IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER IN LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000701120002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 17, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of --8 ~ret
Central
Intelligence
Implications of the Military
Balance of Power in Lebanon
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
cret
SNIE 11/35/36-83
17 January 1984
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
SNIE 11/35/36-83
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY
BALANCE OF POWER IN LEBANON
Information available as of 17 January 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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KEY JUDGMENTS
In SNIE 11/35/36-83 of 23 December 1983, the Intelligence
Community addressed the implications of the military balance of power
in Lebanon, particularly the effect of increased US military activity
there on Syrian goals and tactics and Lebanese domestic politics. We be-
lieve that the basic judgments contained in that SNIE remain valid.
Since the completion of the Estimate, there have been some new
developments which this Memorandum will address:
- Lebanese confessional factions, the Syrians, and the Israelis have
agreed in principle to a security plan that would allow the
central government to expand its area of control.
- The Lebanese Army extended its authority to the Sabra-Shatilla
camp area in late December.
At least portions of the security plan probably will go into effect,
although full implementation of the plan remains uncertain. We believe
Syria supports eventual implementation of the plan, primarily because
Damascus believes implementation will lead to withdrawal of the
Multinational Force (MNF). Full implementation of the plan would
provide a substantial, but probably short-term, boost to the Gemayel
government by extending its authority. Gemayel's domestic standing
would undoubtedly benefit, and implementation of the plan could
provide hirn with additional time to work on political deals with the
Shias and the Druze. Implementation would also improve the political
climate for discussion of national reconciliation issues.
If the plan is put into effect, the security situation for the MNF
could improve because artillery and mortar fire would probably be
reduced, but the threat of terrorist actions against MNF members will
remain even if the plan is fully implemented.
Conditional acceptance of the limited disengagement accord
should not by itself be interpreted as a clear signal that the key
confessional groups are prepared to reach a broader political accommo-
dation on the government's terms or cut separate deals, however. Each
of the key groups-including the Syrians-believes the proposed plan
serves its current needs without compromising its basic security and
political interests.
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If the security plan is not fully implemented-or if it is partially
implemented and quickly breaks down-there will not automatically be
a return to widespread factional fighting. The Druze, the Shias, and the
Christian Lebanese Forces militia all lack any enthusiasm for a return to
protracted fighting and are more interested in maintaining their
positions. Failure to implement the plan or a breakdown, however,
might lead the Gemayel government to attempt to expand its authority
by force.
The Gemayel government's ability to expand its authority militarily-
even in the absence of a political agreement-has steadily improved in
recent months, The Army is capable of conducting limited operations in
certain areas without encountering serious confessional strains. The
Army's improved capability and December's successful sweep operation
in the Sabra-Shatilla camp, however, do not guarantee that the Army
will be successful in a similar operation against Beirut's Shia-dominated
southern suburbs.
Implementation of the security accords could pave the way for
substantial progress on national reconciliation, provided Gemayel makes
a genuine effort to deal with his Lebanese rivals and can come to some
agreement with Syria on the 17 May accord. We believe Intelligence
Community judgments in the December Estimate that Gemayel is
unable to make such efforts remain valid. The longer Gemayel
temporizes on real political reforms, the more vulnerable the plan will
become to local security incidents and the mistrust and suspicion among
various militias.
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DISCUSSION
1. In SNIE 11/35/36-83 of 23 December 1983, the
Intelligence Community addressed the implications of
changes in the military balance of power in Lebanon,
particularly the effect of increased US military activi-
ty there on Syrian goals and tactics and Lebanese
domestic politics.
2. Since the completion of the Estimate, there have
been some new developments which this Memoran-
dum will address:
- Lebanese confessional factions, the Syrians and
the Israelis have agreed in principle to a security
plan that would allow the central government to
expand its area of control.
- The Lebanese Army extended its authority to the
Sabra-Shatilla camp area in late December.
The Security Plan
3. Major Lebanese confessional groups have accept-
ed in principle the proposed security plan as the only
way of inducing the government to enter serious
negotiations on broader political issues. But conditional
acceptance of a limited disengagement accord should
not by itself be interpreted as a clear signal that they
are prepared to reach a broader political accommoda-
tion on the government's terms or to cut individual
deals. Each of the key groups believes that the pro-
posed security plan serves its current needs without
compromising its basic security and political interests.
Progress toward longer term accommodation will de-
pend on the Gemayel government's readiness to reach
agreement with its Lebanese rivals and Syria on power
sharing and the 17 May accord.
4. The Lebanese Government sees the plan as a way
to defuse increasing pressure from MNF contributors
to demonstrate progress and to forestall a precipitous
withdrawal of the MNF. Shia leader Nabih Barri
hopes that implementation of the accord will undercut
his growing opposition-chiefly pro-Iranian Muslim
fundamentalists and leftists alike-who seek to under-
mine his authority and control. Barri believes that an
extension of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Inter-
nal Security Forces (ISF) units in key areas would help
curtail radical activities in the southern suburbs. He
might then be in a freer position to negotiate with the
Gemayel government.
5. Despite Walid Junblatt's objections, the security
plan also offers advantages for the Druze. The pro-
posed accord would help to defuse a troublesome
situation in the lower Shuf by facilitating the with-
drawal of the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) without
compromising Junblatt's control over the Shuf proper.
Moreover, by negotiating with Gemayel over the
security plan, the Druze can demonstrate their cen-
trality to the process and place the responsibility for
further concessions on political reforms directly on the
government. Junblatt also succeeds in maintaining
good relations with Syria and Israel, both of which
generally support the principle of a security
agreement.
6. For the LF, whose position in the Kharroub and
Shuf has become untenable, the accord offers a reason-
ably honorable way out of a bad situation. The LF can
now concentrate their military resources in the more
important Maronite heartland and devote their politi-
cal efforts toward blocking any political accord that
tries to diminish Maronite influence. Moreover, divid-
ed and lacking funds, the LF probably calculates that
for the moment it has more to gain from cooperating
with the government than blocking a security accord
which Israel, its primary patron, supports.
7. Syria's support for the proposed security plan
serves its interests in a number of ways. In our view,
Syria believes implementation of the security plan will
lead to an orderly withdrawal of the MNF. Provision
of this "window of opportunity" will, in the Syrian
view, increase already mounting pressures from within
the contributing countries for withdrawal of their
contingents.
8. Syria seeks to demonstrate that it is a rational
actor whose involvement in negotiations involving
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Lebanon is essential. The fact that Syria is willing to
participate in a negotiation process that also involves
Israel appears intended as a further signal to the
United States that it is willing, in the proper context, to
discuss issues involving Israeli security concerns in
Lebanon.
9. It is also to Syria's advantage to permit Junblatt
some freedom of action on local security-related issues
which do not affect primary Syrian interests. Damas-
cus is aware of Junblatt's unhappiness under too tight
Syrian control. The security plan provides an opportu-
nity for the Druze to be given a reminder that ties
with Syria do not always bind. If Syria wished,
Junblatt could be brought to swift agreement on the
pact. By permitting him to make last-minute demands
which delay implementation of the agreement, Syria
further shows its willingness to tolerate-if not sup-
port-Junblatt's "independence."
11. We believe that Syria supports eventual imple-
mentation of the plan, and it is not clear how long
Damascus will continue to permit Junblatt's last-
minute objections to delay matters. Syria may be
willing to wait until after the US Congress reconvenes
before pressing Junblatt into agreement. If Gemayel or
Army Commander Tannous becomes convinced that
full implementation of the security plan could lead to
an early withdrawal of the MNF, they could take
actions to frustrate full implementation of the plan.
12. Full implementation of the security plan would
provide a substantial, but short-term, boost to the
Gemayel government by extending its authority. It
would also improve the political climate for discussion
of national reconciliation issues. Gemayel's domestic
political standing would undoubtedly benefit from
successful implementation, and it could provide him
an opportunity to work on political deals with the
Shias and the Druze.
Proposed Security Plan
A security plan for the Beirut suburbs and the
Iqlim al-Kharroub area has been proposed, based
on the following points:
- Withdrawal of Druze forces from the west-
ern Kharroub region; evacuation of the LF
from the western Kharroub (between the
Awwali and Damur Rivers); LAF control of
the coastal highway to the Awwali River.
- Withdrawal of the LF from key positions in
the Shahhar region (between Beirut's south-
ern suburbs and the Damur River).
- Introduction of the ISF into the southern
suburbs of Beirut; establishment of LAF
checkpoints; withdrawal of armed militia-
men from the streets.
- Declaration of Beirut International Airport
as a "neutral zone."
- Replacement of LF with LAF forces at the
Barbara checkpoint.
Implementing the Plan
10. At least portions of the security plan will proba-
bly go into effect. Full implementation of the plan,
however, remains uncertain.
13. Although the security situation for the MNF
may improve somewhat if the plan is put into effect,
particularly in respect to artillery and mortar fire
directed against it, the threat of terrorist actions will
persist.
14. Nonetheless, implementation of the security
accord should not be seen as evidence that the factions
are willing to be any more flexible on their political
demands or that they are less determined to protect
their confessional and personal interests. The LF will
continue to resist reforms that jeopardize Maronite
preeminence and are still capable of undermining any
security plan. Meanwhile the Druze, backed by Syria,
will watch closely to ensure that Gemayel does not try
to end-run the reconciliation process by buying off his
rivals with cabinet posts. Junblatt will press for struc-
tural changes that go well beyond an expanded gov-
ernment of national unity. Even Nabih Barri, who is
the most likely candidate to cut a separate deal with
Gemayel, will not be able to work with the govern-
ment until it is clear that the latter is prepared to meet
basic Shia political demands and show more success in
getting Israel out of southern Lebanon.
15. If Gemayel makes a genuine effort to deal with
his Lebanese rivals and comes to some understanding
with Syria, the security accords could pave the way for
a government of national unity. We believe he is
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unlikely to make these efforts. Should he try to turn
the national reconciliation. process into merely a sepa-
rate deal with Barri, while ignoring Junblatt, and
"internalizing" the issue of a new government by
cutting Syria out, the security plan will break down.
The longer Gemayel temporizes on political reforms,
the more vulnerable the plan will become to local
security incidents and the mistrust and suspicion
among various militias.
If the Plan Is Not Implemented
16. Failure to fully implement the current security
plan would not automatically signal a return to wide-
spread factional fighting. The Lebanese Forces militia
is smarting from the military beating it took in the
Shuf, and the Druze probably are more interested now
in maintaining their positions there. A political im-
passe accompanied by low-level violence would pre-
vail at least until spring.
17. If the plan is not implemented, Gemayel might
try to break a stalemate by using the Army to extend
government authority by force. A successful limited
military offensive to control the entire Alayh ridgeline
would strengthen government control in this area and
could improve the government's bargaining position
with both the Druze and the Shias. Gemayel may
calculate that such a move would ensure that US
forces at least would remain to guarantee the survival
of his government. A successful assault would probably
strengthen Christian resolve to resist fundamental
reforms.
18. The ultimate means of breaking the impasse
could come from Gemayel striking a deal with Syria.
In this scenario the Lebanese Government would
agree to become more responsive to Syrian interests in
return for allowing Christian hegemony to continue.
This solution would buy the Christian-dominated gov-
ernment considerable time and allow some sort of
modus vivendi to emerge among Christian, Druze, and
moderate Muslim communities.
Improved Army Capabilities
19. The Gemayel government's capability to ex-
pand its authority militarily-even in the absence of a
political agreement-has steadily improved in recent
months because the Army has grown in strength and is
perceived locally as having succeeded in achieving its
limited objectives to date. Recruitment continues at
high levels, and Tannous believes he is making prog-
ress toward his projected 10-brigade force. Although
the heavy fighting last September caught the Army in
the midst of its modernization effort, the units in-
volved generally performed well and gained much-
needed combat experience.
20. The Army emerged from the fighting last fall
with its multiconfessional balance relatively intact,
indicating that it could probably withstand similar
tests in the future. The Army is capable of conducting
limited operations to consolidate its control of the
entire Alayh ridgeline without encountering serious
confessional strains.
21. The Sabra-Shatilla operation in December
served the Gemayel government's principal objective;
the predominantly Palestinian camps were a political-
ly acceptable target that would indirectly demonstrate
the Army's capabilities to assert itself in West Beirut
and possibly the southern suburbs. Shias in the south-
ern suburbs probably viewed the operation as an
indication of the Army's intentions toward them.
22. The successful sweep of the camps, however,
did not accurately reflect the Army's ability to con-
duct a similar operation in the southern suburbs. Barri
evidently was informed that the Army intended only
to clear the camps of Palestinians and consequently
ordered Shia militiamen not to fight. The confessional
cohesion of Army units invading the camps was not
tested because the troops reportedly confronted pri-
marily Palestinians and other non-Lebanese.
23. The Army now probably could establish a
symbolic presence and checkpoints along major arter-
ies in south Beirut, but a sweep operation against the
Shia neighborhoods could sorely test Army unity.
Recent reinforcement of the southern suburbs with
men and arms from Syrian-controlled areas and the
widespread construction of defensive positions by the
Shia militia could make such an operation considera-
bly more costly in terms of casualties.
24. The long-term success of an Army effort to
control the Alayh ridge would hinge on the extent of
Syrian support to opposing Druze and Palestinian
forces. An Army operation to complete its control of
the ridgeline would sabotage the security agreement
and further convince the opposition of the Gemayel
government's duplicity. The Gemayel government,
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and Tannous in particular, expect that US military
support will be available if required by the Army to
stave off Syrian-backed opponents.
Syrian Attitudes
25. Syria's tactical shift away from military con-
frontation toward political means has not been accom-
panied by any major alterations in Syria's political
objectives, however. The Rumsfeld-Assad meeting of
13 January indicates that there has been no weakening
of basic Syrian goals in Lebanon. In fact, the Syrians
appear to be hardening their positions on the 17 May
accord and on a government of national unity. Syrian
support for the Lebanese security plan and the release
of the captured US airman serve Syria's interests both
with respect to Lebanese and broader US-Syrian rela-
tions. These actions should not be viewed as indicating
a weakening of Syrian resolve or retreat from the
previous Syrian position. Recent indications of Syrian
involvement in organizing a "National Resistance
Movement" in south Beirut suggest Damascus is hold-
ing open the confrontation option.
Arab Pressures on Syria
26. While Arab negotiators have been helpful both
in conveying and refining the views of the various
parties and putting forward suggestions of their own,
Arab (particularly Saudi) "pressure" on Syria has been
of little value in compelling Damascus to change its
pursuit of strategic political goals in Lebanon. Fear of
Syrian-inspired terrorism, sympathy for "Arab" goals
in Lebanon, and simple unwillingness to complicate
relations with Syria over issues not central to survival
of their own regimes will continue to minimize Arab
"influence" over Syria.
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