HAITI: THE ROUGH ROAD AHEAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000100130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence 25X1
Haiti:
The Rough Road Ahead
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ALA 86-10013
March l 986
344
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Haiti:
The Rough Road Ahead
the Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and
Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA
Secret
ALA 86-10013
March l 986
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Haiti: The Rough Road Ahead
Key Judgments Haiti's interim government faces formidable challenges as it tries to direct
In/ormation avai(ab/e a peaceful transition to democracy. Although the new leadership has taken
as of l4 March 1986 preliminary steps to end sporadic looting and mob violence and to
was used in this report.
consolidate its power, the government's ability to maintain order will be
threatened until several critical issues are resolved. Dissatisfaction inside
and outside the government with the pace and scope of political and
economic reforms is growing and, if present trends continue, is likely to
lead within the next few months to another breakdown in public order and
calls for a wider US role.
President Henri Namphy dominates the government on the strength of
military backing and personality, according to Embassy
sources. The ruling council is far from unified, however, and divisions
based on personal and ideological differences are hampering its ability to
function effectively. Many of these differences are symptomatic of deeply
rooted conflict among key components of Haitian society, including the
military authorities, civilian leadership, old-guard Duvalierists, and
reform-minded clergy. Apparent personal discord between Namphy and
council adviser Prosper Avril-who also commands considerable military
support-threatens the government's stability as do conflicts between still
loosely allied civilian and military elements.
The council's footdragging on two pressing issues-Duvalier holdovers in
the government and an election timetable-is eroding its initial popularity.
US Embassy and press reports indicate that Namphy initially was able to
take advantage of the popular mandate for an end to the Duvalier regime
to bolster the council's support, abolish the hated militia, end press
censorship, free political prisoners, and appoint abroad-based cabinet.
Nevertheless, there is festering discontent over the assignment of several
old-guard Duvalierists to cabinet posts, the continuing high profile of some
exmilitia leaders, and the lack of rapid progress toward elections.
We believe that Namphy, while well intentioned, will have to demonstrate
greater responsiveness and compromise than he has shown so far to quell
street demonstrations. According to US Embassy officials, however,
Namphy's military background may incline him to equate responsiveness
iii Secret
ALA 86-10013
March 1986
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with weakness. If the President is widely perceived as stonewalling on
major issues, we believe he will face serious trouble within the next few
months.
Even if the government manages to limit further unrest, in our view it will
be hard pressed to manage the conflicting demands of various key interest
groups while working to install democracy in a country that has long
lacked meaningful experience in participatory party politics. The US
Embassy reports the influential Catholic Church will press for a sweeping
redistribution of income and other reforms that would put the Church at
loggerheads with private-sector elements and old-guard Duvalierists.
Moreover, some Church figures will probably support political party
leaders as both groups push to speed the transition to democracy, setting
the Church against old-guard elements in the government and business
elites, which will try to retain their traditional power.
An economic morass compounds political difficulties. Pervasive dissatisfac-
tion with grinding poverty cannot be alleviated without massive foreign aid.
We estimate that $125 million in new funds would be needed this year-in
addition to the $150 million already committed by various donors before
Duvalier's fall-to stop the slide in economic activity that has occurred in
recent years and to boost real GDP the 3 percent needed to reach the peak
1980 level.
Even rapid and generous foreign aid would do no more than temporarily
prop up living standards until business confidence is restored and invest-
ment increases. To achieve these ends, we believe the government must
appoint a more competent economic team capable of coping with strong
public pressure for job creation and food relief, while at the same time lim-
iting government spending in order to attract IMF support.
Haiti's unstable situation is likely to deteriorate further if exile groups and
their foreign supporters continue to intensify their activity. In light of
mounting exile pressure for legal reentry, the government must weigh the
probable negative reactions of potential aid donors to any barriers to such
reentry against the potential security threat posed by some leftist groups
that might return. Various exile groups already have become more active.
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The highly publicized US role in Duvalier's departure has raised Haitian
expectations that Washington will provide guidance and generous econom-
ic and military aid. In the event of another breakdown in public order for
whatever reason, Haitians would be even more prone to look to Washington
for help. Even if Haiti's economic performance exceeds our expectations,
the influx of illegal migrants to the United States is unlikely to slow.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments iii
Introduction 1
The New Government 1
Establishing Order and Support 3
Popular Reaction 4
Pressing Economic Requirements 4
Aid Needs 4
Potential Donors 8
Political Challenges Ahead 9
Lingering Economic Problems
16
Implications for the United States
16
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Haiti:
The Rough Road Ahead
Introduction
Most Haitians exulted at the overthrow in early
February of the repressive regime of President-for-
Life Jean-Claude Duvalier, who-along with his
father, Francois Duvalier-had ruled Haiti for 29
years. The new military-dominated government under
President Henri Namphy received generally good
marks at home and abroad for its early efforts to
restore public order, dismantle the Duvalier regime's
political apparatus, and protect human rights. The
influential Catholic Church, in the forefront of anti-
Duvalier activity in the past year, also pledged sup-
port for the new government.
The New Government
We believe that the makeup of Haiti's provisional
government reflects the roles of crucial interest groups
in promoting Duvalier's downfall:
? The military, which grew increasingly influential as
Duvalier's personal power weakened, is clearly dom-
inant. The five-man National Council of Govern-
ment, the ultimate decisionmaking authority, is top
heavy with three Army officers, headed by former
Army Chief of Staff and now President, Gen. Henri
Namphy. Another officer, Col. Prosper Avril, holds
the informal but, nonetheless, influential post of
council "adviser."
Still, the interim government's diverse composition,
old-guard Duvalierist cast, and inexperience in politi-
cal and economic decision making already have raised
doubts about its ability to satisfy the political and
economic expectations of a beleaguered populace.
Several leaders of Haiti's fledgling political parties,
for example, publicly have urged an earlier timetable
for national elections than the 18-month minimum
period that Namphy foresees. Public anger against
Duvalierist holdovers in the new overnment has not
abated.
This paper examines the makeup and mandate of the
new government as well as the local reaction to the
priorities it has established. It analyzes the formidable
economic hurdles and conflicting domestic political
pressures confronting the untested coalition. The pa-
per also assesses the outlook for alleviating Haiti's
desperate economic conditions and building a demo-
cratic political framework in the next few years,
considers the potential for greater Cuban and other
outside interference, and discusses the implications
for US interests.
? Old-guard civilian Duvalierists, who were dissatis-
fied with Duvalier but willing to let the military
take the lead against him, have one slot on the
council with Minister Alix Cineas, who represents
continuity but also carries the liability of being a
Duvalierist holdover.
? The fifth position went to leading human rights
activist, Gerard Gourgue, who is the likely propo-
nent of liberal views and unofficial representative of
civil and political organizations.
? Neither the country's political parties, which kept a
low profile during the recent unrest, nor the Church,
which played a key role in events leading to Duva-
lier's ouster, are represented.
The authoritarian structure of the interim govern-
ment, in our view, will enhance the influence of the
military/old-guard axis. The council rules by decree,
and the vast majority of local officials-handpicked
by Duvalier-are still in place and now look to
Namphy for guidance. The military, although out-
numbered in the 13-member cabinet, also controls the
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Gen. Henri Namphy, President
Rose steadily in military under both Duvaliers ...Army Chief' of Stc~f a since
1984 ... political novice
Spanish, but only limited English.
opportunistic.
Col. William Regala, Minister oJ'Interior
In charge of building new internal security force ... favorite oJ' elder Duvalier .. .
Col. Max Valles
Minister oJIr~1ormation ...Commander of Presidential Guard a... trusted by
and loyal to Duvalier ...relatively honest ... an intellectual.
important Interior Ministry, and US Embassy offi-
cials speculate that the previous experience of two-
time cabinet member Cineas has given him added
weight in a cabinet composed of political unknowns.
So far, Namphy's popularity and respect have given
him enough leverage to control the council. Namphy,
despite being a mulatto, consistently stayed in the
good graces of both Duvaliers, even when the regime
strongly espoused black nationalism. He reportedly
has retained personal popularity with, and the trust
of, most Haitians while being widely respected in
military circles. The task of building a new political
system has given the council a sense of purpose, but
US Embassy reporting indicates
that personal and ideological differences among coun-
cil members are undermining unit ,and Namphy
may yet encounter roblems.
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telligent
Col. Prosper Avril, "Counselor" to Council
Inspector General of Presidential Guard a... former close adviser to Duvalier
...has taken high projrle in efforts to restore order ...regarded as honest and in-
Alix Cineas, Minister Without Portfolio
Staunch old-guard Duvalierist, ultranationalist ... 25X6
for new constitution and political parties' law.
Gerard Gourgue, Minister of Justice
President and founding member of Haitian League of Human Rights ... advo-
cates democracy ... US Embassy assesses him as attractive and honest leader but
one whose mettle as a politician is untested ...charged with laying groundwork
been replaced as Inspector General of the Armed Forces
enough on his proposals and that William Regala, in
particular, is a hardliner opposed to political change.
We judge that Avril's inclusion on t e counct resu t-
ed in part from Namphy's effort to avoid a potential
coup by him. The divisions extend to the civilian
sphere as Gourgue apparently has not found many
allies for his pervasive social and political reforms
among the conservatives comprising the remainder of
the council. He already has complained to US Embas-
sy officials that the military members do not act fast
Minister ojPublic Works, Transportation, and Communica- 25X6
Establishing Order and Support
Although sporadic disturbances continue in some
areas, the council has met its immediate objective of
quieting the rioting that arose partly in reaction to
Duvalier's violent tactics during his last days in office.
Although at least 150
people were killed in the aftermath of Duvalier's fall,
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US officials indicate that the country is returning to
normal. Many businesses and all government offices
have reopened, and the looting and destruction of
property owned by the Duvalier family and its allies
in Port-au-Prince have subsided. With minor excep-
tions, schools shut in early January have resumed
classes. To head off potential trouble from exiles,
particularly leftists, the council has announced that it
is screening those trying to return and that any
classified as "undesirable" will be denied entry. In
addition, the government has asked for US and
French help in monitoring exile activity.
To help consolidate control and meet its longer range
objective of returning power to a popularly elected
government, the council is dismantling the last ves-
tiges of the Duvalier regime. The rubberstamp nation-
al legislature has been dissolved, and the brutal
militia, the Volunteers for National Security, dis-
banded. By disarming the estimated 11,000-man mili-
tia, which US Embassy and press reports indicate
many Haitians hold responsible for much of the
violence that marked Duvalier's rule, Namphy also
has eliminated a potentially powerful challenger. Al-
though poorly trained and disciplined, the militia was
well equipped. The President also has eased restric-
tions on the media, released political prisoners, and
made a symbolically important change in the Haitian
flag by restoring the pre-Duvalier blue and red
standard.
The new 13-member cabinet represented a considered
effort to broaden domestic support for the interim
government and enhance its international reputation.
According to US Embassy reports, it was chosen
partly for regional balance. With a few exceptions,
most members generally are accepted by groups
critical of Duvalier-particularly the Catholic
Church. The cabinet is subordinate to the council,
according to US Embassy officials, and so far has
shown little evidence of playing a key decisionmaking
Popular Reaction
Despite the council's quick moves on several fronts,
Namphy remains reluctant to agree to hold national
elections any time soon. According to US Embassy
officials, Namphy believes that, because the transition
to democracy must be preceded by a long educational
process, such elections cannot be held for at least 18
months. Toward this end, he has announced that
municipal and legislative elections will occur before
presidential elections. Voter registration lists-last
used for municipal and legislative elections in the
early 1980s-are outdated and incomplete, according
to the US Embassy. We believe that Namphy, recog-
nizing this deficiency and the government's inexperi-
ence in conducting legitimate elections, is likely to
contend that electoral preparations could take until
mid-1987 or so to complete.
Leaders of political parties have quickly focused on
what they perceive as needless delay on the election
issue and are calling for presidential elections within a
year. Leading politicians such as Gregoire Eugene
and Hubert de Ronceray already have announced
plans to run for president. A march ; y 20,000 youths
in the capital in mid-February demanding early elec-
tions, in our view, has added impetus to their pressure.
In addition, some politicians-particularly Sylvio
Claude, head of the minuscule Haitian Christian
Democratic Party-are calling for the council to
immediately turn over power to a new, more represen-
tative government.
The government's other chief near-term worries are
the strong general objections to the presence of some
half dozen former Duvalierists, including Cineas and
Avril, in top-ranking national government posts and
the lingering political influence of former militiamen
in and around the capital. Members of an increasingly
well-organized, moderate-leftist group in Gonaives
have called for a boycott of schools until Duvalierists
are fired from the government,
In addition, Gourgue told US Embassy
officials that public hostility toward the continued
presence of former militiamen in prominent local
government posts hampers the restoration of calm.
Pressing Economic Requirements
Aid Needs. Necessarily preoccupied with formation of
the government and initial political steps, the govern-
ment has had little chance to deal with more formida-
ble challenges in the economic arena. US Embassy
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Haiti: Military Attitudes and Capabilities
The military has played a dominant role in Haiti
since independence. From 1804 to 191 S, most Haitian
heads oj'state were military leaders. After the US
occupation (191 S-34J, the military seized political
power on several occasions during periods of instabil-
ity but then handed control back to a new civilian
leadership. After becoming President in 1957, Fran-
cois Duvalier created a special militia-the Ton Tons
Macoutes-as a counterweight to the military. Nev-
ertheless, most Haitians continued to perceive oj'the
Army as the organization responsible.for restoring
order in a deteriorating situation. We believe that
recent antigovernment protests convinced Namphy
and other military leaders that the chances ojCom-
munist influence in the ensuing power vacuum had
increased sufficiently to encourage them to accept the
demonstrators' calls for the Army to "assume its
responsibilities"by stepping in to restore order.
The military, traditionally a vehicle for black social
mobility, generally has resented the mulatto elite.
The 6,000-man Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'HJ is
made up oj'jour major ground units with special
.functions and regional units having the main junction
of a constabulary. Haiti also has a small Navy and
Air Corps.?
? Leopard Corps. Established in 1971 by Jean-
Claude Duvalier to provide the FAd'H with an elite
counterinsurgency force, this 371-man unit, none-
theless, is poorly trained and equipped. Its image
was tarnished in 1982, when it.failed to dislodge
eight would-be invaders on Tortuga Island, off
Haiti's north coast, and the Dessalines Battalion
was sent in to defeat the insurgents. Since then, the
Leopards'strength has dropped because Duvalier
made no effort to recruit replacements.
? Dessalines Battalion. Based in the Dessalines bar-
racks behind the National Palace in Port-au-
Prince, this 740-man unit, like the Leopard Corps,
is equipped only with light infantry weapons and
limited wheeled transport. Training is restricted to
the classroom, and units usually do not deploy for
tactical maneuvers, according to the Embassy.
? Presidential Guard. The primary mission oj'this
1,350-man unit is guarding the National Palace. It
controls most of the military's heavy armament:
.five light tanks, six half=track armored personnel
carriers, six armored cars, six artillery pieces, and
a number of antitank guns, mortars, and air defense
guns. Much of their equipment is inoperative, how-
ever, due to lack oj'proper maintenance, according
to US officials.
? Port-au-Prince Police Force. This unit is responsi-
ble jbr law enforcement in the capital. It also has a
small narcotics unit.
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? Regional Departments. The nine regional military 25X1
departments-the North, Northwest, Northeast,
Grande-Anse, Artibonite, Center, South, Southeast,
and West-comprise a total strength of about 2,500
men.
Equipment consists of only 11 small patrol
? Air Corps. The Air Corps consists oI' about 200
men. As in the case of the other services, spare
parts, equipment, and adequately trained personnel
are in short supply due to tight budgetary con-
straints. Last September, Haiti took delivery of
,four Italian jet~ghters costing $6 million.
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reporting indicates that the Treasury's hard currency
stocks are virtually depleted, threatening cutoffs in
vital imports over the next few months. Food and
petroleum supplies probably will be adequate until
mid-April, but prospects for the following months are
unclear. Dwindling supplies of imported raw materi-
als, intermediate goods, and spare parts reportedly are
reducing agricultural and industrial production. Un-
der these circumstances, living standards-already
the lowest in the hemisphere-will deteriorate further
unless foreign aid inflows quicken.
US Embassy) (reports indicate that
business confidence, already low in response to the
uncertain political climate, is dropping further as a
result of worker demands for higher wages. Employ-
ees in more than a dozen factories and government
offices, demanding increases in the current $3 per day
minimum wage and the removal of managers who had
ties to the former regime, have gone on strike since
Duvalier's overthrow. We believe that workers, flush
with victory in Duvalier's fall, may well hold to
unrealistically high demands for better living stan-
dards. Investment, which dropped in reaction to anti-
Duvalier protests, will dip further if the government
decrees substantial wa a hikes.
To raise living standards to the peak 1980 level, we
estimate that Haiti needs roughly $125 million in new
foreign aid this year-in addition to existing commit-
ments from official and private donors. To reverse the
nearly 3-percent drop in real GDP-9 percent in per
capita terms-that has occurred since 1980, we calcu-
late that Haiti would have to raise imports 20 percent
above last year's depressed level to about $400 mil-
lion.' Of this total, about $100 million would be
needed for food purchases-a category that we esti-
mate has fallen at least 20 percent in real terms since
1980. Although falling world oil prices will ease aid
' Because Haiti's economy is so small (1985 GDP was $1.8 billion
versus $11.2 billion for the Dominican Republic) and highly import
dependent (imports comprised 19 percent of 1985 GDP), marginal
increases in imports yield substantial economic growth. We calcu-
late that an increase in imports to $400 million this year would
match peak volume and boost real GDP to near-record levels.
Nevertheless, to the extent that these imports would be used for
consumption, rather than investment, economic rowthg would not
be sustainable without ongoing external support.
requirements somewhat, we calculate that Haiti still
would need roughly $70 million for petroleum prod-
ucts in 1986. The remaining $230 million would
finance imports of raw materials and intermediate
goods for agriculture and manufacturing, as well as
medical supplies, building materials, and small
amounts of finished consumer goods.
pressed to match the 1985 total of $130 million.
We believe that foreign exchange earnings in 1986
will fall far short of import needs, partly as a result of
the recent unrest. The trade deficit alone probably
would measure about $150 million at these import
levels. Despite rising world prices for coffee-Haiti's
main agricultural export-businessmen believe dis-
ruptions during the key harvest and export season of
October through January will limit Haitian earnings
to no more than $70 million this year. We judge that
other commodity exports, including cocoa and sugar,
at best will stagnate near last year's $47 million
earnings. Foreign sales of light manufactured goods
also are likely to be disappointing. On the basis of the
US Embassy's report of numerous cancellations of
existing commercial contracts and postponements of
planned projects, we believe that the expansion of this
sector, envisioned earlier by the IMF, will not occur
this year, and manufactured exports will be hard
In addition to the projected $150 million trade deficit,
we judge that scheduled external debt repayments,
other service payments abroad, and capital flight will
boost foreign funding needs to a total of about $275
million. Haiti is slated to pay $21 million in interest
and amortization this year on $670 million in out-
standing foreign debt. In addition, Port-au-Prince
faces $17 million in IMF repurchase obligations. The
Fund projects further net expenditures of $68 million
in the service sphere, including foreign profit repatria-
tion, expenses related to tourism, and shipping costs.
Earnings from tourism, already reeling from the
island's association with the AIDS disease, will suffer
further losses as a result of the popular disturbances
during the height of the winter tourist season and are
unlikely to top $20 million. On the basis of US
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Haiti: Snapshot of a Dismal Economy
Haiti's economy-desperate in the best of times-hit
particularly difficult straits in 1981. According to US
Embassy reporting, real GDP shrank nearly 3 per-
cent, largely because a hurricane destroyed one-third
of the coffee crop. The concurrent slump in coffee
earnings-coffee prices fe1160 percent between 1977
and 1981-unbridled public spending, and skyrocket-
ing oil prices drained Haiti's finances. This poor
economic performance caused Haiti's standard of
living-the lowest in the Western Hemisphere-to
deteriorate further. According to US Embassy report-
ing, the unemployment and underemployment rate-
which exceeded 70 percent-was eased only by large-
scale emigration. As many as 50,000 Haitians de-
parted annually in the early 1980s to neighboring
Caribbean countries and the United States, according
to an academic study.
the United States also strengthened Haiti's foreign
payments position.
These positive trends, nonetheless, masked serious
problems. Short-term borrowing abroad to support
unchecked government spending caused Haiti's debt-
service ratio to edge toward 15 percent by yearend
1984. The spurt inpublic-sector spending also caused
the inflation rate to more than double to IS percent.
Living standards also suffered from the~scal indisci-
pline. Even with limited government subsidies to
selected areas, food prices escalated I S to 25 percent
in the last ha(f 011984 alone. US Embassy reports
indicate unemployment failed to decline, despite cost-
ly make-work projects. Moreover,
per capita income stood at only $235,
25X1
25X1
25X1
~~x~i
Having exhausted other options, the Haitian Govern-
ment obtained a $65 million standby that ran from
August 1982 to September 1983. This action required
President Duvalier to take an unprecedented step in
sticking to a realistic-and more open-budget. Hai-
ti's efforts yielded a smallloreign payments surplus
by yearend 1983. Economic output also began to
recover in 1983, as official inflows-largely from the
United States, France, and West Germany-nearly
doubled in response to Haiti's adherence to IMF
stipulations. Although intractable problems kept ag-
ricultural production weak, Haiti's manufacturing
sector particularly its assembly industries-be-
came more active due to renewed funding. Investors
and lenders alike were attracted by Haiti's low
wages, industrious workforce, and weak labor
unions.
Haiti's strict compliance under the IMF program
facilitated conclusion of a $63 million program in
July 1983. In May 1984, the outbreak of civil
disturbances over food shortages in several cities and
the resultant increase in public spending on job and
food programs in effect terminated the 14-month
program. Despite the loss of IMF funding, increased
government spending and generous aid disbursements
from patient benefactors helped the economy to grow
2 percent in 1984. Such aid and increased exports to
9 percent below the /980 level in current dollars.
Despite periodic talks between the Fund and the
government, Haiti made no real progress toward an
IMF accord last year. In our judgment, the regime's
unwillingness to come to grips with excessive public
spending and Central Bank credits, in particular,
prevented a new agreement with the Fund.
The US Embassy speculates that
Duvalier also may have directed funds toJ