AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
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Afghanistan Situation Report
79-81 IMC/CB
copy 0 8 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
The large-scale Soviet-Afghan combat operation in
Konduz Province which began on 13 June appears to be
endin . F -1
2.5X1
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SOVIETS MAY RE USING PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS I 2 25X1
three recent Soviet attacks suggest
that precision-guided munitions may have been
used.
KABUL'S CENTRAL MILITARY HOSPITAL I 3
in a recent
description of conditions at the Central Military
Hospital in Kabul, said the hospital is now
treating fewer war-wounded than during the early
years of the Afghan conflict.
IN BRIEF 4
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ZHAWAR KILLI: WINNERS AND LOSERS 6 25X1
Afghan Army troops, with massive Soviet air
support, overran one of the largest insurgent
supply camps in Paktia Province. The loss
probably is only a temporary setback for the
insurgents, however.
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX
SOVA M 86-20058CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
This document was prepared by the office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis.
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX
SOVA M 86-20058CX
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Afghanistan
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International boundary
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0 50 100 150 0 200 Miles
NDIAA
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX 25X1
Si M 86-29958CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
A major Soviet-Afghan combat operation southeast of
Konduz that now appears to be ending probably was an
attempt to check attempts by Panjsher Valley commander
Masood to expand operations in nistan.
northern Afnh-
25X1 X1
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SOVIETS MAY BE USING PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS I 25X1
The Soviet Air Force may be using precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) against insurgent camps and
antiaircraft positions,
25X1
25X1
24 June 1986 25X1
NESA M 86-20095CX
SOVA M 86-29958CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
Soviet SU-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft destroyed
insurgent air defense sites in the Nazian Valley in
mid-March, with only minimal damage to a nearby
were hit last November, while 2bX1
similar structures were not. Additionally 25X1
a Soviet artillery attack at Nazian was 25X1
very accurate" and that a "large box with a window on
the top" was used to direct the fire. 25X1
Comment: AS-10 air-to-surface missiles have been
available to Soviet fighter-bomber units at Shindand
and Ragram airfields since at least autumn 1985, and
the accuracy of the hits described suggests that these
PGMs may have been used during the reported
incidents. The "large box" probably is a laser
designator, a fire-direction aid that probably has been
used more frequently by Soviet artillery units in
Afghanistan
In a recent conversation with officials of the US
Embassy in Kabul, a former Afghan Army doctor described
medical treatment at the 400-bed Central Military
Hospital in Kabul. He asserted that the facility's
workload had increased dramatically between 1980 and
1985, but has dropped since then, possibly because of
reduced combat casualties. He estimated that 20
percent of those wounded in combat die before reaching
a medical facility, and that another 10 to 20 percent
will die despite treatment. Most of the casualties
treated at the hospital had bullet wounds, injuries
from mine explosions, or had been in vehicle
accidents. The physician said that prevalent diseases
among Afghan troops include gastro-intestinal
disorders, malaria, and tuberculosis. He noted that
there is a special 50-bed ward for the exclusive use of
wounded Soviet soldiers and accessible only by Soviet
personnel.
Comment: The hospital, which caters to high-ranking
Afghan civilian and military officials, is
military hospital in Kabul. It has had chr
the main
onic supply
and personnel shortages,
25X1
Despite the section earmarked for
Soviets,
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most Soviet casualties--particularly the se
riously
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX
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SOVA M 86-29958CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
wounded--are evacuated to the USSR. In any case, the
Soviet presence at the hospital probably will diminish
because of the recent completion of a more secure and
probably better-equipped facility at the Kabul Airport
--G.M. Korniyenko, the First Deputy Chief of the
International Department of the Soviet Communist Party's
Central Committee, arrived in Kabul on 23 June. Press
reports indicate that Korniyenko and his delegation met with
Afghan Communist Party chief Najibullah, Prime Minister
Keshtmand, and President of the Revolutionary Council
Karmal. This is the first known visit to Afghanistan by a
member of the Soviet Central Committee Secretariat.
--The 19th plenum of the Central Committee of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is to begin on 26
June, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. Several high-
level PDPA officials--mainly supporters of former Party
Secretary-General Karmal--are rumored to be slated for
removal during the plenum.
--Afghan resistance alliance spokesman Rabbani met with
French Prime Minister Chirac and Foreign Minister Raimond on
23 June. The French evidently wavered about receiving the
insurgent leader out of concern that the meeting would be
seen by the Soviets as a provocative gesture just prior to
President Mitterand's departure for a visit to Moscow next
month. Rabbani's schedule for the remainder of the scheduled
European tour--to the Federal Republic of Germany, Swede
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--are uncertain.
--Japan donated approximately $17 million to relief programs
for Afghan refugees in Pakistan in 1985 and also earmarked
S400,000 for Afghan refugees in Iran. At the same time,
Japan is one of the Kabul regime's leading Western trade
partners, accounting for almost 15 percent of Afghanistan's
imports in 1984.
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX
SOVA M 86-29958CX
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX
SOVA M 86-29958CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
Afghan regime forces, backed by massive Soviet air
support but accompanied by only a small contingent of
Soviet Army units, overran what was probably the most
important guerrilla base camp in Paktia Province in a
three-week operation in April 1986. The insurgents
probably were surprised at the scope and intensity of
the attacks directed aginst their camp and are unlikely
to risk installing similar large caches in Afghanistan
Mountain Hideaways
Zhawar Killi was a Hizbi-Islami (Khalis) base camp on a
main infiltration route between Miram Shah in Pakistan
and eastern Pakita Province. Located in a gully, it
consisted of several large caves built into a 30-meter
cliff. The caves were large enough to store trucks and
captured tanks and armored personnel carriers.
The camp served as headquarters of Jallaludin Haqqani,
the principal insurgent commander in the province, and
contained accommodations for at least 300 insurgents,
workshops, communications facilities, fuel and
ammunition storage, repair facilities, a jail and a
field hospital, It had
evidently been in existence for an extended period.
Several other small insurgent camps and caches were
also located in the hills nearby.
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX
SOVA M 86-29958CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
Tallying the Costs
The insurgents' losses of men and materiel were high.
insurgent groups in
Peshawar estimated that some 150 guerrillas had been
killed or were missing and another 250 had been
wounded. Their camps at Zhawar Killi and Moghol Gi
were overrun and several cache sites with small arms,
antitank and antipersonnel mines, ammunition, clothing,
medical supplies, and food were confiscated by regime
forces.
At the same time, the attacking forces probably also
sustained substantial losses during the long and hard-
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX
SOVA M 86-29958CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
fought campaign.
No Repeats Likely
The regime's victory at Zhawar Killi was a temporary
setback for the guerrillas. Although the campaign
resulted in the destruction of a significant amount of
materiel and a key support base and prevented the
planned assault on Khowst, regime forces withdrew from
the battle area within a few days of the end of the
fighting, and insurgent forces soon reoccupied the
area. Still, destruction of the camp--with the
associated high casualties--probably has heightened the
insurgents' sense of vulnerability.
The guerrillas probably will not attempt to rebuild the
base camp at Zhawar Killi or to construct similar
complexes elsewhere. Although the insurgents evidently
have been trying to increase the amount of materiel
stored inside Afghanistan for fear they may eventually
lose their safehaven in Pakistan, they probably will
not again risk caching as much in one place as they had
at Zhawar. The guerrillas probably will also seek to
improve their intelligence on Soviet and Afghan battle
plans and improve their own security to avoid the
costly surprise that they evidently experienced at
Zhawar Killi.
The success of the Afghan regime forces at Zhawar Killi
is one that they will not be able to duplicate easily
or soon. Most Army units are seriously understrength,
and the regime can ill afford more substantial
losses. Moreover, even with the tremendous firepower
that the Soviets used on the target area, the Afghan
forces' advance on the camps proceeded haltingly. The
impact of Zhawar Killi may be one reason that the
Soviets have again taken the lead in two major
offensives that have occurred since then.
24 June 1986
NESA M 86-20095CX
SOVA M 86-29958CX
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6
Top Secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302630001-6