'OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT RELEASE REGARDING THE SOUTH KOREAN CIVILIAN AIRLINER SHOOTDOWN'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000901170006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 18, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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Central k"igence AFncy
The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
This is in response to your 29 August 1986 letter, which
was received on 4 September, regarding the 1983 shootdown of
KAL-007. The shootdown of KAL-007 occurred because Soviet
air defense personnel consciously chose to fire at the
aircraft. The immediate causes of this tragic event were
failures on the part of Soviet forces to identify the
airliner early in its penetration, when they would have had
sufficient time to use nonlethal means to force it down. But
the overlying cause of the event was a Soviet policy that
valued the sanctity of Soviet airspace over the safety of
international air travel. Certainly this value has no place
in a civilized world.
The current debate on what the Soviets thought about
their target is misplaced. Although it is clear that the
Soviets had initially misidentified this airliner, we will
never know precisely what the Soviet pilot and his controller
were actually thinking as the interceptor closed in on its
target that tragic morning. What is important to keep
clearly in mind is that the tragedy directly resulted from
the Soviets' "shoot first, ask questions later" policy.
Moreover, past experience would suggest that even had the
Soviets properly identified the aircraft, the outcome may
well have been the same. In April 1978, other Soviet
authorities ordered another interceptor pilot to destroy an
earlier lost KAL airliner over the Kola Peninsula. In that
case, perhaps less well known because of its lower loss of
life, Soviet authorities knew precisely what they were
4-,~-3Od
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shooting at and did so with a similar lack of regard
displayed in 1983. The U.S. Government, in its vigorous
protests of 1983, was telling the Soviet Union that such
actions have no place in this world. I believe that nothing
in the Soviet approach has changed and that without such
change we can expect future "accidents" with even greater
human loss.
Enclosed for your information is the official U.S.
Government release regarding the KAL shootdown. Any other
details on this incident are still highly classified. Also
enclosed is Ambassador Kirkpatrick's 6 September 1983 address
to the UN Security Council which most effectively covers the
issue of national responsibility. I hope that these might be
of help in your attempt to deal with the current debate on
KAL-007.
Sincerely,
Is/ William J. Casey
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Enclosures
as stated
Distribution: w/enclss
Original - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - GC
1 - D/PAO
1 - D/OCA
1 - EO/OCA
1 - C/SP/D (SOMA/SIG)
1-
1 -' ULA ecor
1 - OCA Chrono w/o encls.
DRAFTED BY:
'(I b RETYPED: aw en em er
RETYPED: aw (18 September 1986)
STAT
STAT
STAT
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OFFICIAL U. S. GOVERNMENT RELEASE REGARDING THE
SOUTH KOREAN CIVILIAN AIRLINER SHOOTDOWN
Soviet radar tracked the Korean civilian airliner (flight
KAL 007) for nearly two and.pne half hours from approximately
160OZ until it was shot dowt, by a Soviet fighter at 1826Z.
Earlier, while enroute from Anchorage, Alaska, flight 007 was
briefly in the vicinity of one.of our reconnaissance planes,
an RC-135, on a routine mission. The planes were soon widely
separated as the Korean airliner flew on, and the RC-135 re-
turned to its base in Alaska where it was on the ground for
an hour before the shootdown occurred. At no time was that
RC-135 in Soviet airspace, nor were there any other RC-135
aircraft in the Sakhalin area at the time of the shootdown.
The U.S. was not aware that KAL 007 was off course.
When KAL 007 was detected by the Soviets, they scrambled
jet interceptors from a base in Sakhalin Island. At least
eight different fighters reacted at one time or another to
the civilian airliner. The interceptor planes' radio
transmissions--their conversations with each other and with
their own ground control--were recorded. Although these re-
corded transmissions contain only the pilots' voices and not
the Soviet ground controllers, it is clear that the pilots
were responding to orders when the fatal rockets were fired.
The U.S. Government made known to the world the shocking
facts of this incident as honestly and completely as they came
to us.
i
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Following is a transcript of an address by Ambassador
Kirkpatrick to the United Nations Security Council
as recorded by The New York Times:
Thank YOU, Mr. President.
Most of the world outside the Soviet
Union has hard by now of the Korean
Flight 7. carrying 2W persona be.
tweea New York and Seoul. which
air-
smyed off course into Soviet
space, was tracked Soviet radar,
was targeted by a Soviet SU-iS whose
pilot cooly and after careful coosider-
ation fired two air-launched missiles
which destroyed the Korean airliner
and apparently its 2M passengers and
crew.
This calculated attack on a civilian
airliner - smarmed, undefended, as
civilian airliners always are - has
shocked the world.
Only the Soviet people have still not
beard about this attack on the K.A.L.
7 and the death of the passengers. bo.
cause the Soviet Government has not
acknowledged firing on the Korean
airliner. Indeed, not until Sept. 5 did
Soviet officials acbwwledge publicly
.. that K.A.L. 7 had disappeared in its
icy waters.
The Soviet Government has not
been silent about the plane, however.
It has merely lied.
tir=Oka Stateem"
On Sept. 1, Foreign Minister
Grornyko announced, and I quote :
An unidentified plane Conning ft u
the direction of the Pacific Ocean eo-
tsred the airspace of the Soviet Union
the second time violated Soviet
airspace over the Sakhalin .
? did not have ticn
lights, did not respond to queriea and
did not enter into Contact with the
radio control service."
F Minister Gronsyko contin-
ued: ?' tors of the antiaircraft de-
ck were sent aloft toward
p , to give it
the intruder tried
assistance in directing it to the near-
at airfield. But the intruder plane did
not react to the signab and warnings
from the Soviet fighters and contin-
ued its flight in the direction of the
Sea of Japan." End Quotation.
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The am day, Sipt. 2. Tan re-
peated Groin 's charge that Soviet
sirspacs had nn y violated by
quote. an unidentified n1ans" which
quote. "in violation of tional
rxulatbw flew without navigation
ts." unquote. Tess to et-
to establish non tads with the
~d d t6a d the
lvirMt Unions
"Owe the Whalfa Island, they
rats w ft taosrhaosr reins aio the
0-ft rest a do Scam afar
miss tM.
fifEt~ limit;
sit Soviet attspace and cooliotusd its
MW Wmrd Me
SUN a SUN= it wird For
d
e
o
M %I anon of radio location .
rsm after WMA It could be ob-
ssrwdf0>.01s." iedqustatlon.
? Ploft i llsaL is
- - --
- Eadomod ttat ttreeraiad.
phwe
ye" 1Ms -stHasr was fyW wMSr its mom
AL
UbitVWTarsold.* aiswdat
m
we do am hove
to
wonder ibout what IoW he
is As sh1iusr W to its
Wwhen it happened, or what
Wbat Me
N~ we know
tarR
p~
he Ko-
t
atlMne cove ttie bigaft Ideads
to heir Q+ouod oootiaila~s dur-
{tM period from 17:01 to
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tracked.
discusson AUg. ed NO 31d rays re
gruna and its pUHWm
Astum -
Th Gwmmsnt, in
The Un1j
cooperation with the Government of
Japan, has decided to spread the evi-
denpe before this Council and the
world. It is available on the videotape
which will p You wwill
On tbb t ape You hear the Bch
011 b~
included three SetU-1S Flagons and one
Ul .33 FIOW, Including the SU-15
which re-
t who poed
ha hued the missil~tha troYed the
tr*
Korean Air Lines
istraetlsr From G ovi d
While it is obvious that the pilots
are pound aoertrec>alers, tboae ns
are not audible. What we are about to
? " ~~.~
pay b tor yo is the
tape of the actual air
s
I it
is, of OW AM, in Russian. On the
monitor Rumdm and the
319midyl A.
trans Ltianiffil to these
voices t vInto a I ih work-
ing Immediately following my peoss?'
English pt ' win be made
available to all who may wish to study
it. After this ssssim of theme which
Council, an audio CWN*m voices are still dAMw will be Pro-
vided to any - emstsd mission.
Nothing was cut from this tape. The
recording was made on a voiee^actu-
ated recorder and, therefore, it
Covers only those periods of time
when conversation was board.
Lest us rwrw listen to the tape.
(Tof Russian pilots is played)
The transcript we have 11*1 beard,
Mr. President, needs IM
tilm. Quite, the So dom ed- dedRtoosshoot down a
civilian airliner, shot it down, onboard,
liedabout-ft.
an Peinfs
The transcript of the pllo s' cockpit
oonversatioo$ illuminate several key
I no bvtwcsptoi which shot K.A.L. 7
down had the airliner In eisbt for over
20 minutes before tiring h;s missiles.
y wrest the innate Oars:*
TOM lore
4awd rip drummes
e~sd fiat feat to cite groom
saw
10 so ist ~d now MW
wom.;.W
ssisstiss wYc4 1W IMA sky
tar~sf,
Dastrar7 . to lovist atatsmsofs,
MW at'
ri~se.eo P W
with the
diew or to it j@r it to kind in
aooseiae+s aid
I tiosrlpradios...
oal y rospabk
plso y be
GUM M146 qWJF 0-
aircraft, ed f ur of
farist abt ~s1iW s.
~rroat~ st w~^Mty .
pct
Maresd ma at
so polar did dr prSob egos t~ Qa's-
am at t m idaetiq d the tarps air-
Craft. MW at am@ Ad do b9W-to it W mvtbft
r then tss belumWe on the
The add
Maatlty d for airesaf a stew
mm i by toe ptiot of fire attaddr4 In-
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troche ragatloa py which mili-
tary aircraft identity blends or foss.
But of cc M1, the Korean airliner,
or any civilian airliner, could not
have responded to I.F.F., because
commercial aircraft are act equipped
to do so.
We know the which shot
down K.A.L. 7 flew behind, alongside
and in front of the airliner, coming at
feast as close as two kilometers ~.
fore dropping back behind the plane
b Art his miMilM
? At a dManoe of two kilometers.
tinder the Conditbas at
that time, It was to
identify a 747 passa~ Ei-
ther the Sovlw did not know the X
ran plus was a commercial airfto-
ar. or he did not know what he wo flr-
the latter, dm hs fluid his
deadly missiles without hiarwiog or
booms t sax9y have puIlsd ap to wbh
some number of tasters of the
-airlmm to assure by identity, be did
not bother to do so.
in eItber ase, ttiere was shocking
for human life an4 intaraa-
nocros.
in the bays Wowing me destnia
than of K.A.L. 7. Soviet leaders .and
the Soviet prase have said rpeetedty
they do not'arderstand what all the
fists is about.
Z r began by socusl~og the United
states of CI wthing. And recently they have
accused us of a may-,
ver quite saying, that
wwee -awo ne them Into shooting down
W that strayed into their
qNwe pnm* d them into vkdatin
the Iaternatimally agreed upon
standards and practices of behavior.
that --the tarps Isn't r?
to I.F.F." This mesas the
dec-
reran did ant rrspo-d to the
They have spoken as thsugh a
plane's straying off course is a crime
by do th 7 - have sug-
punishable
gested that -'like any self-r+espec~
Mete, they are doing no mere
looking after their so, m-mmsniv which
thky shall permit ao are to te."
They have claimed. still without ac-
kaowledgeing that they shot ao.m the
Korean airiner, that '-our an iaircraft
defense has fulfilled its duty for the
defense of the security of air mather-
land." 'Duey have wed that they
may have mistaken the Korean
airliner for an American reconnais-
wMM .!I.... h.ro et! dn- go aInnit
fiat thsydt sched and slastnlyed it.
Be none of theselies, Whine and
avoctres can wlpsstaiod saamhaatioo
Straying cif course is sot recog-
nised as a apital crime by- civilised
minus. No nation has the asrersign
light .too shoot down Bps an+son or
chicle that may stray across Its bor--
der In peacetime. .
It's hataresting In this ryard to
rsler to the atatsmeots made by the
Soviet at the throe that
they ware rung the
~of aof Oftwe
s -M"6 9 .a
S ed~h tenitaial waters.
At th
GOMOON" of Sweden at time, the note addreessd ~rtoo
d~owi4t Union said, a and I quota. -What
sober-minded person - so say notb-
hog of mWtary spsdatists - an sup-
pose drat a submarine in a surface
ran with rtmoing hew on and nm-
aing diesels, the d which was
heard over a lame distance, i night-
time and in poor visibility conditions,
could snsage Io ac-
]here are iateroatiooafy agreed
UD-
upon standards for intercepting
,%I aircraft. Those intOraatioo-
ally agreed upon, standards call for
serious efforts - at identification, veri-
fication, warning and, it the case Is
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serous, for intercepting the intruder
and forcing it to land or to leave one's
airspace.
Sovereignty neither requires nor
permits shooting down airliners in
pfe
Recently, the Soviets have implied
that the K.A.L. 7 may have been mis-
taken for a U.S. aerial reconnais-
sance flight. But that is no more per-
suasive.
. The Korean Air Lines Boeing 747
was on a routine, scheduled fight. At
the time is the U.S.
reec m asinve~ plane referred to
the Soviets had been on the ground Tor
snore than one hour, more than 1.500
miles away.
Moreover, the United States does
not fly reoo fuaissance missions en
Soviet airspace. We do regularly o?
e rate aircraft in international air-
t monitor Soviet compliance
oft. SALT and. other arms control
agreements. Soviet Government know
s
-what our usual t pattern are and
can readily identity these missions.
Finally, neither the United Status
nor any other country upset abort the
slaughter of the 3W pase~ers of
as r tinng creating a by the
event.
We are protesting a very important
violation of the norms of civilised con-
duct an which international aviation
rests, without which it will not be pos-
sible for any of in to board airliners.
By across continents and oceans with-
art fear of becoming the object of a
murderous attack
1^ternsRhasat Air Tra~1
To a degree we rarely oo?slder, in-
tesiational air travel depends on net-
works of mutual to ttbat we will not
shoot down one anther's airliners,
kidnap, l or Poison pate's and
Crews.
Why did the Soviet Union violate
se ~~? Why have they tied
Two reasons most often advanced
to aplain why the Soviet pilot shot
down the airliner are, first that
was a mistake : the mistake
A. 1 ooeri.ersd this q--Rim, my
pilot vim, with hb gramd
followed a philosophy of
,,hoot now, identify later.
WA if p" elrog was responsible
for this tragic mistake, why bas the
Soviet C*vernment not said so Why
has it tied? And why is it compte-
mexnting its Murderous attack on
ILA.L. 7 with a wink{ attack an the
theed States for ovocadon and ag-
grseelon?
place in se ley Cmav 0 some 21
years ago when m~-_
citied the att. " of the
to the maletakabis evidence
But Adlal Stevenson, too, bad evi-
~ to back up his abl'e as the
Brapmevidence
jo6o tapes we have heard today.
The fact is that violen ~ and "a regular InstrumeM
Soviet
are
Policy Soviet oft regnlary be-
have as though truth were only a
function of force and will, as if the
truth were only what they said it is, as
violence were an imtrumexnt of first
room _ idforeign affairs.
piracy.
*Mangan offaefutivilwMINUCh"
~VembwMiewwwwobstivs
instdWthewastsimil
Soviet laR?pe"entadve Antbar oa r
as SOVW repe~ntatives so often do,
bin-denial with a vicious at-
an the United States. Calling our
attention to threateatng Soviet behav-
ior, Zarin asserted, only mask the
United States' own aggression and
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They occupy Afghanistan and ac-
cuse the United States of interference
in its internal affairs. They create
massive new European vulnerabil-
ities with their SS-20's and accuse
NATO of seeking to upset the balance
of power.
We think otherwise. We believe that
truth is as vital to cooperation and
peace among nations as among peo-
ple.
Global Prospects
It is depressing to consider seri-
ously our global prospects if those
prospects must be built on relations
devoid of truth, devoid of trust.
It is depressing to consider a world
in which a major nation, equipped
with the most powerful modern weap-
ons, believes it has a sovereign right
to fire on a commercial airliner lost
over its territory.
These Soviet actions and claims il-
luminate the Soviet conception of ap-
propriate relations among nations in
peacetime-
They illuminate the world in which
we live and work and make policy. Of
cause, some sophisticated observers
believe that the destruction of Flight 7
was neither the work of an isolated
uante-love, unconcerned about
human life, nor of that Strangeglove
and his ground controller, but was in-
stead a deliberate stroke designed to
intimidate.
A brutal/ lecisive act meant to in-
still fear and hesitation in all who ob-
served this ruthless violence. Much
as the destruction of an Afghan vil-
Isge or the Imprisonment of the Hel-
sinki monitors are intended to secure
compliance through terror.
Whichever the case, whether the
destruction of K.A.L. 7 and its passen-
gers reflect only utter indifference to
human life, or whether that destruc-
tion was designed to intimidate, we
are dealing here not with pilot error
but with decisions and priorities char-
acreristic of a system.
Not only did Soviet omcials shoot
down a stray eomrnerpial airliner
and lie about, they have callously re-
'
fueed offers of international
patlon in search and rescue efforts in
spite of clearly stated international
standards and recommended prac-
tices of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, which call on
states to "grant any necessary per-
mission for the entry of such aircraft.
vessels, personnel or equipment into
its territory and make necessary ar-
with a view to expediting
We an reminded once main that
the Soviet union is a state based on
the dual priasiples of callousness and
mendacity, dedicated to the rule of
force.
Here is how Lanirt described the
dictatorship otthe proletariat in IWO.
He said, arid I quote, "The sdentif c
concept of dic tatotvhip means notb-
moee dean am+astricted power, ab.
Z unimpeded by law or la-
tion
direct of ice, this
ft is do s
mentality Of , that on at the root
97
of the Korean Air Line tragedy. This
A. the reality revealed to the world by
the trag dy. It is a reality we most all
ponder. as we consider threats to
peace and human rights that face, us
The United States deeply believes
that immediate steps should be taken
here in the United Nations to de-
crease the likelihood of any repetition
of the tragedy of K.A.L. 7.
We ask our colleagues to join. with
as in the coming'tAsys in the eff rt to
wrest from this tragedy new clarity
about the character of our world and
new constructive efforts to regder us
all more secure in the air andrao the
g-
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STAT
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