JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000100010006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
12 January 1983
Japanese Foreign Policy
A close US-Japanese relationship has been the cornerstone of
Japan's foreign policy. Prime Minister Nakasone has stressed
that a solid alliance is essential fox-,: successfully coping with
international problems. As a result, we believe the Japanese
will continue to see their diplomatic interests tied closely to
ours and that Tokyo will continue to solicit US views before
making foreign policy choices. Japan, nevertheless, is beginning
to move toward a more active and assertive role in the foreign
policy arena. We believe that an increasingly self-confident
Japan may choose paths different from Washington's when Tokyo
views its interests as transcending the US-Japanese
relationship. 25X1
The Soviet Union
Japan has distrusted Moscow for more than a century. The
USSR's refusal to return the islands north of Hokkaido, its
actions in such countries as Afghanistan and Poland, and its
continued military buildup have all contributed to this
continuing negative attitude. Tokyo has generally followed
This memorandum, requested by State Department officials for use
in preparation for the visit by Prime Minister Nakasone, was
prepared by Japan Branch, Northeast Asia Division, 25X1
Office of E
du A
s sian Analysis. Information available as of 13
January 1983 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Ja an Branch,
Northeast Asia Division, OEA, 25X1
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Washington's lead when dealing with the USSR, and has supported
US initiatives such as sanctions after the Soviet invasion of
A.fghanistan in December 1979. Like the United States, Japan
recognizes the Soviet threat--particularly since Afghanistan--
al'though the two do not completely agree on its severity or on
how best to cope with it.
The Japanese believe it important to keep open channels of
coi,Ynunication to Moscow. Based on his public statements, we
judge that Prime Minister Nakasone views the change. of Soviet
leadership as an opportunity for improving communication. In an
unusual move, he met with the Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo shortly
after taking office. In addition:
-- Tokyo has invited the Soviet Fisheries Minister to
visit Japan in February to negotiate a long-term
fisheries agreement; he will be the first Soviet
Cabinet minister to visit Japan- officially sine.e the
invasion of Afghanistan.
-- Also in February, a large Japanese business mission,
led by Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry President
Nagano, will travel to Moscow,-the first such
delegation to the USSR since 1979.
We expect Tokyo will continue to relax restrictions on
official contacts as well as on trade with the Soviets. In fact,
Tokyo's current plans for exchanges are probably in part an
effort to keep up with other Western countries in developing
relations with Moscow.
-- According to US Embassy officials, Japanese bureaucrats
see signs of a general East-West thaw, including the
high level of Western representation at Brezhnev's
funeral and the end of pipeline sanctions.
Des ite Tokyo's drift back toward business as usual with the
soviets
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we believe Japan will continue.to consult 25X1
closely with Washington on questions of policy toward Moscow. We
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do not expect Tokyo to abandon key demands for normalizing
relations with the Soviets. Nakasone shows no sign, for example,
of changing Japan's policy of refusing to initial a peace treaty
w;i;th the USSR until the Soviets return the Northern
Territories.
China
Since Japan normalized relations with China in the early
1970s, Tokyo has been committed to building stable, broadly based
ties to its major Asian neighbor. To support the moderates in
Beijing and to encourage the Chinese to expand their opening to
the West--as well as to provide opportunities for Japanese
businessmen--Japan has contributed to China's modernization
effort. Tokyo has provided large-scale loans on favorable terms
for equipment used in the construction of railroads, ports, and
whole plants, and has also offered access to Japanese
technology. Some potential for trouble, exists in the
relationship, however.
-- We believe Tokyo is concerned by China's recent move
away from strong public support of Japan's security
treaty with the United States.
-- According to the US Embassy and the Japanese press,
Japanese business leaders are increasingly pessimistic
about significant further expansion of Japan-China
economic ties, and Tokyo may not give Beijing as much
economic assistance as it wants.
-- The textbook controversy last summer spurred Chinese.
criticism of what they described as a resurgence of
Japanese "militarism."
- China will carefully monitor Japanese contacts with
Taiwan and can be expected to express displeasure
should exchanges such as the visit of senior Liberal
Democratic Party leader Esaki to Taipei last summer
The Japanese do not yet view these problems as serious
enough to reevaluate their policy toward China, however, and US
Embassy officials in Tokyo report that they have no evidence that
Nakasone intends to make changes in that policy. The Prime
Minister has pledged to continue to promote good relations with
Beijing on political, economic, and. cultural fronts. We do not
expect Japan to pursue a China policy that runs counter to US
interests in the area: Nakasone has said that stable, friendly
relations with the United States provide the basis for sound
policy toward Beijing.
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In his policy speech to the Diet on 3 December, Nakasone
reconfirmed Japan's commitment to work with the United States and
Western Europe. We expect that Japan will continue to call for
increased cooperation among. advanced democracies. During his
January 1983 trip to Europe, for example, Foreign Minister Abe
expressed interest in consulting more closely with the NATO
countries on security issues. Tokyo has in fact cooperated with
other members of the Western camp, particularly on East-West
problems such as the Afghan and Polish sanctions. 25X1
The Japanese have sometimes considered siding with Western
Europe when it seemed to their advantage--on the issue of the US
oil and gas field equipment embargo, for example--and Japan has
joined Europe in criticizing high US interest rates.
Nevertheless, a review of the Japanese press suggests that Tokyo
continues to perceive some anti-Japanese sentiment in Europe.
Japan has not made significant progress toward developing close
bilateral ties to European nations. It has been much less
responsive, for instance, to West European than to US demands for
trade liberalization. We expect, therefore, that Japan will
continue to put most emphasis on the US relationship. As Kiichi
Miyazawa put it last year while serving as Chief Cabinet
Secretary, Japan must be cautious about cooperating with Europe
lest, in the end, it find itself isolated should the United
States and Europe reach accommodation.
The Middle East
The Middle East is the area in which Tokyo's foreign policy
is most likely to diverge from Washington's. Despite continuing
efforts to diversify its sources of energy, Japan remains
dependent on the Middle East for about 70 percent of its oil.
Consequently, it places considerable weight on ensuring good
relations with the Arab oil exporters. To do so, Tokyo has
sometimes gone further than the United States has wanted. In
late 1981, for example, Tokyo hosted PLO leader Arafat, although
the visit was billed as "unofficial." More recently, the
Japanese have begun to consider recognizing the PLO as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in return for
an "authoritative" PLO statement recognizing Israel's right to
exist. 25X1
We expect Japan will cont.inue to search for initiatives
toward the Middle East that will please the Arabs, although it
will try to avoid antayonizinf-r the United States the
p~,ocess .
he. has already said 25X6
i e wants to v i s a the Middle East next summer. Ile wi l l not be a
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newcomer to the area. In the spring of 1973, while serving as
Minister of International Trade and Industry, he was the first
Japanese Cabinet minister to visit the OPEC countries. At that
t.,ime and again in early 1974 he was in the Middle East to discuss
oil supplies in exchange for Japanese economic cooperation.
According to the press, Nakasone hopes Japan can serve as a
bridge between Washington and the Arab states.
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Japanese and US interests and analysis of the situation in
Asia generally coincide. Both agree on the importance of support
for ASEAN. Under Nakasone--who telephoned the heads of
government of the five ASEAN states irrmediately after taking
office--we expect Japan will continue to assist ASEAN
economically and to support ASEAN's positions on Vietnam and the
Kampuchean coalition.
Shortly:a ter taking office"he said
that he hopes to visit the ASEAN nations this year..
The United States and Japan disagree somewhat on
Indochina. According to Foreign Ministry officials, Tokyo will
continue to freeze aid to Vietnam, but Japan wants to maintain a
"small channel of dialogue" with Hanoi. The Foreign Ministry ..
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believes that by allowing Vietnamese officials to visit Japan and
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may be able to entice Hanoi to negotiate on Kampuchea.
Both Tokyo and Washington agree on the importance of a
stable relationship ,between Japan and South Korea.
in early January, and the two reached general agreement on
Japanese economic assistance to Korea. Nakasone was the first
Japanese prime minister to visit Seoul to hold substantive
discussions with his Korean counterpart since normalization of
relations in 1965. Along with several events last month--the
release of dissident leader Kim Dae Jung and the successful
meeting of Japanese and Korean parliamentarians in Japan--this
visit should improve chances for easing tension between the two
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nations. 25X1
At the same time, anti-Japanese feeling in Korea and a
negative attitude toward Seoul on the part of the Japanese, both
exacerbated by the textbook issue, could continue to trouble the
relationship.
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Japan thus may not be able to move as
quickly to develop close relations with Korea as the United
States would like.
Africa/Latin America
Latin America and Africa generally remain low priorities for
Japan, and Tokyo may not provide as much support as Washington
might like on such matters as the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
Japan's foreign policy interests in the two regions are focused
on the resources and development potential of these regions.
Tokyo is thus most concerned with stability in both areas and is
likely to go along with US policy toward them. US pressure has
been a factor in increased Japanese aid to countries in both
areas. We believe Tokyo considers this involvement a means of
demonstrating to Washington that Japan is a cooperative ally and
one that fulfills its international responsibilities.
International Issues. 25X1
Japan has been one of the United States' most reliable
allies in international forums. Japan has so far supported the
United States in trying to ensure continued Israeli membership in
international organizations, for example. At Washington's urging
Tokyo has begun to take a still small but growing interest in
refugee affairs. Japan will provide financial and technical
assistance to the Bataan refugee reprocessing center in the
Philippines. for example. and has increased food aid for African
refugees. 25X1
Also in response to US pressure Japan has increasingly taken
strategic concerns into consideration when allocating foreign aid
in an effort to strengthen Third World nations and reduce
opportunities for Soviet intervention. Southeast Asia,
particularly ASEAN's "front line state," Thailand--has been the
principal beneficiary of Japanese economic assistance. Japan has
also boosted aid to Turkey, Egypt, an and other strategic
countries in or adjacent to the Middle East. Japan has followed
the US lead during multilateral debt rescheduling negotiations,
including,those on Mexico and Zaire. ex ect Tok o will
continue to be supportive in this area, 25X1
On the other hand, on some international issues Tokyo's
positions have and will continue to diverge from Washington's.
Japan voted for the draft Law of the Sea. treaty last spring.
Although it did not sign the treaty in December, largely in
response to US pressure, US Embassy officials in Tokyo expect the
Japanese to sign sometime this year. On the issue of whaling,
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Tokyo opposed the International Whaling Commission's decision to
ban commercial whaling beginning in 1986. 25X1
Japan's dependence on the Third World for markets and raw
materials has sometimes made it more responsive to the South on
North-South issues than is the United States. We expect Tokyo to
continue to attempt to serve as a bridge between the developing
world and the industrialized nations. 25X1
Japan's special interest in disarmament, and especially in
nuclear disarmament, could lead it to support initiatives--on a
comprehensive test ban, for example--that do not meet US
requirements. In the past, however, Japan has modified its
disarmament policies to take into account US objections, as it
did last summer during the UN Special Session in Disarmament,
when Tokyo did not present a planned draft proposal on the
protection of nuclear facilities. Japan has its own peace
movement, which has sponsored antinuclear. rallies and opposed the
hosting of US military bases. The movement is divided, however,
and although it was active before the special session, it has
been unable to sustain that momentum. 25X1
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SUBJECT: Japanese Foreign Policy
Paul Wolfowitz, Department of State
Albert C. Seligman, Department of State
George Shultz, Department of State
Gaston Sigur, National Security Council
DDI
OEA/NA/Japan Branch
OEA/NA
D/OEA
C/Production/OEA
C/NIC
- NIO/EA
- Executive Director
- C/PES
- OCR/ISG
- CPAS/IMC/CB
DDI/OEA/NA/Japan
(13 January 83)
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 January 1983
Japan: Managing Relations with China and the Soviet Union
relations with the two Communist powers and implications for the
West of the Sino-Soviet talks will be high on Prime Minister
Nakasone's agenda during his mid-January visit to Washing'fon. He
has already emphasized his determination to consolidate relations
with China and has taken the initiative in promoting a dialogue
with Moscow. In addition, however, he has publicly declared that
he regards a strong alliance with the United States as
indispensable for a successful Japanese policy toward China and
the Soviet Union. 25X1
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Japanese and US 25X1
Challenges and Opportunities
China's identification of the USSR as its principal security
threat, and the resulting emphasis Beijing placed on
strengthening relations with Tokyo and Washington, yielded
substantial benefits for the Japanese. In addition to expanded
business opportunities in China, Japan's left-wing opposition was
undercut on security issues by China's endorsement of both the
US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and a moderate strengthening of
This memorandum, requested by State Department officials for use
in preparation for visit by Prime Minister Nakasone, was prepared
by Japan Branch, Northeast Asia Division, Office of 25X1
East Asian Analysis. Information available as of 12 January 1983
was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Japan Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, OEA,
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Recent events, however, have forced Tokyo to initiate a
reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationship and the
implications for Japan.
Two weeks before Nakasone took power, a new leadership
was, installed in Moscow, opening up the possibility that
the Soviets might reappraise their policy toward Japan.
Ten days before Nakasone's election, the foreign
ministers of China and the USSR held the highest level-
official meeting in 13 years.
The new prime minister, moreover, took office at a time
when US-Japanese relations had entered a period of
unprecedented tension over trade and defense issues.
These developments seem to have iegi,stered strongly=with
Nakasone, who appears eager to respond quickly, forcefully, and
creatively. His first foreign policy initiative was to request
an invitation to Washington. While we believe that his primary
motivation was to get bilateral relations back on track, he made
it clear that relations with the two big Communist powers also
figured prominently in his thinking. In an interview with an
American journalist published in mid-December, Nakasone said:
I want to establish a firm and very strong
bond.between (Japan and the United States).
On the basis of this strong tie, we can
develop our policies vis-a-vis the Communist
bloc nations.... Without a strong US-Japan
relationship, we cannot afford to have any
effective Soviet poliey...or any productive China
policy.
While preparing for his visit to the United States, Nakasone
was also initiating contacts with the Soviet Union and China.
Within 12 days of his inauguration, he:
-- Met with Chinese Ambassador Song and telephoned Chinese
Premier Zhao.
Consulted with his ambassadors to Moscow and Beijing.
Agreed to meet with Soviet Ambassador Pavlov, breaking
the precedent set by former Prime Minister Suzuki, who
Tokyo also invited Soviet Minister of Fisheries Kamentsev to
visit.Japan in February for consultations with his Japanese
had kept the Soviet Ambassador at arm's length.
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counterpart. Kamentsev will be the first Soviet cabinet minister
to visit in an official capacity since the invasion of
Afghanistan. In addition, the Prime Minister allowed Nagano,
president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, head of
the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee, and a long-time promoter of
Soviet-Japanese trade, to proceed with plans for a high-level
Japanese business delegation to visit the Soviet Union. The 150-
member mission will be the first of its kind since September
1979. Although Foreign Ministry officials have told the US
Embassy that the Kamentsev and Nagano visits were being planned
well before Nakasone became Prime Minister and have stressed that
this did not represent any softening of Tokyo's.stance toward
Moscow, we believe Nakasone welcomed them as opportunities to
improve communications with the new Soviet leadership.
Possible Policy Response
Soviet-Japanese Relations: DespFt,e these moves, we-believe
Japan will wait for an initiative from Moscow before eonsiderin
any policy than
We believe that, while standing firm on
the principal outstanding problems between the two countries,
Nakasone is sensitive to the opportunity that a,change in Soviet
leaders represents for Japan. There is no indication, however,
that either Nakasone or-anyone else in a position of responsi-
bility is optimistic that the Soviets will make any basic changes
in their policy toward Japan.
In security matters, we believe Nakasone will not permit
Soviet propaganda pressure to divert him from his effort to
tighten the alliance with the United States and strengthen
Japan's defense posture. Given his well established reputation
as an anti-Communist and a hawk, however, Nakasone will probably
find it politically advantageous to avoid highlighting his view
of the USSR as Japan's only serious potential enemy and instead
project an image of flexibility and statesmanship. "In my view,"
he said recently on national television, "(there is) nothing more
unfortunate and dangerous than not having an opportunity to talk
with one's toughest opponent."
Nakasone's approval of the Nagano mission suggests that he
believes it prudent to respond to business pressures to relax
restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. In 1981, bilateral
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trade amounted to $5.3 billion, only 1.8 percent of total
Japanese foreign trade. Nevertheless, for some Japanese
manufacturers of steel and machinery, the Soviet market is
important, and the Prime Minister will probably try to
Sino-Japanese Relations: Nakasone has taken every
opportunity to stress his adherence to Tokyo's long-standing
policy of promoting friendly relations with the People's
Republic. The Chinese in turn have publicly said. that they are
committed to maintaining good relations with his government.) 125X1
Beijing, nonetheless, has adopted a more demanding attitude
toward Japan over the past six months. For example, the Chinese
used the textbook affair last summer and fall to play up .the
potential dangers of right-wing militarism in Japan. With that
specific controversy resolved, Beijing now says little about the
dangers of militarism, and it continues to support a moderate
Japanese defense buildup. In our view, however, Beijing is still
holding to a neutral position on the US-Japan Security Treaty in
contrast to its earlier strong support. Possibly because they
are worried about what this shift in policy portends and possibly
because they are afraid of provoking an overreaction in their own
government, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials in Beijing and
Tokyo emphasize to US officials that nothing has changed.
remain high, and Tokyo will be monitoring developments closely.
The Foreign Ministry probably anticipates that both China and the
Soviet Union will attempt to use any improvement in their
relations to gain leverage in their relations with Japan and the
The Foreign Ministry is stressing to US officials that Japan
and the United States should not be too worried about improved
relations between the Soviet Union and China, which they see as a
self-limiting. process that will stop well short of threatening
the West. The Ministry sees Beijing assuming a more independent,
nationalistic stance and attempting to stake out a position
equidistant from the United States and the Soviet Union.
Japanese officials also believe, however, that the Soviet Union
remains China's chief security concern and that Japan and the
United States remain China's key foreign sources of support for
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According to one of the Foreign Ministry's senior Soviet
experts, the Ministry believes that the Soviet Union under
Andropov will attempt to improve relations with China by
negotiating force reductions along their common border and--
possibly--by pulling troops out of Afghanistan. But it also
believes that Moscow would have to terminate all aid to Vietnam
to achieve a significant rapprochement with China and that Moscow
is not likely to take this step. 25X1
Implications for the United States
Nakasone will arrive in Washington mindful that relations
among the major powers engaged in East Asia are undergoing
adjustments. We believe that these changes, combined with the
advent of the Andropov regime, are perceived by the Prime
Minister as sufficiently worrisome to demand immediate at.tention
on his part. Nakasone's public statements suggest that, in his
meetings with US officials, he will want as clear a picture as
possible of how the United States plans to respond to improving
Sino-Soviet relations. He will want to ensure that the US and
Japanese governments are prepared to move in tandem on East-West
issues and that he will not be.surprised by US initiatives. For
example, Foreign Minister Abe has expressed concern that an arms
limitation agreement with Moscow might shift Soviet SS-20s from
the European to the Asian theater.
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SUBJECT: Managing Relations with China and the Soviet Union
1 -
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1 -
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Richard Armitage, Department of Defense
Francis West, Department of Defense
Cdr. James Auer, Department of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, Department of State
- Albert C. Seligman, Department of State
Larry Farrar, Department of State
George Shultz, Department of State
Gaston Sigur, National Security Council
DDI
OEA/NA/Japan Branch
OEA/NA
D/OEA
C/Production/OEA
C/NIC
NIO/EA
Executive Director
C/PES
OCR/ISG.
CPAS/ 11MIC/CB
DDI/OEA/NA/Japan/
(12 January 83)
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