the move of missile units
and the bringing up of missiles and special fuel.
The siting areas fnr missile units should be chosen
with fairly capaoiOus dimensions. They must ensure
dispersed disposition along the front and in depth and
the camouflaging of all subunits, the capability of pre-
paring several firing positions for each launching assembly,
and the carrying out of a wide maneuver of fire, and must
have convenient access roads.
This gives rise to certain difficulties in choosing
siting areas and in preparing routes.
The considerable distance of the combat formations of
missile units from the forward subunits of friendly troops
(up to 30 to 50 kas) and the clearing of routes for their
move, entail the taking of appropriate steps for the guarding
and defense of these unite both in their positions and on the
march.
amove and with the deployment and preparation of
With the existing organization it is necessary to carry
out the movement of missile units battalion by battalyom,
and when there are several brigades, brigage by brigade,
because this is the best way to achieve topographic-geodetic,
meteorological, and material-technical support, the prepa-
ration of initial data, and the technical preparation o:
missiles for firing.
In individual cases battery by battery movement may
also be carried out. For instance, this nay happen when
only one battalion is operation in an arxW zone and it
is necessary to ensure constant missile unit fire support.
Taking into consideration the difficulties connected
with a
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missile units for firing from new siting areas, it is necessary
to avoid frequent moves of these units, but to use to the
maximum their long range and wide maneuver of fire. However,
a situation should not be allowed to develop in which at
given moments some missile units are moving and the others
are not able during this time to strike at objectives in
the depth of the enemy's dispositions from the old firing
positions.
The most favorable occasion for the organization of
a move would be when an army has subordinate to it not less
than two battalions, or one battalion, but with missile
units subordinate to the front operating in its zone.
The length of the bound during the move may vary.
But one should take into consideration that the margin of
the range of fire of the remaining unit (subunit) should
permit the destruction of enemy objectives until the
missile unit (subunit) that has been moved is ready to
open fire from the new area.
? Let us see how the length of the bound will depend on
the location of the zones and lines' of defense of the enemy.
We shall take the distances of zones and lines of
defense as follows: the second zone of defense is 25 lees;
the first army defense zone is 60 leas; the second army defdds/
zone is 90 kiss; the first defense zone of the army group
is 150 has (Sketch 2).
The rate of advance of the troops is 30 has in 24
hours. The range of firs of missiles with atoiic warheads
available in the battalion is up to 150 has.
In this case the new siting area should be behind the
second defense zone. The length of the bound may be in
the region of 70 to 80 km.. The troops will move to the
new siting area by the morning of the second day of the
operation. The first echelon troops must be followed by
the reconnaissance group of an engineer battalion, which
carries out the selection and the topographic-geodetic
preparation of the new siting area..
?
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First zone second First
of army group army army
defense defense
zone zone
f-- Bound 80 has -w
sketch- 2 . A variant of movement of missile units during
e course of an operation, taking into accFu-nt the layout
of the enema a erne.
By the morning of the third day of the operation the firing
positions will have been surveyed. The move of the battalion
to the new siting area (the length of he route about 100 lees)
will require about 7 hours, the dismantling (svertyvaniye)
will require about 1 hour, and setting up (razvertyvaniye)
in the new area will require up to 4 hours. Thus, up to
12 hours will be required ir all. It follows, that the
move can be started at the end of the second day o: the
operation.
The move of the remaining missile unit (subunit) should
be started when the unit (subunit) previously moved is ready
to open fire.
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position by 30 to 40 kms.
When the distance of the second zone of defense is
50 kms, the first zone of defense of an army is 90 kms,
the second zone of defense of an army is 150 kms, the
first zone of an army group is 200 kns (Sketch 3), and
the rate of advance is 40 kns in 24 hours, then the new
siting area will also be behind the second zone of defense.
It could even be fixed nearer to the first army defense
zone. The length of the bound of a move in this case will
be slightly greater, i.e., in the region of 100 to 110 kms.
It should be possible in this case to have the battalion
ready for firing from the new siting area by the end of
the third day of the operation.
Subsequent moves should be envisaged, depending on
the 5i.'ions which will have to be carried out by the
missile units.
Let us ex%aine the sequence of moves of missile units
when an army has one engineer battalion. In order to
ensure the greatest use of the range of fire from the
areas in the initial position, it is advisable to move
one launch battery at the start of the offensive to a
siting area located in the vicinity of the friendly main
line of resistance and previously prepared as regards
topographic-geodetic and engineering work. Such a move
allows the battery to get ready for firing in a short
time and to increase the range of fire from the initial
< -1 1% 1 - _"
60 40 20 j 20
First zone
of army
group
First army
defense zone defense
zone
Second enemy &=V main
defense zone line of
resistant
i-- Bour.d 11G kms -+
Sketch 3. A variant of movement of missile units th ring the :Nurse
aS an operation, takin into account the laay%ct of the enemy defense.
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Thereupon, the remaining part of the battalion is moved
forward to a new siting area. When the batteries are ready
to open fire from the new siting area,.,the above-mentioned
battery is moved there too. Subsequent moves are carried
out by the entire battalion.
The moving of missile units in a front should be
calculated so that the necessary number of them are
ready to fire at any given moment of the operation. It
is espec ially important to ensure the timely readiness
of missile units to carry out their missions during the
most crucial phases of the operation the commitment to
battle of the second echelon of a front, the repulse of
an enemy counterstrike, etc.
In order to ensure the timely readiness of missile units
it is essential to plan with care the work of the topographdc-
geodetic subunits in preparing the deployment areas from the
topographic-geodetic point of view.
;he ::;,:?cs of missile units are planned by the artillery
headquarters of a front for missile units subordinate to a
front, and in an army by the artillery headquarters of the
army. At the same time, the artillery headquarters of a front
must coordinate the dispersal and movement of all missile units,
whatever their subordination.
If this is not done it may happen that several battalions
will turn up in the same area at the same time, part of which
are under army subordination and the other part under front
subordination.
Besides this, the artillery t.eadquar term of a front must
issue instructions on the sequence of movement of missile units
in the interests of the preparation of mass atomic: strikes
which the front is planning to carry out during the course of
the operation (for instance, before committing the second
echelon of a front to battle).
There is no need to form a special plan of moveaer.t.
It should be worked out on the fire-control map.
When planning a maneuver of atomic ammunition assembly
units (chast sborki atomnykh boyepripasov), it is essential
first of all to proceed from the decision taken regarding the
employment of atomic ammunition in the operation, the timing
of infliction of atomic strikes by missile units, the`aition
Aa4o
? availabli4 V. re(eint, and decree of readiness of4AX
50X1-HUM
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on hand, and their assembly cadabilities. Depending on these
conditions, the atomic munition assembly units may carry
out the maneuver either at the same time as the missile
units or slightly ahead of them in order to ensure the
timely preparation of atomic ammunition. This is not to
exclude the case when the assembly units may be left in
the area occupied, since assembled atomic ammunition can
be transported considerable distances (up to 200 kms
and sometimes even more).
During the course of combat operations, the necessity
may very often arise for an unplanned maneuver of missile
units and of their fire. The carrying out of such a
maneuver calls for high operational efficieLcy in the work
of the commanders of artillery and their staffs. They
should always know the decisions taken by the commander
of a front (army), the location of missile units and the
missions which they are resolving, the degree of readiness
of atomic ammunition and special charges, the location and
eapabiliti.es of atomic ammunition assembly units, and also
the disposition of friendly troops and the troops of the
enemy.
The commander of artillery should always be ready
to report to the commander of the front (army) which
units are in a position to carry out the maneuver, how
long a time this will require, and what steps are deemed
advisable to ensure the speed of the maneuver.
After the commander of tL3 front (army) has approved
the plan for maneuver of missile units and large units, or
the decision to carry out an unplanned maneuver, the
commander of artillery and his staff must coordinate with
the headquarters of the front (army) the movement routes,--
the new siting areas, and the timing of the maneuver, so
that the selected areas are not occupied by other troops
and the routes are c lear .
The question of the steps to be taken for counteracting
enemy reconnaissance, primarily aerial and radiotechnical,
which could detect the maneuver of missile units and large
units, should be decided by the chief of staff of a front
(ate) .
The procedure for conducting radiation and chemical
reconnaissance on the routes and in the new siting areas is
specified by the chief of chemral troop
?
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The questions of preparing the movement routes and
the possibilities of reinforcing the missile units carrying
o,it the mane's:"er with u'tta (subu.nits) of engineer troops
in order to enure a rap?d mare'r7er a-d to carry out the
engineering work connected with equipping of combat formation
elements in the new siting areas are coordinated with the
chief of engineer troops of a front (army). Special
attention during this should be paid to the restoration
and, when necessary, the construction of new bridges and
crossings across water obstacles and the rep?.tir of roadbeds.
Questions of the topographic-geodetic preparation of
new siting areas of missile units, as well as the possibility
of reinforcing them with subunits of the military-topographic
service are coordinated with the chief of the military-
topographic service of a front (army).
It is essential that questions of cover frog .enemy air
?strikesufor ajssi ef'its,islofY&he routes 'and in.the new
siting areas are coordinated with the chief of antiaircraft
defense troops of a front "army).
An is apparent, the volume of work of the commander
of artillery of a front (army) and his staff in organizing
the maneuver of missile units is/considerable. For this
reason, it is always necessary to try to complete at
least part of the above-mentioned measures during the
planning stage, before the maneuver is carried out.
It is evident that reconnaissance groups, having in
their composition topographical subunits and dosimeter
operations for reconnoitering the radiation situation,
should be moved forward in good time, before moving the
,rtssile units to the selected areas. One of the priority
L,.ssions of these groups is reconnaissance of the routes
&ad selection of firing position, the siting (opredeleniye)
of the elements of combat formations, and their topographic-
geodetic tying in (privyazka), which also includes
orientation (orientirovka). Such groups should be headed
by officers capable of taking the appropriate decisions
irdependent ly.
When it is necessary to carry out engineering wor
both on the routes and at the firing position areas of
it is advisable, in coordinatio
ile launchers
i
k
n
,
ss
the m
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with the headquarters of a front (army); to send out
engineer subunits.
Modern conditions of conducting operations oblige the
commander of artillery and his staff to exercise direct
control of the maneuver of missile units, and not limit
themselves just to its supervision. In modern operations,
during the course of a maneuver, various difficulties and
obstacles will be encountered.
The enemy, by using atomic and chemical weapons,
as well as engineer meab , the delivery of atomic strikes
maneuver of our troops by
during the march and during the deployment ofe troops,
crandings,
also by destroying and contaminating the
resorting to the creation of zones of radioactive contamination
in large areas of terrain.
The commander of artillery and his staff must constantly
follow the radiation situation and, in case of need, make
timely changes in the movement routes of missile units
and subunits. Largo units and units, when radioactive
contamination is discovered in wide sectors of the terrain
should not change routes on their own initiative, except
in certsln cases, because nottmowing the overall radiation
situation, and arriving at conclusions about it based solely
on the re...lts of their own reconnaissance, they may find
themselves in a most difficult situation.
The change of routes should usually be indicated
by the art4 llery headquarters of a front (army) for htheeelves
additional reason that the large units and units,
may choose routes occupied by other troops, which also
could result in the frustration of a maneuver.
During the course of a maneuver, the situation may
call for a change not only of routes but also of the
firing position areas (waiting areas). ?or this reason,
the commander of artillery, following the situation
constantly, must in good time add the necessary further
details to the orders previously issued. Changes officers a
maneuver must be communicated to the commanding ears
of missile large units (units) andt~march. deers of This artillery
of the large unit directly during
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for constant liaison with the missile units en a e
the Maneuver. At the same time, g g d in
02 missile large units the commanding officers
during the maneuver in orders toycomplete lo the maxim
itiative
mission within the tassigned
time Iimit3.
The nature of a modern battle or Operatio
for the most decisive maneuver of missile units, calls
especially of their fire. For this re
rt and
of these units is one of the most an n' bhe maneuver
.
their combat use in a modern offensive operation
IJI this
the Maneuver article, lenly some units Of si questions relative to
have been examined.
The maneuver of missile units will important part in the carr i playa no_Iese-
torcing of water obstaclesyiromoutOf other missions (the
the
and destruction of surrounded g. etc
gz'on 1 dement
nSs, etch. P ngs, pursuit
The importance of such a
great during operations in the maneuver
initial is iod o sally
when the insufficient Period o! a war
must compensated quany of. of
all ab of reinforcement
of effort from one direction to r a yhi e rapid
maneuver of units, and especially anotherI.e., by the
of their fire.
In conclusion it is essential to
organization of the maneuver of missile basic units fad of their
problems of their control.
The success of the maneuver of missile units depends
on many factors, including the timel
intelligence, speed in making receipt of
the missions to those eery ng a decision, and in p"sii then the tactical-technical characteristicstof as well as one
launchers (the time required for issile
up, preparation for the first 'a dismantling required
and for reorientation to anew target, time required
the Improvement of exists g
et, etc.) For this reason
thods
new
forms of controlling missilemunits,, ~andethe imh pz,ove ent
o! the tactical-technical characteristics launchers will of missile
have a direct bearing on their maneuver,
?
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