UGANDA: OBOTE'S DIMMING PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Directorate of _ Sccrct
Intelligence
Uganda:
Obote's Dimming Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
Se 'YOVIL!
ALA 84-10072
July 1984
Copy 2 8 9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Directorate of Secret /-~.)X1
Intelligence
Uganda:
Obote's Dimming Prospects
This paper was prepared by
------
contributions byF
IALA, and
Office of Central Reference. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 84-10072
July 1984
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R0002000300042 X1
Secret
Uganda:
Obote's Dimming Prospects
Key Judgments The sharp deterioration of Uganda's internal security in recent months has
Information available imposed serious strains on the Obote regime, raising the specter of a
as of 27 June 1984 prolonged period of instability that could offer North Korea, Cuba, and the
was used in this report.
Soviet Union new opportunities to meddle in the region. Although Obote's
grip on power appears to us to be slipping, he still can count on support
from Uganda's northern region-primarily his own Langi (Lango) tribe.
His opponents, moreover, have even narrower bases of support, and none
seems capable of maintaining even the present degree of shaky government
control over the country. Their weakness and inability to coalesce are key
to the survival of Obote's regime.
Obote faces an uphill battle in trying to maintain the loyalty and discipline
of the tribally fractured military. Effective government control over the
military ended with the death of his close ally Chief of Staff Ojok, a Langi,
in a helicopter crash last December. Since then, Obote, aware of the bitter
Langi-Acholi rivalry within the Army, has avoided the politically volatile
issue of naming a permanent successor to the post. His course, while
perpetuating military factionalism, has deprived the opposing elements of
an issue about which to unite.
Military indiscipline has severely hampered Army operations against
various guerrilla groups. The most active of these, former Defense Minister
Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army, draws its support from
Museveni's Ankole (Banyankole) tribe and, more importantly, from the
Baganda, Uganda's largest single ethnic group. The guerrillas easily
overran an Army barracks at Masindi less than 200 miles from the capital
in late February, replenishing their meager arms stocks and restoring the
group's vitality. The guerrillas, emboldened by this and other recent
successes, probably will continue to employ the hit-and-run tactics against
which the Army has thus far been ineffective. Although the insurgents do
not now pose a direct threat to the government, we believe the Army's mili-
tary ineptitude and brutality toward civilians will continue to undermine
any chance for Obote to build popular support for his regime.
Obote's rivals within the government are taking advantage of the instabil-
ity in the country to build up their own political bases. Relations between
Obote and some of his ministers are poor, according to the US Embassy.
Secret
ALA 84-10072
July 1984
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
Secret
An improved economy during Obote's first three years in office has been
the sole positive element of his regime, but sharply deteriorating security
now threatens to undermine what progress he has made in fostering
economic recovery from the destruction of Amin's misrule. A prolonged
upsurge in violence could easily thwart agricultural production, transport,
and marketing. It also could cause multilateral and Western bilateral
donors-already distressed over the brutality of Obote's forces-to cut
assistance levels from the average $275 million in grants, loans, and debt
relief disbursed over each of the past three years.
On balance, we believe the weakness and disunity of his opponents give
Obote a slightly better-than-even chance to hold office until the elections
now scheduled for December 1985. His loss of credibility as a national
leader, however, raises serious doubt that he would risk holding them on
schedule. He could resort to rigging-a tactic we believe he used as the
Tanzanian-backed candidate in 1980-and he could plausibly justify
postponement on the basis of Uganda's chaotic internal security situation.
Even if held, the elections offer virtually no prospect for providing a forum
for resolving Uganda's political problems and would serve only as the
trappings to validate the perpetuation of the regime in power.
In the interim, Obote's concern over continuing threats to his regime
almost certainly will prompt him to press Great Britain and the United
States for expanded military and economic assistance. In our judgment,
increased aid will do little to vent the underlying pressures on his regime,
which stem from intense tribal rivalries, military indiscipline, and opportu-
nistic intrigue within the government. Nonetheless, if Obote believes his
needs are not being met by the West, we believe he would not hesitate to
deepen military ties with North Korea or to turn to Cuba and the Soviet
Union as alternatives. In our view, all would probably respond positively to
Obote's requests, but they would be likely to keep any proffered aid to to-
ken levels.
We cannot discount the possibility of Obote's removal by coup or
assassination-a move, in our judgment, that would push Uganda quickly
to the left. Based on what little we know about the ideology and
opportunism of likely contenders, almost any successor regime would be
less friendly toward the West and probably would move to establish closer
ties with the Communist states. This would cause new concern among
neighboring countries such as Kenya, Sudan, and Zaire about security
along their borders with Uganda and might prompt some of them to press
the United States for increased military aid.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
25X1
Challenges to the Obote Regime
Turning to Foreign Support 4
The Fragile Economy
Signs To Watch
Implications for the United States
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
11-
Figure 1
Ethnic Groups in Uganda
Fort Portal
' grP' G
OBE
IPNK
Mbarara \
0~
iKabale
pG J
ZQ
Nilo-Hamitic
Iteso
Karamojong
Kumam
Kakwa
Sebei
Suk
Labwor
Tepeth
Uganda is inhabited by some 40 different tribes,
each with its own language, customs, and values.
The country also is divided geographically between
.two of the continent's major ethnolinguistic groups-
the Bantus and the Nilotics. Christians make up the
majority of religious adherents, though traditional
tribal religions remain strong. Muslims, who enjoyed
a privileged position under Amin, make up less than
Nilo-Hamitic
Sudanic
0 100 Kilometers
i
0 100 Miles
Percent of Population
Sudanic
Lugbara 3.7
Madi 1.3
Other
2.0
Bantu
Baganda
16.2
Banyankole
8.1
Basoga
7.8
Bakiga
7.1
Banyaruanda
5.9
Bagisu
5.1
Batoro
3.2
Banyoro
2.9
Rundi
2.2
Bagwere
1.7
Bakonjo
1.7
Banyuli
1.4
Sarnia
0.7
Bagwe
0.6
Baamba
0.5
Bakenyi
0.4
65.5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2 X1
Secret
Uganda:
Obote's Dimming Prospects
Five years after the fall of Idi Amin, Uganda is still
far from national reconciliation. There were high
hopes among Ugandans that Milton Obote-despite
claims of rigging in his election as President in
December 1980-would bring back the relative pros-
perity and peace that Uganda enjoyed during the
immediate postindependence period of the 1960s. This
goal, however, has become more elusive. Initially,
Obote had some success in pointing Uganda toward
political and economic recovery. The government
made a serious effort to restore discipline to the
Army, the guerrilla threat waned, and a package of
economic reforms announced in June 1981 generated
optimism in the private sector.
Since the death of Army Chief of Staff David Ojok in
late 1983, however, the security situation has deterio-
rated badly, aggravating a host of other pressures the
regime faces. Obote's biggest headache is coping with
the undisciplined, factional, and overstaffed Army
and security services. Interrelated with this problem
are several others including: the growing threat to
stability posed by dissidents, bandits, and marauding
government soldiers; the continuing specter of a coup
led by disgruntled military and civilian groups; exac-
erbation of ethnic tensions by military actions against
individual tribes; and the economic dislocation caused
by deteriorating security.
Challenges to the Obote Regime
An Army Out of Control
The survival of the Obote regime depends on a
military whose loyalty is questionable and whose
actions he cannot control. A desultory, often brutal
war with the guerrillas has dragged on since Obote
assumed power in the disputed elections in 1980.
Ethnic rivalries, personal animosities, and even a
desire among some of the military to restore Amin to
power have contributed to internal instability. The
security forces on which Obote depends to maintain
order are riddled with tribalism, personal rivalries,
low morale, corruption, and inefficiency, according to
US Embassy sources. 25X1
Loss of a Leader. The US Embassy reports that what
little control the government had over these forces was
exercised by Army Chief of Staff David Ojok, who
died in a helicopter crash last December. Since then,
the security situation has deteriorated badly, as evi-
denced by an increase of clashes in the Kampala area;
recent guerrilla takeovers of two provincial capitals;
an Army rampage at Namugongo, 10 miles east of
Kampala; and the growing number of violent inci-
dents directed against expatriates.
The highly respected Ojok was a Langi (Lango)-the
same tribe as Obote-and a crucial link between the
President and the armed forces. Obote's own safety 25X1
had depended in part on Ojok's loyalty and vigorous
prosecution of the military's counterinsurgency ef-
forts. We believe Ojok was the power behind Obote, a
potential successor, and the key element in maintain-
ing some semblance of security and order in Uganda.
Obote's naming of Tito Okello, an Acholi, as Ojok's
acting successor-avoiding the politically volatile is-
sue of selecting a permanent replacement-reflects
the problems he faces in handling the military. Ac-
cording to the US Embassy, the Acholi make up
about 60 percent of the Army, and the selection of
Okello probably stemmed from Obote's fear of an
Acholi revolt if another Langi was appointed to the
had been unhappy over alleged favoritism shown to 25X1
Obote's fellow Langi tribesmen, who constitute only
20 percent of the Army. We believe the President,
aware of the Acholi resentment, probably hoped to 25X1
pacify the Acholi by choosing Okello
choli grievances persist, but
Obote has deprived them of a single,-crucial issue 25X1
about which to unite. He knows, however, that any
misstep could precipitate plotting by the Acholi, who
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Secret
Milton Obote was the first Prime Minister of inde-
pendent Uganda. Although the head of the small
southern kingdom of Buganda was elected President
in 1962, the office was largely ceremonial, and Obote,
a northerner, wielded most of the political power.a In
1966, he seized direct control of the government by
engineering a parliamentary proclamation naming
him President. he
was a capable if controversial leader who tried to
create a sense of national unity among his country's
diverse ethnic groups. He achieved some success in
suppressing Uganda's tribal, regional, and religious
rivalries by establishing a strong central government.
Obote held sway by using his political acumen and
his security apparatus to outmaneuver or strong-arm
any opposition. His supporters-mainly his own
Langi tribe and other northern Nilotic groups-
considered him a hardnosed pragmatist; his ene-
mies-mainly the Baganda and other southern Bantu
tribes-considered him ruthless.
In domestic affairs, Obote nationalized some com-
mercial and industrial concerns, but he never clearly
defined his economic ideology or put Uganda on a
path of economic development. In foreign affairs,
Obote was primarily interested in maintaining good
relations with his immediate neighbors, especially
Tanzania on whom he depended for security assist-
ance. He accepted foreign aid from all quarters, but
he remained nonaligned on East-West issues. F_
Despite Obote's efforts to gain wider tribal and
regional support, he relied heavily on his northern
Acholi and Langi backers in the military. His efforts
to incorporate socialist policies were perceived as a
direct threat to the perquisites of the military elite,
however, undermining his support within the mili-
tary. As a result, he was ousted in 1971 by Idi Amin.
In a well-documented reign of terror, Amin-a Mus-
lim from the Kakwa tribe purged all Acholi and
Langi from the armed forces, the police, and the
government and built his power base on the poorly
educated Muslim minorities from the northwest. His
reliance on brutal intimidation to stay in power
resulted in a death toll of more than 80,000 in 1971-
72 alone, according to the International Commission
of Jurists; one informed source places the figure at
500,000 for the full period of the Amin regime.
The economic cost of Amin's reign was the physical
and financial bankruptcy of the economy. Real per
capita income dropped by more than one-third during
1970-79. Despite its fertile agricultural base and
traditional self-sufficiency, Uganda was unable to
produce enough food to feed its people. Moreover,
once-flourishing cotton, copper, tea, and tobacco ex-
ports virtually ceased, making Uganda almost solely
dependent on coffee from foreign exchange earnings.
Skilled personnel fled the country. private-sector
enterprises were abandoned or confiscated, and gross-
ly inefficient parastatal organizations took their
place.
The chaos and brutality of Amin's regime eventually
prompted the defection of all but the most ardent of
his supporters. From 1973 to 1978 numerous coup
and assassination attempts were engineered by offi-
cers from the northwest, including some from Amin's
own Kakwa tribe. By late 1978, Amin had lost
effective control of most of his Army, but, even then,
25X1
25X1
a Buganda and three small southern kingdoms lost their semi-
autonomous status in 1966 when Obote crushed them militarily
and established the supremacy of the central government in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
Secret
the direct intervention of the Tanzanian Army was
required to topple him.
Amin's removal in 1979 led to a series of weak
governments over the next 19 months. Yusufu Lule, a
Baganda, made a short-lived bid to strengthen his
authority and establish a stable government, but he
was unable to overcome tribal splits and other divi-
,sions. His regime lasted only two months before he
was removed by a vote of the quasi-legislative Na-
tional Consultative Council (NCCJ, which believed he
was trying to assume greater power at its expense.
Godfrey Binaisa, Lule's successor, managed to hold
onto power for 11 months, but he also eventually fell
victim to the country's ethnic and political rivalries.
Binaisa, though a Baganda, was not well liked by his
fellow tribesmen. Many Baganda initially saw Bin-
aisa, once the Attorney General under Obote, as a
stalking-horse for the former President and his fellow
northerners. Some Baganda greeted the Binaisa pres-
idency with pro-Lule demonstrations in Kampala.
Although Binaisa eventually convinced some Ba-
ganda he was not a stand-in for Obote, ethnic,
personal, and ideological rivalries also prevented him
from establishing a strong administration. His regime
survived until leaders of the country's embryonic
Army ousted him in May 1980 and established a
ruling six-member Military Commission, which in-
cluded commission chairman Muwanga, Ojok, and
Museveni. The commission stayed in power until
Obote was elected in December 1980.
historically have engaged in antigovernment scheming 25X1
We agree with the US Embassy that naming Okello
to assume Ojok's responsibilities is only a temporary 25X1
expedient-an example of Obote's penchant for put-
ting off decisions that might cause discord. According
to the Embassy, Okello's limited abilities and lack of
charisma offer little hope that he can provide effective
leadership. In our view, Obote's choice of Okello as
interim leader has aggravated the Army's factional-
ism; resentment is growing in both Acholi and Langi 25X1
factions as they press their candidates for a perma-
nent successor, according to the US Embassy.
Preying on the Populace. The bloated ranks, low pay,
and lack of discipline in the Army have contributed to
further serious problems for the regime. According to
the US Embassy, there are about 35,000 to 40,000
men under arms in the various services. Only about
15,000 enlisted or commissioned personnel have re-
ceived basic training; some 15,000 to 25,000 soldiers
in regular and militia units have little or no military
training. Obote recognizes the problems inherent in
reluctant to reduce the size of the Army for fear of
turning large numbers of unemployed armed men
loose amidst the local population.
The US Embassy estimates that the government can
afford to feed no more than 20,000 men.
in May Ugandan defense
has eroded.
contractors-including those that supply food-
ceased deliveries because of nonpayment by the gov-
ernment. As a result, many soldiers stole food and
supplies from civilians, and the US Embassy reports
increased instances where entire villages have been
looted. Among the most victimized have been the non-
Acholi ethnic groups around Kampala and in south-
ern Uganda, whose deep-seated animosity toward the
predominantly Acholi troops has reinforced the sol-
diers' inclination to mistreat them, thus perpetuating
the cycle whereby popular support for the government
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
Secret
most incidents
of the military's assault, theft, and other abuses of
civilians are not reported to the police for fear of
Army reprisal. Police action itself has been deterred
.by the Army. Recently an armed clash took place in
Mbale in southern Uganda between local Army ele-
ments and police units who were sent to the town to
curb military depredations against civilians. A senior
police officer was killed, but Obote was unable to
punish the soldiers for fear of retribution from the
Army,
In late May, in reaction to a dissident assault on a
satellite communications station approximately 10
miles east of Kampala, the Army conducted a sweep
of the area, during which units attacked a nearby
seminary and terrorized the local population. Eyewit-
nesses report that the brutal savagery went on for
several days, ending only when the soldiers could find
no further victims or loot to carry off. The US
Embassy estimated that some 85 civilians were killed.
Obote, frustrated by the brutality of the Army and his
inability to control it, according to the US Embassy,
departed from his customary silence on such events
and publicly condemned the action.
Turning to Foreign Support. We believe Obote has
long recognized the problems with the military and
security forces as well as his dependence on them and
has persistently sought foreign security assistance and
training as a remedy. At first he relied heavily on
Tanzanian troops until their withdrawal by President
Nyerere in 1981. Since then, he has scrambled for
help from wherever he could find it. He has turned to
both the East-North Korea-and the West-pri-
marily the United Kingdom. Shortly after Obote's
visit to North Korea in late 1981, P'yongyang sent a
small number of military advisers and accepted some
Ugandans for training in North Korea. Obote then
persuaded the United Kingdom and several Common-
wealth countries to participate in a military training
program and hired a private British firm-Falcon-
star-to train the police.
Western training assistance to Obote's regime has
been subject to fits and starts. The contract for the
36-man Commonwealth Training Team ran out in
April 1984, and Australia and Canada decided not to
Secret
Internal Training
? Twelve British officers providing training in
Uganda.
? Approximately 50 North Koreans.
? Approximately 50 Tanzanian instructors.
? A six-man US Special Forces training team.
External Training
? Fifty to 60 Ugandans training in North Korea.
? Four to six Ugandans training in Britain.
? Thirty to 40 Ugandans training in Cuba.
? Small number of Ugandans training in Pakistan.
? Fifty to 60 Ugandans training in Sudan.
? Approximately 30 Ugandans receiving 90-day
Ranger training in Egypt.
? Seven Ugandans training in Nigeria.
? Forty to 50 Ugandans training in Tanzania.
? Twenty Ugandans training in China.
? Six Ugandans training in the United States.
renegotiate it; as a result, the team fell apart, accord-
ing to the US Embassy. Moreover, last November,
the govern-
ment decided not to renew its contract with Falcon-
star-primarily because of the high annual cost of
approximately $392,000, but also because Obote dis-
covered that Falconstar managers were maintaining
contacts in London with exiled Ugandan dissidents.
After a lengthy period of consideration, the United
Kingdom resolved to continue assistance for one more
year, including maintenance of a training element in
Uganda and the provision of slots for Ugandan per-
sonnel in training courses offered in the United -
Kingdom. Recently, the United States, in response to
a request by Obote, decided to support Britain's effort
by sending a small Special Forces military training
team to Kampala for about six months.
Uncertainty over the Western military aid commit-
ment has prompted Obote to rely increasingly on the
North Koreans. According to the US Embassy, the
North Koreans are currently providing training for
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Secret
Army artillery specialists, VIP protection training,
intelligence and security training, and paramilitary
training of "youthwingers".of the ruling party-the
Ugandan People's Congress.
Uganda is sketchy, but
there are approximately 50
North Korean military, intelligence, and security
advisers on assignment to Uganda. According to the
US Embassy, these advisers also have been asked to
train the police special forces, filling the gap created
by the withdrawal of Falconstar. The US Embassy
reports that about 50 to 60 Ugandan Army officers
and noncommissioned officers are undergoing four to
six months of training in North Korea. We believe
that this program will continue.
The relationship between North Korea and Uganda
appears to be working smoothly for the most part,
although there have been some signs of friction.
for example,
members of the North Korean contingent have com-
plained over the lack of support from Kampala and,
despite continued efforts by Ugandan officials, have
refused to conduct the training of the special forces in
dissident-infested areas because of their concern for
their personal safety.
The continuing chaos in the Ugandan military has
prompted Obote to look to Tanzania again for help. In
early May he sent his Army Chief of Staff to meet
with the Tanzanian Chief of Defense to discuss the
deployment of a Tanzanian combat force into Ugan-
Nyerere decided not to commit his soldiers and is even
considering withdrawing the Tanzanian advisers cur-
rently in Uganda.
So far the risk of jeopardizing vital Western economic
aid has deterred Obote from taking up recent Cuban
and Soviet offers of military assistance, but we believe
the potential for a turn to Havana or Moscow will
grow if security continues to deteriorate. We do not
have reliable evidence of any Cuban military person-
nel in Uganda, but 30 to 40 Ugandan officers are
undergoing military training in Havana, according to
the US Embassy in Uganda. Moreover, Vice Presi-
dent Muwanga has ties to Cuba-his two sons studied
on the island and have Cuban wives-and has pushed
25X1
25X1
The Ugandans explored the USSR's availability as a
potential source of military aid last August, when a
Ugandan delegation led by the Minister of Internal
Affairs, Luwuliza-Kirunda, visited the Soviet Union.
judgment, Obote would view the introduction of Sovi-
et advisers as aserious risk to any continued Western 25X1
support.
If Obote did feel compelled to press North Korea,
Cuba, and the Soviet Union for support, we believe
they would respond positively but cautiously to his
request, seeking ways to expand their regional influ-
ence without getting inextricably bogged down in
Uganda's morass. P'yongyang probably would be
willing to increase its level of military assistance,
including sending additional advisers to Uganda. It
has only rarely sent more than 100 advisers to any
single country, however, suggesting that any expand-
ed aid would be modest at best. We believe Havana
would be receptive to a request for troops in an
emergency, but it would be sensitive to the regional
political impact and would want to coordinate any
actions with President Nyerere of Tanzania. The
Soviets would probably view their response as a cheap
way to garner favor with the Obote regime or its
likely successors, but they almost certainly would
keep any proffered security assistance to the token
levels
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Secret
Dissidents on the Rebound
The weakness of the Army has permitted the resur-
gence of the guerrilla forces since the beginning of the
year, highlighted by the assault on Masindi in Febru-
ary.' The guerrillas, who in the preceding six months
had been driven from several strongholds and ap-
peared demoralized, probably staged the attack not
only to obtain badly needed arms and ammunition but
also to prove that they were still a viable force. F_
The second guerrilla group is the Uganda Federal
three groups
are now operating against the Obote government-
each apparently receiving local support. The largest is
the National Resistance Army (NRA), with approxi-
mately 1,000 men. It is based primarily in southern
and southwestern Uganda and receives most of its
support from the Ankole (Banyankole) and Baganda
tribes. Its leftist leader, Yoweri Museveni, has waged
a struggle against Obote since losing the race for the
presidency in 1980.
We believe the NRA is the only group capable of
mounting effective, albeit limited, military operations.
US Embassy reports indicate that the NRA was
responsible for the assault on a police post at Hoima,
approximately 200 kilometers northwest of Kampala,
in May and the attack on police and military installa-
tions at Masindi. They captured both food and mili-
tary supplies, including heavy and light arms, ammu-
nition, and transport vehicles. Witnesses reported that
the guerrillas were methodical, disciplined, and
solicitous of the welfare of the local population in both
operations-in contrast to the Army, which apparent-
ly offered virtually no resistance during the assault on
Masindi but returned to loot the town after the
dissidents had withdrawn, according to the US Em-
bassy. The attacks clearly demonstrated the insur-
gents' capability to mount hit-and-run strikes at will
against lightly protected government installations. In
our view, however, they probably still would be unable
to make large, coordinated attacks against well-de-
fended targets.
'On 20 February about 200 NRA guerrillas-poorly armed and
poorly clothed-overran police and military installations at Ma-
sindi, 225 kilometers north of Kampala. They captured large stores
of arms, ammunition, vehicles, uniforms, and food. According to
Western observers, the attackers killed 22 soldiers and 16 civilians;
the bulk of the defending government force fled into the bush.F_
Democratic Movement (FEDEMU).
it was formed in 1983 out of the
remnants of the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM)
organized by Ugandan exiles in Kenya. Its followers
were mainly from southern and eastern Uganda,
particularly among the Baganda tribe.
the UFM had become largely inactive
when its leadership scattered in 1983 as a result of a
Kenyan Government crackdown. Although FE-
DEMU claims to have 1,000 men under arms, evi-
dence available to us suggests that the number is a
few hundred.
The third guerrilla group, the National Salvation
Front (NSF), is small and consists primarily of rem-
nants of Idi Amin's Army. According to the US
Embassy, it is reportedly led by Moses Ali, a Madi.
in early 1984
part of the group moved from the southern Sudan-
west Nile region to the northern part of the country
and linked up with the fierce Karamojong tribe.
the NSF is less well organized
than the other guerrilla groups in the south and,
because it is identified with Amin, has few ties with
the other guerrillas.
Each of these dissident groups has a relatively narrow
ethnic base and is plagued with supply and manpower
problems, according to the US Embassy. The Embas-
sy also reports they have talked of uniting to increase
the military pressure on Obote, but tribal and person-
al rivalries have prevented effective cooperation thus
far. In late 1981,
Libyan leader Qadhafi-eager to expand his
influence in the region-attempted to unite them. He
promised arms, supplies, and training in return for the
guerrillas' agreement to form an umbrella organiza-
tion. Subsequently, some Libyan weapons trickled in
through Rwanda and Burundi, the Libyans provided
training to limited numbers of dissidents, and the
UFM and NRA coordinated some operations,
Since that time, however,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
we have no further evidence of Libyan efforts to work
with these groups, nor do we know of any other
outside sources of help.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Secret
Although the guerrillas have no prospect of directly
overthrowing the Obote regime by force, they have
been emboldened by recent successes and almost
certainly will continue to mount hit-and-run attacks
against selected targets. We believe continuing as-
saults will keep tensions high, contribute to a general
atmosphere of lawlessness, and make Obote more
vulnerable to challenges from within his own govern-
ment.
Rivalries in Kampala -
In our judgment, the civilian politicians in Kampala
are as divided as the Army. We concur with the US
Embassy's view that Obote presides over the civilian
government but does not control it. He has problems
both with his own party, the Ugandan People's Con-
gress (UPC), and the opposition Democratic Party
(DP).
The UPC is a fragile and polarized coalition of
Obote's Langi tribe and the Acholi, which together
make up about 10 percent of Uganda's population.
Since these tribes constitute the largest groups in the
Army, the UPC has strong military support. Nonethe-
less, we believe it is a weak power base for Obote,
because it is fragmented by the personal ambitions of
a number of members-including Vice President and
Minister of Defense Muwanga and Minister of State
Luwuliza-Kirunda-who seek to replace the
President.
Muwanga's long competition with Obote has in the
past year evolved into a bitter power struggle. Accord-
ing to the US Embassy, following the 1980 elections
and into 1983, Muwanga was a convenient buffer
between the Langi and Acholi in the Army. This
buffer, however,-has eroded, and a widening gap
exists between Muwanga and Obote, as Muwanga has
attempted to develop his own internal power base and
assert himself in foreign affairs, particularly with
regard to Cuba.
lif Muwanga advised
Obote on any political strategy the President would
probably avoid it for fear of a hidden motive that
would strengthen Muwanga at Obote's expense. So
far, however, Obote is not strong enough to dismiss
the Vice President, and the protracted power struggle
continues to wear down the government.
Should Obote's grip weaken further, we believe that
the Soviet-oriented Muwanga, described by US offi-
cials as a ruthless politician, might be tempted to
move directly against him. The press, however, re-
ports that as the top Baganda in Obote's government
Muwanga has many enemies. Among his own ethnic
group, he is considered a traitor who has sold out to an
anti-Baganda regime. At the same time, many in
Obote's inner circle mistrust Muwanga because he is
not one of their own. Although he controls the 25X1
military's purse strings as Minister of Defense, he has
little popular support within the Acholi-Langi-domi-
nated officer corps.
in late February more than 100 Army officers
demanded the removal of Muwanga from the Minis-
try of Defense because of his gross corruption.
Muwanga is not the only minister aspiring to the 25X1
presidency. John Luwu- 25X1
liza-Kirunda, Minister of Internal Affairs and Secre-
tary General of the UPC; Crispus Rwakasisi, Minis- 25X1
ter of State in the President's office; and Edward
Rurangaranga, Minister of State in the Prime Minis-
ter's office also have presidential ambitions. The US
Embassy reports that, like Muwanga, Luwuliza-Kir-
unda and Rwakasisi also are leftists with pro-Soviet
leanings. In our judgment, all are opportunists who
would not hesitate to use extralegal methods to seize
power if given the chance.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Secret
The political opposition, the Democratic Party, has
not been able to capitalize on the government's weak-
nesses. According to academic sources, the DP is itself
split along personal and ethnic lines. It has strong
support in the country's largest tribe, the Baganda,
which makes up about 16 percent of Uganda's popula-
tion. The US Embassy reports that the Baganda
consider Obote ruthless and have been suspicious of
him since he crushed their traditional kingdom during
his previous regime in the 1960s.
late last year the government began a
campaign of harassment and arrest against party
members to reduce DP influence. Government intimi-
dation, coupled with the inability of the party to
reward its members with the fruits of political power,
has eroded the DP's strength. In our view, the chances
of the DP mounting an effective political challenge to
Obote are negligible at this time.
To shore up and broaden his base of political support,
Obote recently initiated a reconciliation program
designed to encourage former senior government offi-
cials in exile to return and assist in rebuilding the
country. Martin
Aliker-a leading Acholi doctor held in high esteem
by the Baganda-has already visited Kampala from
Nairobi and met with Obote. In our view, if Aliker
returns and others follow, the President would be able
to present a convincing case that he is opening up the
political process.
The Fragile Economy
In addition to his political problems, Obote over the
past three years has faced the challenge of rebuilding
an economy shattered by the decade of Amin's mis-
rule. Thus far, he has achieved some success in
spurring economic recovery, especially in those areas
of the country that have not been the target of
violence and unrest. Nonetheless, economic activity
remains far below pre-Amin levels. Moreover, a con-
tinuation of the recent deterioration in security almost
certainly would undermine further progress.
Obote has laid the groundwork for sustained growth
by implementing economic reforms necessary to gain
vital IMF financing. Since June 1981, the government
has removed price controls on consumer goods, in-
creased producer prices for coffee and food, steeply
devalued the shilling, and set up a dual foreign
US economic involvement in Uganda is relatively
extensive. The United States, although a negligible
source of imports, is Kampala's largest single export
market, accountingfor about two-ftfths of all sales in
1982. The United States also is a major bilateral aid
donor, contributing some $19 million-most of it
development assistance-over the past two years.
Over the same period, Washington donated about $30
million for Ugandan-related refugees, displaced per-
sons, and returnees. We estimate that US commercial
bank exposure in Uganda, although only a small
proportion of Uganda's $630 million external debt,
accounts for some one-third of all lending from
Western banks. American private investment, as far
as we can determine, is negligible.
exchange market in an effort to rationalize prices and
encourage private-sector production. In addition,
Kampala has held down monetary expansion, sharply
raised interest rates, limited government use of do-
mestic credit, and streamlined the tax system.
These policy measures, along with generally improved
internal security during the first three years of
Obote's presidency and high levels of external assist-
ance-from the IMF, the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, and various bilateral aid donors-
have led to economic growth averaging more than 6
percent annually since 1980-81, according to IMF
statistics. The recovery has been especially buoyant in
the dominant agricultural sector; indeed, Uganda
reached food self-sufficiency again in 1983, according
to the IMF, and official purchases of export crops-
almost entirely coffee-have almost doubled in vol-
ume over the past three years.' Industrial output,
particularly in important agro-processing, also has
expanded rapidly. These gains have carried over to
the balance of payments, where official statistics show
that large aid flows and higher coffee exports have
permitted not only an increase in imports but also
' The increase in official coffee purchases overstates the recovery in
production, because it includes stock drawdowns and reduced
25X1
25X1
I
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
aecrei
Figure 2
Uganda: Selected Economic Indicators, 1979/80-1983/848
8
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
Gross Foreign Reserves, End of Period
Million US $
Composition of Real GDP, 1983/84`
Percent
Manufacturing-
50
Commerce-7.0
Communications,
transport,
utilities-4.0
Government-14.0
Other-14.0
Commercial
agriculture-22.0
a Fiscal year I July-30 June.
5 Provisional.
Projected.
9 Secret
Food and Export Crop Production
1979/80 =100
Legend
__ Food
O Export
0 1979/80 80/81 81/82 82/835 83/847
Composition of Exports, 1982/83 b
Percent
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
aCuret
some reduction in external arrearages and the mainte-
nance of a small foreign exchange cushion. Moreover,
the IMF reports that rapid growth in public-sector
revenues, mainly from external trade taxes, has al-
lowed the government to boost spending while main-
taining a budget deficit-not including an unknown
level of extrabudgetary expenditures-of less than 5
percent of GDP.' Reflecting Kampala's fiscal and
monetary restraint, the increase in supply due to
higher producer prices, and lower import prices, infla-
tion has plummeted from almost 100 percent annually
during the first years of Obote's administration to 20
percent in 1983-84, according to the Fund.
Nonetheless, economic rehabilitation is far from
complete:
? Our calculations indicate that, even if Uganda were
to maintain last year's 5-percent expansion of GDP,
real per capita income would not reach pre-Amin
levels until the close of this century.
? Despite a strong recovery in export agriculture,
production is far below the peak levels of the early
1970s. Industry still is wracked by import shortages
and transport bottlenecks; average capacity utiliza-
tion has risen only to 30 to 35 percent, and many
factories are closed, according to IMF and World
Bank reporting.
? Unrepaired damage to Uganda's transport, commu-
nications, and power networks constrains production
and sporadic outbreaks of violence have caused
further disruption.
? Living standards of wage and salary workers have
dropped because inflation, in part fueled by the
removal of price controls on consumer goods, has
outstripped pay hikes.
In addition, the balance-of-payments position, al-
though improved, still is not strong. Export earnings
are constrained by Uganda's International Coffee
Organization export quota and low prices in the non-
ICO market, at the same time that imports must
continue to expand in order to maintain economic
momentum. Hefty debt service costs-running be-
tween 40 and 50 percent of export earnings, according
to IMF data-place an added burden on the external
accounts. Moreover, despite government efforts to
adjust the official exchange rate in line with currency
markets, US Embassy reporting indicates that the
shilling in April sold at close to a 25-percent discount
in an active black market.
Kampala also has made little progress in overcoming
structural obstacles impeding growth. The country
still is, and probably always' will be, unable to gener-
ate the level of domestic investment necessary to
sustain economic growth. This situation is exacerbat-
ed by high defense spending, which continues to divert
scarce resources away from development projects, and
a near-total reliance on fluctuating coffee exports as a
source of foreign exchange. Moreover, Kampala's
weak administrative capabilities-the result of cor-
ruption and low morale among civil service employees,
poor data bases, and manpower and fiscal con-
straints-limit Uganda's ability to efficiently use aid.
If, as we expect, the recent deterioration in security
persists and widens, we think Uganda's shaky eco-
nomic recovery could be derailed. Extensive guerrilla
and Army operations-particularly if directed at eco-
nomic targets-could result in the destruction and
hoarding of export and food crops, damage to agricul-
tural storage and processing facilities, and major
disruptions in domestic transport and marketing net-
works. Declines in marketed agricultural production
would quickly translate into drops in export earnings.
Capital inflows would further diminish if Western
donors-already distressed over the brutality of
Obote's forces and the disruption of aid flows to
refugee camps within the country-cut assistance
levels. As a result, imports of much-needed agricul-
tural and manufacturing inputs would soon dry up.
Moreover, under these circumstances, we think Obote
would be tempted to reverse current economic policies
by lowering prices to placate urban consumers, in-
creasing defense spending at the expense of social and
development programs, and augmenting the govern-
ment's control over production.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
Secret
President Obote's prospects for solving the root prob-
lems facing his regime are bleak. Economic progress
has been the sole positive element of his administra-
tion, but it is fragile and very susceptible to further
deterioration of the security situation.
On balance, we believe that the most likely scenario
for the regime is for Obote to cling tenaciously to
power and attempt to pursue relatively moderate
policies' to avoid the loss of vital Western economic
and military aid. If Obote believed the survival of his
regime were at stake, however, he would not hesitate
to turn to any source-including Cuba, North Korea,
and the Soviets-that could bolster his position.F_
In our view, ethnic and regional divisions will continue
to fuel political tension, which almost certainly will
heighten as elections now scheduled for December
1985 draw nearer. Tribes that believe the election will
leave them without a stake in the government might
vent their frustration through acts of terrorism, dem-
onstrations, or violence. Nevertheless, the fragmented
nature of the opposition and the lack of a successor of
national stature capable of commanding broad sup-
port and respect give Obote a slightly better-than-
even chance to serve the remaining 18 months of his
elected term.
Obote's loss of credibility-as a national leader, howev-
er, raises serious doubt that he would risk holding the
elections on schedule. He could resort to rigging-a
tactic we believe he used as the Tanzania-backed
candidate in 1980-and he clearly maintains the
option of declaring a postponement, which he could
plausibly justify on the basis of Uganda's chaotic
internal security situation. Even if held, the elections
offer virtually no prospect for providing a forum for
resolving Uganda's political problems and would only
serve as the trappings to validate the perpetuation of
the regime in power.
A continuing deterioration of the security situation,
such as occurred in the past six months, could present
Obote with some difficult policy decisions. Confronted
with a further loss of control, Obote might feel
compelled to turn leftward, particularly if continuing
Army excesses undermined his ability to attract mili-
tary help from Western countries. If fear that the
internal security situation was becoming unmanage-
able led Obote to rely more heavily on P'yongyang or
to turn to Havana or Moscow, he would probably 25X1
incorporate more leftist policies in order to assure
their support.
We cannot discount the possibility of Obote's removal
by a coup from within the government or the military.
According to a US Embassy official, the large num-
ber of armed military personnel constantly present on
the streets of Kampala pose a continuing threat of
assassination. Whatever the cause-personal rivalry,
competition among ethnic factions, military dissatis-
faction, or concern over the divisive impact of the 25X1
regime on the country-Obote's removal would al-
most certainly intensify Uganda's ethnic and political
cleavages and accelerate a descent into anarchy.
Under these circumstances, the prospects for the
emergence of a regime headed by left-leaning oppor-
tunists already in positions of power would be greatly
enhanced.
Signs To Watch
Several developments would serve as positive indica-
tors for the Obote regime:
? Obote takes steps to consolidate power in the UPC
by replacing radical extremists.
? The President demonstrates progress in establishing
control of his Army and identifies a politically
acceptable replacement for late Chief of Staff Ojok.
? Obote undertakes serious efforts to integrate Ugan-
dan exiles into the government to reconcile the
country's diverse ethnic groups and broaden the
base of support for the regime.
We believe, however, that we are more likely to see
evidence of further instability as the regime moves
toward elections. In particular, we should be alert for
signs of increasing security deterioration or a sharper
turn to the left:
? Increased coup plotting in the military that the
government is unable to check.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
secret
? Increased internal squabbling among the leadership,
particularly if it appears that a more radical faction,
such as the Muwanga clique, is gaining the upper
hand.
? A sharp reversal of recent economic progress, par-
ticularly if politically sensitive shortages of food,
fuel, and other necessities occur.
Implications for the United States
Obote is desperate for continued economic and mili-
tary aid. We do not believe his reliance on North
Korea for help or his tentative openings toward Cuba
and the Soviet Union indicate a basic tilt to the Soviet
Bloc or an intent to alter his government's nonaligned
policy. Rather,. we believe his actions reflect an
awareness of his regime's military weakness and his
dependence on support from whatever countries are
prepared to provide it.
The decision by London and Washington to give
military assistance, however, almost certainly has
sharpened Obote's awareness of Western concern over
Communist inroads in Uganda. We believe he will
view this British-American action as only an initial
step toward solving a continuing problem and will be
encouraged to press for more assistance. If he believes
the West is not being responsive enough, he will be
increasingly likely to threaten to call on Communist
support as a bargaining lever for greater Western
concessions.
If Obote should fall, the resulting chaos and struggle
for power would provide Moscow and Havana ample
opportunity to use Uganda as a base for destabiliza-
tion efforts in the region. Neighboring countries are
already alarmed about the possibility of refugees and
violence spilling over their borders. Despite their
disinclination to provide direct military assistance to
Obote, most of Uganda's immediate neighbors have
tried to cooperate with him to encourage stability in
the country. A breakdown of these efforts would
prompt pro-Western countries such as Kenya, Sudan,
and Zaire to look to the United States for greater
assistance.
Secret 12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85S00317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200030004-2