WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT FRANCE: CONCERN ABOUT MILITARY UNREST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 25, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020019-8
Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
France: Concern About Military Unrest
Secret
April 25, 1975
No. 0017/75A
Copy N2 973
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SPLC!AL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelli-
gence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence.
The Special Reports are published separately to permit more
comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by
the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic
Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Direc-
torate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are co-
ordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but,
except for the normal substantive exchange with other
agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated
outside CIA unless specifically indicated.
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For the first time since the Algerian war ended almost 15 ~,,ers ago, discontent
in the military has hec;ome a topic for grave concern in Fracice. The streams of
discontent flow mainly from inadequate military salaries, a failure to define the
mission of the army in the defense of Europe, substandard living conditions, and
changing social attitudes in France.
France has been particularly sensitive to the political role of the military since
1958 when the army played a significant part in the birth o the 5th Republic. At
that time the country was faced with widespread revolt ire the army over policy
toward Algeria, and de Gaulle's return to power was seen as the only alternative to
civil war. Ten years later, when student-labor disorders threatened to topple the
government, the French public noted uneasily that President de Gaulle found it
necessary to assure himself of the loyalty of the army before taking action. Most
recently, French sensitivity has been heightened by the role of the Portuguese
military, which has raised the question in French minds of whether the rumblings of
discontent in the armed forces are the early warning of an attempt by the military to
impose its own solution on France's current social and economic troubles.
During the past six months, the volume of press articles-by generals, journal-
ists, and politicians-has made it impossible for the government to ignore the
problem. President Giscard is proceeding cautiously, however, for t1,1, issue is a
potentially explosive one, and his leftist opposition may have hopes of using it to try
to embarrass, or even bting down, the government. At the same time, he is
constrained by the high cost of meaningful reforms.
Demonstration at Draguignan
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April 25, 1975
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An Army, Cut-Rate
Since the Algerian war, Paris has poured
money into its force de dissuasion-the strategic
nuclear deterrent force that allows France to
maintain its claim of military "independence."
The high cost has beer offset by extremely low
salaries in the armed forces, especially for con-
scripts who are called up at the age of 18 or 19
for 12 months' service. Their salaries, though
recently raised from oughly $17 to $50 a month,
are still five times less than the French minimum
wage. Officers and noncommissioned officers also
earn far less than their civilian counterparts.
Eighty-six percent of conscript barracks
were huilt before World War I, and 10 percent
date from the Napoleonic wars---"without the
honor of being named national monuments."
Another important cause of malaise, particularly
among the cadres, is the feeling of being cut off
from French society. There is an increasing
tendency on the part of the public to question
the need for an expensive peacetime army, and
the prestige of a military career is at a low ebb.
Less than three candidates apply for every
vacancy at the principal military academy, com-
pared with 13 at the civil service - oriented
National School of Administration. Meanwhile,
the proportion of sons from military families who
are accepted by the academies or given direct
commissions is steadily growing-possibly an
indication that the officer corps is feeding on
itself, becoming ever morc isolated from "out-
side" society.
Changing Society
The years of peace that followed France's
disentanglement from its colonial imbroglio; and
the relaxation produced by detente have reduced
the importance of the armed forces in the public's
eyes. Government emphasis on the strategic
nuclear force has similarly served to make the
conventional soldier seem redundant. At the same
time, the gulf between the living standards of the
soldier and his civilian friends has widened
dramatically.
The changing nature oi* society is also re-
flected in the new crop of conscripts, who are
better educated and more sophisticated) than their
predecessors. They are also more politicized-two
years ago, they were demonstrating in their high
schools against the elimination of student defer-
ments-and they have recently bein enfranchised.
An increasing number resent having to donate 12
months to the state-especially when that time is
often wasted on menial and nonmilitary duties.
Finally, the military is confronted with the funda-
mental problem of enforcing rigid discipiine in an
increasingly permissive society.
Military Protests
During the final round of the presidential
election last May, a series of demands in the form
of an ^c;; ''tter was gent to the two candidates,
uiscard and So ialist leader Mitterrand. Originally
signed by 1u0 conscripts and NCOs, the letter
became known as the "Call of the 100." It was
later signed-sometimes in a diluted form-by
some 2,500 to 4,000 soldiers, including many
stationed in West Germany.
The letter called for specific measures to
ameliorate compulsory military service:
? free choice of date and place of induc-
tion between the ages of 18 and 25;
? right to form trade unions;
? pay equal to the minimum wage;
? free transportation.
A series of other demands was aimed at loosening
the bonds of military protocol; eliminating mili-
tary security, tribunals, and sanctions; and
terminating conscript service outside of France.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed
to the Office of Current Intelligence
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April 25, 1g75
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Sites of Conscript Demonstrations
557745 4557745 -FiqIA
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Cragulgnan.
April 25, 1975
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This. document may well represent the most
serious challenge to French m;Iitary institutions
since the early years of the 5th Republic. The
"Call of the 100" has become the manifesto of
the draftee demonstrations that have taken place
since last September in several French and West
Germany cities.
The 200 draftees who broke out of their
barracks last September 10 to march down the
streets of Draguignan in southern France set a
precedent for revolt against the previous system
of protesting through proper military channels.
Driven by what the French media has dubbed le
phenomena ras le bol-military slang for "fed up
to the back teeth"---they chanted slogans against
army crnditi?ins and raised their fists in the salute
of the extreme leftists. Among them were 30
blacks from France's overseas departments who
also protested against racial discrimination in the
barracks. The demonstration was orderly and
ended without incident, but the chain reaction it
set off is still rocking the French military estab-
lishment.
The Draguignan protest was quickly fol-
lowed by incidents of insubordination in a bat-
talion stationed in nearby Nice, and by a joint
letter to the defense minister from 200 draftees
and noncommissioned officers in Paris requesting
a variety of reforms in line with the "Call of the
100."
On January 13, some 100 draftees assigned
to units in Karlsruhe, West Germany, demon-
strated against the living and working conditions
in Germany. They also questioned the need for
stationing French troops in Germany-the first
time a political factor raised by the "Call of the
100" had been used in a demonstration. Two
weeks later, another garrison in West Germany
was affected when some 80 draftees in Tuebingen
protested disciplinary actions taken against fellow
conscripts.
In mid-February, about 150 draftees demon-
~`rated ? the streets of Verdun, demanding a
civilian inquiry into the accidental death of a
conscript. A day later, some 100 draftees met in
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Nancy for a clandestine press conference with the
leader of the Young Communists.
The demonstrations so far have all been
orderly. They have not attacked the concept of
compulsory military service, but have con-
centrated on demands for more pay, better living
conditions, and fewer restrictions.
The military. leadership has blamed leftist
agitation for the unrest in the barracks. This
charge was emphasized by Prime Minister Chirac
during his trip to Moscow last month, when he
accused the French Communist Party of under-
mining national defenses. In fact, there is no
evidence to support the contention that the party
is behind the military malaise. The Communists
and the Socialists have not taken a firm stand on
defense issues. Extreme leftist splinter groups,
however, have been active among the military.
The anti-militarist image formerly associated
with the left in France has become an embarrass-
ment for the Socialist Party. In a confidential
note last January, Socialist chief Mitterrand
warned his party members not to associate
themselves with purely anti-militarist demonstra-
tions "which could only rebound to hurt the
left." One of the reasons for the Socialist change
of heart is reflected in polls showing that over 50
percent of the military officers and NCOs voted
for Mitterrand in the last presidential election.
Nevertheless, Socialist action has been limited to
iss:!ing a 20-point program aimed at improving
material conditions and morale in the barracks.
The Communist propaganda efforts that are
aimed at the armed forces appear to be primarily
defensive-to ensure that the army will not inter-
fere should a leftist government come to power.
But the Communists are also worried about being
"passed on the left" by extremists active among
the armed forces. The French Communists'
propaganda tries to counter the appeal of more
radical leftist groups by building strict discipline
among the party's military members and by
emphasizing the necessity for wide-ranging
reforms. Many Communist draftees signed the
April 25, 1975
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The Socialist "National Convention of
Reserve Cadres for the New Army" and the Com-
munist "Federation of Officers and NCOs of the
Republican Reserve" compete to enroll members
ci the officer corps. To date, their influence has
been small and has been confined largely to lower
ranking reserve NCOs. Sonior NCOs and officers,
who consider themselves members of professional
cadres and identify with the French bourgeoisie,
so far have not been as susceptible as the draftees
to the proletarian solidarity approach of the left.
General Marcel Bigeard
"Call of the 100" but they have steered clear of
radical "soldiers' committees" and have not been
conspicuous in the demonstrations. As the new
secretary of state for defense, General Bigeard,
recently remarked, "Communist soldiers are
always well behaved and disciplined. If one day
there were a Communist defense ministry, there
would be no more street matches."
There is soma evidence that the Young Com-
munists are stepping up their activities in an ef-
fort to avoid being left in the just of radical left
splinter groups. The draftee demonstration and
nevis conference in Nancy in mid-February was
"sponsored" by the leader of the Young Commu-
nists. Dofenso Minister Bourges, who has seized
every opportunity to blame the Communists for
the military troubles, immediately denounced the
party as the instigator of the demonstration.
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April 25, 1975
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French military security forces link the
formation of soldiers' committees to the presence
of soldiers belonging to the Trotskyite Commu-
nist Revolutionary League (formerly the Commu-
nist Revolutionary Front), the Marxist Revolu-
tionaty Alliance, the Anti-militarist Committee,
and other leftist splinter groups. Security crack-
downs and the splitting up of groups of known
sympathizers had severely curtailed the activities
of these organizations until the "Call of the
100"-which embodied many of tho demands
made by the soldiers' committees-gave the move-
ment new impetus.
France's most respected newspaper, Le
Monde, conducted a survey among soldiers in late
January. The newspaper concluded that the
Trotskyite Revolutionary League was heavily
involved in focusing the attention of draftees on
"legitimate grievances," thereby drawing the
draftees into soldiers' committees. Soldiers inter-
viewed pointed out that even though one of the
three leaders of the initial demonstration at
Draguignan was connected with the Trot, kyites,
he had not hidden this fact. The soldiers
emphasized, however, that even though some of
the demonstrations may have been "encouraged"
by Trotskyites it would be a grave mistake to
assume that draftees' grievances were contrived.
Government Response Sluggish
In early December a report on army morale
prepared by the army's then chief of staff, Alain
de Boissieu, was leaked to the press. His report
was apparently initiated as a result of the
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incident at Draguignan. De Boissieu urged that
co editions in the military be improved and sug-
g^Aed a revision of missions to adapt the French
army to its financial means. According to Le
Monde, the memorandum conceded that morale
had become a se; ious problem and even intimated
that, should French society suffer another
upheaval like that of May 1958, the army might
not escape involvement. The words "May 1968,"
and the specter of army involvement in a student-
labor confrontation with the government, evoked
a strong negative emotional response from the
French public.
The Council of Defense met on December
18 and announced that the basic statute
governing officers and NCOs would be studied
and revised. The new laws would provide for
quicker promotion and would encourage younger
cadres. The results of the study, incorporating
suggestions made by all ranks of officers, were
submitted to the defense minister in early April
and will be hammered into a new statute to go
before the Council of Defense. The report calls
for the division of all officer grades into three
groups-junior officers up to captains, com-
mandants up to lieutenant colonels, and colonels
and above-within which promotion would be
automatic. An age lime would be established for
prorvotion into these major "groups." Military
purists in France are already decrying the new
proposjls as a minor revolution that will create a
whole c;,tegory of short-term officers, changing
the arrr,>r from a way of life to a vocation.
In early January, the military trial of one
black and two wl',;te :-2aders of the demonstration
at Draguignan once again focused public attention
on conscript grievances. Thousands of leftist
civilians demonstrdted in Paris and Marseilles in
support of the defendants, and the Socialist and
Communist parties declared their solidarity with
the draftees. The black draftee was acquitted-
"proving there is no racial prejudice in the army,"
as one French news magazine drily remarked-and
the other two received token sentences. The
verdicts were lenient P':ough to deter strong reac-
tions, but on the whole the army suffered from
'ho exposure given to anti-militarist propaganda.
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At
the end of January, Giscard repk .ed
Meaningful Reforms Expensive
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Defense
Minister Soufflet
who had not been
effective
,
and, moreover, was identified in the
In the current economic climate it will be
public mind with the government's inadequate
response to military discontent. Yvon Bourges, a
dynamic civil servant and staunch Gaullist. be-
came the new minister. Giscard also filled the
vacant secretary of state for defense slot by
appointing a colorful and controversial paratroop
general, Marcel Bigeard.
Bigeard will be a key figure in the govern-
ment's attempt to cope with the military. He may
well be the best man for shaking the army out of
its torpor. Bigeard rose through the ranks and
survived the bloodiest fighting of the French
colonial wars to become one of France's most
decorated soldiers. Though worshipped by the
men in his command, he is regarded with some
suspicion by the high command because of his
unorthodox methods and his well-publicized
irreverence for other generals.
The first indication that Bourges and Bigeard
were coming to grips with the military problem
came on March 4 when the cabinet announced
several new measures aimed at improving morale
in the armed forces. Among these, conscripts
were to be allotted one free trip home per month,
and their pay was tripled to 210 francs (about
$50)-still one of the lowest salaries in NATO.
Bourges has also opted to retain the Permanent
Military Service Council set up by Soufflet
shortly before his resignation. The council-com-
posed of military, parliamentary, and private
members-is empowered to investigate and report
on all aspects oi military service. Bigeard has
called for a more flexible code of discipline, but
no action has yet been taken.
Giscard has promised further reforms and
has emphasized the ;iecessity for rei itegrating the
military into the mainstream of French life. In his
March "fireside chat" to the nation, he also
stressed the importance of the conventional
forces. Drawing attention to the explosive nature
of world crises today, he called for a more mobile
and flexible army capable of defending French
interests anywhere in the world at a moment's
notice.
very difficult to expand the military budget.
Prime Minister Chirac supports the Defense Minis-
try's appeal for more fund
Barring a real increase in funds for the de-
fense budget, further increases in personnel ex-
penditures will have to come at the expense of
weapons development and procurement, or
through reduced combat preparedness standards.
Already, the completion of a third group of
IRBM silos has reportedly been canceled for
budgetary reasons, and the air force has been
forced to reduce both flying time and the number
of bases for its strategic bomber force.
Alternatively, Paris may choose to reduce
the size of its forces in order to arrest the rising
imbalance between personnel costs and force de-
velopment and readiness. The US embassy reports
that Paris is already asking itself if it can continue
to afford a half-million-man defense force. US
officials ind'-ado that increasing personnel costs,
coupled with the absence of a shooting war, could
compel Giscard's government to reduce the armed
forces to 300,000 or 400,000 men.
The most likely political solution in the
short term is a program of conventional "re-
forms" designed to make the existing system
more palatable. In the long term, however, France
will have to come to grips with the basic question
of whether to increase defense spending or accept
a reduced role as a world power.
Meanwhile, the demonstrations will con-
tinue, and the military, especially the lower ranks,
will remain a fertile field for leftist exploitation.
Unless the promised "further reforms" come
quickly, the conscripts could become more dis-
orderly. Officers and senior NCOs, however,
remain firmly committed to the existing system,
and there does not appear to be any imminent
danger of the French military pushing for a voice
in French politics or participating to any signif-
icant degree in a major civil disturbance.
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