SPECIALIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF PRODUCTION PLANNING IN BULGARIA'S MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP81-00280R000200210016-6
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 11, 2011
Sequence Number: 
16
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Publication Date: 
November 27, 1956
Content Type: 
REPORT
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CIA-RDP81-00280R000200210016-6 JJI~w 10 1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11 : CIA-RDP81-0028OR000200210016-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11 : CIA-RDP81-00280R000200210016-6 AT SPECIALIZATION AND IJTEGRATIOI OF PRODUCTION PLAQIMG IN BULGARIA'S MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY Tezhka Promishlenost, Sofia, No 7, 1956 In a short period of time, Bulgaria has achieved significant successes in the construction of socialism. The country has been transformed from a backward agrarian country into an industrial and agrarian country. In the socialist reconstruction of the country's economy, heavy industry has be- come the sound foundation and source of development for all branches of the national economy. Domestic machine building is playing a large part in the industrial- ization of Bulgaria. After the nationalization of industry and especially during the First and Second Five-Year Plans, machine building became an important branch of heavy industry and the economy as a whole. During this period, the reorganization and consolidation of nationalized small- scale enterprises were completed. New mack4ine-building plants were built, and many of the old enterprises were reconstructed and equipped with new, modern equipment. The artisan's method of work was replaced largely by the. semiplant and plant method of work, and the work of laborers was special- ized. As a result, the assortment of products of the machine-buildi$s industry increased, production of new types of machines was mastered, equip- ment was more extensively utilized, and many enterprises were freed from side aspects of production that did not pertain to them directly. Machine- building production increased nearly elevenfold from 1948 to 1955. The present economic upsurge in Bulgaria is indissolubly connected with the widespread introduction of new equipment in production and with the struggle for technical progress. Moreover, the struggle for technical progress, for an uninterr*ted improvement in production equipment, is an extremely important task Inseparably related to the development of domestic machine building. To carry out this task accurately and quickly, therefore, the organization of the machine-building industry mustbe constutly improved, and must entail the widest possible use of specialization, coordinated inte- gration of production planning, and other such forms of production organi- zation. Technical progress calls for the specialization of various functions of the production process. The very process of technology leads tothe specialization of various aspects of production and requires that the manu- facture of the same product be concentrated in mass production by special- ized enterprises, rather than distributed among max- enterprises. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11 : CIA-RDP81-0028OR000200210016-6 `T The technical level of production in specialized plants is signifi- cantly higher than in plants of the more universal type. In specialized enterprises, conditions are created for a more accurate and more effective utilization of personnel (designers, technologists, and supervisory engineer- ing and technical personnel), machines, and tool bases and other produc- tion shops. When high-production machinery and perfectedptechnological processes are used in specialized plants, savings in materials of up to 30-2+p percent are realized, time consumed in mechenival processing and other operations is cut in half, labor productivity is increased, the quality of production is improved, and the cost of production is decreased. With integration of production, the available reserves of an enter- prise's production capacities are distributed and utilized to the greatest extent. Invested capital, in turn, is economized and can be used for-other purposes. Through integration, the profitability of individual machine- building plants is raised significantly. Integration of planning assures production of parts with uniform de- sign and uniform dimensions and large serigO-production with homogeneous parts produced according to a single technological process, requiring only a change in work tools or readjustment of equipment in transferring from one series to another. Specialization and integration in Bulgarian machine building are in the beginning stage. During 1953. the Ministerial Council and the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party issued a special decree on the specialization And integration of machine-building plants of the Machine- Building Administration in the system of the Ministry of Heavy Industry. The decree approved the-basic activity of the machine~WaLiding enterprises with a view to their furtherer specialization. Several enterprises having approximately the same activity were consolidated to decreamestheir number and improve their organization of supply, equipment, and management. At almost the same time, the first measures were taken to intregate machine-building enterprises of various departments of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, the Ministry of Electrification, the Ministry of Agricul- ture, and the Ministry of Transport. What has been done to determine the activity and specialization of basic machine-building enterprises had-had positive results, but it is far from sufficient. In many enterprises, little has been done to estab- lish i basic outline of activity and specialization. In several enter- prises, the principle of specialization is not being observed; orders are being issued to plants which are not designed to turn out the type of product desired. For example, the "Vulko Chervenkov" Plant in Sofia, vhilch specializes in metal-cutting machinery, vas required under its 1955 plan to produce 5 spring hammers, 13 pneumatic hammers, 8 sixty-ton eccentric presses, 12 foundry presses type 271, and other machinery. This assignment Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP81-0028OR000200210016 6 ?AT diverted the attention of engineering and technical personnel from their work of improving and perfecting the production of metal-cutting machinery in the plant. During the second quarter of 1955, this mistake of the Machine-Building Administration was corrected, and the V. l(olarov" Machine Plant in Stalin., which specializes in the production of the desired machin- ery, was given the production order. The production of a "Felton" water turbine, a power machine, vas in- cluded in the production program of the "Stalin" Plant in Dimitrovo, which specializes in mining machinery and equipment. The "N. Vaptsarov" Plant in Pleven specializes in the production of vagter turbines. There are similar cases in a number of enterprises in the system of the Machine-Building Administration. Although planned as early as 1952, Integration did not begin until 1954. Since-1955, about 15 percent of the deliveries in machine-building plants of the Ministry of Heavy Industry have ben coordinated, and about r5 percent in the Electric Power Administration.' Integration is carried out mostly between plants of individual administrations; only a_smal-2 amount is carried between individual administrations and departments. Integration has snot proceeded systematically and has often caused the consumer plant to fail to fulfill its plan because of lags in the work of the supplier plant. During 1955, the "Stalin" Plant in Dimitrovo hindered the work of the Machine-Building Plant in Troyan, the "Vaptsarov" Plant in Pleven, the "Sila" Plant in Yambol, and other plants by failing to deliver steel castings on time, although the plants are all under one administra- tion. A number of failures in integration during the last 2 years have occurred as a result of poor planning by the Machine-Building Administra- tion and the Ministry of Heavy Industry. Because of late clarification and approval of production plans, the integration plan has been worked out later and later. Although it is usually sent to enterprises during February, it provides for production. of parts according to=plan for the first quarter. Naturally, the supplier enterprise is late, and this, in turn, disrupts the plan of the consumer enterprise. Many times the integration plan specified the production of parts which, if produced by an enterprise (other than the one specified?), would be cheap= er and of the same quality. During 1956, integrated deliveries of the Machine-Building Administra- tion were.significantly larger than during 1955. Integration is carried out between enterprises of the Machine-Building Administration system; with enterprises outside the system of the administration but of a department of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, which includes the Machine-Building Administration; and with enterprises of other governmental organs, such as the Ministry of Electrification, the Ministry of Transport, and the Sofia Urban People's Cduncil. Despite the 1956 improvementrover 1955 fulfillment of planned assign- menta for coordination between machine-building plants, a number of short- comings still' exist. For exajaple, although the integration plan of the machine-building enterprises wens prepared and sent to the enterprises on time, changes were subsequently made in the Machine-Building Administra- tion's plan which brought about changes in the integration plan. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP81-0028OR000200210016-6 SIAI Some plants are not delivering the necessary parts on tier or are delivering low-qt .lity parts, thereby disrupting the plan fulfillment of consumer enterprises. Because the State Spare-Parts Plant in Sofia and the "Vulko Chervenkov" Plant in Sofia could not supply the "Strug' Machine-Building Plant in Nova Zagora with reductor gearboxes for spraying machines, the "Strug" Plant was unable to produce 50 sprayers. Because the "G. Dimitrov" Machine-Building Plant in Vidin was unable to -supply pumps Tor several boilers to the "G. Kirkov" State Rpbber Plant in Sofia, the lag in production of steam boilers during January cou:,d not be made up. The "G. Diaitrov" State Macbtne-Build- ing Plant in Ruse was late in delivering tempered castings to the "Mashatroy' State Machine-Building Plant in Troyan. Plants No 11 and 12 could not fulfill their integration assignments in agreement with the plan approved by the ministry and could not supply-the 'V. Kolarov' Plant in Stalin with parts of diesel and gasoline motors. Shortcomings were noted during April also. The State Spare-Parts Plant in Sofia did not supply the "V Kolarov" Plant in Stalin with gear wheels for 18-horsepower diesel motors on time. Because the "Anton Ivanov" Plant in Plovdiv vas late in delivering cast iron molds to the "Anton lvanov" State Chemical and Aniline Plant in Sofia, the Sofia plant was unable to complete the production of several machines scheduled for April. The "G. Dimitrov" State Machine-Building Plant in Ruse sent the "Mashstroy" Plant in Troyan poor-quality molds of tempered cast iron for Heller annunciators- The "Elektrometal" State Industrial Enterprise supplied the State Spare-Parts Plant in Sofia with poor-quality castings for DT-54 bearing parts, and the "Stalin" Plant in Dimitrovo did not send all the planned parts for drills to the "Sala" State Machine-Build- ing Plant in 7ambol. Because plants of the Electrical Industry Administration did not supply Plant No 12 with electrical eppllances for sprayer motors, the plan (unspecified I for Plant Nc 12 was not fulfilled. In Plovdiv, the "Anton :vanov" Plant of the Metalworking Administra- tion did not supply bolts and nuts for the production of agricultural machinery. This hindered the production of U-5M motors, haymaking machines, seed-cleaning machines, and other machinery. Plants of the Machine-Build- ing Administration were compelled to produce bolts and nuts for machines; this disrupted their own regular production. A characteristic weakness of almost all plants is that they do not devote enough attention to Integrating plan fulfillment. In general, the task of integration is underrated. Efforts are directed almost sa[clusively to fulfilling a plant's own production plans, as if the integration plan were not the plant's "own" plan. The managements of several plants do not feel responsible for the integration plan and do not devote enough atten- tion to It. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP81-0028OR000200210016-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11 : CIA-RDP81-0028OR000200210016-6 V 1 fl 1 Consumer plants are also guilty of shortcomings, in that they do not always promptly clarify needed integration details and do not supply blue- prints and models on time. Present practice has shown that the disconnection between individual departments is not conducive to specialization and integration and does not allow production capacities tb be fully utilized. For example, ac- cording to approxljoate data, the utilization of basic equipment in plants under the Machine-Building Administration lac a_tvo7shift program was as follows: according to time utilized, 77.6 percent in 1953, 78.2 percent in 1954, and 78.8 percent in 1955; and according to installed capacity, 27.6 percent, 21 percent,,aad 23.5 percent in the same years, respectively. These data do np; incluAgcapacity utilization in metallurgical enter- prises. The situation is similar In the utilization of machinery in plants under the Transport Industry Administration. For the remaining adminis- trations there are no data on Jaow their production capacities are utilized. Since no account of these indexes has been kept, the managements of admin- istrations and enterprises do not know to what extent machinery is being utilized, and the information they do supply is unrealistic. The.Zollow- ing conc)?ision may be drawn, however, from an analysis of shift programs in the ".il';ation of basic equipment: in the Electrical Industry Adttn- istrati of 929 basic sschines-on hand, 573 are working in one ahifiv 235 _in i lifts, and 31 in three shittsy on the basis of a--two-shift program, .,ref!i'e, the average shift coefficient is l.4, leaving a free unutiliz. production capact;_w of 0.6. In the Transport Industry Administration, screw-cutting lathes work on 1.52 shifts, vertical boring lathes on one shift, turret lathes on one shift,-tire mills on one shift, boring machines on one shift, and milling machines on one shift. Basic machines and equipment in this administra- tio during 1955 were utilized on one shift. In the..Machine-Building Administration, however, lees were worked an average of 2.5 shifts and boring machines, 3 shifts. Data show that the tendency in individual enterprises is to be self- atisfied and not uncover their available pro- duction capacities with v ch ihtegrated orders for: other enterprises could be completed. The manufacture--of Lachine-building products of one type is carried out in various departments. The same product is produced in several plants belonging to several departments and administrations; for example, bridge cranes, manual and electric, are produced in the "Stalin" Plant in Dimitrovo, under the Machine-Building Administration; in the "Khr. Smirnenaki" Plant in Sofia, under the Ministry of Electrification; in the "Proms" Plant in Sofia under the Ministry of Construction; in the "Vulko Chervenkov" Equipment and Installations Plant in Sofia, under the Ministry of Transport; and in the "Tolbukhin" Repair Plant, under the Ministry of Agriculture. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11 : CIA-RDP81-00280R000200210016-6 Such duplication ahd triplication can be pointed out in the manu- facture of ' r y other 'roduc . This dismemberment of the=nac2Mnd-build- ing industry does not allow the specializing of enterprises to its great- est extent and does not allow the industry to b developed as a whole. A plan of national dimensions has still not been worked out for specialization in machine buildings. All machine-building plants produce a large quantity of -identical parts performing the same work in various machines under identical con- ditions. These parts must be maximally standardized to permit them to be series -produced according to single blueprints in specialized plants. The main iirection in the further development of machine building is to adopt the`-princtples of series production and mass production. Parts must be_aystematically standardized, units and machines must be .made uniform, technological processes must be standardized, the aggregate processing-of parts must be intcroduced, and units, shops, and plants must be specialized. The Ministry of Foreign Trade must put an end to the `diversity of the automobile and tractor park in Bulgaria which is supplied with Bulgarian spare parts. Designing organizations of ministries and departments and designing divisions of basic machine-building plants must re-examine designs, parts, and units common to various machines in individual brances of machine bolding. For example, agricultural machines must be made uniform with standardized parts and units of a uniform design, but with moving parts, axles, gearboxes, bearing castings, gears, etc., in different sizes. In drawing up operational blueprints of uniform parts, plant technol. ogists must assist in meeting the requirements for mass production of these parts.. For strict adherence to-unifokm designs, a special central control must be organized to approve all operational blueprints of machines which are to go into series production, At the sastime, strict accoupt- ing of the use of unifoom parts and a special system(for formulation of their technical documentation must be-organized. A quick-and complete introduction of these measures will make it possible to calculate the essential volume of parts whose production is necessary to-organize specialized mass production. These measures must not bW examined sporadi- cally _ nd temporarily, but must be systematically carried out. This is one of the important future assignments on which the newly prcJected Scientific Research Institute for Mac!line Building must begin work and which it must solve,-in conjuneti:cn-with the Institute for Standardiza- tion, the "Mashproekt? Departmental Machine Construction Organization, and designing divisions of plants. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11 : CIA-RDP81-00280R000200210016-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11 : CIA-RDP81-00280R000200210016-6 TAT There is still no complete perspective plan for integration; thus, contact between the consumer and producer enterprise is weak; the former cannot rely on-prompt delivery, and the latter is unable to prepare for prompt fulfillment. The Ministerial Council, the ministries, and the administrations do not periodically check the fulfillment of the integration plan, and its nonfulfillment is noted only when the plan of the consumer enterprise falls short of completion. Quick and timely action must be taken to remove the shortcomings and weaknesses in planning and fulfilling integration plans and to out- line mes-'uses for strengthening first achievements and expanding special- ization and integration in the Bulgarian machine-building industry. The already-existing integration of production is being carried out with difficulty outside the systems of individual ministries and depart- ments. The production of new types of machines is not being centrally superviseddwith the result that two or more departments are simultaneously producing the same type of machine. The dissociation of individual departm?nts leads to irrational utili- zation and placement of capital investments. A typical example is the unjustified spontaneous investment of capital in the construction of found- ries in plants of all departments- The foundries are often concentrated, in the same cities Sofia, there are foundries in the "G. Dimitrov" Locomotive and Railroad Car Plant, the V. Chervenkov" Equipment and Installations Plant, the V. Chervenkov" Metal-Cutting Machinery Plant, the "Proms" Plant, the '6 Septem?-ri' Plant, the "V. Kolarov" Plant, Plant No 12, and several cooperatives. The situation is no better in Stalin, Plovdiv, Pleven, Stara Zagora, Burgas, and other cities. As a result, many foundries have been constructed, but they are-small in area, unmecha- niied, and have a very low productivity.. The average productivity in Bulgaria is 10 tr_ns per worker annually, as compared with 40 tons in the Soviet Union. The productivity of individual foundries during 1955 fluctu- ated frota C:32 to 3.5 -tons-per square metes In the "G. Dimitrov" Loco- motive and-Railroad Car Plant, as a result 04' the introduction' of conveyer smelting, productivity in smelting-parts for railroad-car brak'ts increased to 47.5 tons per square Meter.. ? . The consolidation and regionalization of cast-iron foundries will lead to mechanization of processe?ss imDrovemert, of technology, quality improve- ments and elimination of defects, especially, hidden ones. It is possible to construct modern foundires.,vith a capacity which, through integratta , can more economically 3at.isfy more of the needs of machine building with a capital :nveetment significantly lower ths,R the amount individual depart- ments spend for' a large number of foundries. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11 : CIA-RDP81-0028OR000200210016-6 STAT in spite of shortcomings and weaknesses, specialization and integra- tion have played a large. role in this stage of-the development of Bulgari- an .aachine building. During 1954, under comparatively difficult cori- tions and with a shortage of electric power, consolidated and specialized plants of the Machine-Building-Administration produced 16.7 percent more products than in 1953, and during 1955, 15 percent more than in 1954. The results achieved support the correctness of the line taken in specialization and integration. However, there are still-significant reserves in Bulgarian machine-building plants which can and must be un- covered and utilized for specialization and integration. To eliminate weaknesses and shortcomings in machine building, basic machine-building enterprises must be united under one management. This would lead to a more accurate designing and specialization of enterprises, a properly directed development of the machine-building industry as a whole, a more efficient utilization of the present widely dispersed mechin - e_y park, a more operational and competent management of enterprises, and a more accurate planning of capital investments for construction and for supplying plants with'pachines and equipment. The present practice. of supplying the same machines for various?departments.vithout taking into account their complete uiilization?vill be curtailed. labor payments and standardization and the distribution and utilization of engineering and technical personnel will be more correct. The. technological situiation will be improved;.modern, mechanized regional foundries vf.l1?b. constructed; and specialized, high-performance equipment ?for.mass production w-il_be pro- vided. The unification of the machine-building industry.under one' manage- ment will create condityiona'for large=scale series production. All this will help to increase output and labor productivity and to lover the cost and improve the quality of machine-building production.. .