CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302590001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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YOUNG PRESIDENTS' ORGANIZATION KAUAI UNIVERSITY
2 FEBRUARY 1988
CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
OVER THE YEARS, PUBLIC VIEWS OF CIA AND ITS ROLE IN T1
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY, BY MOVIES,
TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS BY JOURNALISTS, HEADLINES
GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, EXPOSES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY EXPERTS WHO HAVE NEVER
SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND BY SOME WHO HAVE SERVED AND
STILL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR ROLE. WE ARE SAID TO BE AN
INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND YET ARE THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST
EXTERNALLY SCRUTINIZED AND MOST PUBLICIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
IN THE WORLD. WHILE WE SOMETIMES AR.E.,.ABLE. TO _REF,U.T.E-.-,PUBLICLY
ALLEGATIONS AND CRITICISM AGAINST US, USUALLY WE MUST REMAIN
SILENT. THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF IMAGES OF CIA
AND VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT.
TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO ILLUMINATE, AND I HOPE
EXPAND, YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.
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THIS ROLE TAKES THREE BROAD FORMS:
FIRST, CIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS
AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE
PRESIDENT,-THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE
DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE AND MANY OTHER
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
SECOND, CIA IS CHARGED WITH THE CONDUCT OF COVERT
ACTION, THE ONE AREA WHERE WE IMPLEMENT POLICY. THIS
IS A SUBJECT SO COMPLEX AND SO CONTROVERSIAL AS TO
REQUIRE SEPARATE TREATMENT AT ANOTHER TIME, ANOTHER
PLACE.
THIRD, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT, CIA'S ROLE IS PLAYED OUT
IN THE INTERACTION, PRIMARILY IN WASHINGTON, BETWEEN
CIYA-.AND-THE POLICY.. COMMUNITY-. T iS I`N-' T`HE ,DYNAM'ICS OF
THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF CIA
ARE DETERMINED -- WHETHER CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE HEEDED
OR NOT, WHETHER CIA'S INFORMATION IS RELEVANT AND
TIMELY ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, AND WHETHER CIA's
RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYMAKERS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE AND
PROBLEM TO PROBLEM, IS SUPPORTIVE OR ADVERSARIAL. IT
IS THIS DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
THAT IS THE LEAST WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IT IS THIS AREA
THAT I WILL FOCUS ON TODAY.
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WHAT THEN, DOES CIA DO? BECAUSE OF THE MEDIA'S FOCUS ON
.COVERT ACTION, I WOULD._._LL_KE..._TD SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT OVER 95
PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO THE
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. ABOUT THREE PERCENT OF
CIA'S PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION.
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
NOW, IF WE ARE NOT SPENDING MOST OF OUR TIME AND MONEY
ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS, WHAT EXACTLY DOES CIA DO?
CIA DEVOTES THE OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF ITS RESOURCES TO
MONITORING AND REPORTING=ON-=-DAY TO=DAY DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE
WORLD, AND DETERMINING AND RESPONDING TO POLICYMAKERS' LONGER
RANGE REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS.
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATIOM"FlN'DS ITS ~WAY' TO THE 'POUTCYMAKER
IN SEVERAL WAYS:
-- FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY TO DAY EVENTS AND
DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR
OFFICIALS DAILY OR EVEN SEVERAL TIMES A DAY.
-- SECOND, THE CIA CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS
DESCRIBING BOTH EVENTS AT HAND AND POTENTIAL
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OPPORTUNITIES OR PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES.
NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB-CABINET MEETINGS BEGIN WITH AN
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.
THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. THESE
ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S VIEWS. ALL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE'
TO AND COORDINATE ON WHAT IS SAID IN THESE ESTIMATES.
-- FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY
INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. CIA'S ASSESSMENTS OR RESEARCH
PROGRAM IS THE PRODUCT OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION IN.THE WORLD. THE
RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING -- FROM STRATEGIC
WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES; EPIDEMIOLOGY TO SPACE; WATER
AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INS`TAB'ILITY;;
MINERAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE;
SOVIET LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS;
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO
COMMODITY SUPPLIES; AND MANY, MANY MORE.
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CIA-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS
SO FAR, SO GOOD. WHAT IHAVE JUST REVIEWED IS A TEXTBOOK
DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. IT IS NEAT,
UNAMBIGUOUS, CLINICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL, EVEN COMMENDABLE --
AND HIGHLY MISLEADING. WHAT ABOUT USERS WHO LOOK NOT FOR DATA.
OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT FOR SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE;
OR THOSE WHO SELECTIVELY USE OR MISSTATE INTELLIGENCE TO
INFLUENCE PUBLIC DEBATE-OVER POLICY; OR USERS WHO LABEL
INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO SOFT, TOO HARD OR COOKED; OR
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WITH THEIR OWN AGENDAS OR BIASES; OR THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR HELD
AT TOO GREAT A DISTANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT.-OR-ONE-WHO IS HELD
TOO CLOSE; OR THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING
EVALUATIONS, OR ANALYSIS THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG; OR THE USE
OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE-AND-LEG'IS'LATIVE BRANCHES?
THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF OFFICIALS IN CIA AND POLICY
AGENCIES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE AND MANY SIMILAR ISSUES AND THE
INTERACTION AMONG THEM COMPRISE THE DYNAMIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP
-- WHAT PROFESSOR YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI OF HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF
JERUSALEM DESCRIBES AS "THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE."
THE FACT IS THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE POLICYMAKER AND THE
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY -- AND WITH
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FRIGHTENINGLY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- COME TOGETHER HUGELY IGNORANT
OF THE REALITIES AND COMPLEXITIES.-OF EACH OTHER'S-WORLD --
PROCESS, TECHNIQUE, FORM AND,. CULTURE.. CIA..0F.F.ICERS CAN TELL
YOU IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY
COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE
SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS
OF INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SWELLS "WHEN THEY COMPARE THE
SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN COLLECTION OF
THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE
CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY DECISIONS
ARE MANY A TIME REACHED."
THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE -- OF CIA -- IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THIS
CONFERS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, ABOVE ALL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH
AUTONOMY ALSO IMBUES THE CIA-POLICY COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP WITH
A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSARIAL AS WELL AS SUPPORTIVE CONTENT. AND,
THE-POLICYMAKER HAS A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES, MANY"-LEGITIMATE,
SOME NOT.
POLICYMAKERS LEGITIMATELY WANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
THAT WILL INFORM AND GUIDE THEIR TACTICAL DAY TO DAY
DECISIONMAKING. IN SOME AREAS, WE CAN AND DO MEET
THEIR NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1980, THANKS TO A VERY
BRAVE MAN, WE WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF THE STEP BY STEP PREPARATIONS FOR THE
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IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. IN EARLY 1986, WE
WERE ABLE TO DOCUMENT IN EXTRAORDINARY DETAIL ELECTORAL
CHEATING. IN THE.. PHI.L.IPEI.NES.._ THERE ARE EVEN SOME AREAS
WHERE OUR INTELLIGENCE IS SO GOOD THAT IT REDUCES
POLICYMAKERS FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM FOR MANEUVER. YET, I
WOULD HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES AND
ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE SUCH
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE -- MOST OFTEN POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE -- IS SORELY DEFICIENT AND POLICYMAKER
COMPLAINTS ARE JUSTIFIED.
IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU THAT VERY FEW POLICYMAKERS
WELCOME CIA INFORMATION WHICH DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE
CHALLENGES THE SUCCESS OR-ADE-QU"CY-:OF THEIR POLICIES OR
THE ACCURACY OF THEIR PRONOUNCEMENTS. INDEED, DURING
THE VIETNAM WAR, A CONSTANT REFRAIN.FROM POLICYMAKERS
WAS, "AREN'T YOU GUYS ON THE TEAM?"
IN THIS CONNECTION, THE POLICYMAKER IS OFTEN SUSPICIOUS
THAT WHEN CIA'S.,ANALYSIS SUGGESTS POLICY IS FAILING OR
IN DIFFICULTY, THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE, WITH MALICE,
WIDELY CIRCULATED BY THE AGENCY FOR USE AS AMMUNITION
BY CRITICS OF THE POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH,
WITH CONGRESS OR WITH THE PUBLIC.
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MANY POLICYMAKERS BELIEVE CIA ALLOWS ITS BIASES TO
DOMINATE. I.- REPORTING.. WHO.-WOULD DISAGREE THAT CIA
OFFICERS HAVE. VIEWS AND BIASES, AND THAT THEY TRY TO
PROMOTE THEM? BUT, CIA IS NOT MONOLITHIC; THERE IS A
WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS INSIDE ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE.
INDEED, THE INTERNAL DEBATES ARE FIERCE AND SOMETIMES
BRUTAL -- AFTER ALL, THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH. IT IS
NOT A PLACE FOR THE FAINT-HEARTED. WE HAVE ELABORATE
PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWING ASSESSMENTS TO TRY TO FILTER
OUT INDIVIDUAL BIAS AND MAKE OUR REPORTING AS OBJECTIVE
AS POSSIBLE. AND WHEN WE SEND OUT A PROVOCATIVE
ANALYSIS BY- AN INDIVIDUAL WE TRY ALWAYS TO IDENTIFY IT
AS A PERSONAL VIEW.
BEYOND THIS, IS THERE AN INSTITUTIONAL BIAS THAT
AFFECTS OUR WORK? PROBABLY, IN SOME AREAS, IN THE
BROADEST SENSE; `"A 4D `PERHAPS `BASED` `ON EX'PER IENCE. AS AN
INSTITUTION, WE ARE PROBABLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET
INTENTIONS THAN MOST; MORE CYNICAL ABOUT THE PUBLIC
POSTURE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED TO THEIR
ACTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT; MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EASE
AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN USUALLY
AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS; AND, FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY,
WE WILL TEND TO SEE PERILS AND DIFFICULTY WHERE OTHERS
DO NOT.
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-- POLICYMAKERS' IMPATIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE -- WITH CIA
-- IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES
WRONG IN OUR ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS, AND WE OFTEN
CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON NEW ANALYSIS OR NEW
.INFORMATION. WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ERROR GRACEFULLY,
AND OFTEN DO NOT FOREWARN POLICYMAKERS OF REVISED VIEWS
BEFORE THE INFORMATION HITS THE STREET. A POLICYMAKER
WHO HAS MADE DECISIONS BASED ON ONE ASSESSMENT ONLY TO
SEE IT CHANGE OR TO FIND THAT IT WAS WRONG WILL NOT
THINK FONDLY OF US OR SOON WISH AGAIN TO PROCEED ON OUR
ASSURANCES OR ASSESSMENTS.
-- CIA's RELATIONSHIP ..WITH QC?ONGRESS??-ALS-O IS?.A :SPECIAL
PROBLEM FOR POLICYMAKERS FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND IT
PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCES OUR ROLE. VIRTUALLY ALL CIA
ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEES "MOST "GO"'AL'SO TO "THE 'ARM'ED- SERVICES,
FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. IN
1986, CIA SENT SOME 5000 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO
CONGRESS AND GAVE MANY HUNDREDS OF BRIEFINGS. ALL THIS
IS NEW IN THE LAST DECADE OR SO. AS A RESULT, AND
THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND
REPRESENTATIVES ARE &TEN ~ BET TE'R --INFORMED ABOUT CIA' S
INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT THAN THE
POLICYMAKER. AND THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OFTEN USED TO
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CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE EXECUTIVE
AGENCY AGAINST ANOTHER, AND TO EXPOSE DISAGREEMENTS
WITHIN AN.. ADM I_N..I STRAT ION
MOST SPECIALISTS WRITING ABOUT-THE CHANGED BALANCE
OF POWER IN RECENT YEARS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND
CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, CITE WATERGATE
AND VIETNAM AS PRIMARY CAUSES. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A
THIRD PRINCIPAL FACTOR -- WHEN CONGRESS OBTAINED ACCESS
TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THE MID-1970S
ESSENTIALLY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THIS-SITUATION ADDS EXTRAORDINARY STRESS TO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIA =AND---POL=ICY AGENCIES.
POLICYMAKER SUSPICION OF CIA USING INTELLIGENCE TO
SABOTAGE SELECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IS OFTEN NOT
FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. AND NOT A FEW MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS ARE WILLING TO"'EXPLO'IT"THIS SITUATION'BY THEIR'
OWN SELECTIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTS THEIR
VIEWS. THE END RESULT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE
CONGRESSIONAL HAND IN POLICY DEBATES AND TO HEIGHTEN
GREATLY THE TENSIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE REST OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
NOW, LET ME TURN TO CIA`S ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
POLICYMAKER AS SEEN FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT.
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LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT IN EVERY ADMINISTRATION
DURING WHICH I HAVE-SERVED THERE HAVE BEEN-A NUMBER OF
SENIOR.POLICYMAKERS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND ABOVE) WHO
WERE AVID USERS AND READERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND WHO
AGGRESSIVELY SOUGHT CIA ANALYSIS AND VIEWS. THEY
DEDICATED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO TALKING ABOUT
SUBSTANTIVE AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH US. WE HAVE HAD
UNPRECEDENTED ACCESS IN THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE
PRESIDENT ON DOWN, ESPECIALLY FOR ANALYSIS, AND DAILY
CONTACT WITH THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE
SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE. THEY HAVE OFTEN
DIRECTLY TASKED --US AND OFFERED REACTIONS TO T-HE
INTELLIGENCE THEY READ -- AND THEY HAVE READ A GREAT
DEAL. THIS IS TRUE ALSO OF THEIR SENIOR SUBORDINATES,
WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT. THIS HAS,
CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO IMPROVING 'THE 'RELEVANCE,
TIMING, AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR ANALYSIS AND OTHER
SUPPORT. IT IS A DYNAMIC, HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP, EVEN
THOUGH IT IS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CURRENT ISSUES.
-- THIS PREOCCUPATION WITH CURRENT REPORTING IS, FROM OUR
PERSPECTIVE, A MAJOR PROBLEM. IF, AS I HAVE BEEN TOLD,
THE AVERAGE TENURE OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN
GOVERNMENT IS 21 MONTHS, A SHORT TERM FOCUS IS
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UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LAMENTABLE, AND, ULTIMATELY, VERY
COSTLY TO OUR COUNTRY. ONE OF OUR GREATEST CONCERNS
OVER, THE.. YEARS..__HAS._..BEEN__THE.-UNWILL.INGNESS OR INABILITY
OF MOST POLICYMAKERS TO SPEND MUCH TIME ON LONGER RANGE
ISSUES -- LOOKING AHEAD SEVERAL STEPS -- OR IN HELPING
TO GUIDE OR DIRECT OUR EFFORTS.
-- IN PART BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT TIME SPENT ON
INTELLIGENCE, TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS EARLY ON HAVE 4
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO THAT,
WHEN DISAPPOINTED, TURN TO SKEPTICISM WHETHER WE CAN DO
ANYTHING.
-- IT HAS BEEN ,MY EXPER=IE_,NCE-OVER-THE iYEARS THAT THE
POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE
WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE MOST OFTEN IS TO IGNORE IT;
SOMETIMES, THEY WILL CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO
NARROWLY FOCUSED-DR --AS INCOMPETENT -(AND "THEY" ARE
SOMETIMES RIGHT); AND OCCASIONALLY THEY WILL CHARGE
THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR THAT IT REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. IN
21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A
POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER)
CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH
WHICH HE AGREED. ON VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET
POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA, LEBANON, THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AND OTHER ISSUES OVER THE
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YEARS, OUR ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT DASH
COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND EFFORTS OF THE,
POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES WE_.HAVE.B.E.E.N WRONG, BUT ON
PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL WE HAVE NOT FLINCHED FROM
PRESENTING OUR HONEST VIEW.
POLICYMAKERS HAVE ALWAYS LIKED INTELLIGENCE THAT
SUPPORTED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, AND THEY OFTEN TRY TO
INFLUENCE THE ANALYSIS TO COME TO CONCLUSIONS THEY
WANT. THEY ASK CAREFULLY PHRASED QUESTIONS; THEY
SOMETIMES WITHHOLD INFORMATION; THEY BROADEN OR NARROW
THE ISSUE; ON RARE OCCASIONS, THEY EVEN TRY TO
INTIMIDATE. THE PRESSURES CAN BE ENORMOUS. THIS IS
WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGE,NCEOFFICERS, BOLSTERED
BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE . AND AN OFTEN
ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY
TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT.
A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE
NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES IHE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL
DDT! TDI C (1C Tf1 1AC A1 V>An1.1 TT i,1n111 n AI (Cl nr r-,-r .
,rL HLL I~IV Vrr 1 YrVVLL H L V LJL 4 V 0 L i )Ii
-- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN
ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY OF
CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE
SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS IS ONE OF THE
SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND
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OBJECTIVITY.
CONCLUSION
WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED HERE IS THE REALITY OF CIA'S ROLE IN
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. I HAVE TRIED TO GO
.BEYOND THE MECHANICS AND THE HEADLINES TO IDENTIFY THE
STRESSES, TENSIONS, RIVALRIES, ENDURING COMPLAINTS AND
RELATIONSHIPS -- THE PULLING AND HAULING, DAY IN AND DAY OUT,
REAL LIFE IF YOU WILL -- THAT DETERMINE CIA'S ROLE AND ITS
IMPACT. CIA'S AUTONOMY IS UNIQUE IN OUR GOVERNMENT, ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. OUR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ELEME.NTS-.OF,,.THE.-,EXE:C.UTIVE-?ARE A
DYNAMIC BLEND OF SUPPORT AND RIVALRY, OF COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT.
THE REAL INTELLIGENCE-STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, WITH HELP FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS, IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE POLICYMAKER -- A STORY THAT HAS
BEEN NEGLECTED IN PREFERENCE TO CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS,
PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIA AND THE CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE
UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT
AMERICANS KNOW THAT OUR MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION AND
ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE
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MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND IT IS IN THIS ROLE THAT
CIA IS, IN FACT, AMERICA'S EYES AND EARS: IT'S FIRST LINE OF
DEFENSE. INDEED, PERHAPS A MAJOR REASON THE UNITED STATES IS
AT PEACE IS THAT ITS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ARE ALWAYS AT WAR.
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