LETTER TO CASPAR WEINBERGER FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001704300017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 26, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/01 :CIA-RDP88B00443R001704300017-2
The D~ -nor of Central Intclli~;cnce
26 April 1985
The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301
Dear Cap,
I think you will be interes
in the London Times editorial which is also attached.
Yours,
William J. Casey
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/01 :CIA-RDP88B00443R001704300017-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/01 :CIA-RDP88B00443R001704300017-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/01 :CIA-RDP88B00443R001704300017-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/01 :CIA-RDP88B00443R001704300017-2
P.O. Boz 7, 200 Gray's Inn' Road, London W~~X 8EZ'.,`-~tlc~honc;., 01=837 1234
7UE~ y, t7 Pit /C l9,g 3-~ ~dE,l3
GENEVA. INTERMISSION
~1?'}icn the Gcncva talks started O(rcial opinicin in EuroPe.ds ~ Wcstcrn;fire pq,wcer. This would
on February 12 there was a beginning to stabilise more (trmly ; ; reverSe?,ihe' present balance of
danger that the Soviet propa- behind the Strategic De{enee ";,forces.,yr1'.Centrat,Europe, where
Banda campaign against Presi- . lnitiativc. France and Gerrt~any : ~ Warsa~ -.l?,act~: firepower and
dent Rcagan's Strategic Defence . in their different s+?ays will c{earlY..'_rpanpov~er;h~5`heavily outnum-
Initiative would be continued become involved in some aspect:. tiered ~tfic 'West. The American
and intensified outside the of the programme. So~wiU the. Defence Secretary, Mr _ Wein-.
framework of negotiations, British Government when ~t has ~berger, promised to share in this
making a nonsense of the idea of overcome the attack of stage technology? at .the: :December
secret discussions at Geneva. fright revealed b~? Sir Geoffrey 1983 melting oC,NATO defence
7-oday the teams adjourn for five Howes speech last month. ministers, .but his ]/uropean
~~~ccks to take stock in their The focus will then shift' from counterparts have been slow to
respective capitals and. though the technicalities of spare-based 1ake~'up the offer because' .the
the Soviet campaign against SDI missile dcfcncc to the land and extent of the technological sap
has been continued. ,t has not air battle in Europe. , Herc .between -Europe and America
been carried to the point where colossal dcfcnsive advances can has hitherto not _been .fully
the West could doubt how much no~v he achieved. When Prtsi- app~eciatcd in Europe.
store the Soviet leaders set by dent Rcacan made his ori~i~t21, Nevertheless _ throuRh~~e
secret negotiations. The talks speech in March 1983 ' he ; impact o tts superior technology
may not have proceeded very far emphasised the duality of the a st t$.no o rout watt
tot.?ards any kind of outline arms concept of SD1 - dcfcnsive --`--~~ ~~ ~--- ------
control agreement, but there is against incoming nuclear an opponuntty to ac~t,eve a
rcd_ucUOri:in stratcgt~,.and taco-~
now the clear prospect of a missiles on the one hand, and cal vulnerability which has bee_o
So3iet/American summit during a spectacular improvement in ~riconccivable for most of the last
the year, and the Soviet side still the non-nuclear conventional -fort- ycars.~- It. ma~? not __bc
seems to hope that the SDI will dcfcncis as w~cll. ".4mcrica dots surpnsutg that European govcrn-
hc negotiated a~~a~. posses now the tcchnoloet'rs co merits ~\?cr_c ,n,t,a~sn~~--.to
t ma_v take a long time for the at aut ver\ s,eri,Ta,iCimpmve- ------'-
respond to this ide.a~n~Rwcrc
$Ot'tel IC:tdrr'~}tlp IO aCCCpI rntntsin'tlic'"c ffcct~~~Crics~of our ~~rir~ n~rrnuno the trrhnnlnoi_
---- ia, ?~a~~,tl~~JSl.~~t v? r-~nia,. .gyn..
dcfcncc ~ is not ncsotiablc. 166rcr~s -;lu? saki.. ~~~ rc rescn_ta_ ti~_e .__O.n,~thc-. othcr-
ccrtainly for so lung as President "~fiiii ~~has a much more ?-~ - - ~'
hand the Reagan admin,stratlon
Reagan is in control. Given a imme 1 c aph ,cation_ tc~ : uro- has not een or t r,`~in a out
successful first phase of research In 'o ~?emrn[i(ian dues the - B--?
t tc t~%c?~-g?_i~- t~chRical
w
ld
an
d d
eve
l
opment t
ou
f'ti
lli
h
at
spectac
l
e
-
o
a
st
i
`"'r
irch
I
c
sc
.
t
e
?
cmcnt r s because It
probabll? apple also to his' ts-ecrtaiffl~ -thc`Bntis~i Govern- achlc~
successor. A dcfcnsive philos- merit's desire to ,become in- tas ecn waiting (~or_-_.niorc
uphy is al~yays going to he volvcd with technical research at c?~~ncingy.`~cnionstntions oC-
prcfrrahle to a democratic a Icycl Which could lx developed European su f r I n-
gotrrnmcnt ih the Icchnolos}? .in a wide variety of scrottdary ci e of SUI hel~rr rc\ra_~I~t>'Tua~
...:-._ .,. .._..~ .. :. ..._.-,. e.._ ..__t:.....:..__ ._..._:a_ .~- -~-r----. 1 more r nlCa sccrCl~
nearly forty years the technology field. That may he easier. to ~-i'rr-- the pause before the
ol- missiles has favoured the achieve fmm the existing: tech- Genera teams meet again. Presi-
oflcnse so that western sovcrn- nologirs ahtadv in Antcrican dent Reagan will ha~?c been to
merits bare had to maintain a possession, c~ploitcd more Europe al a VVcstcrn summit and
strncgy of rctaliauon as their widely as a result of the the Alliance as a whole will
means ofdelcnrc. having neither Ewvpean elTort. than by entering un_doubtcdly have a.clcarcr idea
the technical means nor the an unesrn partnership in which of where everybody stands on
resources to provide a purcl~ Britain would have to cope for SDI and in the non-nuclear
defensi~r alternati~r. limited cunu'acts in missile battlefield application of that
No~.? tic arc facing a period, drfcnet: ~~ithout acquiring the technology within N.4T0. At the
tvhirh may last a srncration ur
mart, whin the emerging tech-
ability to prt,tit from such work
in a ~yidrr field.
resumption of the Geneva talks
on Mav i0, therefore. it should
nolugc is nuur fa.rntrablc to
NA'Tn has already adjusted to
hr clear to the Soviet Union that
~ielrnsive s_vstenls. That means
a new uric> ctl tactical Itlans
the .-~ntrncan programme will
that the unit cuss ol? any
based on the c~prrtatiun of a
proceed with alliance involve-
~irlrnsivc cduipmcnt is cheaper
decisis~ tcchnolugical supinur-
ntcnl and support. That will
than the eurresprnuiing oflcnsiyc
i1v over H'arsa~y Pact li,rnta_
provide ~ constructive elarifi-
~~rapun. In the citrnntstanccs.
buns. The ol>'crntiunal doctrines
cation to the nc~otiations and to
nu democratic
leader could
rntph:l~ix? t~rcalcr weapon aCCU-
the prilintinarics which ~~ill lx
,cnuir ~urh an
uf~lutrtunity to
niv. rapid ,nerca~i~ in ntohility,
necessary hrk~rc I'resiclcnr Kia-
t,t t,.rtlc In. ltiuttlr ~.tth a purely
a ~.iJcl land of Iarg.rts and
Ban and Mr (~~rhachov ntirr
tl,'ten"~C ?~~linl ttt ?ItaleCie
1tltlliCanll i,l ~1,.1~i1 anil ttiecrvl,n
l:tlef ril Ihr ~C:II :tl art f :t>'.r'\\ i~~I
~" Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/01 :CIA-RDP88B00443R001704300017-2