THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SATELLITE STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R003200680003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 10, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP82-00457R003200680003-6
i COUNTRY.,,;
TOPIC_
EVALUATION
DATE OBTAINED
REFERENCES
PAGES Z ENCLOSURES (No. & rYPE),
.REMARKS.
'T`he sharp battle in progress in Czechoslovakia between the
Roman-Catholic Church under Cardinal BERAN and Slovak pea-
sants against the anti-religious policy of the Czech Govern-
ment again tends-to focus attention on the conditions prey:
vailing in the so-called "Satellite States" of the Soviet
Union.
CLA$SIFICKfION. .'
803d et TTM n12 mn d ",At Al I i P St of _9__ ...RV PORT
The Soviet Union and 3atell!It,ft St ea
The fight against the church in Czechoslovakia proves that
the slim conces icns made to the ,"extern Powers by the
Soviet Government during the Parris Conference does not
prevent 1.70SCOI'" ' from further fortifying and improving its.
position in Eastern Europe and from applying methac?.s which
are bound to be sharply condemned by the W"est. Indeed,-
the prediction seems to be confirried that the Soviet.
Government yielded in the BERLIN question for the sole
purpose of easing political pressure and eliminating the
danger of war at the present moment and to obtain a
breathing period which would permit them to turn to
re urgent objectives. One of these objectives is
xurdouhtecLL,y the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern
E$aurope and the Far East..
To clarify understanding of the consistancy of Soviet
Union operations in E ztern Europe, the most important steps
in their policy of consolidation of power may again 'be
summarized, M OSCOr'' was at first interested only in occu-
pying strategic positions, seizing control of the armies
:end police while it left bourgeois figure-heads in much
the same positions as the Rumanian monarchy, "thioh was not
removed until December 1947. T'Ith the army and police brought
under control. M4OSC007 would then liquidate the most dangerous
opposition p::-,. -ties ? In agrarian countries the peasant parties
were usually the first to be removed. This may be illustrated
by the execution of PETKOFF, leader of the Bulgarian peasants,
and the condemnation of M':"._ATIU, aged leader of. the 'Rumanian
peasants. Steps against the bourgeois parties foilcx?ed. They
were persecuted and their leaders arrested or forced to go
abroad. In this manner these parties slowly lost their
influence,
/1! A11h~i~/A AT~ASE
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Date: .11$-MM 197
. T 7(_ -- v ~Im ~ .e. ~r a.d'.aa..si.0 MAIM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP82-00457R003200680003-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP82-00457R003200680003-6
M ~ ROL - U. S. OFF IC 14S OIILY
ttl'~~
50X1-HUM
Mergers served to bring the Socialist parties under
2OSCO'' s control. Those parties Were combined with
the us.-Illy mall membe
hi
rs
ps of the Communist carties
into one "workers* party". After some months the
mergers ="rould then be followed by "purge&' which
eliminated the most vigorous opposition in tbeformer
Socialist
~narties
,
Hand in hand -a th the o~ter
i
t
m
n
ion of the opposition
went the indoctrination of Bolshevist principles in
economy and administration. IIhe most important means of
,production, coar'.oreial enterprises, the transportation
system, barks and large estates were nationalized and
the collectivization of agriculture was started. The
pace set in the different countries varied according
to the degree of resistance to be overcome.. '"ith all
opposition groups eliminated, only the religious
bodies and those Communist elements which mould not
condone complete subjugation of. their countries to
I:O'300'"' could still to be considered dangerous by the
Kremlin. MMOSCO'"'s first fight against the. church led
to the dissolution of the Greek-Catholic Church in
Rumania, to arrests to prominent Protestant clergy-.en
in Bulgaria and to the sub j ugati can of the Lutheran and
Methodist Church in I'u.ngary. The '"ussian-Orthodox
Church in all countries concerned .'as brougpit under
close control of the state on the r.`OSCO" pattern.
"?hale these victories were easily obtained, the fight
against the ::tomanCatholic Church proved more diffi-
cult, this church being backed b;~ the Vatican. Cardinal
MINDSZEI. Y was 'sentenced to life imprisonment in
. ary. The fight continues in Czechoslovakia and
there are signs of impending strong action against the
Roman-Catholic Church in Poland.
6? MM"O8CO'"'s advance against the so-called "nations1 opposition"
within the Communist parties resulted in a serious defeat
in Yugoslavia but successes in the other satellite States,
"'lien rient too far in its policy towards Yugoslavia
TITO shook off the Kremlin's tutelar e and ,., '
ent hi s own
way... I?oviover GO1;MU A, the paverful -arty secretary in
Poland, and RAJK, once r sinister of the interior and then
f''orei0i ,:mister of '.:iangary, both fell victim to T101CO1?T's
policy. In 'Free Greece", General T iU XO.S was superseded
by a Communist who did-,not oppose the establishment of an
"independent" (TOSCO?"~aontrolled) ecedonia4 In Ailbiania,
DZO DZ , the party secretary ~-?ho had been the most. pa.,r erful
man next to the prime xii.nister, died because he had sided
with TITO. In Bulgaria 9 FOSTOFF, party secretary and the
man next to. OIT'bROFF, *,,ns removed from office, arrested
and ?;ill soon be tried, its to DI11.7ITROF:F, his death was
very opportune for I10'7CO17, Recent press attacks against
him had already indicated that his star was fading
: `O SCOY"' s distrust of him began in late 1947 t=hen he came
out t"'ith plans for confederation of the Balkan Countries.
These suspicions became still more acute when he failed
to sign the Cominform Protocol of 28 June 1945 against
TITO o
COI`TROL U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP82-00457R003200680003-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP82-00457R003200680003-6
/COITTROL U. S ? OFFICIALS ONLY
ET!LL--
uAu!" apparently aims for the government of the '3atellite
Mates by quislings in -hom there is no threat of political
. .
4._r~.;~::.,11~:z in d tcs not ~ seen ~J1.'C1c7zablc', that this flf;ht i:;'a.L?ist
both in r'a tarty opposition and the church should yet be
ended. The gravity of this opposition and the still treater
task of dominating Yugoslra ia. again makes it appear under-.
tandable that I"OSCG may - ish for a breathing spell in.
Central f'urope,
" 0:`)C O"'Is nr eserrt situation in relation to the 'satellite
Co a.,ntri es nay be briefly rendered in the follof?in, ,
a 'u-.o s lavi a
(1) TITO has stood up to the Lremlin for Wore than a year.
Elie UJGSR carries on this fight chiefly ??'ith economic
?7eapons, dbani a ,w uman.ia., Bulgaria, Funpary, Czechoslovakia
and iecently ;.'oland stopped trading -ith 'ug,oslavia on orders
from L OSCO"". .s a result TITO must lean more and more to the
"-Western Pot=ers and seek to obtain their economic aid. K e is
no" necotiating A?ith Italy and Great Tritain for the con-
elusion of long-term contracts and he is o},plyinp to bankir
institutions in the tnited 'tates for loans,, : ccordinr', to
ne."s nap er : enort s ,, the v,$A intends to link the granting of
a large credit - :,`:200,000,000 -as said to be under dis
cussion but the figures mentioned fluctuate .n 'iith the fol-
log??ing political der-rands.
Yugoslavia must stop supporting the Crock rebels;
('b) Yugoslavia must recognize the decision of the PARIS
Conference regarding. . ustria'a borders;
(c) hCoslavia must accede to the return of the T'ree
Territory of T''tIE TE to Italy.
(2) In his speech in POLL on 10 July 1949 Marshal, TTTO
co rented on these questions as follws?.
(u i Yugoslavia ' s Greek borders "'Jill be seal. ed, ?ITO
reasoned that this measure is necessary because Greek
Government troops violated the border. Ye also referred
to the fact t bat Greek Communists sided -ith the Cominform
in its flei1t against -ut-?oslavia